

CHAPTER FOUR

CASE STUDIES IN URBAN OPERATIONS

Only study of the past can give us a sense of reality and show us how the soldier will fight in the future.

Ardant du Picq

While history cannot guarantee valid answers to every military question, past events frequently illuminate present problems. Analyzing military history in the context of modern operational principles allows leaders and planners to apply the lessons learned from past conflicts to help solve the military problems of today. The complexity of joint operations, the increasing capabilities of today's forces, and the lethality and accuracy of modern weaponry complicate operational considerations—such as unity of effort, legitimacy, and restraint—that the JFC must contend with when planning a joint urban operation. By applying the experience and knowledge demonstrated in case histories, the JFC can better shape operational success.

This chapter will review selected US and foreign military experiences in urban operations conducted throughout the late-Cold War and post-Cold War periods. Because urban areas complicate military operations in ways that other environments do not, the JFC should devote special attention to the unique challenges that future JUO may present. The following case studies highlight many of these challenges, some of the innovative ways military forces have responded to them, and various lessons learned.

The case studies were selected for their particular relevance to future JUO and were researched using a rigorous methodology that focused on the key factors that influence JUO from an operational perspective. The case studies are by no means comprehensive operational histories; rather, each case study highlights a few of the major observations most applicable to future JUO. The seven case studies represent the broad spectrum of urban operations and highlight the specific challenges that a JFC may face when operating in an urban area:

- The Battle for Grozny is an example of a high-intensity urban battle and provides significant lessons on the inherent difficulties of isolating an enemy in a city and the challenges of maneuvering in, around, above, and/or below urban terrain.
- During the invasion of Panama City, US forces demonstrated the importance of HUMINT in urban battlefield preparation and the utility of SOF units as precision strike forces capable of penetrating densely populated urban areas.
- Operations in Port-au-Prince illustrated the importance of understanding the political, social, and geographic realities of the urban area and demonstrated how the threat of force can be used effectively to achieve diplomatic solutions during humanitarian crises.
- Operations in Mogadishu demonstrated the importance of understanding the political, historical, and cultural context for violence in an urban area before defining operational objectives and the value of recognizing the limitations of humanitarian intervention. Operations also demonstrated the need for synchronization of the command and control architecture in the rapidly changing urban fight.
- The British military's experience in the urban area of Belfast illustrates the ways in which a city can be divided by race, ethnicity, or religion and the complications that factionalism in an urban area can pose to a JFC.
- Operations in Sarajevo illuminated the successful application of air power to support a force defending an urban area.
- The NEO performed in Monrovia, Liberia in 1996 is an example of an operation that has become an increasingly frequent feature of the landscape of US military actions in the post-Cold War era.




Figure IV-1. Case Studies of Urban Operations

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Grozny, Chechnya 1991–1996

Timeline: The Battle for Grozny

- 6 September 1991
 - General Dzhokhar Dudayev dissolves the Supreme Soviet legislature in Grozny
- 27 October 1991
 - Dudayev elected President of Chechnya
- 8 November 1991
 - Following Dudayev's mini-coup against the Communist *nomenklatura* in the republic, Russian President Yeltsin declares a state of emergency and sends Interior Ministry (MVD) troops to "restore order" in Chechnya. The Chechen people block the airport; the troops pull out three days later
- January 1992
 - The Parliament of the Chechen Republic calls for the ousting of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic People's Deputies from Chechno-Ingushetia
- February 1992
 - Dudayev seizes a large cache of weapons from Russian military bases and arms depots in Grozny and forms an army of independent Chechens
- March 1992
 - The Parliament of the Chechen Republic passes a constitution confirming its independence from the Russian Federation
- April 1992
 - Dudayev decrees that all Russian military units stationed on the Republic's territory "must be transferred to the jurisdiction of the Chechen Republic"
- June 1992
 - Russian troops are hastily removed from Chechnya under pressure from the local population, leaving behind 80 percent of their heavy arms and 75 percent of their smaller arms
- December 1992–January 1993
 - Russia drafts a treaty ordering the separation of powers between Russia and Chechnya
 - The treaty is repudiated under pressure from Dudayev
- May–July 1993
 - Attempts at negotiations between Russia and Chechnya fail
 - Chechen armed forces dissolve the Parliament
 - All remaining opposition leaders are driven out of Chechnya, leaving no remaining groups in Chechnya with which Russia can negotiate a settlement
- 2 April 1994
 - Dudayev dissolves the newly -elected regional parliament, alienating most of the influential Chechen leaders
- 26 November 1994
 - Chechens loyal to Moscow attack Grozny; the tank assault fails
- 29 November 1994
 - The Russian Security Council decides to send federal troops to secure Chechnya's borders
- 11 December 1994
 - Yeltsin sends 40,000 troops into Chechnya, starting a military campaign to crush Dudayev's independence movement
- 31 December 1994
 - The Russian assault on Grozny begins the all-out war in Chechnya
- January 1995
 - Russian troops and armor move into central Grozny after intense artillery fire; rocket and tank bombardment reduces the capital to ruins
 - The Russian army meets fierce resistance from the Chechen populace
- February 1995
 - Chechen rebels abandon Grozny but fighting continues in surrounding villages
- 30 August 1996
 - A fragile peace accord is brokered, postponing a decision on the status of Chechen independence until 2002

Figure IV-2. Timeline: The Battle for Grozny




Figure IV-3. Map of Grozny, Chechnya

Russian operations in Grozny illustrate the importance of understanding the political, social, and geographic realities in the urban environment before initiating a campaign. The Russian Security Council drastically underestimated the Chechen rebels' resolve to gain independence, while overestimating the superiority of the Russian military. The supposition that control of the capital city of Grozny would end the rebellion, an inadequate command and control structure, and a failure to effectively utilize CMO led to a disastrous campaign.

Operational Background

In October 1991, Dzhokhar Dudayev was elected President of Chechnya. Dudayev declared Chechen independence on 1 November 1991 and soon began to develop a power base in the capital city of Grozny, the political core of the region. He ousted the Soviet Federated Socialist Republic People's Deputies from Chechnya and began attacking Russian military bases and arms depots in Grozny and seizing large weapons caches.

As Dudayev continued to promote nationalism and consolidate his power throughout Chechnya, Russia began to turn its attention to the breakaway republic. On 11 December 1994, Yeltsin ordered troops to start moving into Chechnya in an attempt to halt the secession of Chechnya by force. The Russian government assumed that subduing Chechnya would prove relatively easy, viewing Dudayev and his army as nothing more than a disorganized band of rebels. With Dudayev's defeat in Grozny, a pro-Russian government could be installed to re-establish Russian political authority in the republic.

Planning Considerations

Due to the hasty decision to subdue Grozny, planning for the operation began only two weeks prior to the assault. This resulted in:

- Confused command and control
- Deployed units untrained in urban combat
- Failure to consider external factors: the Russian Security Council initiated an attack at the worst possible time of year to fully utilize a primary weapon—aircraft; due to the winter conditions, the Russian Air Force was of only limited use
- Inadequate logistics
- The rapid deployment overwhelmed the already fragile logistics system so that it was incapable of supporting the deployed troops

Figure IV-4. Planning Considerations

On 31 December 1994, after only two weeks of planning, 40,000 Russian troops entered Grozny. The military plan called for a three-stage campaign. During the first stage, Russian forces would converge on Grozny from three directions: north, east, and west, leaving the south open for Dudayev to withdraw his forces into the mountains. Russian leadership anticipated that gaining control of the capital would be relatively easy. In the second stage, any remaining Chechen forces would be isolated in the mountains by Russian troops, a pro-Russian government would be re-installed to power in Grozny, and Russian control over the lowlands gradually re-established.

In the final stage, the Russians would eliminate the last pockets of Dudayev's resistance in the mountains. By this time, it was hoped that

the population of the highlands would shift their allegiance away from Dudayev in the face of political tranquility and economic stability visible in the country's newly liberated areas. The entire campaign was estimated to take three years, the third stage being the longest.

However, contrary to all expectations, Dudayev, far from deserting Grozny, reinforced his positions in the city, anticipating the imminent attack and

using the gap left by the Russian Army in the south as his main supply route. Rather than the light resistance that they had originally anticipated, Russian forces encountered determined opposition from highly motivated rebels. The three columns of armor and motorized Russian infantry found their advance slowed by crowds of unarmed villagers blocking the roads and by effective resistance from Chechen units. The Russian attack was halted, with many casualties inflicted.

The Urban Area

The political and social aspects of urban areas can affect JUO to a great degree. This was especially true in Grozny. During the Battle of Grozny, the Russian Federation failed to recognize the political and social realities that existed in Chechnya and therefore underestimated the commitment of Chechen rebels to repel the Russians.

Dudayev had fostered the notion of Chechen independence, transforming the region from a semi-autonomous Russian republic into a well-armed state with a committed military. An intense hatred of Russia and a deep-seated nationalism motivated the Chechen rebels to prevent the Russians from occupying the country. As a result, the invading Russian military encountered an organized, well-equipped army.

Moreover, Russian leadership overestimated the significance of the capital city in suppressing the nationalistic movement within Chechnya. The Russians believed that control of the city would symbolically reinforce their superiority

Fighting in the Urban Area

During the initial attack on Grozny, the Russian military followed old Soviet tactics which specified that tanks would lead the assault followed by infantry fighting vehicles and dismounted infantry. However, the number of infantry used in Grozny was not sufficient to support the operation, and tanks became the main targets for attack. Moreover, Russian tanks could not lower their gun tubes far enough to shoot into basements or high enough to reach the tops of buildings. This allowed the Chechens to systematically destroy the column from above or below with RPGs and grenades. As a result, 105 of 120 Russian tanks deployed to Chechnya were lost during the initial attack. Russian forces eventually overcame this difficulty by attaching mesh wire cages capable of repelling RPG-7 antitank grenade launchers, Molotov cocktails, and bundles of antitank grenades.

Figure IV-5. Fighting in the Urban Area

and thereby demoralize the rebels. The Russian assumption that control of Grozny would lead to automatic capitulation of the Chechen rebels presumed the importance of the city. While control of Grozny was important, due to the telecommunications and political organs that resided there, the Chechen rebels were committed to continue the fight for independence even without control of the capital. Once Russian forces took Grozny, Chechen rebels continued the fierce fighting in the countryside.

Three-dimensional Aspects of the Urban Area

In addition to understanding the political and social aspects of an opponent, a commander should also be aware of the local urban terrain. The Chechens had a distinct advantage in Grozny. Not only did they know the city's sewer, metro, and tram systems intimately, they also knew the city's back alleys, buildings, and streets. Conversely, inadequate maps and misinformation hampered Russian planning. They had 1:100,000 scale maps, when a scale of 1:25,000 would have proven more useful. Impromptu maps were often made by hand; however, the Chechens took down street signs and repositioned them to confound Russian navigators. Poor roads also limited ground transport, and military convoys were subject to ambush and delays by unarmed Chechen civilians blocking the road. Russian troops found rises and bends in roads turned into fortresses and bridges mined or closed off with reinforced concrete blocks.




