

## C4 ARCHITECTURE

The joint command, control, communications, and computers (C4) architecture provides a framework of functional and technical relationships for achieving compatibility and interoperability of C4 systems. Architectures provide the logical link between operational requirements and C4 systems development. They are based on doctrine defining command relationships and information requirements (what information is exchanged to support the varied functions of operations, intelligence, logistics, and planning). The supporting analyses for architectures document the doctrinal basis for joint interfaces and can recommend or prescribe an equipment solution for each interface. The equipment solution may be met by existing, programmed, or yet to be developed systems.

### Related Terms

C4 systems

### Source Joint Publications

JP 6-0 Doctrine for Command, Control, Communications, and Computer (C4) Systems Support to Joint Operations

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## C4I FOR THE WARRIOR


*"We have set the course with C4I For The Warrior concept. Many milestones have been achieved. The Global Command and Control System is well underway. We continue to make progress toward a common global vision to provide the Joint Armed Forces with the critical information they need."*

**General John M. Shalikashvili 12 June 1994**

**The Common Global Vision.** Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence (C4I) For The Warrior (C4IFTW) (see figure below) sets forth a 21st century vision of a global information infrastructure made up of a web of computer controlled telecommunications grids that transcends industry, media, government, military, and other nongovernment entities. C4IFTW provides a unifying theme, guiding principles, and milestones for achieving global C4I joint interoperability that will allow any warrior to perform any mission — any time, any place; is responsive, reliable, and secure; and is affordable.


**The Infosphere Architecture.** The C4I For The Warrior vision put the Armed Forces of the United States on a course toward an open systems architecture referred to as the global grid (see second figure below) that will provide virtual connectivity from anywhere to anywhere instantaneously on warrior demand.

The architecture of grid networks can support both vertical and horizontal information flow to joint and multinational forces. Commanders at all levels require a distributed communications grid comprised of links employing any electronic transmission media overlaying an area of responsibility/joint operations area. Nodal points may be terrestrial, airborne, and/or space-based. Nodal points automatically store, relay, and process information. Voice, data, and imagery flows together in digitized form across all communication paths. Automated user terminals from man portable to more stationary types allow personnel to instantly connect in any fashion desired (e.g., electronic mail; instantly reconfigured (virtual) voice radio nets; imagery; connected sensor grids; or extended personal presence by creating synthetic environments such as virtual reality).



The specific paths used to set-up virtual connectivity are controlled by computers. Warriors no longer depend on a single communication link, but have vastly increased reliability and flexibility with access via any of hundreds or thousands of circuits available through the Global Command and Control System and the Department of Defense information infrastructures, host nation, commercial service, or any combination. Virtual connectivity is automatically determined, established, and maintained on warrior demand through the grid network. When no longer needed, the resource is automatically made available providing efficient use of C4 resources.

**The Warrior Vision of the Infosphere.** The bottom line is a shared image of the battlespace between joint decision makers and warfighters at all levels and with instantaneous sensor to shooter connectivity. The joint force commander and subordinate leaders gain a coherent understanding of operational situations, regardless of the enemy’s actions or responses, strategically, operationally, or tactically. Commanders see the battlespace together as a team — they perceive and move ideas and knowledge in a timely and coherent fashion. The virtual grid also links sensors to shooters to allow rapid exploitation of opportunity and generate quick, decisive actions.



### Related Terms

#### Source Joint Publications

JP 6-0 Doctrine for Command, Control, Communications, and Computer (C4) Systems Support to Joint Operations

### CAMPAIGN

A series of related military operations aimed at accomplishing a strategic or operational objective within a given time and space. JP 1-02

Campaigns represent the art of linking battles and engagements in an operational design to accomplish strategic or operational objectives. Campaigns are conducted in theaters of war and subordinate theaters of operations; they are based on theater strategic estimates and resulting theater strategies. Campaigns of the Armed Forces of the United States are joint; they serve as the unifying focus for our conduct of warfare. Modern warfighting requires a common frame of reference within which operations on land and sea, undersea, and in the air and space are integrated and harmonized; that frame of reference is the joint campaign. As such, the joint campaign is a powerful concept that requires the fullest understanding by the leaders of the Armed Forces of the United States.

The joint campaign is planned within the context of the modern theater environment, a complex setting where events, especially in a crisis, can move rapidly. This puts a premium on the ability of joint force commanders (JFCs) and their staffs and components to conduct campaign planning under severe time constraints and pressures. The joint campaign supports national strategic goals and is heavily influenced by national military strategy. Logistics sets the campaign's operational limits. The joint campaign is oriented on the enemy's strategic and operational centers of gravity. The full dimensional joint campaign is in major respects "non-linear." That is, the dominant effects of air, sea, space, and special operations may be felt more or less independently of the front line of ground troops. Joint campaigns rest upon certain foundations of the joint operational art. These foundations are the key collective capabilities of the Armed Forces of the United States to wage war: warfighting competencies that have particular relevance to the joint campaign and may play key roles in ensuring its success. From these capabilities the JFC chooses and applies those needed to prosecute the campaign.

The joint campaign seeks to secure air and maritime superiority and space control. These are important for the effective projection of power. Furthermore, air and maritime superiority, and the enhanced support to terrestrial forces assured by space control, allow the JFC freedom of action to exploit the power of the joint force. For instance, air and maritime superiority are prerequisites to attaining a mobility differential over the enemy: first and foremost by protecting friendly mobility from the enemy and second by enabling joint interdiction to degrade the enemy's mobility. The capability of the armed forces for forcible entry is an important weapon in the arsenal of the JFC. Transportation enables the joint campaign to begin and continue. Direct attack of the enemy's strategic centers of gravity (by air, missile, special operations, and other deep-ranging capabilities) is an integral part of the joint theater campaign. Special operations afford a flexible and precise tool upon which the joint campaign often relies heavily. The joint campaign should fully exploit the information differential, that is, the superior access to and ability to effectively employ information on the strategic, operational, and tactical situation which advanced US technologies provide our forces. Sustained action on land, the capability provided by land power to the JFC, is often a key capability of the joint campaign. Finally, leverage among the forces is the centerpiece of joint operational art. Force interactions can be described with respect to friendly forces and to enemy forces. Friendly relationships may be characterized as supported or supporting. Engagements with the enemy may be thought of as symmetric, if our force and the enemy force are similar (e.g., land versus land) or asymmetric, if the forces are dissimilar (e.g., air versus sea, sea versus land). In combination, they illustrate the richness of relationships achievable with joint forces and the foundation for synergy that those relationships create.

Campaigns serve as the military focus for the conduct of war and often in operations other than war. Campaigns, especially in multinational efforts, must be kept simple and focused on clearly defined objectives. The more complex the campaign or the more players involved, the more time and effort it takes to plan and coordinate. Whenever possible, JFCs at all levels should plan far enough in advance to allow subordinates sufficient time to react to guidance and conduct their own planning and rehearsals.

To achieve assigned objectives, joint forces conduct campaigns and major operations. Functional and Service components of the joint force conduct subordinate and supporting operations, not independent campaigns. Campaigns are often conducted in phases. Campaign phasing should consider aspects such as prehostilities (including predeployment activities), lodgment, decisive combat and stabilization, follow-through, and posthostilities (including

redeployment). Logistics is critical to phasing. Logistics is key to arranging the operations of campaigns and should be planned and executed as a joint responsibility.

### Joint Campaigning in the Solomons, 1942-1943

The struggle for control of the Solomon Islands was a critical turning point in the war against Japan. These campaigns can best be appreciated as a sequence of interacting naval, land, and air operations.

