

CHAPTER THREE

PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS IN JOINT URBAN OPERATIONS¹

In one moment in time, our Service members will be feeding and clothing displaced refugees—providing humanitarian assistance. In the next moment, they will be holding two warring tribes apart—conducting peacekeeping operations. Finally, they will be fighting a highly lethal mid-intensity battle. All in the same day, all within three city blocks. It will be what we call the three block war.

General Charles C. Krulak, 31st Commandant, USMC

Urban area analysis should examine the various structures and functions of the physical and cultural environment in order to anticipate and prepare responses to a range of contingency situations. As military leaders examine urban operations, it becomes clear that the kinds of combat and peacekeeping capabilities required for JUO will depend upon the particular situation and setting at hand. Whether conducting a humanitarian relief supply mission or enforcing a no-fly zone, the JFC should acquire a thorough knowledge of the urban area prior to identifying operational tasks and should identify the objectives, weapons, training, tactics, and organizational requirements that will integrate joint forces to successfully accomplish the mission.

A. The Urban Area

Urban areas generally denote plots of land wherein population density equals or exceeds one thousand people per square mile and in which an average of at least one building stands per two acres of land. A typical built-up urban area is characterized by a concentration of structures, facilities, and populations and is normally the **economic, political, and cultural focus** for the surrounding area.

Categories of built-up areas are classified as:

- Villages (populations of 3,000 or less)
- Strip areas (industrialized zones built along roads connecting towns or cities)
- Towns or small cities (populations of up to 200,000)
- Medium cities (populations of 200,000 to one million)
- Large cities with associated urban sprawl (populations in excess of one million)

Whether a modern metropolis or a shantytown in a developing country, every built-up, urban area has an identifiable system of urban characteristics that constantly are interacting and changing. The JFC should attempt to identify key characteristics and develop an operational plan that leverages US strengths against critical nodes, choke points, and/or LOC with minimal impact on the urban area and its population. By understanding the urban area and developing an operational-level situational awareness, the JFC should be able to shape, modify, and/or control adversary behavior by applying asymmetrical strengths against key enemy centers of gravity. In MOOTW, the JFC should effectively engage appropriate centers of gravity while stabilizing and supporting missions that maintain peace and restore a semblance of normalcy to the urban area.

Characteristics of the Urban Area

From the streets, sewers, high-rise buildings, and industrial parks of the modern world to the sprawl of houses, shacks, and shelters that form urban areas in less-developed regions, an urban area is as diverse as it is complex. In order to map an urban area, the JFC should consider five essential characteristics:

- Physical
- Infrastructure
- Commercial
- Residential

- Socio-economic

These characteristics should be regarded as interdependent, ever present, and frequently overlapping. By layering the components and developing a comprehensive awareness of the urban area, the JFC can determine specific actions, timelines, and resource commitments.




Figure III-1. Urban Characteristics

Understanding the Urban Area

Physical information is the most basic characteristic for defining an urban area and includes all essential features such as structural dimensions, composition, and spacing of: airport or landing facilities, ports or waterways, buildings, streets, highways, bridges, tunnels/sewers, railroads, telephone wires, power lines, zone specific combustibles, natural barriers, and surrounding vegetation. This layer should also provide information on climate, elevation, and surface composition.

- The physical urban area can be divided into four basic levels: building, street, subterranean, and air. Operations may include engagement on all levels at any given time, and military forces, when taking positions in, above, beneath, and/or around an urban area, may have to negotiate a variety of obstacles.
 - > The JFC should develop three-dimensional operational plans that allow for efficient air-ground-maritime mobility and effectively convey information on appropriate features to subordinates in three-dimensional terms.
- The correlations between physical characteristics and military considerations include choke points, landing platforms, lines of sight, mobility, fields of fire, observation, obstacles, cover, concealment, indirect fire siting, fire hazards, command and control, rubble potential, weapon range, building markings, etc.
 - > Selection of landing zones is at times difficult. Air defense, pathfinder, access and egress, and a myriad of other doctrinal considerations should be fully examined in support of operations likely to include ground, naval, and air representation.
- The physical diversity of the urban terrain can fragment units, compartmentalize encounters, disrupt spans of control/communication, and complicate fire support, surveillance, airlift, and transportation.
 - > Technical procedures or techniques to overcome disruptions in a soldier's vision, communications, and/or global positioning system (GPS) should be established and known to all military personnel involved in urban operations.

Infrastructure information includes water distribution facilities, medical services, sanitation procedures, waste treatment plants, environmental hazards, communication capabilities, media and information dispersal (including telecommunication networks), power generation substations and offices; US embassies, diplomatic organizations, NGOs, other government and non-government facilities, police, and military.

- The infrastructure of urban areas in developing countries is markedly inferior when compared to that of major metropolises. An estimated 25 to 50 percent of urban inhabitants in developing countries live in impoverished slums and squatter settlements, with little or no access to adequate water, sanitation, or refuse collection. The lack of even the most rudimentary facilities and utilities has health and disease implications for inhabitants as well as US forces operating in the given environment.
 - > The JFC needs to determine the location and numbers of refugees and internally displaced persons; requirements for water, food, sanitation, housing, medical services, heating supplies, etc.; infrastructure restoration demands; facilities, supplies, and capabilities necessary to respond to starvation, disease, epidemics, weapons effects, and/or the use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).
 - > Combat Service Support (CSS) must provide for supply, maintenance, transportation, health services, engineering, and other support services.
- Targeting and/or controlling key infrastructure components, such as electrical power generator plants, telecommunication nodes, and command and control centers, can deter and/or isolate enemy aggression and have a cascading effect against other remaining key nodes and systems.
 - > The JFC can gain operational advantage by targeting certain infrastructure components. Such decisive engagement includes precision air strikes, electronic disruption of adversary communications, or insertion of SOF or conventional ground forces to seize a key facility or structure.

During the night of 3-4 October 1993, US soldiers in Mogadishu found that the sheer number of laser traces caused confusion during attempts to provide fire support. Ground contacts were asked to make figure eights with their lasers so that pilots could distinguish them.

During operations in Somalia, because of Somalia's limited infrastructure, a temporary base was established by the Marines along with important engineering support to enable additional forces and their equipment to join the effort. Once a stable center of operations was established, troops moved to outlying areas and began the process of restoring order.

EC-130 *Compass Call* aircraft jammed commercial radio and TV stations, as well as Panamanian Defense Force radio nets during the initial entry for Operation JUST CAUSE.

Figure III-2. Understanding the Urban Area

Understanding the Urban Area, cont.

Commercial area information includes business centers (stores, shops, restaurants, food/craft marketplaces, trading centers, business offices) and outlying industrial/agricultural features (strip malls, farms, food storage centers, mills) as well as environmentally sensitive areas (mineral extraction areas, dump sites, chemical/biological facilities).

- The interplay between public and private activities often makes it difficult to distinguish between commercial and residential areas. In some urban areas, community and economic activity are intricately interwoven in the urban fabric. Local populations sometimes congregate to take part in the daily market, religious, social, and cultural activities.
 - > These centers of activity must be examined in terms of noncombatant considerations, symbolic and cultural value, local communications and networking, and as a potential center for political gatherings and organization.
 - > The JFC should have an understanding of the commercial system and how it effects operational decisions.

Residential area information includes all housing quarters—from squatter settlements to the suburbs—and all community facilities such as churches, schools, museums/cultural centers/monuments, public transportation facilities, police/fire stations, and hospitals.

- Residential areas are characterized by a variety of building materials, archetypes, and layouts (compact versus sprawl).
- The JFC should recognize that during fighting in, around, under, or over less substantial buildings, weapon rounds and fragments pose a considerable threat to noncombatants and friendly soldiers.
 - > The JFC should consider non-standard use of capabilities and the application of non-lethal coercive force when operating in populated areas.
 - > The JFC should consider designating protected zones in residential areas and charge ground forces (combat and combat support units) with establishment, supervision, and/or defense of such zones.