Figure IV-6. The Chechen Strategy of Concentric Circles

Command and Control

Command and control is especially important in a JUO when coordination of forces is required to negotiate a multifaceted environment. Russian command and control was convoluted, resulting in poor synchronization of Russian forces during the battle. Russian units had no unity of command; command was scattered between the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of Defense, and the Federal Counterintelligence Service, the successor to the KGB. Commanders did not coordinate with Russian units on their flanks. In fact, they moved in almost autonomous columns along four main routes. The organization and sequencing of force caused many command and control problems for Russian troops. For example, General Anatoly Kvashin commanded the Main Assault Force which entered Grozny from the north. As Kvashin advanced, Chechen rebels focused most of their firepower on his force because, unknown to Kvashin, the Russian commanders from the east and west gave false reports about their whereabouts. It was not until the second day of the operation that Kvashin realized that he was fighting in the city without the help of Groups East and West.

On the other hand, Chechen mobility and innate knowledge of the city exponentially increased their ability to command and control their forces. The Chechens generally did not maintain strongholds, but remained mobile. Hit and run tactics made it very difficult for the Russian force to locate pockets of resistance and impossible to bring its overwhelming firepower to bear against the enemy force. Moreover, high-rise buildings and structures impeded Russian transmissions, especially those in the HF and VHF/UHF ranges, making it difficult to communicate unit locations. The Chechens overcame this problem by using cellular phones and commercial scanner systems, which allowed them to communicate easily with one another and ensured the coordination of their combat operations.

Force Multipliers

Activities, such as PSYOP, CA, and PA, are important force multipliers in any operation. In future JUO, maximizing civilian support and minimizing civilian hostility to friendly forces will be critical. In Grozny, both sides employed PSYOP techniques. The Russians employed leaflets, loudspeakers (to

relay an appeal to the population to lay down their weapons and not provoke the Russian force), and radio interference in Grozny. The Chechens, on the other hand, used human road-blocks, protests, threats ranging from the possession of nuclear weapons to the unleashing of Islamic fundamentalists, and international pressure from organizations such as the Congress of the Peoples of the Caucasus (who threatened to turn the whole region into a “raging inferno”). The Chechen intent was to damage the morale of Russian soldiers and mobilize Russian public opinion against the intervention. The Russian goal was to scare the Chechen rebels into submission.

The Battle for Grozny	
<p>Russian obstacles:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Inadequate preparation for the campaign in terms of training, intelligence, reconnaissance, as well as political and propaganda backup • Shortage of manpower in army units • Lack of motivation and poor morale among troops • Lack of current unit training, in general, or urban combat, in particular, of the Army and Air Force, due to inadequate funding (Many commanders complained that their units had no opportunity to conduct military exercises during the last three years. The Air Force pilots had an average of only twenty flying hours per year. The result: an ineffective use of artillery, armor, and air power.) • Poor quality of communications equipment and a consequent lack of vertical coordination between chains of command and horizontal coordination between units (Sometimes, different Russian units fought against each other for hours without being aware of the fact.) • Lack of coordination between the Army, the Air Force, and the Internal Troops; inability of many senior officers (up to the rank of general) to command and coordinate the actions of their subordinates 	<p>Chechen advantages:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Better intelligence than the Russian army (Dudayev knew about Russian troop movements, the names of Russian commanding officers, as well as their plans, in advance.) • A highly motivated, all volunteer force— whoever joined the Chechen Army did so of his own volition • Knowledge of Russian tactics, weapons, strengths, and deficiencies (Many officers and soldiers of Dudayev’s force, including Dudayev himself, served in the Soviet Armed Forces and used the same weapons, uniforms and equipment as the Russian army, which sometimes made it difficult to tell them apart from the Russian troops.) • Better communication (cell phones, local media, and civilians) • Tactics of street fighting more effective than those of their Russian counterparts (By using small, mobile units armed with light weapons, Dudayev achieved lower manpower losses and much greater maneuverability.)

Figure IV-7. The Battle for Grozny

Public affairs also can enhance the probability of achieving operational objectives during urban campaigns. PA in an urban environment allows an adversary to engage the active support of noncombatants. The Chechen conflict represents the first time that Russian and foreign correspondents monitored a

Russian intervention. However, the Russian military failed to anticipate the importance of PA in their planning. For example, during the battle, Russian commanders prohibited their troops from speaking with the news media, while the Chechen rebels freely expressed their perspectives to the international press. In fact, the Chechens used mobile TV stations to override Russian TV transmissions and deliver messages from President Dudayev directly to the people. As a result, the Chechens (and many local Russians who were originally supportive of Russian involvement in the region) increasingly viewed the Russian military as an enemy, having received only one perspective of the conflict through the news media. Had the Russian military jammed Chechen broadcasts and employed mobile PA systems, it is possible they could have bolstered the noncombatant support for their efforts that was present at the outset of the campaign.

Major Observations:

- A clear, concise, and well-planned campaign is necessary for success
- The political and social realities that exist in an urban environment need to be recognized
- Intelligence and knowledge of the local terrain is a necessity when operating in an urban environment
- The use of SOF, PSYOP, PA, and CA may be essential in an urban operation
- The command and control structure needs to be able to adapt to the urban environment where communication may be difficult

Panama City, Panama 1989

Timeline: Operation JUST CAUSE

- September 1987
 - Senate passes resolution urging Panama to reestablish a civilian government; Panama protests alleged US violations of the Canal Treaty
- November 1987
 - Senate resolution cuts military and economic aid to Panama; Panamanians adopt resolution restricting US military presence
- February 1988
 - Noriega indicted on drug-related charges; US forces begin planning contingency operations in Panama (OPLAN BLUE SPOON)
- 14 March 1988
 - First of four deployments of US forces begins providing additional security to US installations
 - Noriega creates Dignity Battalions (DIGBATs) to augment the Panamanian Defense Force (PDF)
- 16 March 1988
 - Select PDF officers attempt a coup against Noriega
- 9 April 1988
 - Joint Task Force Panama activated
- 7 May 1989
 - Civilian elections are held and the results are invalidated two days later by Noriega; DIGBATs assault opposition candidates and crowds during victory parades
- 11 May 1989
 - President Bush orders 1,900 additional combat troops to Panama (Operation NIMROD DANCER)
- June-September 1989
 - Contingency planning for military operations intensifies
 - US begins conducting joint training/freedom of movement exercises (SAND FLEAS and PURPLE STORMS)
- 3 October 1989
 - Noriega defeats second coup attempt; PDF demonstrates ability to quickly move units from Rio Hato and Ft. Cimarron
- 15 December 1989
 - Noriega proclaims himself supreme leader of Panama and declares a state of war with the US
- 16 December 1989
 - Marine lieutenant shot and killed by PDF; Navy lieutenant and wife detained and assaulted by PDF
- 17 December 1989
 - NCA directs execution of Operation JUST CAUSE
- 19 December 1989
 - US forces alerted, marshaled, and launched
- 20 December 1989
 - Task Force Atlantic secures Colon, Madden Dam, Gamboa, Renacer Prison, and Cerro Tigre
 - Task Force Bayonet secures Ft. Amador, Comandancia, and PDF sites throughout Panama City
 - Task Force Red secures Torrijos International Airport and Rio Hato
 - Task Force Pacific secures Panama Viejo, Tinijitas, Ft. Cimarron
 - Task Force Black secures communications nodes, Pacora River Bridge
 - Task Force Semper Fi secures Bridge of the Americas, Howard AFB
- 21 December 1989
 - Panama Canal reopened for daylight operations
 - Refugee situation becomes critical
 - Task Force Bayonet begins CMO in Panama City
- 25 December 1989
 - Rangers secure David, the last PDF stronghold
 - Operations in western Panama continue successfully
- 3 January 1990
 - Noriega surrenders to US forces
- 31 January 1990
 - Operation JUST CAUSE ends and PROMOTE LIBERTY begins

Figure IV-8. Timeline: Operation JUST CAUSE



Figure IV-9. Map of Panama City, Panama

The military invasion of Panama was one of the largest and most complex joint airborne and ground contingency operations in recent history. Using rapid, precise, and overwhelming combat power, the JFC established total control in and around Panama City, isolated the Panamanian Defense Force (PDF), and deposed Panamanian leader Manuel Noriega. The operation demonstrates how the JFC can leverage meticulous planning, streamline command and control, and effectively use SOF and aerospace forces in future JUO to isolate enemy aggression.

Operational Background

During 1988–1989, following two failed coups, rampant brutality, anti-US demonstrations, and increased political tensions, US relations with Panama began to deteriorate significantly. On 15 December 1989, the National Assembly of Corregimiento declared Panama to be in a state of war with the US. In response to this declaration, on 17 December 1989, the NCA directed the Joint Chiefs of Staff to execute Operation JUST CAUSE to protect American citizens, secure the Panama Canal, support democracy for the people of Panama, and apprehend the head of the PDF, Manuel Noriega.

Lieutenant General Stiner, Commander of the Joint Task Force (CJTTF), had identified the critical nodes for the operation beforehand, targeting PDF strongholds, including garrisons, airports, ports, transportation centers, and media locations. On 20 December 1989, five task forces simultaneously attacked twenty-seven major targets and gained operational control in and around Panama City. Every major PDF installation along the Panama City to Colón north-south axis and along the Fort Cimarron to Rio Hato east-west axis was either hit directly or PDF forces were blocked at these points from moving into Panama City. Task Force Bayonet, the major fighting force in Panama City, captured and neutralized La Comandancia—Noriega’s headquarters and the PDF’s largest weapons cache. With La Comandancia in US hands and reinforcement routes blocked, the possibility of organized resistance by the PDF collapsed. On 3 January 1990, Noriega surrendered to US forces.

After organized resistance in Panama ended, the transition from combat to stability operations required immediate assistance to the local population. Widespread looting and general lawlessness had reduced Panama City to a state of anarchy. No US civilian agencies were prepared to assume responsibility for post-combat nation-building programs, forcing combat units to establish law and order and provide food, water, healthcare, traffic control, and garbage collection to the local population. CA and PSYOP personnel were used to bolster support for the newly installed government of President Endara. By 31 January 1990, the situation had stabilized and the democratic process had begun to take hold. Operation JUST CAUSE ended, and US troops were withdrawn.

Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield

Standard intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) did not take into account such factors as civilian population, logistics sustainability, or critical resource and economic areas. These factors are crucial in environments where civilian responses, including massive flight, passive support for the enemy, or overt aggression, must be foreseen and contingency plans prepared.

Figure IV-10. Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield

Despite intensive planning and sound doctrine, US commanders were not able to anticipate some of the tactical challenges of ground maneuver during the urban battle. US forces encountered many unfamiliar obstacles unique to urban terrain.