Operations began with the August, 1942 amphibious landings at Guadalcanal, an audacious stroke to eliminate the threat posed by a potential Japanese air base on that island to the Allied air and sea lines of communications with Australia. During the next several months, under the tenacious leadership of General Alexander A. Vandegrift, USMC, Marine and later Army units fought a series of desperate land battles to defend Henderson Field, the captured airfield on Guadalcanal. During the same period US Navy and Allied naval forces fought six grueling surface actions, finally thwarting the Japanese naval bombardment that had so punished the land and air forces ashore. From Henderson Field flew a unique air force: Marine, Navy, and Army Air Forces planes under a single air command, the "Cactus Air Force." (CACTUS was the codeword for Guadalcanal.) In the words of Rear Admiral Samuel Eliot Morison, "If it had wings it flew; if it flew it fought...."<sup>1</sup>

In February 1943 the Japanese evacuated Guadalcanal. The Allies undertook a sequence of actions to capture the remaining Solomons and isolate the huge Japanese base at Rabaul. Local air superiority enabled naval surface forces to shield amphibious landings from enemy surface ships and submarines; land forces once ashore seized and built airfields; from these airfields air forces assisted in their defense and extended air cover to shield further naval advance; and then the cycle repeated. The Cactus Air Force grew into Air Solomons Command, a remarkably effective joint and combined air organization led in turn by Marine, Navy, and Army Air Forces commanders.

1. Rear Admiral Samuel E. Morison, *The Struggle for Guadalcanal* (Boston: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1949), 74.

### Related Terms

campaign plan; campaign planning; crisis action planning; deliberate planning; joint operation planning; operational art

### Source Joint Publications

JP 1	Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States
JP 0-2	Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)
JP 3-0	Doctrine for Joint Operations
JP 5-0	Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations

## CAMPAIGN PLAN

A plan for a series of related military operations aimed at accomplishing a strategic or operational objective within a given time and space. JP 1-02

## FUNDAMENTALS OF CAMPAIGN PLANS

- Provide broad strategic concepts of operations and sustainment for achieving multinational, national, and theater strategic objectives.
- Provide an orderly schedule of decisions.
- Achieve unity of effort with air, land, sea, space, and special operations forces, in conjunction with interagency, multinational, nongovernmental, private voluntary, or United Nations forces, as required.
- Incorporate the combatant commander's strategic intent and operational focus.
- Identify any special forces or capabilities the enemy has in the area.
- Identify the enemy strategic and operational centers of gravity and provide guidance for defeating them.
- Identify the friendly strategic and operational centers of gravity and provide guidance to subordinates for protecting them.
- Sequence a series of related major joint operations conducted simultaneously in depth.
- Establish the organization of subordinate forces and designate command relationships.
- Serve as the basis for subordinate planning and clearly define what constitutes success, including conflict termination objectives and potential posthostilities activities.
- Provide strategic direction; operational focus; and major tasks, objectives, and concepts to subordinates.
- Provide direction for the employment of nuclear weapons as required and authorized by the National Command Authorities.

The joint campaign plan achieves sequenced and synchronized employment of all available land, sea, air, special operations, and space forces — orchestrating the employment of these forces in ways that capitalize on the synergistic effect of joint forces. The objective is the employment of overwhelming military force designed to wrest the initiative from opponents and defeat them in detail. A joint force, employed in its full dimensions, allows the commander a wide range of operational and tactical options that pose multiple and complex problems for the enemy. Preparation of a campaign plan is appropriate when contemplated military operations exceed the scope of a single major operation.

Campaign plans are unique, with considerations that set them apart from other plans. These plans synchronize operations by establishing command relationships among subordinate

commands, by describing the concept of operations, by assigning tasks and objectives, and by task-organizing assigned forces. They orient on the enemy's centers of gravity; achieve simultaneous and synchronized employment of land, sea, air, space-based assets, and special operations forces; clearly define an end state that constitutes success, failure, mission termination, or exit strategy; and serves as the basis for subordinate planning. (See figure above.) Two of the most important aspects of this plan are the synchronized employment of forces and the concept for their sustainment.

The joint campaign plan is based on the commander's concept. The formulation of the commander's concept is the intellectual core of the campaign plan, which presents a broad vision of the required aim or "end state" (the commander's intent) and how operations will be sequenced and synchronized to achieve conflict termination objectives (including required postconflict measures). Accordingly, the campaign plan itself can be brief, though implementing orders will usually be longer.

The theater campaign plan embodies the combatant commander's vision of the arrangement of related major operations necessary to attain strategic objectives. Theater campaigns synthesize deployment, employment, sustainment, and subordinate operations into a coherent whole. Through theater campaign plans, combatant commanders define objectives; describe concepts of operations and sustainment; arrange operations in time, space, and purpose; organize forces; establish command relationships; assign tasks; and synchronize air, land, sea, space, and special operations, often in coordination with allies, interagency operations, nongovernmental operations, and even United Nations operations. Theater campaign plans are time-sensitive, iterative, and adaptive, depending on the mission and forces available.

*"In forming the plan of a campaign, it is requisite to foresee everything the enemy may do, and be prepared with the necessary means to counteract it. Plans of the campaign may be modified ad infinitum according to the circumstances, the genius of the general, the character of the troops, and the features of the country."*

**Napoleon II, *Maxims of War*, 1831**

Campaign plans form the basis for developing subordinate campaign plans and supporting plans and, under uncertain circumstances, the framework or a series of operation plans for phases of campaigns. Subordinate joint force commanders may develop subordinate campaign plans or operation plans that accomplish (or contribute to the accomplishment of) theater strategic objectives. Thus, subordinate unified commands typically develop campaign plans to accomplish assigned missions. Also, joint task forces can develop and execute campaign plans if missions require military operations of substantial size, complexity, and duration and cannot be accomplished within the framework of a single major joint operation. Subordinate campaign plans should be consistent with the strategy, theater guidance, and direction developed by the combatant commander and should contribute to achieving combatant command objectives.

Campaign plans are used by national authorities as well as by subordinates. By means of a campaign plan, combatant commanders give the National Command Authorities and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) information needed for intertheater coordination at the national level. Submission of a well-conceived campaign plan to the CJCS gives the combatant commander's estimated time-phased force requirements for consolidation with other combatant command forecasts at the national level. The campaign plan may be used to influence the joint strategic planning process.

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## CAMPAIGN PLANNING

The process whereby combatant commanders and subordinate joint force commanders translate national or theater strategy into operational concepts through the development of campaign plans. Campaign planning may begin during deliberate planning when the actual threat, national guidance, and available resources become evident, but is normally not completed until after the National Command Authorities select the course of action during crisis action planning. Campaign planning is conducted when contemplated military operations exceed the scope of a single major joint operation. JP 1-02

Campaign planning, like all joint operation planning, is based on evolving assumptions. It is characterized by the need to plan for related, simultaneous, and sequential operations and the imperative to accomplish strategic objectives through these operations. Campaign planning is as much a way of thinking about warfare as it is a type of planning.

Although not formally part of the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System, campaign planning encompasses both the deliberate and crisis action planning (CAP) processes. If the scope of contemplated operations requires it, campaign planning begins with or during deliberate planning. It continues through crisis action planning, thus unifying both planning processes.

Campaign planning and principles are the responsibility of the combatant commander. Combatant commanders translate national and theater strategy into strategic and operational concepts through the development of theater campaign plans. The campaign plan embodies the combatant commander's strategic vision of the arrangement of related operations necessary to attain theater strategic objectives. Based on strategy adopted during the crisis action planning procedures, combatant commanders design campaigns to accomplish national or multinational strategic military objectives. Campaign planning is a primary means by which combatant commanders arrange for strategic unity of effort and through which they guide the planning of joint operations within their theater. It communicates the commander's purpose, requirements, objectives, and concept to subordinate components and joint forces, as well as to supporting commands and Services, so that they may make necessary preparations.

Campaign planning has its greatest application in the conduct of combat operations, but can also be used in situations other than war. Campaign plans guide the development of supporting operation plans (OPLANs) or operation orders and facilitate national-level coordination of strategic priorities and resource allocations. The use of campaign planning is refocused as the scale of contemplated operations and the imminence of hostilities decreases. During peacetime deliberate planning, combatant commanders prepare joint OPLANs, including campaign plans, in direct response to taskings in the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan. Tasking for strategic requirements or major contingencies may require the preparation

of several alternative plans for the same requirement using different sets of forces and resources to preserve flexibility. For these reasons, campaign plans are based on reasonable assumptions and are not normally completed until after the National Command Authorities (NCA) selects the course of action during CAP. Deliberate plans may include elements of campaign planning, however these elements will have to be updated as in any deliberate plan used at execution. Execution planning conducted is for the actual commitment of forces when conflict is imminent. It is based on the current situation and includes deployment and initial employment of forces. When a crisis situation develops, an assessment is conducted that may result in the issuance of a CJCS WARNING ORDER. Courses of action (COAs) are developed based on an existing OPLAN or operation plan in concept format, if applicable. The combatant commander proposes COAs and makes any recommendations when the Commander's Estimate is forwarded to the NCA. The NCA select a COA and, when directed, the Chairman issues a CJCS ALERT ORDER. The combatant commander now has the essential elements necessary for finalizing the construction of a campaign plan using the approved COA as the centerpiece of the plan.