Socio-economic information includes demographics, ethnic/cultural information, historical background, political/religious tension and conflict (ruling and opposition parties), anachronistic customs and behaviors, relative levels of corruption, suspicion of government, criminal unrest, ascribed traditions and norms, and levels of political mobilization and polarization.

- Urban areas usually contain mixed populations that often are divided along ethnic and/or socio-economic lines. Lower-income neighborhoods tend to be compartmentalized and marginalized.
 - > In order for the JFC to develop effective PSYOP and CA plans, intelligence resources need to identify expectations that may differ according to economic strata, cultural backgrounds, or other factors.
 - > At a minimum, all military personnel need to be thoroughly and typically briefed on the cultural peculiarities, ethnic tensions, and political climate of the urban area.
- Establishing contact and influencing members in specific areas will depend on a number of factors including the homogeneity of the local population, sectional antipathies, factional differences, relations with authority figures, and susceptibility to propaganda.
 - > The effectiveness of television, radio, leaflets, billboards, loudspeakers, and other mediums in dispersing information and propaganda will depend on the availability of electricity, appliances, and levels of literacy.

Looting and black market activity in Somalia had significant impact on the level of control necessary to distribute relief supplies throughout the country. If the JFC had a more accurate sense of the extent to which illegal commercial activity would disrupt the relief supply distribution effort, sufficient negotiations/force could have been massed and applied to the critical nodes of black market trade.

Effects of munitions on various building materials are still poorly documented. Spalling, debris, and flying glass tend to cause more friendly casualties than enemy fire.

Both fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft over-flights were employed in the former Yugoslavia in an intimidation role—an application that capitalized on the threat, rather than the actual use, of firepower.

During the battle of Grozny, two Chechen fighters took a building in Grozny and seized Russian prisoners after two of their comrades had been killed. They executed two of the prisoners and then released the others. Their behavior was predictable given the ancient system of retribution, *adat*, culturally ascribed by clan tradition. Ethnic and religious traditions, beliefs, and volitions, such as those seen in Chechnya, can become mental force multipliers that over the long term can outlast weaponry and manpower. If aware of these factors, the JFC can account for them during operational planning.

Soon after peace operations began in the Dominican Republic, the 1st Psychological Warfare Battalion deployed with various types of broadcasting and printing facilities. Loudspeaker trucks proved to be very effective in imparting information. The unit also ran a radio station powerful enough to reach the interior of the island.

Figure III-2. Understanding the Urban Area, cont.

Air Considerations and Planning Factors

- Challenges of urban close air support and air interdiction (fratricide, enemy identification, collateral damage, terminal attack control)
- Urban air navigation challenges, especially over large urban areas
- Flight hazards of high-density wires, antennas, and obstructions
- Difficulties in achieving undetected ingress
- Reduced flight visibility due to smog/industrial haze
- Urban lighting effect on aircrew night optical devices
- High-density radio frequency effects on aircraft communications, instrumentation, and navigational aides
- Increased threats to flight, including high-density small arms fire
- Aircraft ground security
- Unique challenges of urban personnel recovery
- Landing zone (LZ) and fast rope

Figure III-3. Air Considerations and Planning Factors

Defining and understanding the urban area prior to operational planning may require extensive intelligence gathering and reliance on SOF, including CA and PSYOP units. The JFC should optimize intelligence resources and capabilities in order to map the urban area as a dynamic, multidimensional landscape that is highly interactive. A mutually supportive combination of human, electronic, and archival data should allow the JFC to thoroughly identify and analyze an adversary's dependencies. This is central to the JFC's ability to shape and control behavior through an "operational effects" orientation.

Information/Intelligence Required for Joint Urban Operations²

The role intelligence plays in successful urban operations cannot be overstated. Intelligence supports all aspects of a campaign and provides the basis for action throughout the range of military operations. During JUO, the JFC relies on comprehensive intelligence to determine the socio-political environment, terrain features, adversary capabilities, mission objectives, and operational concepts. Intelligence gathered at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels allows the JFC to decide which forces to deploy; when and where to deploy them; and how to employ them in a manner that accomplishes the mission at the lowest human and political cost. Gaining and maintaining intelligence dominance during

a JUO enhances the JFC's flexibility; provides additional air-ground-maritime solutions appropriate to the situation at hand; identifies key enemy vulnerabilities; and helps the JFC clearly define the desired end state and determine when that end state has been achieved.

The JFC is responsible for identifying intelligence resources and establishing intelligence support. The Joint Intelligence Center (JIC) and the Joint Intelligence Support Element (JISE) are the primary intelligence organizations which provide support to the joint warfighter during a JUO. National and theater/regional command levels can use the JIC, while the JISE supports the joint force element. At the national command level, the National Military Joint Intelligence Center (NMJIC) is the focal point for all defense intelligence activities in support of joint operations and facilitates efficient access to available DoD information.

In addition, the National Intelligence Support Team (NIST) is tasked to provide tailored national-level, all-source intelligence to deployed commanders during crisis or contingency operations. Requiring minimal command support, the NIST provides a vital link from commanders operating in an urban area to the joint resources of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), National Security Agency (NSA), National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA), and the NMJIC. The reach-back provided by the NIST directly supports the JFC during a JUO. NIST capabilities include: expediting time-sensitive requests for information, coordinating indications and warning support, coordinating special assessments, providing video teleconferencing and electronic mail for analyst-to-analyst discussions, de-conflicting reporting from the different analysis producers, providing immediate access to national databases, coordinating imagery support from theater and national levels, and coordinating targeting and battle damage assessment support.³

<u>Intelligence</u>	<u>Definition</u>
TECHINT <i>Technical Intelligence</i>	Intelligence derived from exploitation of foreign materiel. Technical intelligence begins when an individual Service member finds something new on the battlefield and takes the proper steps to report it to strategic, operational, and tactical level commanders. The item is then exploited at succeeding higher levels until a countermeasure is produced to neutralize the adversary's technological advantage.
IMINT <i>Imagery Intelligence</i>	Intelligence derived from visual photography, infrared sensors, lasers, electro-optics, and radar sensors such as synthetic aperture radar wherein images of objects are reproduced optically or electronically on film, electronic display devices, or other media.
SIGINT <i>Signals Intelligence</i>	A category of intelligence comprising, either individually or in combination, all communications intelligence, electronics intelligence, and foreign instrumentation signals intelligence.
MASINT <i>Measurement and Signature Intelligence</i>	Scientific and technical intelligence obtained by quantitative and qualitative analysis of data (metric, angle, spatial, wavelength, time dependence, modulation, plasma, and hydromagnetic) derived from specific technical sensors for the purpose of identifying any distinctive features associated with the target. The detected feature may be either reflected or emitted.
HUMINT <i>Human Intelligence</i>	A category of intelligence derived from information collected and provided by human sources.
OSINT <i>Open Source Intelligence</i>	Information of potential intelligence value that is available to the general public.
CI <i>Counterintelligence</i>	Information gathered and activities conducted to protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted by or on behalf of foreign governments or elements thereof, foreign organizations or foreign persons, or international terrorist activities. The four functions of counterintelligence are operations; investigations; collection and reporting; and analysis, production, and dissemination.

Figure III-4. The Seven Primary Intelligence Sources

Sources of intelligence should include a mutually supportive combination of human, electronic, and archival data. Collection and production of SIGINT, HUMINT, IMINT, MASINT, TECHINT, OSINT, and CI provide the JFC with the intelligence needed to apply available forces wisely, efficiently, and effectively. Fusing imagery, signal, and electronic intelligence with archived data and ground-based human intelligence, the JFC can capitalize on information superiority and identify and analyze the adversary's nodes critical to the ability to operate effectively across the three-dimensional urban environment. For example, timely and accurate local area weather forecasts play a significant role in the development of a comprehensive intelligence plan. Precise local weather forecasting enables the JFC to anticipate what assets will provide the needed coverage for intelligence collection and assists the JFC in requesting, allocating, and tasking intelligence platforms. During all JUO, whether a combat situation or a humanitarian effort, intelligence organizational resources, methodologies, and products should be established and exercised regularly. All resources should be flexible and applicable to a range of military options and scenarios.