Force Protection

Light armored vehicles (LAVs) protected soldiers moving through the built-up areas of Panama City. Also, the *Rough Rider* concept of protecting convoys by interspersing armed troops in LAVs among trucks of normal cargo allowed a discreet build-up of forces during Operation JUST CAUSE.

For example:

- In the battle for La Comandancia, the PDF built barricades blocking access to the compound using large commercial vehicles and garbage trucks and established firing positions from surrounding apartment buildings. As well, all structures in the compound were reinforced with concrete, limiting the impact of firepower from M-113s.

Figure IV-11. Force Protection • During the assault on Renacer Prison, where two American journalists were being held, soldiers had to maneuver through concertina wire, chain link fences, steel doors, and concrete walls.

Pressed for time and under heavy fire in both instances, the task forces' organic weapons were slow to breach these obstacles. In future JUO, the JFC should consider the influence of movement and the ramifications of insufficient or inappropriate firepower in the urban environment.

Specifically, Operation JUST CAUSE revealed the need for increased situational awareness to avoid fratricide during urban battles. During combat operations on, around, or above urban terrain, forces can be fragmented, visibility reduced, and communications limited by physical structures such as buildings, streets, and walls. As a result, in two cases during the operation, soldiers received friendly fire. A helicopter fired on an Army squad and killed two soldiers in a night operation at Rio Hato. Another instance of fratricide occurred during the battle for La Comandancia, when an AC-130 *Spectre* gunship wounded a number of soldiers while they were attacking one of their objectives in the PDF complex.

Operational Planning

Prior to the deployment of JTF South, the US spent two years planning the operation and three months fine tuning it. Numerous trips to Panama were taken to ensure that all targeting and logistical issues were addressed and resolved. Even before receiving command, the CJTF insisted that sufficient forces be massed and committed in the initial assault to overwhelm the PDF in every operational area. There were extensive rehearsals and nearly half of the operational forces were in place in Panama before 16 December.

Intelligence

Prior to Operation JUST CAUSE, military personnel with fluency in Spanish were sent on repeated tours with in-country Army and Marine units to gather intelligence on the PDF

- US forces received excellent information on the size and loyalty of the PDF
- Noriega was watched, listened to, and tracked

This type of HUMINT contributed greatly to the success of Operation JUST CAUSE

The contingency plan, code named PRAYER BOOK, was built on maximum surprise, with maximum combat forces using minimum force. This allowed for a concentration of combat power to overwhelm the opposing force and limit collateral damage. The plan was complex, involving both SOF and conventional forces that were carefully synchronized for maximum disruptive effect. Planning and operations were fully integrated across all four Services, while the sequencing of forces took full advantage of land, naval, air, and special operations capabilities.

Figure IV-12. Intelligence

Special Operations Forces

Special operations forces were involved in Panama throughout the entire campaign. SOF helped to prepare the battlefield and then reinforced the main effort once the airborne attack was over. SOF elements included Army Special Forces, Army Rangers, Army Special Operations Aviation, Naval Special Warfare, and Air Force Special Operations Forces. SOF participated in almost every action during Operation JUST CAUSE including infiltration, special

reconnaissance, precision strike, and underwater demolition. These small, highly skilled units conducted attacks, often supported by AC-130 *Spectre* gunships, and were able to penetrate densely populated operational areas successfully as quick reaction forces. Other uses of SOF included the attachment of PSYOP and CA personnel to various task force units to serve as advisors, translators, liaisons, and assist in refugee control. This proved highly effective and aided in reestablishing law and order, promoting stability, and assisting in the establishment of a new Panamanian government. In future JUO, the JFC should strongly consider the use of SOF capabilities as force multipliers when working in a multifaceted urban environment.

Aerospace Power in the Urban Environment

Operations in Panama highlight the importance of aerospace power in supporting JUO. Throughout Operation JUST CAUSE, aerospace forces played a critical role in protecting US citizens and defeating PDF elements. For example, AC-130 *Spectre* gunships conducted precision strike operations, airlift platforms performed strategic airdrop and airland operations, EC-130s jammed PDF radio and TV stations, and multi-service rotary-wing aviation provided maneuver for ground forces. These operations helped to neutralize PDF units in the urban area and interdicted key reinforcing units at numerous chokepoints throughout the city. In future JUO, the JFC should consider the full range of aerospace options to shape, control, and/or defeat an urban adversary that may contribute to the JFC's overall campaign plan.

Major Observations:

- Meticulous planning and extensive training help overcome many potential obstacles in JUO
- SOF capabilities are force multipliers before, during, and after an urban operation
- Streamlined command and control and identification of critical nodes allow the US to leverage all its capabilities

- Panama highlights the importance of aerospace power in conducting precision strike operations and supporting ground force operations during a JUO

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Port-au-Prince, Haiti 1994

Timeline: Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY

- December 1990
 - Jean-Bertrand Aristide is elected president
- September 1991
 - Aristide is deposed in a bloody coup and General Raoul Cedras takes control of Haiti
- 3 July 1993
 - Governor's Island Accord is signed, calling for the early retirement of General Cedras, the formation and training of a new civilian police force, and the return of President Aristide on 30 October 1993
- 30 October 1993
 - Cedras refuses to step down as president
- January 1994
 - Joint Task Force 180 established by President Clinton
- 31 July 1994
 - UN Security Council unanimously votes to approve the invasion of Haiti
 - MNF established, UNMIH redesignated
- August 1994
 - Preparations for military action move forward on parallel tracks of OPLANS 2375 and 2380; planning for the Haiti operation is interrupted by Cuban refugee crisis
- 7 September 1994
 - CJCS briefs President Clinton on what will eventually be named Operation RESTORE DEMOCRACY
- 12 September 1994
 - US Atlantic Command (USACOM) chairs interagency meeting to brief and plan the Haiti operation
- 13-14 September 1994
 - USS *Dwight D. Eisenhower* departs Norfolk with elements of 10th Mountain Division; USS *America* departs Norfolk carrying troops of XVIII Airborne Corps and SOF; fourteen reserve cargo carriers called up
- 15 September 1994
 - President Clinton says US has "exhausted every available alternative;" former President Jimmy Carter, Gen. (Ret.) Colin Powell, and former Senator Sam Nunn depart for Haiti on final diplomatic effort; C-130s already in the air
- 18 September 1994
 - Carter-Powell-Nunn initiative is successful, convincing General Cedras to cede power
- 19 September 1994
 - MNF transitions from forced entry operations plan (OPLAN 2375, Operation RESTORE DEMOCRACY) to a permissive entry operations plan (OPLAN 2380, Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY)
 - 21,000 US forces disembark at Port-au-Prince uncontested
- 20 September 1994
 - Haitian security forces beat pro-democracy demonstrators in Port-au-Prince
- 22 September 1994
 - A firefight between USMC and Haitian forces in Cap-Haitien leaves 10 Haitians dead
- 15 October 1994
 - President Aristide arrives in Haiti and the reduction in US forces begins immediately
- 31 March 1995:
 - US-led MNF formally turns command of the Haiti operation over to UNMIH

Figure IV-13. Timeline: Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY




Figure IV-14. Map of Port-au-Prince, Haiti

During Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY, US political leaders used the threat of a decisive, immediate invasion to negotiate terms for the reestablishment of peace and democracy in Haiti. Following this diplomatic compromise, US forces permissively entered the capital city of Haiti, Port-au-Prince, as part of a multinational peacekeeping force to ensure civil order so that a stable, democratic Haitian government could return to power. Throughout the operation, US forces dissuaded violent opposition in Haiti by encouraging restraint and cooperation among the Haitian people through extensive civil-military operations that fostered a relationship of trust and cooperation between US forces and Haitian civilians. The US experience in Haiti suggests that well-trained forces can conduct peacekeeping operations in urban areas with low costs and significant benefits.

Operational Background

In December 1990, Jean-Bertrand Aristide won the Haitian presidency in a fair and democratic election. Aristide took office in February 1991,

only to be overthrown by dissatisfied elements of the army led by Lieutenant General Raoul Cedras, Commander of the Haitian armed forces. Aristide was forced to leave the country in September of the same year.

In the three years that followed, over 3,000 Haitians were killed; and from 1991 to 1992, more than 40,000 refugees fled the country in a large-scale exodus. The political and human rights climate continued to deteriorate as the military and *de facto* government sanctioned repression, assassination, torture, and rape in open defiance of the international community's condemnation. The failure of diplomatic overtures and limited impact of economic sanctions throughout 1993 swayed the UN to adopt Resolution 940 authorizing member states to use all necessary means to facilitate the departure of Haiti's military leadership and restore constitutional rule and Aristide's presidency. Then-Secretary of Defense Perry tasked the US military with developing a plan to forcibly remove the Haitian military and establish a secure environment for democracy (Operation RESTORE DEMOCRACY), as well as an alternative plan of permissive entry into Haiti if diplomatic overtures proved effective (Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY).

By the end of 1993, Operation RESTORE DEMOCRACY seemed imminent. Between 8 January and 18 September 1994, major US communication exercises were conducted, planning continued, and under JTF direction, the Coast Guard, Navy, Air Force, and Marines participated in rehearsals that simulated the requirements for an invasion of Haiti. On 31 July 1994, after eight months of intensive training and preparation, the UN Security Council unanimously approved the invasion of Haiti.

The day before D-day, former President Jimmy Carter, former Senator Sam Nunn, and General (Ret.) Colin Powell traveled to Haiti in a final effort to resolve the situation diplomatically. The Carter mission ultimately was successful in negotiating the resignation and departure of Haiti's top military leaders. However, it still required the initiation of the deployment of first-echelon invasion units to Haiti to convince the Haitian military that US threats were credible and that force would be used if negotiations failed. On 18 September, the Haitian

military promised to cooperate with a multinational task force in establishing a stable political climate so that Aristide could be reinstated. With the signing of the Carter Accord, the OPLAN for the alternative Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY was initiated, and US forces entered Port-au-Prince without resistance. The US military's mission in Haiti had changed from a forced entry to a permissive entry operation focused primarily on nation-building and humanitarian assistance.

Upon arrival in Haiti, the US Army's 10th Mountain Division immediately secured the port, the civilian airport, key roads, and the US Embassy. US forces established civil order in Port-au-Prince and dedicated a special military police force to help curb street violence. Despite these efforts, on 30 September, a group of Aristide's opponents attacked demonstrators marching in Port-au-Prince. An estimated five Haitians were killed and scores were wounded. The day after the massacre, troops moved to arrest members of paramilitary militias—forcibly entering their headquarters and offices and removing all weapons, documents, and people found inside. Following this action by US forces, Emmanuel Constant, leader of the main opposition party, announced that he would accept President Aristide's return and called on militia members to lay down their arms.

The success of these raids reinforced the US policy of dealing aggressively with adversary governments to ensure the protection of unarmed Haitians. The US continued to confirm this policy by dismantling Haiti's main arsenal of heavy weapons, Camp d'Application, as well as other smaller weapon caches, as part of its weapons control and reduction program. Meanwhile, to help ensure the protection of noncombatants, the French, Canadian, and US governments instituted a program to develop a new police force. The project emphasized constitutional procedures, respect for human rights, and legitimate law enforcement practices. International monitors were placed in Haiti to ensure that the new police force maintained ties to the new civilian government and was dedicated to ensuring public order.