*Admiral Chester W. Nimitz briefs William D. Leahy, President Roosevelt, and General MacArthur on Pacific offensive plans, 26 July 1944. Throughout the Pacific War, Admiral Nimitz used intelligence to determine enemy intentions and arrange his campaigns and operations accordingly. At the Battle of Midway in June 1942, for instance, superb signals intelligence led to one of Nimitz' greatest victories.*

### Related Terms

campaign plan; campaign planning; crisis action planning; deliberate planning; joint operation planning; operational art

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
### CENTERS OF GRAVITY

Those characteristics, capabilities, or localities from which a military force derives its freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight. JP 1-02

A key concept that integrates intelligence and operations is centers of gravity, a term first applied in the military context by Clausewitz to describe “the hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends.” Joint doctrine defines centers of gravity as: “Those characteristics, capabilities, or localities from which a military force derives its freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight.” (See figure below.)

Finding and attacking enemy centers of gravity is a singularly important concept. Rather than attack peripheral enemy vulnerabilities, attacking centers of gravity means concentrating against capabilities whose destruction or overthrow will yield military success. Though providing an essential focus for all efforts, attacking centers of gravity is often not easy. “Peeling the onion,” that is, progressively first defeating enemy measures undertaken to defend centers of gravity, may be required to expose those centers of gravity to attack, both at the strategic and operational levels. Actions to extend offensive efforts throughout the theater, including deep penetrations of enemy territory, can increase the vulnerability of enemy centers of gravity.

This concept of centers of gravity helps joint force commanders focus their intelligence requirements (including the requirement to identify friendly centers of gravity that must be protected from enemy attack). Intelligence should be timely, objective, responsive, complete, accurate, and relevant. It should aid the identification of centers of gravity and suggest how they might most effectively be dealt with. Beyond that, however, intelligence should provide the capability to verify which desired military effects have or have not been achieved and



generally support the commander's situational awareness in what will often be a dynamic, fast-moving, and confusing (fog of war) situation.

The essence of operational art lies in being able to mass effects against the enemy's sources of power in order to destroy or neutralize them. In theory, destruction or neutralization of enemy centers of gravity is the most direct path to victory. However, centers of gravity can change during the course of an operation, and, at any given time, centers of gravity may not be apparent or readily discernible. For example, the center of gravity might concern the mass of enemy units, but that mass might not yet be formed. In such cases, determining the absence of a center of gravity and keeping it from forming could be as important as defining it.

Identification of enemy centers of gravity requires detailed knowledge and understanding of how opponents organize, fight, make decisions, and their physical and psychological strengths and weaknesses. Joint force commanders and their subordinates should be alert to circumstances that may cause centers of gravity to change and adjust friendly operations accordingly.

Enemy centers of gravity will frequently be well protected, making direct attack difficult and costly. This situation may require joint operations that result in indirect attacks until conditions are established that permit successful direct attacks. It is also important to identify friendly centers of gravity so that they can be protected. Long sea and air lines of communications from the continental US or supporting theaters can represent a center of gravity. National will can also be a center of gravity, as it was for the US during the Vietnam and Persian Gulf Wars.

#### **Related Terms**

operational art

#### **Source Joint Publications**

JP 1                      Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States  
JP 3-0                    Doctrine for Joint Operations

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## **CENTRALIZED PLANNING**

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A joint force commander (JFC) has the authority to organize forces to best accomplish the assigned mission based on the concept of operations. The organization should be sufficiently flexible to meet the planned phases of the contemplated operations and any development that may necessitate a change in plan. The JFC will establish subordinate commands, assign responsibilities, establish or delegate appropriate command and support relationships, and establish coordinating instructions for the component commanders. Sound organization should provide for unity of effort, centralized planning, and decentralized execution. Unity of effort is necessary for effectiveness and efficiency. Centralized planning is essential for controlling and coordinating the efforts of the forces. Decentralized execution is essential because no one commander can control the detailed actions of a large number of units or individuals. When organizing joint forces with multinational forces, simplicity and clarity are critical. Complex or unclear command relationships or organization are counterproductive to developing synergy among multinational forces.

#### **Related Terms**

decentralized execution; unity of effort

#### **Source Joint Publications**

JP 3-07                    Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War


### CHAIN OF COMMAND

The succession of commanding officers from a superior to a subordinate through which command is exercised. Also called command channel. JP 1-02

As shown in the figure below, the National Command Authorities (NCA) exercises authority and control of the armed forces through a single chain of command with two distinct branches. The first runs from the President, through the Secretary of Defense, to the commanders of combatant commands for missions and forces assigned to their commands. The second branch, used for purposes other than operational direction of forces assigned to the combatant commands, runs from the President through the Secretary of Defense to the Secretaries of the Military Departments. The Military Departments, organized separately, each operate under the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense. The Secretaries of the Military Departments exercise authority, direction, and control, through the individual Chiefs of the Services, of their forces not specifically assigned to combatant commanders.

The commanders of combatant commands exercise combatant command (command authority) (COCOM) of assigned forces and are directly responsible to the NCA for the performance of assigned missions and the preparedness of their commands. Combatant commanders prescribe the chain of command within their combatant commands and designate the appropriate command authority to be exercised by subordinate commanders.

The Military Departments operate under the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense. This branch of the chain of command embraces all military forces within the respective Service not specifically assigned to commanders of combatant commands. This branch of the chain of command is separate and distinct from the branch of the chain of command that exists within a combatant command.



*“For when the king is on the field nothing is done without him; he in person gives general orders to the polemarchs, which they convey to the commanders of divisions; these again to the commanders of fifties, the commanders of fifties to the commanders of enomoties, and these to the enomoty. In like manner any more precise instructions are passed down through the army, and quickly reach their destination. For almost the whole Lacadaemonian army are officers who have officers under them, and the responsibility of executing an order devolves upon many.”*

**Thucydides Peloponnesian Wars, 422 B.C.**

Commanders in the chain of command exercise authority as prescribed by law or a superior commander, defined as one of the following command relationships, over the military capability made available to them: COCOM, operational control, tactical control, or a support relationship. Unless otherwise directed by the NCA, COCOM is reserved for the commanders of the combatant commands. The majority of forces are apportioned to support the missions of multiple joint commanders. While COCOM can only reside with one combatant commander, the responsibilities of the combatant commander to carry out assigned missions require that they coordinate on a continuous basis with the combatant commander exercising COCOM over forces planned to support their operational needs.

### **Related Terms**

administrative control, combatant command (command authority), command, control, operational control, tactical control

### **Source Joint Publications**

JP 0-2

Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)

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## **CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF**

**General.** The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the principal military adviser to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff assists the President and Secretary of Defense in performing their command functions. The Chairman transmits to the commanders of the combatant commands the orders given by the National Command Authorities (NCA) and, as directed by the Secretary of Defense, also oversees the activities of those commands. Orders will be issued by the President or the Secretary of Defense and are normally conveyed by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff by authority and direction of the Secretary of Defense. Reports from combatant commanders will normally be submitted through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who forwards them to the Secretary of Defense and acts as the spokesman for the commanders of the combatant commands.

The Chairman is appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, from the officers of the regular component of the armed forces. The Chairman arranges for military advice, as appropriate, to be provided to all offices of the Secretary of Defense. While holding office, the Chairman outranks all other officers of the armed forces, however the Chairman may not exercise military command over the combatant commanders, Joint Chiefs of Staff, or any of the armed forces.