The Importance of HUMINT

If you don't understand the cultures you are involved in; who makes decisions in these societies; how their infrastructure is designed; the uniqueness in their values and in their taboos—you aren't going to be successful.

George Wilson, *Air Force Times*

Experience in JUO clearly demonstrates that HUMINT is essential to understanding and communicating with the local population and to developing situational awareness. The urban area hosts a number of non-traditional human resources that the JFC should consult in order to determine, direct, and coordinate missions. SOF (including CA and PSYOP personnel), terrain analysts, military patrols in local villages, military engineers, UN military observers, and others who may have direct contact with the indigenous population can provide specialized and detailed intelligence to the operators and planning staff essential to developing and fulfilling the JFC's intent. These human assessments can address specific requirements relating to the local population and ramifications of joint force plans and actions.

Historical and cultural information and analysis are essential to understanding the proclivities of adversaries, their method of operation, and how they interact with their environment. This understanding is important to mission success. The JFC should know the disposition of the local population: is it friendly, neutral, or hostile, and what factors would change this disposition? By dividing the urban area into sectors based on information gathered (hostile versus non-hostile, armed population versus indifferent population), the JFC can deploy the tactics appropriate to deterring aggression and accomplishing mission objectives. For instance, it may be necessary to maximize the use of PSYOP or political actions in one part of an urban area; to launch an assault in another section; and finally, to use precision strikes to destroy installations with minimal collateral damage in other parts of an urban area.

Leveraging Civilian Intelligence Resources

The intelligence environment during Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR was complex and involved numerous, nontraditional resources. Civilian agencies (nongovernmental, private voluntary, and international organizations) were relied upon for their network of influential contacts, compiled historical and specialty archives, and established relationships with local leaders and business people. They understood the infrastructure of the region and had expertise in military, political, cultural, and economic issue areas. Civilian organizations analyzed a wide spectrum of threats, including the former warring factions, criminal activities, extremists, civil disturbances, and terrorism, along with monitoring equipment storage sites and barracks, human rights violations, mass gravesites, and potential “hot spots” caused by resettlement and inter-ethnic conflicts.

Lessons From Bosnia: The IFOR Experience

Figure III-5. Leveraging Civilian Intelligence Resources

An accurate picture of potential threats is fundamental to the success of an operation, as changes in the behavior of the local populace may force an adjustment in the operational plan. Hostile activities can impede forward movement, destroy logistics stockpiles, or close airports and seaports. Moreover, the behavior of noncombatants can either assist or derail military operations. The JFC should identify civilian needs, in-place authorities, those willing to assist friendly forces, and those sympathetic toward adversarial objectives in order to gauge potential reactions of population segments to the urban operation.

The JFC should construct an intelligence architecture that can monitor tactical military capabilities as well as provide current and predictive information on the intentions of both combatant and noncombatant populations. Failure to use all intelligence assets in the analysis of political, economic, and social instability may result in inadequate responses to the root causes of the instability and, in turn, initiate and/or prolong urban conflict. Often present in the urban area prior to military involvement, civilian agencies may maintain an array of critical contacts, historical and specialty archives, and relationships with local leaders. By exploiting intelligence capabilities across Service and agency boundaries and sharing information among echelons of command, the JFC can better predict threats to mission success and ensure that adequate force protection measures are implemented.

All attempts to collect information from NGOs, PVOs, and other civilian organizations should be characterized by openness and transparency, including a clear statement of the purposes for which information will be used, so as to avoid undermining cooperative efforts. During a JUO, recognition of the civilian organization's willingness to share information must be respected and accepted in order to continue positive interaction between the military and the organization, as well as the organization and the people it is serving.

Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) in Urban Operations⁴

Effective C4ISR employs a synergistic architecture linking joint force command and control, communication, and computer (C4) nodes with intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets. An efficient C4ISR architecture should supply the joint force with a continuous automated flow and processing of information through rapid and secure voice, data, facsimile, and video communications. Well-planned execution of operations with the appropriate C4ISR systems gives the JFC the advantage of making timely,

C4ISR Capabilities of Aerospace Assets

Overflying aircraft and satellites can provide real-time intelligence and relay transmissions from forces within or around an urban area. These airborne ISR resources can be as sophisticated as the Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS), EP-3 Aries II electronic warfare and reconnaissance aircraft, or Predator unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) or as technologically simple as a video camera in a scout helicopter. However, imagery assets have only a limited capability to detect the activities inside buildings and cannot detect activities underground.

effective decisions. During an urban operation, the JFC may need to give special consideration to the challenges of communicating in an urban area.

For example, joint force units operating over, under, around, or within an urban area may have difficulty communicating with other joint force units due to interference from urban area structures. Although JFCs may face similar challenges in other types of operational environments, such as jungles or mountains, the density of these urban structures exacerbates interference. On the other hand, urban infrastructure can

Figure III-6. C4ISR Capabilities of Aerospace Assets

also offer opportunities to facilitate telecommunications. Because urban areas are generally technological hubs, JFCs requiring additional telecommunications capabilities may find important communications resources accessible in the urban area of operation.

Urban Telecommunication Considerations

Joint force units operating over, under, around, or within a city may have difficulty communicating to other joint force units due to interference from city structures. The density of these urban structures exacerbates the impact of this interference on the ability to communicate as compared with other environments. Therefore, communications system, operational, and technical considerations must be addressed prior to beginning an urban operation.

System	Operational	Technical
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Radio Frequency (RF) signals may be degraded • Communications systems may need more power to “blast” through buildings • LOS communications may be limited • Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP) communications may be difficult to support • Specialized communications architectures may be needed due to the different capabilities of NGOs assigned to CMOC 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Conventional systems may be inadequate • Situational awareness may be required to conduct Close Air Support (CAS) operations • There may be need for: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Redundancy (for frequency bands) - Cellular phones (to possibly leverage civilian infrastructure) - Tactical satellite communications to offset LOS shortfalls - Retrans (more retrans locations; requirement to constantly move the locations) - Standardized message formats (to pass data) - Special communications planning (retrans, relays, antenna siting, etc.) - Utilization of visual signals and other means of communications to supplement radio communications 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Changing message formats • Difficulty maintaining situational awareness (due to decreased capability of GPS in urban areas) • Improperly formatted data • Incompatible transmission media (civilian agencies) • RF interference with host nation telecommunications infrastructure

Figure III-7. Urban Telecommunication Considerations

Combat Camera

Combat camera can be used to:

- Visually document for NCA what joint forces are accomplishing, versus relying on potentially inaccurate media reports
- Provide JFCs with an effective means to refute enemy claims of collateral damage, excess force, etc.
- When combined with gun camera tapes from US Air Force, US Navy, and US Army aviation, combat camera can provide a rapid means by which a joint force can tailor tactics, techniques, and procedures appropriate to the urban scenario at hand

In addition, SOF may be able to offer unique C4ISR capabilities to the JFC during an urban operation. SOF are trained, equipped, and organized to undertake special reconnaissance (SR) missions that may prove useful in JUO. For example, a JFC may consider utilizing SOF assets to relay critical information across the urban terrain. JUO commanders should identify any specialized

Figure III-8. Combat Camera

units and/or equipment required for urban operations as early as possible.

Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)⁵

The threat of WMD occurs across the range of military operations and may be used in isolation or as an adjunct to conventional combat power. A JFC operating in an urban environment must be prepared to deter and/or defend against adversary nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) weapons use or mishap. NBC defense operations present many unique challenges to commanders operating in an urban area. The greatest problem from a civil-military operations' perspective is the decontamination of infrastructure, the decontamination and possible relocation of the civilian population, and the decontamination of military forces. A clear understanding of the effects of WMD, along with the implementation of the principles of NBC defense, can significantly reduce these challenges.

An NBC defensive strategy demands effective orchestration of the joint force and resources in providing direction, intelligence, and employment to counter enemy NBC war making capabilities. Avoidance, protection, and decontamination are the primary principles of NBC defense during a JUO. NBC defense should include planning and coordinating strategic intelligence to determine enemy NBC capabilities and vulnerabilities; proliferation, intentions, and indications; and warning measures. When operating in an urban area, the JFC's first priority is to protect friendly forces and noncombatants and safeguard strategic centers of gravity throughout the range of JUO. When operating in an urban area, the JFC should employ active security and defense measures, conduct deception operations, and be prepared to provide logistical and medical support for possible NBC defense operations.

B. Civil-Military and Interagency Support in the Urban Area

Civil-military operations (CMO) and public affairs (PA) require collaboration among US forces, governmental agencies, NGOs, international organizations, PVOs, and in many instances, the media, in order to carry out broad-based objectives. In a JUO, this interagency, multi-organizational involvement necessitates a range of civil-military activities to garner support from the local populace and enhance the effectiveness of the military operation while minimizing friendly and noncombatant casualties.

In an operational sense, the problem of achieving maximum support and minimum civilian interference with urban operations will require the intentional cultivation of popular goodwill and the coordination of intelligence efforts, security measures, and operational efficiency.

Civil-Military Operations

The ability of the JFC to communicate effectively with staff, multinational coalitions, and humanitarian organizations will be critical to CMO success in an urban operation. Military support activities, such as CA and PSYOP, may be used to help achieve specific military, political, and economic objectives. Moreover, through support, assistance, advisement, coordination, and strategic planning, CMO may help commanders understand the unique economic, cultural, social, and military characteristics of the urban environment. For example, CA and PSYOP personnel may be able to help address the local population and enemy forces respectively, while PA personnel may interact with US forces as well as national and international media representatives. During an urban operation the JFC should remember that CA, PSYOP, and PA are force multipliers and should be fully integrated—information disseminated by one organization should be available to all sources.

Civil Affairs⁶

CA serves as a link between military and civilian operations by securing support from the civilian populace for military involvement; forging positive relationships with host nation counterparts and government officials; and assuring civil or indigenous understanding of and compliance with controls, regulations,

directives, or other measures taken by commanders to accomplish the military mission and attain US objectives.

CA activities during a JUO may include advising civilian authorities and the public on their relationship with military forces, strengthening host government legitimacy, and/or preventing or reducing violence by bridging critical gaps between the civilian and military sectors. In addition, CA units may coordinate and facilitate the operations of in-country agencies in order to help rebuild or build the infrastructure of the urban area, including schools, health facilities, agricultural works, houses, etc. To do this, CA functional specialists may coordinate with other units, local authorities, officials, relief organizations, and additional US and international agencies and provide information on where additional manpower, experience, and equipment can be obtained. CA units also help determine the goods and services available in-theater that might be of use to the JFC during a JUO.

Individual Service CA Capabilities

- US Army—US Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) maintains four regionally aligned civil affairs commands/brigades under the Army Reserve Command United States Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command (USACAPOC). In addition to psychological operations groups, USACAPOC includes one Army Active Component (AC) CA battalion consisting of regionally oriented companies and is structured to deploy rapidly and provide initial CA support to military operations until RC CA assets can be deployed. Unlike the RC units which comprise nearly 97 percent of the Army's CA forces, the AC battalion is not designed or resourced to provide the full range of CA specialty skills.
- US Marine Corps—USMC commands, with reserve augmentation, have the capability to plan and conduct CA activities in contingency or crises response operations. The USMC does not maintain AC CA units. CA activities are carried out using all assets from within a Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF). CA activities are limited to the minimum essential civil-military functions necessary to support

the assigned missions. USMC RC CA units consist of two Civil Affairs Groups (CAGs) that are organic to, and augment the capability of, the MAGTF.

- US Navy—Neither the Navy nor the Coast Guard maintains CA units. However, Navy construction battalions, legal officers, Coast Guard law enforcement, search and rescue personnel, medical personnel, harbor defense, etc. have the capabilities to support and/or complement CA activities.
- US Air Force—The Air Force does not maintain CA units. However, USAF AC, RC, and National Guard Commands have a variety of functional organizations, including legal, supply, health service support, engineer, security forces, and construction resources with capabilities that support and/or complement CA activities.

Psychological Operations⁷

The principal objective of PSYOP is to promote specific opinions, emotions, attitudes, and/or behavior of a foreign audience in support of US or coalition objectives. Personnel assigned to PSYOP include regional experts and linguists who understand the political, cultural, ethnic, and religious subtleties of the urban area, as well as functional experts in technical fields such as broadcast journalism; radio operation; print, illustration, and layout operations; and long-range tactical communications. PSYOP assets can assist the operational commander in overcoming some of the fundamental challenges of an urban environment. For example, assistance may include non-PSYOP military information support to missions such as humanitarian assistance, refugee control, and NEOs. Whether in a combat operation or MOOTW, PSYOP gives the operational commander the ability to reach a target audience in an urban area with specific messages designed to elicit desired responses.

Public Affairs⁸

All they need to do really is quietly let people know truth. There is no need to bang the big drum. Official reports should stick to the absolute truth—once you start lying, the war's as good as lost...All this talk of guiding public opinion and maintaining the national morale is so much empty puff.

Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, 1884–1943

Censorship today is virtually impossible, with backpack satellite-broadcast systems and telephones that allow reporters to file their copy from anywhere in the world.

James Adams, Washington Bureau Chief, *London Sunday Times*

The mission of joint PA is to expedite the flow of accurate and timely information about the activities of US joint forces to the public and internal audiences. News media representatives and military journalists will conduct first-hand and after-the-fact reporting of joint operations, and the information they are given must be consistent with national and operational security.

PA is important because news media can significantly affect the execution of military operations, and particularly JUO. This is due to the complex relationship among information, the public (international and domestic), and policy formulation. Much of the public's knowledge of national activity is informed by the news media. Although the degree to which this connection succeeds in shaping US government policy is arguable, news media conveys information that can affect urban operations. PA helps manage the flow of information from the event to the public via the media.

Failure to do this can hamper the JFC's ability to conduct an urban operation. For example, because the Russian military refused to communicate with reporters during Russia's battle against Chechen separatists in Grozny in 1994, the media primarily reported the perspective of Chechen rebels. This encouraged local support in Grozny for the Chechens and allowed the rebels, who lacked sophisticated command and control equipment, to openly broadcast operational guidance to their forces.

On the other hand, successful engagement of the media can serve as a force multiplier. For example, the US military's openness and responsiveness to the media during peacekeeping efforts in urban areas such as Brcko and Sarajevo have helped explain the challenges and successes of US forces in the Balkans to the public. This helped maintain political support for Balkan operations both domestically and internationally, as well as encouraging the morale of US soldiers serving in the Balkans.

Thus, support for operations and the military itself may rely to a great degree on how media represent US forces' conduct in operations. It is the JFC's responsibility to manage the flow of information that media receive and subsequently present to the public. Consequently, PA guidance is essential to a JFC planning and/or undertaking military operations. It is particularly important in JUO.