While President Aristide remained in exile, US forces had pacified the country and kept order. On 15 October 1994, President Aristide returned to Haiti

and resumed his political activities. In March 1995, an expanded United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH), numbering 6,000 troops, replaced the multinational force.

The Urban Area

The dictatorship of the Duvalier family and the continuing mismanagement and oppression of military rule had impoverished Haiti and largely destroyed the fragile civil society. In addition, the international economic embargo had taken its toll and Port-au-Prince was in a state of disrepair. When US forces finally arrived in Port-au-Prince, the great majority of Haiti's citizens welcomed the US military presence in the hope that it would restore civil order.

To help rebuild the country's infrastructure, US forces worked with Haitian contractors and laborers on reconstruction projects. Unfortunately, Haiti's infrastructure required significant improvements. The roads of Port-au-Prince were too narrow to carry heavy truck traffic and there were few functioning traffic lights. The electric supply was uncontrolled and power outages were frequent. Upon arrival, US Army engineers built roads, restored electricity and clean drinking water to the city, helped deliver food and medical supplies, initiated garbage collection, and reopened schools. By the end of Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY, US forces had worked with Haitian officials to improve public health, sanitation, education, welfare, public administration, justice, transportation, and communication systems. In future JUO, the JFC should keep in mind that providing basic services such as these to displaced or dispersed civilian populations may be an integral part of MOOTW in an urban area.

Civil-Military Operations

The large civilian population in Port-au-Prince and the complexities of the humanitarian mission required the US to interact constantly with other US governmental entities, such as USAID and the State and Justice Departments, along with a variety of NGOs that also supported nation-building in Haiti. To help resolve the cultural and operational differences between the military and

civilian organizations, the JTF created a formal political-military operations plan that included a CMOC. US forces also established a HACC as a part of the CMOC to serve as a clearinghouse for all humanitarian requests for assistance and to prevent NGOs from inundating the headquarters. CA and Army Special Forces personnel were instrumental in manning and facilitating these activities. In retrospect, the relative smoothness of the operation owes much to the intensity of civil-military cooperation that the CMOC helped to foster.

Intelligence Support to Joint Operations in Urban Areas

Intelligence is as critical in MOOTW in urban areas as it is in combat operations in urban areas. During Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY, the Joint Staff supported USACOM intelligence needs by setting up the Haiti Intelligence Joint Task Force. The JFC utilized all available resources, drawing on the experience of the Joint Staff J-2, the State Department, and other sources to gain a deeper understanding of the main personalities of the local leaders in Haiti. The Joint Deployable Intelligence Support System coordinated the flow of tactical intelligence to all levels of command.

Figure IV-15. Intelligence Support to Joint Operations in Urban Areas

In addition to the CMOC, Military Information Support Teams (MISTs) were established in June of 1994 to support US policy to restore Haiti's democratic government, counteract misinformation broadcasts by Haiti's *de facto* military regime, and disseminate messages from Aristide to the Haitians. The MISTs were typically five-person teams composed of a PSYOP officer; a noncommissioned officer; two PSYOP specialists with photography, videography, journalism, or editing skills; and a civilian analyst with linguistic and area specialist skills. The MISTs interacted with both US and host nation militaries and law enforcement agencies to develop appropriate PSYOP missions, information campaigns, and military intelligence support.

Psychological Operations

Even before Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY began, PSYOP provided vital support to the US mission in Haiti and was a valuable force multiplier. Aircraft flew missions into Haiti under the call sign of RADIO

DEMOCRACY to persuade listeners to refrain from violence so the country could restore political legitimacy and to dissuade Haitians from migrating to the US. The radio program also was used to discredit the ruling military junta and convey the US intent to remove the corrupt regime. Prior to the arrival of forces, US aircraft dropped millions of leaflets over Port-au-Prince encouraging the civilian population to increase pressure on the illegal regime to step down.

Immediately following Carter's diplomatic settlement, helicopters flew over the city broadcasting aerial messages announcing that US troops were coming in peace to help restore democracy. By reducing tensions and encouraging supportive behavior, information campaigns helped to promote restraint and enhance military security. Live PSYOP mobile loudspeaker messages promoted noninterference while posters and leaflets emphasized civil order. By advocating reconciliation rather than revenge, PSYOP helped curb violence and facilitated disarmament programs. Additionally, as part of the weapons reduction policy, a Weapons-for-Cash program used radio commercials, mobile and aerial loudspeaker messages, and posters and handbill distributions to convince Haitians to turn in weapons and explosives or information regarding the location of weapons caches.

Major Observations:

- Well-trained forces can conduct peacekeeping operations in urban areas with low costs and significant benefits
- Use of a CMOC and a HACC helped facilitate and coordinate cooperation between the military, US governmental agencies, and NGOs
- SOF can provide vital support to urban operations by helping to foster local support and cooperation

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Mogadishu, Somalia 1991–1993

Timeline: Operation RESTORE HOPE and UNOSOM II

- January 1991
 - The government of dictator Siad Barre falls and civil war ensues
- Summer 1991
 - Political chaos reigns in Somalia; local warlords control the country and there is constant fighting among militias
 - A long-standing drought destroys farms and livestock, famine is rampant throughout the country
- August 1992
 - President George Bush orders an emergency airlift of food to Somalia
 - CENTCOM activates Operation PROVIDE RELIEF (UNOSOM I)
- November 1992
 - UN ship attempting to deliver food to Mogadishu is attacked
 - The UN Security Council calls for immediate military action
- 3 December 1992
 - US-led UNITAF is authorized by UN Security Council Resolution 794 to establish a secure environment in Somalia to ensure the distribution of relief supplies during Operation RESTORE HOPE
- 7 January 1993
 - In response to persistent sniper fire, 400 Marines raid a compound in Mogadishu headed by Mohammed Farah Aideed, the largest raid during Operation RESTORE HOPE
- February 1993
 - 24 Somalis are killed in a street fight between rival clans, causing increased rioting in Mogadishu
- 3 March 1993
 - UN Security General submits Resolution 814 to UN Security Council proposing the formation of UNOSOM II
- 23 March 1993
 - US forces perform a final withdrawal from participation in Operation RESTORE HOPE
- 26 March 1993
 - UN Security Council Resolution 814 directs formation of UNOSOM II, UN-led operation with expanded enforcement power to disarm Somali factions and establish democratic governance
- 4 May 1993
 - The transition to UNOSOM II is completed
- 5 June 1993
 - The Somali National Alliance (SNA) ambushes Pakistani forces, changing the nature of UNOSOM II operations
 - Operational tempo increases
- 26 August 1993
 - Task Force Ranger, comprised of over 400 special operations personnel and Army Rangers, trained in urban combat, arrives in Somalia to assist in maintaining peace and aid UN efforts to arrest Aideed
- 25 September 1993
 - A Quick Reaction Force (QRF) helicopter is shot down
- 3-4 October 1993
 - 100 Rangers and SOF operators of Task Force Ranger launch raid to capture key SNA officials
 - 18 US soldiers killed in the battle
- 8 October 1993
 - A force augmentation package is deployed
- 9 October 1993
 - President Clinton sets 31 March 1994 as the date for US withdrawal from Somalia
- 20 October 1993
 - JTF-Somalia, made up of Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps elements, is stood up to provide force protection during the phased withdrawal
- 1 December 1993
 - US forces begin withdrawal
- 23 March 1994
 - US mission in Somalia ends

Figure IV-16. Timeline: Operation RESTORE HOPE and UNOSOM II



Figure IV-17. Map of Mogadishu, Somalia

The US military’s experience in Mogadishu during Operation RESTORE HOPE and UNOSOM II offers a number of useful lessons for future commanders planning to execute JUO. In particular, US operations in Mogadishu illustrate the unique challenges posed by Third World urban environments, the importance of HUMINT when dealing with unfamiliar societies and turbulent political conditions in areas populated by noncombatants, and the difficulties of command and control in JUO.

Operational Background

By the early 1990s, a civil war involving more than 14 clans divided Somalia into a nation of hostile social factions held together by weak political alliances. In 1992, drought and famine compounded ethnic tensions and political instability, creating a potentially explosive situation. The UN responded by sending relief supplies and humanitarian aid to Mogadishu, but widespread looting and lawlessness prevented supplies from reaching the hungry and sick. Consequently, on 3 December 1992, the UN Security Council authorized UN member states “to use all necessary means to establish a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia” (Resolution 794, operative para. 10). US forces became significantly involved in the ensuing humanitarian operations: RESTORE HOPE and UNOSOM II.

The objective of Operation RESTORE HOPE, which lasted from 9 December 1992 through 26 March 1993, was to develop and lead a multinational military coalition known as the Unified Task Force (UNITAF). UNITAF was tasked with providing a secure environment for the distribution of relief supplies to the “famine belt” in southern Somalia. As the largest operating port in the country and prior focus for nongovernmental humanitarian relief activity, Mogadishu became the key logistics hub supporting all operations in Somalia. Consequently, the US designated the city as the entry point for the operational build-up of over 38,000 troops and as the headquarters for the coalition of twenty-one nations aided by over thirty active humanitarian relief organizations.

The coalition force first gained control over the flow of relief supplies into and through the city and stabilized the Somali militia conflict. The operation then expanded to additional ports and airfields throughout the country’s interior with key towns throughout Somalia serving as distribution sites for relief suppliers. In less than a month, additional distribution sites were operating in the major towns of Baledogle, Gialalassi, Bardera, Belet Weyn, Oddur, and eventually extended to the southern town of Kismayo.



Figure IV-18. Map of Somalia

With minimal use of force, UNITAF established a secure environment in which relief reached the needy. In March 1993, the US began to pull its forces out of Somalia and hand-off the UNITAF operation to UNOSOM II. The US had successfully provided effective, professional, and unified C2 for the coalition force, enabling UNITAF to fulfill its limited mandate. Despite this success, hostile faction leaders and political chaos remained a problem on the ground in Mogadishu. Maintaining order increasingly proved to be beyond the capabilities of UNOSOM II peacekeepers.

The transition from Operation RESTORE HOPE to UNOSOM II took place in May 1993. UNOSOM II went beyond the limited mandate of Operation RESTORE HOPE to include the advancement of political reconciliation in Somalia. UN Security Council Resolution 814 directed UNOSOM II to disarm Somali factions and to hold accountable Somalis who breached international law. The shift from a peacekeeping mission to a peace enforcement mission was rejected by Somali clan leaders who perceived the UN as having lost its neutral position among rival factions. One of the more powerful clan leaders, General Mohammed Farah Aideed, aggressively turned against the UN operation and began a radio campaign that characterized UN soldiers as an occupation force trying to re-colonize Somalia.