The Chairman acts as the spokesman for the combatant commanders, especially on the operational requirements of their commands. These commanders will send their reports to the Chairman, who will channel them to the Secretary of Defense, subject to the direction of

the Secretary of Defense, so that the Chairman may better incorporate the views of these commanders in advice to the President and the Secretary of Defense. The Chairman also communicates, as appropriate, the combatant commanders' requirements to other elements of the Department of Defense (DOD).

The Chairman assists the President and the Secretary of Defense in performing their command functions. The Chairman transmits their orders to the combatant commanders as directed by the President and coordinates all communications in matters of joint interest addressed to the combatant commanders by other authority. In addition to other duties as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Chairman will, subject to the authority, direction, and control of the President and the Secretary of Defense preside over the Joint Chiefs of Staff; provide agenda for meetings of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (including, as the Chairman considers appropriate, any subject for the agenda recommended by any other member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff); assist the Joint Chiefs of Staff in carrying out their business as promptly as practicable; and determine when issues under consideration by the Joint Chiefs of Staff will be decided.

In performing Chairman functions, duties, and responsibilities including those enumerated above, the Chairman will convene regular meetings of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and, as appropriate, consult with and seek the advice of the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, collectively or individually, and of the combatant commanders.

Subject to the direction, authority, and control of the President and the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman will be responsible for the following:

- Prepare military strategy and assessments of the associated risks. These will include a military strategy to support national security objectives within policy and resource level guidance provided by the Secretary of Defense (such strategy will include broad military options prepared by the Chairman with the advice of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the combatant commanders), and net assessments to determine the capabilities of the Armed Forces of the United States and its allies as compared to those of potential adversaries.
- Perform duties, as assigned by the President, to assist the President and the Secretary of Defense in performing their command functions.
- Assist the President and the Secretary of Defense in providing for the strategic direction of the armed forces, including the direction of operations conducted by the combatant commanders.
- Prepare strategic plans, including plans that conform with resource levels projected by the Secretary of Defense to be available for the period of time for which the plans are to be effective.
- Prepare joint logistic and mobility plans to support those strategic plans and recommend the assignment of logistic and mobility responsibilities to the Military Services in accordance with those plans.
- Advise the Secretary of Defense on the preparation of policy guidance for the preparation and review of contingency plans.
- Provide for the preparation and review of joint operation plans that conform to policy guidance from the President and the Secretary of Defense.
- Prepare joint logistic and mobility plans to support those joint operation plans and recommend the assignment of logistic and mobility responsibilities to the armed forces in accordance with those logistics and mobility plans. Ascertain the logistic support available to execute the general war and joint operation plans of the combatant commanders. Review and recommend to the Secretary of Defense appropriate logistic guidance for the Military Services which, if implemented, will result in logistic readiness

consistent with approved plans.

- Advise the Secretary of Defense on critical deficiencies and strengths in force capabilities (including manpower, logistic, and mobility support) identified during the preparation and review of joint operation plans and assess the effect of such deficiencies and strengths on meeting national security objectives and policy and on strategic plans.
- Establish and maintain a uniform system of evaluating the preparedness of each combatant command to carry out missions assigned to the command.
- Advise the Secretary of Defense on the priorities of the requirements, especially operational requirements, identified by the combatant commanders.
- Advise and assist the Secretary of Defense concerning the preparation of annual policy guidance to be provided to the heads of DOD components for the preparation and review of program recommendations and budget proposals of their respective components.
- Advise the Secretary of Defense on the extent to which the program recommendations and budget proposals of the Military Departments and other DOD components conform with the priorities established in strategic plans and with the priorities established for the requirements of the combatant commanders.
- Submit to the Secretary of Defense alternative program recommendations and budget proposals, within projected resource levels and guidance provided by the Secretary of Defense, in order to achieve greater conformance with the priorities established in strategic plans and with the priorities for the requirements of the combatant commanders.
- Recommend a budget proposal for activities of each combatant command. Activities for which funding may be requested in such a proposal include joint exercises, force training, contingencies, and selected operations.
- Advise the Secretary of Defense on the extent to which the major programs and policies of the armed forces in the area of manpower conform with strategic plans.
- Develop and establish doctrine for all aspects of the joint employment of the armed forces.
- Formulate policies for the joint training of the armed forces.
- Formulate policies for coordinating the military education and training of members of the armed forces.
- Provide for representation of the United States on the Military Staff Committee of the United Nations in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.
- Submit to the Secretary of Defense, not less than once every 3 years, a report containing such recommendations for changes in the assignment of roles and functions of the Services and changes in the assignment of missions of the combatant commanders as the Chairman considers necessary to achieve maximum effectiveness of the armed forces.
- Prepare integrated plans for military mobilization.
- Subject to the direction of the President, attend and participate in meetings of the National Security Council.
- Advise and assist the President and the Secretary of Defense on establishing combatant commands to perform military missions and on prescribing the force structure of those commands.
- Periodically, not less often than every two years, review the missions, responsibilities (including geographic boundaries), and force structure of each combatant command, and recommend to the President through the Secretary of Defense any changes to missions, responsibilities, and force structures as may be necessary.
- Oversee the activities of the combatant commands.
- Serve as the spokesman for combatant commanders, especially on the operational

requirements of their commands. In performing this function, the Chairman will confer with and obtain information from the combatant commanders with respect to the requirements of their commands; evaluate and integrate this information; advise and make recommendations to the Secretary of Defense with respect to the requirements of those commands, individually and collectively; and communicate, as appropriate, those requirements to other elements of the Department of Defense.

- Review the plans and programs of combatant commanders to determine their adequacy, consistency, acceptability, and feasibility for the performance of assigned missions.
- Advise and assist the Secretary of Defense on measures to provide for the administration and support of forces assigned to each combatant command.
- Determine the headquarters support, such as facilities, personnel, and communications, required by combatant commanders and recommend the assignment to the Military Departments of the responsibilities for providing such support.
- Provide guidance and direction to the combatant commanders on aspects of command and control that relate to the conduct of operations.
- Provide military guidance for use by the Military Departments, Military Services, and Defense agencies in the preparation of their respective detailed plans.
- Participate, as directed, in the preparation of multinational plans for military action in conjunction with the armed forces of other nations.
- Prepare and submit to the Secretary of Defense, for consideration in connection with the preparation of budgets, statements of military requirements based on US strategic considerations, current national security policy, and strategic plans. These statements of requirements include tasks, priority of tasks, force requirements, and general strategic guidance for developing military installations and bases and for equipping and maintaining military forces.
- Assess military requirements for defense acquisition programs.
- Advise and assist the Secretary of Defense in research and engineering matters by preparing statements of broad strategic guidance to be used in the preparation of an integrated DOD program; statements of overall military requirements; statements of the relative military importance of development activities to meet the needs of the combatant commanders; and recommendations for the assignment of specific new weapons to the armed forces.
- Prepare and submit to the Secretary of Defense, for information and consideration, general strategic guidance for the development of industrial and manpower mobilization programs.
- Prepare and submit to the Secretary of Defense military guidance for use in the development of security assistance programs and other actions relating to foreign military forces, including recommendations for allied military forces, materiel, and facilities requirements related to US strategic objectives, current national security policy, strategic plans, and the implementation of approved programs; and to make recommendations to the Secretary of Defense, as necessary, for keeping the Military Assistance Program in consonance with agreed strategic concepts.
- Manage for the Secretary of Defense the National Military Command System (NMCS) to meet the needs of the NCA and the Joint Chiefs of Staff and establish operational policies and procedures for all components of the NMCS and ensure their implementation.
- Provide overall supervision of those Defense agencies and DOD field activities assigned to the Chairman by the Secretary of Defense. Advise the Secretary of Defense on the extent to which the program recommendations and budget proposals of a Defense agency or DOD field activity, for which the Chairman has been assigned overall supervision,

conform with the requirements of the Military Departments and of the combatant commands.