Fundamental aspects of urban areas magnify the importance of PA in JUO. This is due to:

- **The increased importance of noncombatants in urban operations.** As previously discussed, noncombatants play an important role in JUO. Media reporting can strongly influence noncombatants in urban areas of operation, as the previous example of the Battle of Grozny demonstrates.
- **The increased likelihood of media presence in urban areas.** Urban areas tend to be more accessible than other military areas of operation. This is due to the close vicinity of airports, ports, and major surface thoroughways into most urban areas versus the relative lack of access into jungles, deserts, etc. These increased points of access make it easier for media representatives to enter an urban locale and report on a JUO.
- **Urban areas tend to have the technological resources required by news media.** Technological resources enable the media to report easily from within urban areas, often in ways that a joint force has

difficulty controlling, such as mobile satellite links and cellular telephones. This can jeopardize operational security (OPSEC).

For these reasons, it is important that JFCs undertaking JUO recognize the importance of working with the media to ensure the dissemination of accurate and timely information to the general public, military personnel, civilian employees, and family members. The following considerations should help facilitate this:

- It is likely that media representatives will seek to interview Service members, making every soldier, sailor, Marine, and airman a potential spokesperson. Thus, commanders should disseminate PA guidance throughout the joint force. The JFC should use every opportunity to allow the media access to unit personnel and create an open channel of dialogue.
- The JFC should keep in mind that voids in information supplied to the media by the military may be filled with hostile propaganda and/or media speculation. By proactively assisting news media representatives, commanders help reporters understand the joint force's role and produce coverage that enhances confidence in US policy and the US military. Nevertheless, JFCs must balance OPSEC and other operational requirements with PA needs.
- PA, CA, and PSYOP messages must be coordinated early during the planning process. A continual exchange of information must exist during execution. Although PA, CA, and PSYOP messages may be different, they must not contradict one another or the credibility of all three will be lost. Although each has specific audiences, information will often overlap between audiences. This overlap makes de-conflicting messages crucial. Under no circumstances will PA personnel engage in PSYOP activities, or vice versa. The JFC will establish separate agencies and facilities for PA and PSYOP activities. At no time will PSYOP personnel address the media, unless related to coverage of the PSYOP function.

- The ability of the news media to transmit instantaneous and often live reports must be considered when planning an operation. Failure to adequately plan can create a situation that endangers news media representatives and the operation itself.
- Joint and multinational PA activities require personnel, transportation, communications, and technical resources. These assets are essential to the conduct of PA operations. The goal is to anticipate and respond to fluctuating coverage and to tailor resources to ensure no loss of efficiency. As part of this resource planning, facilities must be designated for the functioning of the PA infrastructure and for the news media. In addition, it is likely that the peacetime staffing of an organization's PA office will be inadequate to respond to the inevitable increase in news media and public interest, so contingency planning must address the need for rapid expansion of the PA staff.

Interagency Communication and Coordination⁹

What's the relationship between a just-arrived military force and the NGOs and PVOs that might have been working in a crisis-torn area all along? What we have is a partnership. If you are successful, they are successful; and, if they are successful, you are successful. We need each other.

General John M. Shalikashvili

Military means alone may be insufficient to meet national or coalition objectives in JUO. Commanders and military planners have to integrate and coordinate their activities with those of other organizations addressing needs that are beyond the capabilities of military forces, including pre-hostility, combat, and post-hostility responsibilities.

JP 3-08, "Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations, Volume 1," states that "interagency coordination forges the vital link between the military instrument of power and the economic, political and/or diplomatic, and informal entities of the US Government as well as nongovernmental organizations." The JFC has a number of tools to help facilitate interagency communication in the

urban environment. The JFC should maintain a good working relationship with a variety of nongovernmental and governmental agencies.

Examples of such entities are numerous and varied. The JFC will find the State Department, US Agency for International Development (USAID), or the UN among those agencies frequently and actively involved in a crisis region. Nongovernmental organizations—such as the Peace Corps, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the International Committee of the Red Cross and Red Crescent, or Africare—may be engaged in the theater as well. Organizations such as these often have been immersed in the conflict long before the joint force arrives and often remain long after the joint force departs. Many of these organizations possess a vital understanding of the complexities of the crisis at hand, have a legitimate role to play in the urban environment, and can serve as an asset to the JFC.

A successful operation in the urban environment will combine the strengths, interests, and institutional knowledge of the appropriate agencies, departments, and organizations involved in the region. Achieving this critical “unity of effort” among all the players at the operational level, however, can be elusive. Institutional and organizational biases in policies, procedures, and techniques may serve to work against the collective goal of creating and maintaining cohesion. Furthermore, NGOs and PVOs do not operate under the military or governmental aegis, making command and control with these actors hard to facilitate. Thus, effective interagency coordination at the operational level requires a deliberate, well-planned effort by the JFC and his staff. Organizational and planning initiatives in the early stages of an operation—including the recognition of mutual objectives—will enable close and constructive dialogue between all agencies involved.

11 Steps for Organizing Interagency Coordination at the Operational Level

1. Identify all agencies, departments, and organizations that are or should be involved in the operation
2. Establish an authoritative interagency hierarchy, considering the lead agency identified at the national level, and determine the agency of primary responsibility
3. Define the objectives of the response effort
4. Define courses of action for both theater military operations and agency activities while striving for operational compatibility
5. Solicit from each agency, department, or organization a clear definition of the role that each plays in the overall operation
6. Identify potential obstacles to the collective effort arising from conflicting departmental or agency priorities
7. Identify the resources required for the mission and determine which agencies, departments, or organizations are committed to provide these resources, reducing duplication and increasing coherence in the collective effort
8. Define the desired end state and exit criteria
Maximize the mission's assets to support the longer-term goals of the
9. enterprise
10. Establish interagency assessment teams
11. Implement crisis action planning

(JP 3-08)

Figure III-9. 11 Steps for Organizing Interagency Coordination at the Operational Level.

To be used in the planning stages of an urban operation, these steps provide the organizational framework necessary for ensuring that interagency considerations are accounted for and that common pitfalls are avoided, including problems such as incomplete operational coordination, interagency logistics confusion, and *ad hoc* command arrangements. In addition to this framework, the JFC has a number of tools with which to establish the infrastructure for interagency cooperation.

- **The Country Team**—The senior, in-country, US coordinating and supervising body, headed by the Chief of the US diplomatic mission,

and comprised of the senior member of each represented US department or agency, as desired by the Chief of the US diplomatic mission.

- **Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC)**—An *ad hoc* organization, normally established by the geographic combatant commander or subordinate, to assist in the coordination of activities of engaged military forces, and other US government agencies, NGOs, PVOs, and regional and international groups. With no established structure, its size and composition are situation-dependent.
- **Executive Steering Group (ESG)**—Composed of the principals from the joint force, the ambassador’s staff, and the relevant NGOs and PVOs, the ESG interprets and coordinates theater aspects of strategic policy. The ESG can provide for a high-level exchange of information and serve to assist in resolving difficulties among the various organizations.
- **Liaison Sections**—Serving as the focal point for communication and information exchange with external agencies and the host nation government, Liaison Teams can centralize direction over planning, coordination, and operations. Composed of designated liaison officers, their primary role is to foster better relations and understanding between participating forces, agencies, and local governmental entities.
- **Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Center (HACC)**—A temporary body that operates during the early planning and coordination phases of a humanitarian assistance operation. Normally composed of representatives from USAID/Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), US Public Health Service, US Army Corps of Engineers, key NGOs and PVOs, and international and regional organizations. The HACC’s responsibilities diminish upon the creation and implementation of the CMOC.

- **JTF Assessment Team**—Deployed to the joint operations area to facilitate the mission analysis process (when feasible), the JTF Assessment Team is a US government-only entity that can provide valuable preliminary assistance in determining the scope of the mission, the type of force required, and the availability of in-country assets. It is normally constituted of Joint Staff (or unified command) personnel, logistic, engineer, medical, legal, and chaplain expertise, as well as CA officers and USAID/OFDA officials.
- **Political Advisor (POLAD)**—Assigned to the combatant commander by the Department of State, the CIA liaison officer, or any specifically assigned person, the POLAD may provide the JFC with diplomatic considerations, enable informal linkage with embassies, and supply information regarding policy goals and objectives of the Department of State. Specifically, when crisis action planning becomes necessary, the POLAD communicates with the appropriate ambassador(s) as part of crisis assessment and helps to bring together US national resources within the host country.