Partially in response to Aideed's call for collective armed resistance, UNOSOM II conducted short-warning inspections of weapons caches. On 5 June 1993, the Pakistani contingent was ordered to inspect an arsenal under the control of Aideed. However, the Pakistani commander was not informed that Aideed had threatened that such an inspection would "lead to war." Unprepared for trouble, the Pakistani brigade went to the inspection in unarmored vehicles. Aideed ordered an ambush to test the UN troops and to shore up his sagging support. The inadequate communication procedures between friendly forces led to a disastrous battle between Pakistani soldiers and Aideed's men, resulting in 24 Pakistani killed and 57 wounded.

In response to the June ambush of the Pakistani unit, UN forces launched attacks against Aideed's home and his command center. The UN also issued a warrant for the arrest of Aideed, but he escaped and went into hiding. Less than a month later, a US helicopter attacked an Aideed stronghold, killing more than a dozen Somalis. Somali mobs retaliated for this action, causing tension and violence in Mogadishu to intensify. The US responded by deploying a contingent of 400 US Army Rangers and other SOF personnel that arrived in Somalia on 26 August 1993.

The new task force was assigned to assist the US Army's 10th Mountain Division units in maintaining the peace in and around Mogadishu and to aid the

UN efforts to arrest Aideed and neutralize his followers. On 3 and 4 October, a group of nearly 100 Rangers and SOF operators executed a raid to capture some of Aideed's closest supporters. Two *Blackhawk* helicopters supporting the raid were shot down, and militia gunmen and hostile mobs surrounded the Americans. It took over ten hours for a relief force, with help from Pakistani and Malaysian troops, to break through and rescue the surrounded troops. Eighteen American soldiers were killed during the battle, resulting in calls by Congress for the withdrawal of American forces from the UN peacekeeping mission in Somalia.

Based on these events, US leaders concluded that the objectives of UNOSOM II were not achievable. The main US objective in Somalia then became self-protection until US forces could be withdrawn. In less than 72 hours, US strategic lift brought significant reinforcements to Mogadishu. Over the following months, assets such as AC-130 *Spectre* gunships successfully conducted "air presence" deterrent operations, helped target illegal militia weapon caches, and provided accurate close air support to UN ground forces during the final days of the UN withdrawal in a steadily deteriorating security environment. US forces began their withdrawal on 1 December 1993.

The failure of UNOSOM II must be placed in a historical context. In every previous UN-commanded field operation, success has depended on a high degree of local support for UN objectives. No peacekeeping operation has ever been strong enough to impose its will on warring factions. Although initially successful in establishing a secure environment for humanitarian assistance, operations in Somalia, and particularly in its capital city of Mogadishu, ultimately reflected the inherent difficulties of coalition operations and vague missions with multiple, and seemingly contradictory, objectives.

The Urban Area

During operations in Somalia, lack of infrastructure posed significant complications and hazards to the JFC. When US forces first entered the city, Mogadishu's basic infrastructure was in disrepair; air transportation was limited; harbor facilities were underdeveloped; and there was no telephone system. Consequently, the JTF established a temporary base of operations upon arrival in

Mogadishu. Major improvements in roads, warehousing, and other facilities were undertaken by a Naval Construction Regiment. This important engineering work improved the reception sites and enabled more forces and their equipment to join the relief effort.

Intelligence Gathering

Low Technology and Unconventional Defenses

Local clan forces employed numerous low-technology options to report the movement of US forces. The JFC should anticipate these types of unconventional defenses and be prepared to respond to the unique complexities of operating in the urban environment.

Examples of low technology and unconventional defenses:

- Drums were used as a means of communication
- Kites were used to interfere with helicopter operations
- Noncombatant support for rival clans was rallied using radio campaigns; mobs were enticed to attack UN forces
- Militia gunmen intermingled with civilian crowds making it difficult for UN forces to properly identify the enemy

Figure IV-19. Low Technology and Unconventional Defenses

assets and provided him with the situational awareness necessary to achieve mission success. In comparison, during UNOSOM II, US leaders failed to take certain factors of Somali culture into consideration, contributing to the operation's failure.

During Operation RESTORE HOPE, HUMINT gathering took advantage of the humanitarian NGOs that had been working on the ground in Mogadishu prior to the formation of UNITAF. These organizations had developed

A JFC should recognize that every urban area is defined by a unique set of physical, social, economic, cultural, and historical circumstances. In Mogadishu, Somali social, economic, and political relations are mediated by an unwritten social code dictated by kinship and religious precepts. Even though Somalis share a single ethnic background, a single language, and a single religion (Sunni Islam), clan rivalry and a patrilineal hierarchy divide the country. These cultural cleavages contribute to a volatile political atmosphere in which clan personalities and historical relationships govern decision-making. Understanding this foreign system of government significantly helped the JFC of Operation RESTORE HOPE to make use of local

relationships with official contacts, observed first-hand the dynamics of Somali politics, and were able to provide significant intelligence on militia activities. This type of HUMINT is essential in urban operations. Continuous monitoring of the local population's disposition and the adversary's intentions ensures that diplomatic and/or military efforts are appropriate to the situation and well received by relevant political leaders.

To track and disperse this type of intelligence, US forces established a CMOC to serve as a clearinghouse for information between the humanitarian agencies and the multinational coalition force. The CMOC communicated daily with State Department Presidential Envoy Robert Oakley, a former US Ambassador to Somalia who knew most of the major Somali political players. Clearing a political path for the US-led relief effort, Oakley and a small staff traveled into southern Somalia explaining to local leaders what to expect as troops arrived at distribution sites.

The importance of understanding local politics and integrating indigenous decision-makers into an urban operation cannot be overstated. Leveraging local support ensured that US-led forces would be welcomed and helped sustain a calm political atmosphere in Somalia throughout the entire relief effort. UNITAF units tried to build on local leadership and reestablish elements of the Somali National Police—one of the few respected national institutions in the country that was not clan-based. The police force staffed checkpoints throughout Mogadishu and provided crowd control at feeding centers. The local police force provided both security and valuable HUMINT to UNITAF.

In contrast, as the mission in Somalia changed from peacekeeping to peace enforcement during UNOSOM II, the UN failed to develop a full awareness of the local population's disposition and did not obtain adequate intelligence on the adversary's intentions and capabilities. In-depth intelligence gathering could have helped the JFC to predict the proclivities of adversaries, their method of operation, and the way in which they interacted with their environment. For example, a greater commitment to intelligence during UNOSOM II would have uncovered the fact that many militia officers had extensive training from the

Soviet military academy in Odessa and from Italian military schools and were able to adapt technologies and incorporate unusual tactics. As reflected in the 5 June ambush of Pakistani soldiers, and later during the 3–4 October battle, the JFC underestimated the military capabilities of rival factions, and as a result, UN forces were not adequately prepared for contingency situations.

As this case study suggests, intelligence gathering is essential to developing operational awareness in the urban environment. A JFC planning an urban operation should attempt to understand the social norms and political customs that define the urban area. A range of HUMINT sources exists to assist the JFC in developing an understanding of the adversary in relation to the urban area. It may be necessary for a JFC planning a joint urban operation to call upon a variety of nontraditional human sources, such as NGOs, foreign experts, anthropologists, regional specialists, expatriates, CA personnel, and SOF, for vital information on the urban area.

Command and Control

Maintaining synchronized and efficient command and control is particularly important in an urban operating environment. From a ground perspective, joint forces must be able to maneuver through densely populated, three-dimensional terrain that can complicate communications and fragment units. Joint forces face similar challenges when operating around or over such terrain. An effective chain of command can streamline tactical complications by providing clear and precise operating procedures. On the other hand, a vague or indiscriminate chain of command will hinder the ability of a JFC to plan, direct, coordinate, and control forces during urban operations, as was the case during UNOSOM II.

The shift in tactics from peace operations to peace enforcement marked the transition to UNOSOM II and necessitated a change in C2. Throughout Operation RESTORE HOPE, the JFC possessed the elements—a concentration of effort, forces that had trained together, and well coordinated logistics support—to successfully achieve operational and strategic objectives. In contrast, during UNOSOM II, the JFC had a more difficult task. In particular, an unusual

assortment of command relationships made the exercise of authority and unity of effort difficult. UNOSOM II was composed of contingents from different armies and was constrained by linguistic barriers, doctrinal and operational differences, and divergent capabilities. Throughout the UN operation, complex and inefficient command relationships and a lack of standardization and interoperability among the coalition forces resulted in breakdowns in communications and logistics.

All the problems of C2 inherent in a multinational peacekeeping operation (lack of unified doctrine, nonstandard equipment and operating procedures, national checks on contingents' freedom to follow UN orders) were magnified by UNOSOM II's ambitious mandate and the dangers of the operating environment. The breakdown in operational control of Mogadishu during UNOSOM II was characterized by:

- The fragmentation of forces by confining each unit to specific geographic areas
- Inconsistent disarmament and weapons-screening policies that varied according to geographic sector
- Different ROE for the various UNOSOM II contingents, which confused Somali expectations and left coalition soldiers uncertain as to how effectively their foreign commanders might defend them
- Complex command and control arrangements that delayed communications between coalition forces (for example, when the US JFC asked an Italian commander for armored assistance, he had to wait for the Italian unit commander to receive approval from Rome)

From the breakdown in command and control during UNOSOM II, it is clear that the UN did not properly plan for direct or indirect opposition to the peace enforcement mission. In future JUO, the JFC needs to develop the operational awareness and in-depth intelligence necessary to respond to a variety of operations as mission objectives may change. The JFC should also keep in mind that the urban area is a complex and unique operating environment in which

the ramifications of inefficient and unorganized C2 can be immediate and may result in a large number of casualties.