- Periodically, not less often than every two years, report to the Secretary of Defense on the responsiveness and readiness of designated combat support agencies. Those include the Defense Information Systems Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the Defense Logistics Agency, the Defense Mapping Agency (DMA), the National Security Agency, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Central Imagery Office, and any other Defense agency designated as a combat support agency by the Secretary of Defense.
- Provide for the participation of combat support agencies in joint training exercises, assess their performance, and take steps to provide for changes to improve their performance.
- Develop a uniform readiness reporting system for reporting the readiness of combat support agencies.
- Provide direction and control of the DIA for the purpose of ensuring that adequate, timely, and reliable intelligence and counterintelligence support is available to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the combatant commands.
- Oversee military aspects of activities of the Defense Nuclear Agency.
- Advise the Secretary of Defense on mapping, charting, and geodesy requirements and priorities and provide guidance to the DMA and the combatant commands to serve as the basis for relationships between these organizations.
- Select officers to serve on the Joint Staff. May suspend from duty and recommend the reassignment of any officer assigned to the Joint Staff.
- Exercise exclusive direction of the Joint Staff.
- Advise and assist the Secretary of Defense on the establishment and review of joint duty positions, including those designated as critical joint duty positions.
- Advise the Secretary of Defense on establishing career guidelines for officers with the joint specialty and on procedures for overseeing the careers, including promotions and career assignments, of officers with the joint specialty and other officers who serve in joint duty assignments.
- Advise and assist the Secretary of Defense on the periodic review, accreditation, and revision of the curriculum of each professional military education school to enhance the education and training of officers in joint matters.
- Advise and assist the Secretary of Defense in preparing guidelines to be furnished to the Secretaries of the Military Departments for ensuring that specified officer promotion boards give appropriate consideration to the performance of officers who are serving or have served in joint duty assignments.
- Designate at least one officer currently serving in a joint duty assignment to each officer promotion board that will consider officers who are serving or have served in a joint duty assignment. (The Secretary of Defense may waive this requirement in the case of any selection board of the Marine Corps.)
- Review the reports of selection boards that consider for promotion officers serving, or having served, in joint duty assignments in accordance with guidelines furnished by the Secretary of Defense and return the reports with determinations and comments to the Secretary of the appropriate Military Department.
- Submit to the Secretary of Defense an evaluation of the joint duty performance of officers recommended for an initial appointment to the grade of lieutenant general or vice admiral or initial appointment as general or admiral.
- Prescribe the duties and functions of the Vice Chairman with the approval of the Secretary of Defense.

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## CHAIRMAN'S READINESS SYSTEM

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- Appoint consultants to the Joint Staff from outside the Department of Defense, subject to the approval of the Secretary of Defense.
- Perform such other duties as the President or the Secretary of Defense may prescribe.

### Related Terms

#### Source Joint Publications

JP 0-2            Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)

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## CHAIRMAN'S READINESS SYSTEM

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has the responsibility to monitor and assess the readiness of US military forces to fight and meet the demands of the National Military Strategy. The Chairman's Readiness System (CRS) supports the Chairman in meeting this responsibility. Joint operation plans provide the foundation for the CRS — they are the standards against which readiness is measured in the Joint Monthly Readiness Review. This senior forum is designed to assess both Unit Readiness, as reported by the Services, and Joint Readiness, as reported by the combatant commanders. The end product of the CRS is senior level consensus on the readiness of the force to successfully execute Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan tasks. Significant shortfalls or deficiencies are assessed in terms of risk and may be remedied through operational or programmatic actions. Joint operation plans have a major role in the process to address remedies to shortfalls and deficiencies.

### Related Terms

#### Source Joint Publications

JP 5-0            Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations

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## CHEMICAL WARFARE

All aspects of military operations involving the employment of lethal and incapacitating munitions/agents and the warning and protective measures associated with such offensive operations. Since riot control agents and herbicides are not considered to be chemical warfare agents, those two items will be referred to separately or under the broader term "chemical," which will be used to include all types of chemical munitions/agents collectively. The term "chemical warfare weapons" may be used when it is desired to reflect both lethal and incapacitating munitions/agents of either chemical or biological origin. Also called CW. JP 1-02

The primary uses of chemical warfare (CW) are to achieve surprise and cause mass casualties, particularly against an unprepared adversary. Chemical weapons can be used to hinder the momentum of an opposing force, disrupting command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence, and degrading combat potential, to include the use of CW agents to restrict the use of terrain, facilities, and equipment.

The Chemical Weapons Convention, originally signed by 65 nations in Paris in January 1993, bans the acquisition, development, production, transfer, and use of chemical weapons throughout the world. It also provides for the destruction of all chemical weapons stocks and production facilities within 10 years after the agreement takes effect. Further, it requires the monitoring of national chemical industries to ensure compliance, through both routine and

so-called challenge inspections. The convention will take effect for the United States in 1995, if ratified.

*“This is a complex problem that requires an experienced hand and a determined approach. First, we’ve got to deal with those nations that have used the gas. . . We must restore the prohibition against the use of those terrible weapons. The barriers against chemical warfare, breached during the Iran-Iraq War, must be repaired and raised even higher.*

*Second, we’ve got to prevent those nations approaching the threshold from proliferating. That calls for careful intelligence and controls on the technical capabilities that allow production of the weapons . . .*

*Third, we’ve got to prevent the most ominous proliferation of all. The eventual combination of chemical weapons and ballistic missiles could put new destructive power in the hands of governments with terrorist records.*

*At the end of the First World War, the so-called war to end all wars, mankind sought safety in collective security. Part of that security was to outlaw the use of certain weapons — chemical weapons — as a sign of our civilization. Collective security failed eventually under Hitler’s blows. One of the first signs of the breakdown of civilization was the use of gas in Ethiopia.*

*From that time until our own, despite World War II, and countless conflicts, somehow the ban on the use of chemical weapons remained intact. Yet now, just as we look up, look forward to a new decade and perhaps a whole new era of peace — the alarm bell has sounded. I’ve heard that bell and I know what it means. And if I’m remembered for anything, it would be this: a complete and total ban on chemical weapons.”*

**George Bush, Address at the University of Toledo  
Toledo, Ohio, October 21, 1988**

### **Related Terms**

nuclear, biological, and chemical defense operations; riot control agent

### **Source Joint Publications**

JP 3-11      Joint Doctrine for Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Defense

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**CINC LOGISTIC PROCUREMENT SUPPORT BOARD**

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Geographic combatant commanders (CINCs) coordinate contracting operations within their commands. This requirement may be met through the CINC Logistic Procurement Support Board (CLPSB), which is a temporary board designed to achieve a properly coordinated acquisition program. The CLPSB is chaired by a Logistics Directorate representative and includes representatives from each of the component commands. CLPSB functions are as follows:

- Coordinates with US Embassies and host countries for acquisition of supplies and services and for operations by contractors performing under US contracts.
- Eliminates duplication by arranging for single-Service contracting assignments for specified supplies and services, when appropriate.
- Provides an exchange of information among contracting activities covering such matters as sources of supply, prices, and contractor performance.
- Provides guidance on the consolidation of purchases.

## CINC'S STRATEGIC CONCEPT

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- Establishes procedures to coordinate procurement with the supply operations of the commander and area.
- Prescribes payment procedures consistent with currency-control requirements and international agreements.
- Promulgates, as necessary, joint classification and compensation guides governing wages, living allowances, and other benefits for Third World country national and indigenous employees, in coordination with appropriate agencies.

### Related Terms

#### Source Joint Publications

JP 4-0

Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations

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
## CINC'S STRATEGIC CONCEPT

Final document produced in Step 5 of the concept development phase of the deliberate planning process. The commanders of combatant commands (CINC's) strategic concept is used as the vehicle to distribute the CINC's decision and planning guidance for accomplishing joint strategic capabilities plan or other Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) taskings. CJCS approval of the strategic concept becomes the basis of the plan for development into an operation plan or operation plan in concept format. Formerly called "the concept of operations." Also called CSC. JP 1-02

The commanders of combatant commands (CINC's) strategic concept is the final document produced in step 5 of the concept development phase of the deliberate planning process. The CINC's strategic concept is used as the vehicle to distribute the CINC's decision and planning guidance for accomplishing joint strategic capabilities plan or other Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) taskings.