While the size and scope of each CMO in the urban environment will determine the extent to which some or all of these teams and centers will be needed, the need for interagency coordination will most likely be present in all urban contingencies. This is due to the changing nature of modern military operations and the inherently complex dynamics of the urban environment that necessitate an enhanced role for interagency coordination. Compensation for organizational and operational differences, agreement of command and control arrangements, and an overall unity of effort among all involved actors is crucial to operational success. Only through effective, thoughtful planning by the JFC can proper coordination be realized in the urban environment.

C. Multinational Coalitions and Urban Operations¹⁰

JUO in regional crises may involve coalitions different from familiar, long-standing alliance structures. Joint forces should be prepared to plan and

conduct urban combat operations and urban MOOTW with forces from other nations. When assessing the theater strategic environment, geographic combatant commanders must consider international security agreements, formal and informal command relationships with allies, collective security strategies, global and regional stability, and regional interrelationships. UN resolutions may also provide the basis for use of military forces in urban areas.

Coalition urban operations are accompanied by doctrinal, cultural, and language differences that challenge the overall coordination of the objective and the ability to achieve unity of effort. Lack of understanding and misperceptions can result in unanticipated and counterproductive constraints on the operation. In all JUO—particularly in the case of multinational coalitions—differences in cultural and national perspectives should be factored into every aspect of the urban operational plan to **ensure unity of effort in achieving a common mission.**

When operating in an urban environment, it is imperative that sound and effective command relationships are developed. For example, in Somalia, Unified Task Force (UNITAF) operations were successful, in part, because unity of effort was maintained—the US set the agenda and coalition partners agreed to the mission objectives and followed the US lead. A common understanding of command relationships will facilitate the required unity of effort. Multinational directives should delineate the degree of authority that may be exercised by a multinational commander and the procedures necessary to ensure the effectiveness of command relationships. Ideally, the coalition or alliance will designate a single military commander to direct the multinational efforts of participating forces.

The effectiveness of multinational operations will be improved by establishing rapport and harmony among senior multinational commanders. During a JUO, respecting multinational partners and their ideas, cultures, religions, and customs is as essential as assigning missions appropriate to each multinational partner's capabilities and ensuring that they have the necessary resources to accomplish those missions. Liaison centers can facilitate the dispersal of information, ease communications, and encourage cultural sensitivity.

During Operation RESTORE HOPE in Somalia, the communication and coordination between affected agencies and coalition forces were critical to the success of the initial humanitarian intervention. From day one, liaison and advisory teams started to work through communication issues, and the combat intelligence team (CIT) became involved in the operation. A CMOC served as the clearing-house for all information to and from the humanitarian agencies to the multinational coalition force, providing information on operations through daily briefings, responding to emergency requests in a timely manner, and keeping track of other activities as required (food, logistics, shipment arrivals); further, all patrols were debriefed.

Intelligence Considerations in Multinational JUO

Sharing of intelligence between coalition forces is essential to integrating all resources and capabilities into a unified system that will best fulfill the prioritized intelligence needs for joint operations. The JFC should:

- Adjust for national differences
- Determine requirements for special intelligence arrangements
- Seek full exchange of information
- Provide for complementary intelligence operations
- Establish a multinational intelligence center with representatives from all coalition nations
- Designate liaisons to address issues of culture, language, doctrine, and operational intelligence requirements
- Recognize issues of releasability and classification of intelligence

Figure III-10. Intelligence Considerations in Multinational JUO

The JFC should tailor coalition forces to ensure that communications, processing capability, and down-links are available for effective dissemination of mission objectives, intelligence, operational plans and procedures, tactics, and rules of engagement. Mission considerations for multinational forces include:

- Provide SOF Liaison Elements (SFLE) to US and coalition forces
- Assign missions that are commensurate with each multinational force's political commitment and military capability
- Consider command and control issues including: language, force capabilities, cultural and historical backgrounds, religious beliefs, logistics, training, and political goals and objectives

- Evaluate multinational leadership, self-discipline, commitment, knowledge, and capabilities (individual, unit, equipment) prior to mission assignment
- Determine logistical support requirements, capabilities, and responsibilities (to include medical)
- Determine what is an acceptable degree of risk for commitment of each unit in a multinational force for specific missions
- Treat all contingents as legitimate partners
- Centralize planning and decentralize execution

Vignette: Multinational Coalitions and Joint Urban Operations

Beirut, Lebanon: US Multinational Force (USMNF)

US Multinational Force (USMNF), consisting of forces from France, Britain, and the United States, was originally created to assist the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) evacuation from Beirut following Israel's 1982 invasion. The US Marines were well-trained to execute such an operation, as were their coalition partners. Nonetheless, due to the political sensitivity of the mission and the unique requirements of the evacuation, Ambassador Habib personally initiated an intensive planning process involving regular and extensive discussions of operational issues within the coalition. This process provided a central hub for information-sharing, decision-making, and arbitration, and resulted in exceptional coordination. Unfortunately, this high level of coordination did not continue through the presence phase of MNF operations. Significantly, there was no specific individual, such as Habib, to orchestrate planning and operations. As a result, the three MNF contingents conducted actions in their respective areas in accordance with directions received from the national authorities of each nation. Although a Military Committee was created, chaired by the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) representative and comprised of representatives from each MNF contingent and the LAF general staff, the committee functioned as no more than a conduit for the flow of information, rather than as a central point for coordinating military activities. Moreover, there were no Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) representatives on the committee (despite IDF occupation of sections of Beirut), and contact with the Israelis was restricted to diplomatic channels. The lack of combined coordination and shared doctrine presented problems as the situation in and around Beirut deteriorated. MNF contingents were increasingly confronted with harassment and attacks, and Lebanese forces under fire began requesting assistance. The MNF national contingents responded differently to such requests—this disjointed effort produced negative consequences. Although all three partners assisted the LAF, explicit US support through naval gunfire contributed to the perception of USMNF bias and made it the main target for opponent hostilities. Moreover, lack of coordinated response among MNF partners may have signaled questionable commitment levels to the combined operation, providing hostile factions with an incentive to exploit an already ill-defined mission.

D. Operating as a Joint Team

JFCs should understand the preeminent need to undertake JUO as a joint team. Urban areas present multi-faceted challenges to military forces. This is exacerbated by the fact that a single JUO may include missions as varied as humanitarian assistance and combat. Operational and environmental complications will require the application of diverse capabilities that transcend typical Service boundaries. This means that JFCs should:

- **Plan** JUO with the full range of joint assets in mind
- **Train** interactively from the joint task force level down to the lowest tactical levels with these joint assets to fully exploit the possibilities of cooperation; whenever possible, include representatives from international organizations in training events to gain a better understanding of their capabilities, concerns, and limitations
- **Use** the most appropriate combination of joint assets available when executing a JUO
- **Cooperate** with all relevant military, governmental, and nongovernmental agencies throughout the execution of JUO to overcome the potential limitations of command and control arrangements

Operation JUST CAUSE in Panama offers an example of how appropriate consideration of these factors may benefit a JUO. Prior to the deployment of Joint Task Force South, the US spent two years planning the operation and three months fine tuning it. US forces trained by extensive rehearsals and nearly half of the operational forces were in place in Panama before 16 December 1989.

The complex plan called for careful synchronization of both SOF and conventional forces in order to develop a maximum disruptive effect. Planning and operations were fully integrated across all four Services, while the sequencing of forces took full advantage of land, naval, air, and special operations capabilities. Following the capture of Noriega, SOF, including PSYOP and CA personnel, were attached to units to work with the local population and serve as

advisors, translators, liaisons, and assist in refugee control. This proved highly effective and aided in reestablishing law and order, promoting stability, and assisting in the establishment of a new Panamanian government. The success of JUST CAUSE serves to illustrate how planning, training, cooperation, and using the most appropriate combination of joint assets available foster a sense of a joint team which is absolutely necessary to the conduct of a successful JUO.