Major Observations:

- Understanding the social, cultural, and political atmosphere is necessary for enhancing situational awareness and force protection
- Good HUMINT and intelligence is invaluable to understanding the local environment
- NGOs may have in-country assets, HUMINT sources, and established relationships that could prove beneficial to the military operation
- In coalition operations, countries must be assigned tasks that correspond to their capabilities
- Any ROE discrepancies need to be resolved prior to, or early in, the operation
- Establishing a robust C2I architecture is critical for rapid dissemination of information and intelligence to the forces engaged in the urban fight

Belfast, Northern Ireland 1969–Present

Timeline: Belfast, Northern Ireland

- 1949: Republic of Ireland declared; Northern Ireland's (NI) six counties remain part of the United Kingdom
- 1968: Civil rights marches and demonstrations begin and continue through the next year
- 1969: Civil unrest leads to the deployment of British Army troops to augment the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC)
- 1970: First British Army soldier killed
- 1972: Direct Rule established; British Regular Army troop levels reach 22,000 men
- 1974: Northern Ireland Executive collapses; Northern Ireland (Special Provisions) Act instituted
- 1977: Reorganized RUC resumes the lead in security matters; introduction of Special Air Service to Northern Ireland
- 1978: Northern Ireland (Special Provisions) Act refined; Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) declares they are "preparing for a long war"
- August 1979: Lord Mountbatten killed in Ireland; ten days later, 18 soldiers killed by PIRA bomb; worst single-day death toll for 10 years
- May 1981: IRA member Bobby Sands dies after hunger strike; widespread rioting in Belfast
- October 1981: Irish Republican Army (IRA) initiates 2-month bombing campaign in London
- November 1981: Unionist MP killed in Belfast
- May 1983: Direct Rule extended
- October 1984: First British soldier jailed for killing a civilian in Northern Ireland, rejoins his regiment after 26 months in jail
- November 1985: Anglo-Irish Agreement signed giving Ireland a consultative role in NI
- December 1986: Intensive bombing campaign against military targets throughout NI
- March 1988: Loyalist terrorist opens fire at IRA funeral, killing three; during the subsequent IRA funeral, two British soldiers dragged from their car in West Belfast and murdered—covered on TV and Army film
- July 1992: Royal Irish Regiment created as a result of the merger of the Royal Irish Rangers and the Ulster Defense Regiment
- December 1993: Joint Declaration of British and Irish governments that the Irish people in both parts of Ireland have the right to decide their own future
- August 1994: IRA announces cease-fire
- October 1994: Combined Loyalist Military Command announces cease-fire
- December 1994: First British troop reduction
- January 1995: Army ends daylight patrols in Belfast, relaxes security measures
- June 1995: Further British troop reduction
- February 1996: IRA cease-fire ends; Army patrols resume
- July 1997: IRA re-institutes cease-fire
- March 1998: Good Friday Agreement signed, finalizing the multi-party talks

Figure IV-20. Timeline: Belfast, Northern Ireland




Figure IV-21. Map of Belfast, Northern Ireland

The British military’s experience in Belfast from 1969 to the present offers a number of useful lessons for conducting operations on urban terrain. Specifically, British operations in Belfast illuminate the challenges of conducting prolonged stability operations in an urban environment and, in particular, the difficulties involved in balancing force protection requirements with the exigencies of noncombatant population control in a diverse and divided city.

Operational Background

In 1921, an Irish Free State was created, granting autonomy to most of the island of Ireland, but leaving the northern six counties (historically known as Ulster) under British control. In 1949, the Irish Free State declared itself the Republic of Ireland, with Ulster remaining part of the United Kingdom.

The “Troubles” of Ulster stem from intense disagreement between the Catholic minority population and the “loyal” Protestant majority over the inclusion of the region within the United Kingdom. Catholics, for the most part, are opposed to British control, while Protestants typically favor it. The disagreement has been exacerbated by real and perceived social, economic, and political inequalities between the two groups. Over the decades, Catholic-

Protestant differences have resulted in an uneasy atmosphere punctuated by episodes of extreme violence from both sides. In 1969, as Catholic and Protestant factions began rioting and violence spread to many neighborhoods in Belfast, British troops were deployed to augment the local Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) as a stabilizing force throughout Ulster.

The British operational strategy has remained constant since its initial employment 30 years ago. The British have focused their objectives on three pillars: attrition, deterrence, and reassurance. They have established strongpoint bases in the neighborhoods with the worst violence, maintained a visible, stabilizing presence throughout the city, and implemented an extensive intelligence network to identify and apprehend terrorists in order to stem the violence. This stabilizing presence has assisted the RUC in maintaining law and order throughout the city and has supported stability throughout Ulster.

In Belfast, the British focused on maintaining a continuous presence throughout the city, concentrating in the partisan neighborhoods that were the scene of much of the violence. This presence has fluctuated in response to the level of violence and terrorism in the city. During times of increased violence, the British asserted almost total control of the city by saturating Belfast with a British military presence. During the periods of successful negotiations between the relative calm allowed the British to relax their control of the city and reduce patrolling and operations.

Tactically, the British have perfected stability operations in an urban environment. They have developed special task organizations to provide the greatest mobility, coverage, and reaction throughout the city, relying on a combination of foot, vehicle, and aerial patrols as well as observation platforms. The integration of the Special Air Service (SAS) and other specially trained units to include intelligence, engineering, and aviation assets has greatly enhanced British military effectiveness throughout the operation.

While the British military operation has always been considered relatively successful in achieving its military objectives, only recently have peace negotiations shown promise in bringing about a permanent end to the violence.

In 1994, both the IRA and the Combined Loyalist Military Command (CLMC) agreed to a cease-fire and increased their efforts at negotiation. This period of relative calm allowed the British Army to begin troop reductions and relax force protection standards. In February 1996, the IRA renounced the cease-fire and the violence increased. The negotiations continued, however, and in July 1997 the cease-fire was reinstated. In March 1998, the British, the IRA, and Loyalist factions signed the Good Friday Agreement, finalizing the negotiations and bringing more stability to the province, though not yet ending the conflict.

Belfast's Influence on the Northern Ireland Campaign

As the cultural, political, and population center of Northern Ireland, Belfast is important to the British military campaign to bring stability to the area. However, the capital city of Belfast is not the critical center of gravity for factions seeking to influence the political settlement. Unlike many counterinsurgency campaigns, such as the French in Algeria, where the control of the capital city of Algiers was central to defeating the FLN insurgents, Belfast has never played such a role.

The objective of the British military in Northern Ireland has never been to defeat the military arms of the various factions; it has simply been to deter these forces from violent action until the UK government can implement an agreeable political solution. As such, British strategy has targeted terrorist forces throughout Northern Ireland, as opposed to focusing on more compartmentalized geographic areas. Identifying terrorist cells, providing a stabilizing presence, and responding to violent acts are equally necessary in the countryside and urban areas. The difference between the two environments is not necessarily in their levels of importance, but rather in the tactics used to accomplish these objectives. The modern transportation and communication networks of Northern Ireland make it virtually impossible to isolate the city from the countryside. Consequently, the British have concentrated their efforts on isolating the whole of Northern Ireland from outside interference.

The Urban Area

Like many urban areas, Belfast is divided into major neighborhoods. Over the years, many of these neighborhoods have become divided by the conflict, with each faction retreating into the haven of its own section. Violence erupts when members of one faction cross the neighborhood boundaries to confront and attack other faction members. The infamous neighborhoods of Shankill (99% Protestant) and Falls (97% Catholic) are but two of the many sections of Belfast which have erupted in violence over the past 30 years. The division of these neighborhoods consists of more than just social/cultural cleavages. Over the years, physical barriers have been erected along the most violent fault lines. Today, many neighborhoods have their borders marked by concrete, tin, and barbed wire walls that physically separate combatants and noncombatants.

Two obstacles present in many urban stability operations are not present in Belfast: language and cultural barriers. The British soldiers and the citizens of Belfast, Catholic and Protestant alike, share a common language and heritage. On the one hand, this likeness allows British intelligence and SOF personnel to blend in easily with the local population and has vastly increased the HUMINT network available to the British commander. On the other hand, the fact that the citizens of Belfast are British subjects has made duty in Belfast psychologically troubling for many soldiers, particularly given the indiscriminate nature of the violence, which has resulted in numerous “noncombatant” casualties.

Controlling the Urban Population

While noncombatants are always a factor in urban operations, controlling the civilian population of Belfast is actually the primary focus of the entire operation and is integral to achieving stability. Because the conflict does not have distinguishable uniformed “combatants,” but rather draws its combatants from the civilian population, controlling and influencing the populace is key to identifying combatants, pre-empting and deterring violence, and stemming support for terrorist activities. More broadly, although stability can be temporarily created by force, long-term stability is ultimately dependent on changed popular perceptions,

attitudes, and behavior. The task of controlling the civilian population while fighting terrorism has proved challenging for British forces not only because “combatants” are difficult to identify, but also because overly aggressive enforcement to root out combatants risks the danger of provoking the noncombatant populace toward militancy. Moreover, the nature of the mission has required British forces to perform a range of “police” functions that are atypical of normal military duties.

The key to controlling the urban population has been the synchronization of military and police responsibilities within the city. Due to the nature of stability operations, the line normally present between military and police objectives has become blurred. While the RUC is the law enforcement agency within Northern Ireland, it has evolved into more of a paramilitary force in order to deal with the extreme cases of violence in the city. In order to properly support the RUC, British commanders have adapted their military force to accomplish both military and police tasks. For example, British forces have modified their intelligence units to enable tracking of informants, often exploiting typical police tools such as working dogs. SAS, the equivalent of US Special Operations Forces, has adopted many of the functions of a SWAT team to extract terrorists. More generally, British forces have taken on basic policing duties such as street patrolling.

To accomplish their tasks, the military forces in Northern Ireland have been granted special legal and police powers by the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act of 1978, to include the authority to:

- Stop and question any person about his identity and movements
- Stop and search any person for weapons
- Arrest without warrant and detain for four hours
- Enter premises and search with only the permission of a commissioned officer
- Stop vehicles/vessels for search
- Control and restrict highways, rights of way, and access to buildings

Exercise of these powers has been instrumental in enabling the British forces to assist the RUC in maintaining a stable environment. However, in some instances, real or perceived abuses of these powers have incited the local populace. The nationalists (and some loyalists) have always felt these “special powers” were too broad and allowed the soldiers to violate their civil rights. In recognition of these sentiments, British commanders have generally been extremely careful in monitoring the use of these powers and ensuring that their soldiers do not abuse them. The British rules of engagement have allowed their soldiers to use reasonable force to prevent a crime or assist in the lawful arrest of offenders or suspected offenders. Violations of ROE by British soldiers have been prosecuted under United Kingdom law, and the offenders have been punished, although too lightly in the eyes of some factions.

Despite some criticism, the British have been generally successful in exercising control of the urban population without provoking popular backlash by their presence. In large part, they have done this by adapting to the exigencies of the mission and by coordinating extensively with their police counterparts. Compared to many US operations, the British performance in Belfast provides a model of both inter-Service and inter-agency cooperation. Militarily, the British have established a solid chain of command based on regional areas in which all members of the armed forces are subordinate. The integration of Regular Army forces with special forces, intelligence, and explosive ordnance disposal units has been seamless. The British have also done a remarkable job interfacing with the local RUC units, and have effectively modified their forces to perform police functions. Given the likelihood that US forces may be called upon in the future to carry out stability operations either abroad or at home, the British experience in Belfast provides insight for the JFC into the challenges and successes of controlling an urban population.

Force Protection

The British success in stabilizing the urban area has created incentives for terrorists to target British forces, giving rise to force protection concerns. Paradoxically, actions taken to enhance force protection have run the

risk of alienating the populace and reducing the force's effectiveness in maintaining stability, thus demonstrating the difficulty in balancing force protection requirements with those of policing an urban population.

Throughout the campaign, British forces in the countryside have been able to use large unit patrols (company-size units), long-range surveillance, and temporary checkpoints to enforce stability, but the urban environment has required the soldiers in Belfast to saturate the area with multiple small patrols, establish permanent observation posts, and maintain strongpoint bases inside the neighborhoods they are patrolling. These tactics have proven extremely effective in denying targets of opportunity to the terrorists in Belfast. The price of British success in protecting Belfast's infrastructure and government facilities from terrorist attacks, however, has been that the soldiers and their garrisons have in turn become the target. In particular, as the terrorist cells of the various factions have been unable to find easy targets within the city, some groups, especially the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA), have attempted to solidify their legitimacy as an "army" by attacking predominantly military targets.