The concept development phase of deliberate planning is accomplished by the supported commander responsible for developing the plan. Concept development follows six steps: mission analysis, planning guidance development, staff estimates, commander's estimate, CINC's Strategic Concept, and CJCS review. (See figure below.) The assigned task is analyzed, a mission statement is developed, and planning guidance is prepared and issued to the staff as well as subordinate and supporting commands in step 1. During step 2, alternative courses of action (COAs) are developed and distributed for staff estimates of supportability to be completed in step 3. In step 4, alternative COAs are war-gamed, analyzed, and compared to produce a commander's estimate containing the commander's decision on the preferred COA. In step 5, the selected COA is then expanded into the CINC's Strategic Concept that is submitted to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for review and approval. When approved in step 6, the CINC's Strategic Concept provides the basis for plan development.

During the CINC's Strategic Concept step of the concept development phase, the supported commander prepares a Strategic Concept, which is an expansion of the selected COA, as a narrative statement of how to conduct operations to accomplish the mission. The supported commander may convene a concept development conference involving representatives of subordinate and supporting commands, the Services, Joint Staff, and other interested parties.



### Related Terms

concept development; deliberate planning; operation plan; operation plan in concept format

### Source Joint Publications

JP 5-0            Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations  
 JP 5-03.1        Joint Operation Planning and Execution System, Vol I: (Planning Policies and Procedures)

### CIVIL ADMINISTRATION

An administration established by a foreign government in (1) friendly territory, under an agreement with the government of the area concerned, to exercise certain authority normally the function of the local government, or (2) hostile territory, occupied by United States forces, where a foreign government exercises executive, legislative, and judicial authority until an indigenous civil government can be established. Also called CA administration. JP 1-02

Civil administration is a unique action undertaken by US commanders only when directed or approved by the National Command Authorities. Civil affairs support consists of planning, coordinating, advising, or assisting those activities that reinforce or restore a civil administration that supports US and multinational objectives in friendly or hostile territory.

Civil administration missions in friendly territory are normally undertaken pursuant to an agreement with the government of the area concerned. This form of civil administration is also called civil affairs (CA) administration. Depending on mission requirements, the full range of CA functional specialty skills may be required for the activities shown in the figure below.

### CIVIL AFFAIRS ADMINISTRATION

- Assist foreign or host-nation governments in rehabilitating and building government and socio-economic infrastructure
- Coordinate and supervise provision of US resources to meet essential civil requirements
- Assist other US Government or foreign/host-nation agencies in providing US resources to meet essential civil requirements
- Oversee contacts between military forces and civil authority and population to the extent required by the mission
- Coordinate essential funding programs with appropriate US Government agencies
- Coordinate and assist in the return of government controls to civil or indigenous authority as soon as practicable

In a civil administration by an occupying power, also called military government, agreements will contain provisions as to the authorities of the occupying power and the obligations of the submitting government. Furthermore, the exercise of executive, legislative, and judicial authority by the occupying power will be determined by policy decisions at the highest level and may even involve an international policy making group. Emphasis on CA activities to implement long-range plans increasingly influences or replaces measures intended to satisfy short-range needs. Consistent with established policy, a sound local administration is developed, always subject to the authority of the occupying power. An informed populace is fostered through news media, public discussion, and the formation of acceptable political parties. CA forces are trained to plan and conduct essential CA activities to assist commanders in the most effective policy implementation concerning reorganizing or reconstituting government structures.

Regardless of the program adopted, CA personnel and military commanders should be aware that the manner in which they carry out established policies has a significant bearing on subsequent courses of action designed to achieve US security objectives.

### Related Terms

civil affairs

### Source Joint Publications

JP 3-57 Doctrine for Joint Civil Affairs

## CIVIL AFFAIRS

The activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces and civil authorities, both governmental and nongovernmental, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile area of operations in order to facilitate military operations and consolidate operational objectives. Civil affairs may include performance by military forces of activities and functions normally the responsibility of local government. These activities may occur prior to, during, or subsequent to other military actions. They may also occur, if directed, in the absence of other military operations. JP 1-02

**General.** Civil affairs (CA) are those interrelated military activities that embrace the relationship between military forces and civil authorities and populations. CA missions include civil-military operations and civil administration. Joint force commanders (JFCs) integrate civil affairs and synchronize their effects with combat operations to minimize civilian interference with military operations and safeguard noncombatants and their property.

CA is an inherent responsibility of command. CA encompasses the activities that military commanders take to establish and maintain relations between their forces and the civil authorities and general population, resources, and institutions in friendly, neutral, or hostile areas where their forces are employed. Commanders plan and conduct CA activities to facilitate military operations and help achieve politico-military objectives derived from US national security interests. Establishing and maintaining military-to-civil relations may entail interaction between US, multinational, and indigenous security forces, and governmental and nongovernmental agencies as part of missions tasked to a JFC. These activities may occur before, during, subsequent to or in the absence of other military actions.

**Authority.** A commander's authority for undertaking CA activities in support of all military operations can stem from a variety of sources. Factors such as mission, policy determinants,

and the relation of the government of the country concerned to the United States have an influence on civil affairs.

The authority to conduct CA activities or exercise controls in a given area or country may arise as a result of successful military operations, international cooperative agreement, or from an agreement between the United States Government (USG), or military commander, and the government of the area or country in which US forces may be employed.

International law, including the law of armed conflict, affords occupying powers certain rights and responsibilities. These include the authority to establish civil administrations and to control or conduct governmental matters both during and after hostilities.

*"The world has grown smaller, in recent years ever more rapidly. It is hard to divorce our country from a number of conflicts to which years ago we would have hardly paid any attention. While we cannot engage ourselves in all conflicts, we now have a choice...(in civil affairs) have a tool which can help in the early resolution of enormously difficult, potentially intractable situations..."*

**Ambassador T.R. Pickering (remarks to a NDU conference)**

**Civil Affairs Activities.** Civil affairs activities are inherently civil-military in nature. While they may be integral parts of both military civic action (MCA) and civil-military operations (CMO), they are not synonymous with either. Civil affairs activities in MCA, as part of more comprehensive USG security and economic assistance programs, may originate from a national plan and entail specific projects, central funding, authorization to use indicated resources, and joint participation with other USG agencies. The long-range goal of MCA is to nurture national development. Projects include, but are not limited to, those in education, public works, agriculture, transportation, communications, health, sanitation, and others contributing to host nation (HN) economic and social development. The fundamental tenet of any successful civic action program is civilian self-help. Civil affairs assets are trained either to plan MCA programs or to provide professional advice and assistance to the HN military forces or agencies in establishing local expertise and providing skills and materiel assistance not available to the local civilian participants identified to assume the leadership roles for future long-term development.

As part of CMO, civil affairs activities range from advice and assistance to civilian authorities and a population concerning their relationship with military forces to those that promote the welfare, stability, and security of friendly governments and their population. Civil affairs activities assist and coordinate military efforts to strengthen host-government legitimacy and help to prevent or reduce violence by bridging critical gaps between the civil and military sectors. Use of dedicated CA forces, and the conduct of CA activities, will enhance planned CMO by helping to ensure civil or indigenous understanding of, and compliance with, controls, regulations, directives, or other measures taken by commanders to accomplish the military mission and attain US objectives.

Civil affairs activities, however, are distinguishable from CMO insofar as the former are characterized by applications of functional specialties in areas normally the responsibility of indigenous government or civil authority. Civil affairs activities may extend to assumption of governmental functions required in an occupied territory during or immediately subsequent to hostilities. Civil affairs activities are further characterized by the items listed in the figure below.

## ADDITIONAL CHARACTERISTICS OF CIVIL AFFAIRS ACTIVITIES

- The use of forces (units and personnel) possessing an in-depth understanding of politico-military, economic, and social aspects of countries or regional areas where military forces are employed
- The capability to enhance and influence the civil-military operational planning and execution by Department of Defense (DOD), non-DOD, multinational, nongovernmental organizations / private voluntary organizations, and other agencies through estimates of operational impacts on civilian populace, resources, and institutions in areas where military forces are employed. As stated above, some or all civil affairs activities may be part of civil-military operations tasked to a joint force commander; planned, or executed, by dedicated civil affairs forces, or other DOD forces; or a combination thereof
- The fundamental concept of control of policy at the highest practical level, coupled with the integration of military and civilian efforts at the lowest echelon feasible
- The requirement to negotiate with belligerents during peace-enforcement operations

**Principles of CA Activities.** Certain general principles apply to all CA activities. They are the basis for initial planning purposes in the absence of specific guidance. These principles are described as follows:

**Mission.** Civil affairs activities are conducted in support of military operations to assist commanders in fulfilling obligations to civilian noncombatants imposed by international law agreements that may be in effect, or to further the national and international policies of the United States.