Trained and ready forces that are rapidly and strategically deployable are required for response to spontaneous, unpredictable crises. Such forces are usually drawn from the active force structure and are tailored joint organizations that capitalize on the unique and complementary capabilities of the Services and US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). In many cases, RCs are required to facilitate deployment of such forces or provide capabilities that are necessary for a robust, versatile joint force. During the planning and implementation of JUO, JFCs and their subordinates should be knowledgeable of the capabilities and limitations of both AC and RC forces with respect to their ability to operate effectively in urban areas and contribute to the joint team.

E. Other Joint Urban Operational Planning Considerations

There are a number of basic planning considerations that must be weighed when coordinating operations during JUO. The proximity of forces, number and location of noncombatants, media presence, and other factors can force a JFC to rapidly alter tactical and operational conditions. Commanders and staffs at the strategic and operational levels must anticipate possible contingencies, unforeseen directives, and changes in mission throughout the operation. Given the challenges of the urban operating environment, the JFC should give special consideration to **rules of engagement, legal issues, and logistics** during a JUO.

Rules of Engagement (ROE)

US Foreign Policy may succeed or fail on the basis of how well rules of engagement are conceived, articulated, understood, and implemented.

Naval Justice School

As a defender of international law, democratic rule, and human rights, the US must pay special attention to the way it employs force. This is particularly true in JUO such as peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance, where a premium is placed on the avoidance of human fatalities and minimizing collateral damage.

ROE dictate **when, where, against whom, and how** force can be used. Development and modification of, training with, and broad dissemination of clear and concise ROE are crucial to force protection and mission success during urban operations. ROE are issued by a competent military command authority, always recognize an individual's inherent right of self-defense, and never prohibit using whatever means necessary for personal and unit self-defense. ROE must also recognize the commander's inherent authority and obligation to use all necessary means to defend joint force units and other designated individuals. ROE are normally incorporated into every operational plan and operational order and ensure all operations are carried out in accordance with national policy goals, mission requirements, and the rule of law. Every military member has a duty to understand, remember, and apply ROE, and failure to comply with ROE may be punishable under the Uniform Code of Military Justice. Questions regarding ROE should be promptly elevated up the chain-of-command for command resolution.

In all circumstances, ROE should be tactically sound, flexible, understandable, enforceable, consistent with core combat capabilities, and disseminated at all levels. Because ROE may be modified during urban operations due to changes in threat or in the political situation, the development, distribution, training, and modification of ROE must be timely and responsive to changing mission and threat parameters and be in line with Service-specific core combat capabilities. Further, ROE should provide sufficient flexibility to respond to a variety of situations. **Key ROE considerations for JUO include: US**

policy, international law, threat, commander’s intent, operational considerations, and tactical capabilities.

Vignette: ROE in a Multinational Force

Beirut, Lebanon: US Multinational Force (USMNF)

The ROE for the USMNF presence in Beirut were restrictive throughout the mission, despite escalating hostilities that threatened the force and its ability to carry out its mission. The restrictive ROE reflected the assumed permissive environment and the desire to emphasize the peaceful nature of the mission. In addition, restraint on the part of the USMNF was meant to bolster the perception of USMNF neutrality and to signal confidence in the Lebanese Armed Forces’ (LAF) ability to manage hostilities. Stringent ROE also would prevent noncombatant casualties that could undermine local and international support for the mission. As such, the US Marines were required to carry unloaded weapons and were prohibited from firing into areas where the potential for civilian casualties was high. When the force did return fire, it had to be in self-defense and strictly proportionate in response. As hostilities escalated and direct attacks on the USMNF increased, the ROE were modified slightly to allow loaded weapons while patrolling and to permit naval gunfire in support of the LAF, the latter of which had the unfortunate effect of diminishing perceived American neutrality. In general, however, the ROE were maintained, severely limiting USMNF response options to the attacks. These limitations enabled hostile factions to attack the USMNF from civilian areas with relative impunity, undermining the force’s ability to protect itself and to carry out its “presence” responsibilities. Significantly, successive commanders interpreted mission activities in light of the escalating hostilities and restrictive ROE very differently. The third commander sought to maintain outward presence by continuing his reliance on patrols to gain valuable information, promote goodwill with the local population, and signal the commitment to the mission. In contrast, the final Marine Amphibious Unit commander modified the strategy, electing to reduce patrols and “hunker down” in the compound. Although his intent was to diminish the vulnerability of his force, the shift in course may have actually increased force vulnerability by reducing HUMINT capability, undermining local perception of US commitment, and providing a ready target for terrorist attack. The lesson from USMNF in Beirut is that ROE should complement, rather than shape, how a force executes a mission.

Vignette: Selective ROE

Beirut, Lebanon: Operation PEACE IN GALILEE

During Operation PEACE IN GALILEE, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) were confronted with a large noncombatant population that was intentionally exploited by the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) to shield its fighters and assets. Following a failed attempt to convince all civilians to leave West Beirut, the IDF adopted a two-tiered approach aimed at isolating noncombatants from combatants and influencing noncombatants to support PLO withdrawal. The ROE for this approach were also two-tiered and involved a highly selective combination of non-violent manipulation and force. At best, the strategy achieved only marginal success in influencing civilian behavior. The fate of noncombatants did, however, dramatically diminish the overall political success of the operation by challenging the morality of the means employed by the PLO to achieve military victory. The two-tiered approach distinguished between Lebanese and Palestinian civilians, the latter of which were considered PLO sympathizers and therefore legitimate targets. The approach, enabled by the existence of geographically distinct population enclaves, was intended to exploit Lebanese-Palestinian divisions and to provide a safe haven within the city to signal that survival through withdrawal from high threat areas was an option. Accordingly, areas populated largely by Lebanese were subject primarily to non-violent methods of influence, such as manipulation of basic services (electricity, water) and intermittent denial of access to fuel and food. Bombing in these areas was tightly controlled, with strict ROE for target selection and weapons' release. In contrast, the IDF exercised far less target discrimination in the southern suburbs and refugee camps populated almost exclusively by Palestinians. By the end of the campaign, these areas received intense ground, aerial, and naval bombardment, resulting in high civilian casualties. Although the ostensible purpose of the bombings was to strike military targets, the attacks were also meant to pressure those parts of the urban population that supported the combatants. Indeed, IDF bombings were accompanied by psychological measures such as low-level flyovers, dropping of flares, and sonic booms that were intended to frighten the populace and break its will to resist. The two-tiered approach may have succeeded in dividing some loyalties within the city, but little evidence indicates that Lebanese pressure on the PLO was intense or effective in provoking PLO withdrawal. More importantly, the actual and perceived treatment of noncombatants by the IDF created a political backlash to the operation within the international community and within Israeli society that, in many ways, offset the military gains. The Israeli experience demonstrates the inherent difficulty in separating combatants from noncombatants in an urban environment, the risks associated with manipulating noncombatants for operational purposes, and the hazards of harming civilians in the modern media age. In future JUO operations, the JFC may be unable to differentiate or separate combatants from noncombatants and must find ways to selectively influence various audiences. As the IDF case shows, the stakes are higher in a combat situation because failure to adequately distinguish noncombatants from combatants could result in excessive civilian casualties. At the same time, the JFC must be aware that even non-violent efforts to manipulate noncombatants may be politically sensitive. Finally, public relations are critical to operational success when operating in an environment with noncombatants. The JFC must work closely with the political advisor and public affairs staff to understand the potential political consequences of various courses of action and to aggressively shape the public image of the operation with a mind to influencing key audiences—domestic public opinion, international public opinion, the opponent, noncombatants, local factions, etc.—in order to garner or maintain support for the operation.