In response, British commanders initially instituted extreme force protection measures, running the gamut from ballistic protection vests and helmets to fortress-like operational bases and large unit patrols. These protection measures were very successful in decreasing the violence against British soldiers in Belfast, but the emphasis on force protection decreased the soldiers' ability to stabilize the city. The large unit patrols, while providing a large measure of protection for the soldiers, inhibited effective British saturation of neighborhoods. The fortress-like bases and bulky protective clothing created an "us versus them" mentality among both the civilian population and the soldiers themselves. As the force protection increased and the stabilizing effect decreased, the terrorists were again provided more targets of opportunity among the civilian population and infrastructure.

The British commanders, however, identified this "see-saw" effect and, in many cases, adapted their tactics to strike a better balance between force

protection and effective presence activities. As one of many examples, British forces switched to small unit patrols, consisting of four-man teams, to enable greater mobility. In addition, British soldiers now patrol Belfast wearing berets instead of helmets in order to appear less aggressive, thus reflecting the lowered tension and displaying sensitivity. It is also important to note that the British rely extensively on force protection enhancements that do not detract from presence activities, such as intelligence.

The British experience in Belfast provides insight into the challenges of conducting prolonged stability operations in an urban environment. In particular, it demonstrates the tension between urban population control and force protection requirements. It also illustrates how difficult it is for a stabilizing force to maintain impartiality in a highly charged political environment. For future stability operations in urban areas, the British experience provides the JFC with an example of a force's ability to learn from experience and achieve relative success in balancing the competing demands of force safety and effectiveness in a complicated and protracted stability operation.

Major Observations:

- Specialized task organizations provide the greatest mobility, coverage, and reaction throughout the city, enhanced by a combination of foot, vehicle, and aerial patrols
- The integration of SAS, intelligence, engineers, and other specially trained units has enhanced British military effectiveness throughout the operation and streamlined the chain of command
- Stability operations often include military and police responsibilities requiring extensive coordination between the two
- Saturating the area with multiple small patrols, establishing permanent observation posts, and maintaining strongpoint bases inside the

patrolled neighborhoods have proven effective in denying targets of opportunity to terrorists

- British commanders have adapted military tactics to strike a better balance between force protection and effective presence activities to minimize the “us versus them” mentality

Sarajevo, Bosnia 1992–1995

Timeline: Operations in Sarajevo

- 3 July 1992
 - Operation PROVIDE PROMISE begins
- 14 September 1992
 - Increased shelling in Sarajevo
- 5 February 1994
 - 68 civilians killed in the shelling of a market in Sarajevo
- 9 February 1994
 - NATO issues an ultimatum to the Serbs warning them to withdraw all heavy weapons or face air strikes
- 20 February 1994
 - NATO declares that there has been virtual compliance
- 28 August 1995
 - A mortar attack on Sarajevo kills 38 civilians
 - Operation DELIBERATE FORCE is launched
- 20 September 1995
 - UN and NATO leaders agree that operational objectives have been met

Figure IV-22. Timeline: Operations in Sarajevo




Figure IV-23. Map of Sarajevo, Bosnia

During operations in Bosnia, UN, NATO, and US forces performed urban relief operations and force protection in Sarajevo, the capital of Bosnia, and reinforced a simultaneous Croatian ground offensive to deter aggressive Serbian behavior and bring diplomatic efforts to a successful conclusion. NATO operations in Bosnia highlight the importance of urban relief and protection during major peace enforcement operations.

Operational Background

In 1991, Slovenia and Croatia declared independence from the former Yugoslavia, followed by Bosnia and Macedonia in the winter of 1991–92. As a result, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) was composed of only Montenegro and Serbia (including the provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina). Under the manipulation of FRY political elites and with the support of provincial politicians, the Yugoslavian People’s Army (JNA), the Serbian minority of the FRY, fought to gain control of the four provinces to maintain a unified Yugoslavia. Failing to do this, the Bosnian Serbs began to forcefully carve out Serbian enclaves in the other provinces under the banner of a “Greater Serbia.”

By 1992, NATO and the US had committed to preserving the independence and territorial integrity of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Operations PROVIDE PROMISE and DELIBERATE FORCE were both a part of the overall multinational campaign to secure peace in Bosnia. The coalition placed significant emphasis on ensuring that Sarajevo, the capital of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and other prominent urban areas remained viable and capable of sustaining their inhabitants. To that end, NATO devoted significant resources to providing relief to Bosnia and protecting its major cities from Serb aggression.

Relief efforts centered on Operation PROVIDE PROMISE (1992–1995) and consisted of an airlift/drop of humanitarian relief supplies into Sarajevo and other key cities throughout Bosnia. The airlift began on 3 July 1992 and was an ongoing effort for four years to protect the city of Sarajevo and maintain an air bridge into Bosnia to deliver humanitarian assistance. UN officials ended the operation after concluding that access to Sarajevo no longer was blocked. The operation, which came to surpass the Berlin Airlift in duration, flew a total of

12,895 missions and transported 160,677 metric tons of food, medicine, and other supplies into Sarajevo and other safe areas.

As part of the larger effort to deny Bosnian Serb aircraft the ability to operate over Bosnia, the NATO/UN partnership alliance provided close air support to the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Bosnia-Herzegovina and conducted authorized air strikes to relieve the siege of Sarajevo and other threatened safe areas. These NATO air strikes compelled the Serbs to pull back their heavy weapons around Sarajevo into NATO/UN-monitored storage sites in 1994. Aerial ISR assets were used to monitor events in and around UN Safe Areas to ensure that the Serbs were complying with UN and NATO mandates. For example, UAVs conducted reconnaissance—detecting, monitoring, and reporting activities on the border of Serbia and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in support of relief operations.

However, by the Fall of 1994, the warring factions' disregard for UN mandates regarding Safe Areas and heavy weapons exclusion zones (EZs), targeting of NATO and UN aircraft and ground forces, and increased factional fighting dictated a more prudent military contingency plan. Operation DELIBERATE FORCE was an air attack planned to reduce Serbian military capabilities to threaten or attack safe areas and UN forces. On 28 August 1995, a mortar attack on Sarajevo, killing 38, triggered the launch of DELIBERATE FORCE. The majority of targets attacked during the operation were Integrated Air Defense System (IADS) nodes, ammunition depots, and equipment storage and maintenance facilities. By 20 September 1995, UN and NATO leaders agreed that operational objectives had been met, the mission had been accomplished, and end states achieved. The operational effect of DELIBERATE FORCE was to end the Bosnian Serb military efforts to either take the Safe Areas or render them unlivable.

The Urban Area

The ultimate success of NATO in Bosnia was dependent on NATO's ability to provide relief to Bosnia's civilian population and to protect key urban areas throughout the country. Safe areas assumed particular importance, as the

fall of just one of the Safe Areas would have signified failure on the part of NATO and the UN to ensure the viability of Bosnia’s key cities, possibly undermining the credibility of the UN and NATO in future negotiation efforts. It is likely that if NATO had failed to re-supply Sarajevo and protect it from Serbian military aggression, this might have emboldened the Bosnian Serbs, caused great suffering among noncombatants, and undermined NATO and UN efforts to bring relief to Bosnia.

Minimizing Collateral Damage

Precision Guided Munitions

Precision guided munitions proved particularly effective in Sarajevo given NATO’s strong desire to avoid collateral damage. Such munitions constituted roughly 70% of the 1,150 air-delivered munitions dropped by NATO aircraft; the vast majority (88%) were delivered by US aircraft.

Many of the weapons and target acquisition systems that supported these munitions worked well, but the need to enhance their effectiveness in adverse weather and in foliage-covered terrain was apparent.

Figure IV-24. Precision Guided Munitions

The focus of the international media was so concentrated in Sarajevo that the Commander in Chief AFSOUTH stated, “Every bomb was a political bomb.” If Serbian forces had the opportunity to exploit public opinion in a manner that influenced diplomatic efforts, the military’s credibility and support could have suffered. Accordingly, the intent was to preserve as much of the infrastructure of Sarajevo as possible, while destroying the military foundations of Serbian power. To this end, NATO employed precision guided munitions during air strikes to minimize collateral

damage. The minimal collateral damage resulting from air strikes relieved political pressure on NATO, and NATO was able to sustain the intensity of the operation and increase pressure on the Bosnian Serbs to negotiate a diplomatic settlement to the conflict.

Command and Control

During operations in Bosnia, a wide range of operational constraints were imposed on NATO forces. These constraints developed from concerns regarding the political implications of military action in Bosnia and from a keen desire to avoid both casualties within NATO or UN forces and unnecessary loss of life or damage to property within the urban area of Sarajevo. The UN viewed the operations as peacekeeping efforts, implying that force should be used only for self-defense; while NATO perceived them as peace enforcement efforts, implying that force could be used to coerce one side or another toward a diplomatic solution.

Many of the nations involved in the air operations also had committed ground forces and had legitimate concerns with regards to target selection, ROE, and air cover. To help ensure the safety of both ground and air forces and limit collateral damage and civilian casualties, the UN insisted that both the UN and NATO reach consensus before military force could be applied. The UN implemented a “dual key” system of authorization in which decisions had to be processed through two command structures.

While ensuring agreement, this system limited the commanders’ ability to respond effectively to threats. Both commanders and US diplomats considered this arrangement overly restrictive, resulting in extreme delays that often jeopardized the effectiveness of action. In future operations, the US should expect that diplomatic and political requirements associated with urban MOOTW may impose command arrangements that complicate unity of command. To accommodate these complexities, commanders need to effect liaison and coordination at each echelon of the command chain, as well as among the various aviation units and command centers involved in the operation.