**Command Responsibility.** Responsibility for the conduct of CA activities, including civil administration if directed by higher authority, is vested in the senior military commander, guided by directive, national policies, military strategy, applicable treaty or agreement, and international law.

**Continuity and Consistency of Policy.** Essential to the success of CA activities, in light of their inherent complexity and political sensitivity, is a comprehensive and clear Department of Defense (DOD) CMO policy transmitted through command channels.

**Reciprocal Responsibilities.** The commander of an occupying force has the legal right to require the inhabitants within an operational area to comply with directives necessary for mission accomplishment and proper administration of a given area. In return, the inhabitants

have the right to freedom from unnecessary interference with their property and individual liberties.

**Economy of Personnel and Resources.** The activities of CA assets should be limited where possible to those involving coordination, liaison, and interface with existing or reestablished civilian authorities. Maximum use of local or indigenous resources should be made consistent with satisfaction of minimum essential civil requirements.

**Humanitarian Considerations.** The use of force beyond military necessity is prohibited. Military commanders should plan operations that include the maximum humanitarian assistance and the minimum suffering for noncombatants that abide by, and exceed if possible, rules of engagement, law of land warfare, and the Geneva Conventions.

**Civil Affairs Assets.** Many DOD organizations have inherent capabilities to support CA activities and conduct CMO. Combatant commanders may be supported by any or all of the following military CA assets:

- Active component or Reserve component (RC) CA forces organized, equipped, and trained to carry out missions that specifically include the conduct or support of CA activities (RC CA units constitute the vast majority of these forces).
- Civil affairs personnel assigned or attached to combatant commands.
- Other RC personnel possessing functional specialty skills applicable to CA activities across the range of military operations.

Although not trained in functional civilian specialty skills for CA operations, DOD forces and personnel trained in such military skills as engineer, medical, dental, veterinary, intelligence, military police, communications, logistics, and transportation complement CA assets and provide significant support to CA activities and CMO. Other special operations forces (SOF) elements and personnel with area orientation, cultural awareness, linguistic capability, and experience in military and civilian advisory and assistance activities will ordinarily collaborate in CA activities and, in certain cases, conduct CA activities of more limited scope. The use of a relatively small number of dedicated CA assets can provide commanders an economy of force capability to achieve assigned objectives through direct interface with civil government officials, agencies, and population. (See first figure below.)

**Designation of Civil Affairs Forces as Special Operations Forces.** Per Department of Defense Directive 2000.13, 27 June 1994, "Civil Affairs," "US Army civil affairs forces are designated "special operations forces" under title 10 United States Code 167 ...." This action does recognize the commonality of CA force preparation with other SOF, provides increased emphasis on Commander in Chief, United States Special Operations Command (USCINCSOC) oversight and support structure, and integrates CA force initiatives into United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) programs. Designation of CA forces as SOF does not alter relationships or principles of organization and employment regarding CA forces' support to military operations.

**Assignment of Civil Affairs Forces to USSOCOM.** All US Army CA forces stationed in the continental United States are assigned by the Secretary of Defense to USCINCSOC who has combatant command (command authority) (COCOM) over assigned forces. USCINCSOC normally exercises COCOM of assigned CA forces through the United States Army Special Operations Command, a Major Army Command of the Department of the Army. United States Marine Corps CA Groups are organic assets to Marine air-ground task forces.

**Responsibilities of the Commander in Chief, United States Special Operations Command.** USCINCSOC's responsibilities for the development of strategy, doctrine, and tactics for joint CA are interrelated with those of the Chiefs of the Services. Therefore,

## OBJECTIVES OF CIVIL AFFAIRS ACTIVITIES

- Facilitate commanders' mission capability by obtaining civil support and reducing civilian interference with military operations
- Assist commanders' compliance with operational law requirements, insofar as military circumstances permit, by providing those resources necessary to meet essential civil requirements, avoiding damage to civilian property and usable resources, and minimizing loss of life and suffering
- Assist commanders in achieving developmental goals in friendly or foreign countries by assisting or reinforcing the political and socio-economic viability or efficiency of public institutions and services of host forces
- Assist or supervise the stabilization or reestablishment of civil administration, when directed by the National Command Authorities, in friendly, neutral, hostile, or occupied territory in support of US and multinational objectives

USCINCSOC coordinates with the Joint Staff, combatant commands, and the Services to ensure that all CA requirements are addressed. Additionally, USCINCSOC performs the duties described in the figure below.

**Organization for Civil-Military Operations.** A tailored civil-military organizational structure may be established by combatant commanders, JFC, joint force special operations component commander, or Service or functional component commanders to command and control CMO. Regardless of the name given this structure (e.g., Military Support Group in the United States Southern Command - Operation JUST CAUSE, TASK FORCE FREEDOM in USCENTCOM - Operation DESERT STORM, and Military-Civil Relations Task Force in the United States European Command - Operation PROVIDE PROMISE), the concept of CA command and control organizations may be organized in two ways described below, (names are notional and used for ease of description).

Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force (JCMOTF). A JCMOTF is normally a US joint force organization, similar in organization to a joint special operations task force or joint task force, flexible in size and composition depending on mission circumstances. It may be developed to meet a specific CMO contingency mission, supporting humanitarian or nation assistance operations, a theater campaign of limited duration, or a longer duration CMO concurrent with or subsequent to regional or general conflict, depending on National Command Authorities (NCA) or theater guidance. In rarer instances, a JCMOTF could be formed as a standing organization, depending on NCA or theater guidance and resource availability. A JCMOTF may be formed in theater, in continental United States, or in both locations, depending on scope, duration, or sensitivity of the CMO requirement and associated policy considerations. Joint commanders may organize JCMOTFs to perform some or all of the CMO-relevant functions listed below:

## CIVIL AFFAIRS RESPONSIBILITIES OF COMMANDER IN CHIEF, UNITED STATES SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND


- Recommends civil affairs policy guidance to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Services, and US military commanders, as required
- Prepares and provides assigned civil affairs forces to other combatant commanders for conduct of civil affairs activities, as required
- Coordinates with Commander in Chief, US Atlantic Command (CINCUSACOM) for planning the use of civil affairs to support continental US disasters or other emergency relief operations when directed by appropriate authority <sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> CINCUSACOM coordinates with Director of Military Support, through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, concerning plans and procedures for providing any or all military assets determined appropriate to support the domestic civil sector in the continental US as circumstances require for military support to civil authorities (DODD 3025.1).

Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC). A CMOC is the JFC's nerve center for CMO and coordination with other non-DOD agencies. CMOC members are primarily civil affairs personnel augmented by other DOD and non-DOD (i.e., Department of State, United States Agency for International Development, Federal Emergency Management Agency) liaison personnel. A CMOC may have functions closely resembling those for a JCMOTF above, but in addition have certain characteristics differing from a JCMOTF, some of which are enumerated as follows: A CMOC is flexible in size and composition to effectively coordinate military support to humanitarian assistance or associated contingency or crisis response operations in a given area or country. It may be the primary coordinating agency for all international organizations, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), USG agencies during war or peace operations where DOD has complete control of the theater. A CMOC may be organized to help integrate US military forces into both multinational forces and military-civil partnership efforts. It may comprise or be augmented by either or both military and civilian personnel representatives of any organization the commander, joint task force considers necessary to effectively coordinate CMO.

Situations in which establishment of JCMOTFs and CMOCs are considered are highly scenario-dependent. The next two figures below generally depict such arrangements or relationships, but are intended as illustrative examples only.

# JOINT CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS TASK FORCE (JCMOTF)



1. Combatant commander or joint force commander may maintain direct control of JCMOTF for a specific contingency.
2. Scenario dependent. Combatant commander may direct formation of a JCMOTF in support of other commands as necessary.
3. Liaison with other US Government agencies, host-nation forces, international organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and private voluntary organizations as required.