ROE must be clearly articulated and understood to establish the role of non-lethal weapons as an additional means of employing force, for the specific purpose of limiting the probability of death or serious injury to noncombatants or, in some circumstances, to enemy combatants. ROE are most effective when they are disseminated, understood, and rehearsed by all units involved in an urban operation. In coalition urban operations, allied forces must understand the ROE, and any differences between the ROE and instructions from allied headquarters must be resolved. Allies can still contribute to JUO even if their ROE vary somewhat from US ROE, as long as all participants coordinate and agree upon the variations.

During a JUO, rifle, machine gun, and other weapons rounds and fragments may pose a greater threat to noncombatants and friendly soldiers. Collateral damage inflicted upon homes, hospitals, and civilian infrastructure may lead to disease and starvation, creating a potential refugee situation. Likewise, extensive damage to urban infrastructure may make rebuilding financially overwhelming for a friendly host nation, a defeated enemy, and/or international aid sources. In these circumstances, the availability of non-lethal weapons systems may offer a greater range of options to forces operating under these conditions.

Additionally, the JFC may want to consider employing non-lethal options to gain advantage over those who rely exclusively on lethal options. The degree of provocation required to employ non-lethal options is substantially less. This may result in a more proactive posture and quicker response, as well the diminished likelihood of having a situation escalate to a point where deadly force is required to resolve the conflict. The JFC should keep in mind that demonstrated restraint may greatly diminish the anger and remorse felt when deadly force is required after non-lethal options have been applied and failed. Non-lethal weapons can facilitate post-incident stabilization by reducing populace alienation and collateral damage.

Legal Issues

A good legal advisor is a force multiplier and is essential to the JFC's ability to accomplish the mission in a lawful manner. The JFC's Staff Judge Advocate (SJA) should be familiar with the laws related to legal assistance, military justice, administrative and civil law, contract and fiscal law, and operational and international law. The entire campaign should be reviewed for compliance with domestic and international law. The SJA will be the most vital resource in the process of understanding the myriad of statutory, regulatory, and policy considerations.

In the role of operational advisor, the SJA develops and oversees execution of a legal services support plan; drafts general restrictive orders; provides advice and assistance in the development, interpretation, and modification of ROE; and advises various staff sections and boards as requested on the entire range of operational and politico-military issues.

During JUO, the JFC should consider having the SJA draft a *General Order* to establish basic policy for the joint force regarding prohibited activities while deployed.

The SJA also can assist in other areas including:

- The Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC)
- Targeting
- Disposition and treatment of refugees
- Disposition and treatment of displaced persons, detainees, evacuees, or expelled civilians
- PSYOP and CA
- Local culture, customs, and government
- Military and political liaison
- Claims
- Administrative and criminal investigations

- Environmental requirements
- Contingency contracting
- Legality of landing fees
- Interpretation of transit agreements

In multinational operations, coalition partners should be integrated into the planning process to ensure all legal requirements are identified. The SJA should be prepared to conduct liaison with local police forces, local authorities and court officials, and international organizations. Special attention should be given to the detention of local nationals or others who attack or disrupt the joint force as these situations can become politically complicated and culturally sensitive. In the likelihood of injured people and/or damaged property during JUO, the SJA should implement a compensatory claims system. In MOOTW, the JFC should direct the SJA to consider the following:

- Staffing a multinational task force law office
- Coordinating the efforts of attorneys from different nations and/or the UN
- Having foreign claims authority and sufficient assets to investigate and adjudicate claims
- Establishing civil administration if directed by the NCA
- Assisting with legal issues when dealing with NGOs and PVOs

Logistics¹¹

Logistics sets the campaign's operational limits.

JP-1, "Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States"

JP 4-0, "Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations," defines logistics as the process of planning and executing the movement and sustainment of operating forces in the execution of a military strategy and operations. The art of logistics is the way in which the JFC integrates the strategic, operational, and

tactical sustainment efforts within the theater, while scheduling the mobilization and deployment of units, personnel, and supplies in support of the employment concept of a geographic combatant commander.

Due to the Service-specific nature of much of the equipment and supplies used in JUO, individual Services are responsible for the implementation and execution of logistic functions for their own forces, unless it is otherwise provided for by agreements with national agencies or allies, or through common, joint, or cross-servicing assignments. The JFC reviews the requirements of the Service component commands and establishes priorities in order to utilize supplies, facilities, mobility assets, and personnel effectively.

During multinational operations, logistics is a national responsibility. In an urban environment, units will deploy with unit basic loads and be self-sufficient in all classes of supply except Class III – bulk fuels and POL – and Class IV – construction material. Logistics elements may be required to deal with a number of non-military entities (contractors, host nation organizations, and NGOs) during urban operations. A National Support Element provides full spectrum operational level logistics support to US forces and mission-essential common item support for US and multinational forces under certain conditions.

The JFC's objective is to minimize the logistical footprint through contracting, host nation support, inter-Service support agreements, acquisition and cross-servicing agreements, and local purchase whenever possible. The concept of sustainment is to “push” supplies and material to employed units until the urban objective is secured, then transition to a “pull” concept whereby engaged units obtain required replenishment stocks from designated sources of supply, and finally to transfer responsibilities to a logistics civilian augmentation program (LOGCAP) as soon as possible. In the urban area, overtasking of resources may develop (such as overuse of the main road to bring in tanks and HMMWVs or conflicted airspace use by the Services). The JFC can use the J4 to de-conflict these potential problems and coordinate the Services' logistic requirements.

JFC logistics plans in JUO should:

- Focus engineer effort on obstacle clearance and maintaining LOC, initial force beddown, and construction of initial security/force protection components
- Utilize field expedient procedures for field services
- Emphasize on-site exchange of maintenance secondary items
- Define vehicle/equipment recovery procedures
- Address considerations for protecting the environment
- Describe circumstances where controlled substitution is authorized
- Establish mobility and transportation policies, i.e., units will be self-sufficient, using organic assets
- Identify LOC and coordinate with engineers for maintenance and Military Police for security
- Establish medical policies to include evacuation plans and holding timelines
- State the surface and rotary-wing medical evacuation policy and procedure
- Cover mortuary affairs processes based on operational considerations
- Enumerate the evacuation, temporary interment, and mass burial policies

F. Conclusion

Although JUO may occur in the context of a wide variety of greater campaigns and major operations, they share unique characteristics that may challenge a joint force. This chapter should assist the JFC in gaining a practical perspective of the challenges posed by these characteristics. Understanding these

factors and how they affect each other in campaign planning and execution may help a future joint force avoid some of the pitfalls and mirror some of the successes of the historical urban operations discussed in Chapter Four of this Handbook.

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- ¹ JP 5-0, “Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations.”
 - ² JP 2-0, “Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Operations;” JP 2-01, “Joint Intelligence Support to Military Operations;” JP 2-02, “National Intelligence Support to Joint Operations.”
 - ³ JP 2-02, “National Intelligence Support to Joint Operations.”
 - ⁴ JP 6-0, “Joint Doctrine for Command, Control, Communications, and Computer (C4) Systems Support to Joint Operations;” JP 3-56, “Command and Control Doctrine for Joint Operations.”
 - ⁵ JP 3-11, “Joint Doctrine for Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Defense;” JP 3-12, “Joint Nuclear Operations.”
 - ⁶ JP 3-57, “Doctrine for Joint Civil Affairs.”
 - ⁷ JP 3-53, “Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations.”
 - ⁸ JP 1-07, “Doctrine for Public Affairs in Joint Operations.”
 - ⁹ JP 3-08, “Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations,” Vol. I and II. JP 3-08, Vol. II, presents a comprehensive list of US Government, NGOs, PVOs, regional and international agencies.
 - ¹⁰ JP 3-16, “Joint Doctrine for Multinational Coalitions.”
 - ¹¹ JP 4-0, “Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations.”