Major Observations:

- Minimizing collateral damage can help relieve political pressure, help sustain support for an operation, and increase pressure to negotiate a settlement
- Dual C2 structures (UN and NATO) can be overly restrictive and limit the commander's ability to respond effectively

Monrovia, Liberia 1996

Timeline: Monrovia, Liberia

- June–September 1990
 - Liberian rebels lay siege to Monrovia to oust President Samuel K. Doe
 - Economic Community of West Africa Cease-Fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) peacekeeping force enters Liberia to end siege; rebels break up into ethnic warlord militias; seven years of civil war begin
- August 1995
 - Peace plan (13th since 1989) is signed establishing a Ruling Council and mandating that the presidency rotate among Council members until elections can be held
- 6 April 1996
 - Fighting erupts between warlord factions in and around Monrovia after Ruling Council attempts to oust Roosevelt Johnson
- 9 April 1996
 - Europe-based Navy and Army SOF security elements secure US Embassy
 - Air Force SOF helicopters begin evacuation of the first of 2,200 personnel to Freetown, Sierra Leone
- 11 April 1996
 - Elements of an Army airborne company based in Italy augment SOF and Marine Embassy guards
- 12 April 1996
 - CONUS-based Army SOF elements begin air evacuation from Monrovia
 - Air refueling operations underway
- 19 April 1996
 - Cease-fire declared, but sporadic fighting continues; ECOMOG leaders meet to get the peace process back on track
- 20 April 1996
 - 250 Marines from 22nd MEU relieve SOF security and air evacuation elements as well as Army airborne company security forces at Embassy
 - 22nd MEU begins evacuation of remaining 750 civilians
 - CDR, 22d MEU, assumes command of ASSURED RESPONSE JTF

Figure IV-25. Timeline: Monrovia, Liberia



Figure IV-26. Map of Monrovia, Liberia

NEOs are conducted to assist the US Department of State in the evacuation of noncombatants, nonessential military personnel, selected host nation citizens, and third country nationals whose lives are in danger, from locations in a host foreign nation to an appropriate safe haven. They usually involve a swift insertion of a force, temporary occupation of an urban objective, such as a US Embassy, and a planned withdrawal after mission completion. NEOs are usually planned and executed by a JTF under an ambassador's authority. The NEO performed in Monrovia, Liberia in 1996 is an example of an operation that has become an increasingly frequent feature in the landscape of US military actions in the post-Cold War era.

Operational Background

The flare-up of fighting among Liberia's warlord factions in April 1996 was the latest of many disruptions to the fragile peace plan of August 1995 that temporarily ended Liberia's brutal civil war. By late March 1996, factions of Liberia's Ruling Council had expelled one of its own members, Roosevelt Johnson. This action provoked hostilities, and beginning on 5 April in Monrovia, members of Johnson's militia rampaged against suspected supporters

of the Ruling Council action, blowing up helicopters and seizing hundreds of hostages. By 6 April, gangs of heavily armed youths were engaged in sporadic, intense exchanges of small arms and heavy weapons fire throughout the city as a West African peacekeeping element, known as ECOMOG, stood by. This situation, along with the closure of Monrovia's international airport on 8 April, led to a presidential order to evacuate US citizens and certain categories of third country nationals. The relative suddenness of the deteriorating situation precluded the pre-positioning of an Amphibious Task Force off Liberia's coast. Consequently, the nearest element afloat—the 6th Fleet Landing Force with the 22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) (Special Operations Capable) aboard—was seven days away. The J-3, in coordination with CINCEUCOM and CINCSOC, elected to deploy CONUS- and European-based SOF and an Army Airborne Battalion Combat Team from Italy to begin Operation ASSURED RESPONSE on 9 April in advance of the 20 April arrival of the 22nd MEU.

The Urban Setting

Monrovia has some 450,000 inhabitants spread over an area the size of Washington, D.C. There are few high-rise buildings in this port city. The US Embassy is located on a point of land on the Atlantic Ocean several miles to the south of Monrovia's center. Much of the fighting occurred in the area of a military barracks inhabited by Roosevelt Johnson's militia, located some two miles from the US Embassy. The Embassy grounds possessed a helicopter landing pad, and the adjacent housing compound was large enough to accommodate the approximately 15,000 civilians seeking sanctuary.

NEO planning sought to establish total control of the Embassy grounds using a security force to augment existing Marine guards and sustain the Embassy as an operational US diplomatic facility and as the primary air evacuation point. The street fighting between militia gangs occasionally deterred the movement of groups of evacuees who requested military forces to escort them to the Embassy. The most significant challenge was twofold: locating evacuees in Monrovia unable or unwilling to come to the Embassy and then transporting them from air/ground pick-up points. Several sites in the city that afforded security forces

partial control from militia interference during the pick-ups that occurred outside the US Embassy were selected.

The Operation

The objective of the NEO in Monrovia was to conduct the safe, rapid evacuation of US and eligible third country nationals from the urban departure area to a designated safe haven. The departure area was the US Embassy compound. There were two alternate sites: the ECOMOG compound four miles from the Embassy and the International Trust Company compound some three miles from the Embassy. Inherent in an NEO is the need to provide security to the evacuation departure area. The NEO must also provide security to personnel during the air transit phase from the departure area to the safe haven. Evacuations are most susceptible to fire from small arms, RPGs, and other weapons during the first moments of transit over the urban areas.

Mission Analysis: Critical Questions for an Urban NEO

- Where is the embassy/evacuation point in the city and what are its physical characteristics?
- What is the overall urban military/diplomatic/social situation that will impact the NEO?
- Who are the indigenous leaders and what is their C2 structure that will influence the urban situation?
- What are the ground, air, and sea threats that may impact the securing of the evacuation point and the routes transiting the urban area?
- What type and how many evacuees and refugees are anticipated; and what is the weather in the area?

Figure IV-27. Mission Analysis: Critical Questions for an Urban NEO

NEOs are often executed in an urban area in which little intelligence or area familiarity is available through military channels. As a result, much information must be provided by diplomatic and non-government organizations familiar with the situation in order to answer the JFC's critical operational questions. The answers are not always provided with complete certainty and detail. They will, however, influence the concept of operation, security force composition and numbers, evacuation response times, air/sea evacuation resources and routes, logistics support requirements, intermediate and final safe haven designations, and any adjustments to standard rules of engagement.

Mission Planning and Execution

Based on the initial mission analysis conducted by the Joint Staff, and then by the designated JFC and senior US diplomat in-country, a concept of operations and supporting force structure was developed in order to plan the NEO.

In view of the rapidly deteriorating situation in Monrovia and the time required for the 6th Fleet Landing Force to arrive off the coast of Liberia, CINCEUCOM deployed SOF elements to first secure the Embassy grounds and then initiate the evacuation. Synchronization of the operation was coordinated by an Army Special Forces Brigadier General who, as the JTF commander, established his base in the US Embassy in Monrovia subsequent to the arrival of Europe-based Navy SEAL and Army Special Forces on 9 April. Once security of the Embassy compound was assured, the JFC coordinated the arrival of evacuation helicopters from Army Special Forces units from CONUS and Europe-based Air Force SOF units staging out of Freetown, Sierra Leone, to airlift US citizens and other eligible personnel.

Several issues impacted the evacuation operation. The first was that not all US citizens could get to the Embassy as a result of the urban hostilities. Second, engagements between heavily-armed gangs, often under the influence of drugs and alcohol, were occurring within several blocks of the US Embassy. Arriving and departing evacuation helicopters made tempting targets to undisciplined militia gangs. Third, the sheer number (an estimated 15,000) of refugees in the Embassy grounds, most of whom were ineligible for evacuation, created substantial food, water, medicine, and sanitation requirements. The JFC had to ensure that there was sufficient logistics support at the Freetown international airport transload site, 235 miles northwest of Monrovia, to accommodate the health and sanitation needs of the evacuees and to support evacuation aircraft logistics requirements. This was critical to rapidly moving evacuees from the Embassy through Freetown to their final destination of Dakar, Senegal.

The JFC responded by coordinating with the Embassy to determine the location and identity of US civilians in Monrovia who were unable to reach the

Embassy. Subsequently, decisions were made to use SOF elements as escorts for US nationals who lived near the Embassy. Other civilians were directed to an air pick-up point three miles from the Embassy in the International Trust Company compound. Simultaneously, forces from an Italy-based US Airborne Battalion Combat Team deployed to the Embassy to free up SOF elements to provide ground security escorts.

The Embassy also coordinated with ECOMOG to use its compound as an air evacuation point. ECOMOG agreed to transport US and third country civilians in armored personnel carriers from locations in Monrovia to the US Embassy or ECOMOG compounds. The concern for the security of helicopters arriving and departing the Embassy and ECOMOG compounds led to a decision to conduct the majority of evacuations at night when hostilities were less intense and the threat of gunfire less predominant. Air security for the evacuation consisted of close air support and reconnaissance provided by SOF AC-130 *Spectre* gunships. The evacuation and its air support required a substantial aerial-refueling effort using tanker aircraft deployed from the United Kingdom. Evacuation helicopters on their return flights from Freetown airlifted supplies to the refugees and the Embassy staff in the Embassy compound. Over 2,100 evacuees were airlifted to Freetown and on to Dakar during the 10-day SOF operation. Marines from the 22nd MEU evacuated another 750 personnel upon their arrival on 20 April and assumed command of the operation.

Rules of Engagement in the Urban Setting

NEO rules of engagement are standard ROE governing the conduct of US military forces in a potentially hostile MOOTW situation. They are combined with other ROE that respond to the unique characteristics and objectives of the largely urban setting of these operations. There are two cornerstone ROE: the first is that if US forces are threatened, all necessary measures including lethal force may be employed. As a corollary to this, forces will not return fire unless they have a reasonable certainty of the source of the fire. The second is that US forces will observe strict neutrality in hostilities between belligerents.

Accordingly, US forces in imminent danger will cease NEO activities until the source and cause of the hostile fire is determined and responded to appropriately.

The JFC must ensure that these ROE are fully understood by all military personnel participating in the NEO since decisions to respond to hostile situations are normally delegated to the lowest level of the security force. In Operation ASSURED RESPONSE, SOF personnel escorting US citizens to the Embassy frequently had sudden encounters with militia members on Monrovia's streets and had to take necessary measures to avoid conflict while being prepared to respond with appropriate force. Marine security augmentation forces were often challenged at the Embassy gates by heavily armed youths in encounters that required an unequivocal demonstration of a willingness to use lethal force to deter threats of militia gunfire directed at the Embassy.

Planning and Execution Issues

Operation ASSURED RESPONSE involved SOF elements from all the Services in addition to the employment of a MEU, which arrived for the NEO's final phase. No matter what the force composition, the JFC will be confronted with a unique operating environment. Unlike other operations in which the military may attempt to shape the situation to its advantage, NEOs generally require a response to the situation as it exists. This requires adjusting to the changing conditions presented by the urban setting, by the predominantly paramilitary/civilian character of the threat, and by the actions of the evacuees themselves.

The many dynamics of the urban operating environment and its human components provide an inherent unpredictability in NEOs. The JFC must work with the Embassy team to develop an operational concept that can respond to unpredictability. NEO forces must have substantial experience in operating in urban settings and interacting with civilian populations to increase the probability that ROE will be adhered to flawlessly. Evacuation helicopters will frequently operate in the middle of cities, requiring pilot experience in urban flying and in operating at night with night vision goggles. Behavior of adversary elements is unpredictable and marked by a fractured urban command and control

environment. Consequently, current information on weapons capabilities, identities, intent, and attitudes of the indigenous factions and their leaders toward the US and the US military performing the NEO is vital. Communications with the factions involved should convey US intent. Obtaining commitments of non-interference also is critical to achieving an unopposed evacuation.

Major Observations:

- NEOs are generally a response to a particular situation and may provide less opportunity to shape the urban setting
- Situational intelligence necessary for military preparation is often difficult to acquire during NEOs
- NEOs are generally more unpredictable than other types of operation