## CIVIL AFFAIRS GENERAL PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

- Administrative, logistic, and communications support requirements of civil affairs forces
- The need for early employment of civil affairs specialty capabilities
- The coordination between civil affairs requirements and campaign plans and strategies
- The coordination of civil affairs requirements with other appropriate staff functions and non-Department of Defense agencies

**CA Planning.** Planning for, and coordination of, CA activities facilitates mission accomplishment. Civil affairs planning is based on national policy and reflects a variety of legal obligations such as the provisions of the US Constitution, statutory law, judicial decisions, Presidential directives, departmental regulations, and the rules and principles of international law, especially those incorporated in treaties and agreements applicable to areas where US forces are employed.

**Deployment and Employment Planning.** Selection of CA forces in support of an operation plan, operation plan in concept format, or operation order should be based on a clear concept of CA mission requirements. Joint Operation Planning and Execution System integrates all elements of deliberate or crisis action CA planning, and identifies, resources, and phases CA required forces. General planning considerations are shown in the figure above.

### Civil Affairs in the Persian Gulf: Planning

One of the functions of civil affairs is to assist in integrating US forces smoothly with the population and forces of the host nation. Deployment of large numbers of US forces to Saudi Arabia meant harmonizing our western culture with the culture of our host. The challenge facing US personnel was to adapt to the customs of Saudi Arabia so conduct created an impression of respect for the Saudis and their culture. A rigorous indoctrination program was undertaken to orient US personnel on the region's uniqueness and its history, customs, religion, law, and mores.

Civil affairs planners were active in identifying, planning, coordinating, and integrating host-nation support which was crucial to effective military operations. They identified sources of contract labor, services, materials, and supplies. Civil affairs planners assisted the Saudis in civil defense emergency planning. They kept the status of the Saudi civil defense preparedness including dispersal locations, warning systems, shelters, and nuclear, biological, and chemical defense resources for civilians. Prior to offensive operations and at the request of the US embassy, civil affairs officers met with

**US civilian nationals living and working in Saudi Arabia to assure them of Coalition military capabilities so as to relieve some of their anxiety about being in a war zone.**

**Source: DOD Report to Congress,  
Conduct of the Persian Gulf War,  
April 1992**

**CA in Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW).** CA units contain a variety of specialty skills that support MOOTW. CA capabilities are normally tailored to support particular operational requirements. CA units may provide assessments of the civil infrastructure, assist in the operation of temporary shelters, and serve as liaison between the military and various NGOs and private voluntary organizations (PVOs). Establishing and maintaining military to civil relations may include interaction among US, allied or coalition, host-nation forces, as well as NGOs and PVOs. CA forces can also provide expertise on factors which directly affect military operations to include culture, social structure, economic systems, language, and host-nation support capabilities. CA may also include forces conducting activities which are normally the responsibility of local or indigenous governments. Selection of CA forces should be based upon a clear concept of CA mission requirements for the type operation being planned.

### **Related Terms**

civil-military operations; special operations

### **Source Joint Publications**

JP 3-0	Doctrine for Joint Operations
JP 3-05	Doctrine for Joint Special Operations
JP 3-07	Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War
JP 3-57	Doctrine for Joint Civil Affairs

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## CIVIL ENGINEERING SUPPORT

civil engineering

Those combat support and combat service support activities that identify, design, construct, lease, or provide facilities, and which operate, maintain, and perform war damage repair and other engineering functions in support of military operations.

JP 1-02

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is responsible for the preparation of joint logistic plans, to include plans for civil engineering support. In this capacity, the Chairman manages the development of operational planning and execution tools, recommends assignment of civil engineering responsibilities to the Military Services, and recommends to the Secretary of Defense appropriate civil engineering guidance for the Military Services. The Chairman advises the Secretary of Defense on critical deficiencies and the relative priority of competing civil engineering support requirements of the commanders of a combatant command (CINCs).

The CINCs prepare Civil Engineering Support Plans (CESPs) as an integral part of their joint operation planning process. They develop training and exercise programs to evaluate and improve preparedness for civil engineering missions and are responsible for prioritizing, planning, and coordinating civil engineering support requirements for their area of responsibility.

## COMBATANT COMMANDER REQUIREMENTS

- Evaluate component commanders' civil engineering support requirements with respect to combatant commander's plans.
- Assess the risk of civil engineering support shortfalls on the ability to accomplish assigned missions.
- Validate component commanders' civil engineering support requirements and prioritize requirements, use of civil engineering forces, and other civil engineering support capabilities and assets.
- Coordinate with and provide guidance to DOD specified contract construction agents.
- Direct the allocation of component commanders' civil engineering forces and construction material (Class IV).
- Establish theater construction policy.
- Set priorities for theater civil engineering missions.
- Task components for theater civil engineering missions, tasks, or projects.
- Develop and prioritize national disaster or hostile action infrastructure recovery plans.
- Review Service civil engineering support and construction programs for validity in support of joint operation plans.
- Identify and support civil engineering support requirements for joint operations that exceed component funding authorities.

The Military Services staff, organize, train, and equip civil engineering resources to perform tasks required by their assigned roles and missions. They provide, through Service components, input to each CINC's CESP development process regarding Service component requirements. (See figure above.)

### Related Terms

combat service support

### Source Joint Publications

JP 4-04


Joint Doctrine for Civil Engineering Support

CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS

Group of planned activities in support of military operations that enhance the relationship between the military forces and civilian authorities and population and which promote the development of favorable emotions, attitudes, or behavior in neutral, friendly, or hostile groups. JP 1-02

The term “civil-military operations” (CMO) is a broad, generic term used to denote the decisive and timely application of military capabilities to enhance the relationship between the military and civilian populace in order to ensure accomplishment of the commander’s mission. CMO range from support to combat operations to traditional nonmilitary roles assisting countries in bringing about political, economic, and social stability. (See figure below.)

CMO are undertaken to encourage the development of a country’s material and human resources to assist in achieving US and host-government political, economic, and psychological objectives. CMO involve liaison and coordination among US, multinational, and indigenous security forces, and among US forces and other government agencies as well as nongovernmental or private voluntary organizations. A variety of types of units, including engineer, medical, intelligence, security, special forces, psychological operations, civil affairs (CA), communications, and transportation provide capabilities, in varying degrees, to plan and conduct CMO and achieve political, economic, and psychological objectives. Dedicated CA forces, by virtue of their area and linguistic orientation, cultural awareness, experience in military-to-host-nation advisory and assistance activities, as well as in civil-oriented functions paralleling governmental functions, can be essential in CMO designed to secure support



from the civilian population, fulfill essential civil requirements consistent with military missions, and create as positive an effect as possible on friends, allies, and host-nation counterparts and governments.

As a fundamental precept, CMO should be closely coordinated with the Country Team and other US Government agencies. Most military responses or efforts, especially those in military operations other than war, require the military-civil partnership that successful CMO provide. CMO also may be manifested through activities associated with humanitarian assistance, civil defense, counterdrug operations, and counterterrorism. Normally, CMO does not connote activities pertaining to enemy prisoners of war, civilian internees, or other detainees. Successful CMO should use military CA functional specialty skills but do not necessarily require their use. In all cases, actions by the Armed Forces of the United States should support the host or friendly country's control over CMO programs and enhance popular perceptions of its stability and legitimacy.

### **Related Terms**

civil affairs; special operations

### **Source Joint Publications**

JP 3-07            Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War  
JP 3-57            Doctrine for Joint Civil Affairs

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## **CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS CENTER**

A Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC) is the joint force commander's nerve center for civil-military operations (CMO) and coordination with other non-Department of Defense (DOD) agencies. CMOC members are primarily civil affairs personnel augmented by other DOD and non-DOD (i.e., Department of State (DOS), US Agency for International Development, Federal Emergency Management Agency) liaison personnel.

A CMOC may have functions closely resembling those of a Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force (JCMOTF), but in addition have certain characteristics differing from a JCMOTF, some of which are enumerated as follows:

- A CMOC is flexible in size and composition to effectively coordinate military support to humanitarian assistance or associated contingency or crisis response operations in a given area or country. Such operations may result from decisions and direction emanating from authoritative US or multinational policymaking bodies or from United Nations mandates.
- A CMOC may be the primary coordinating agency for all international organizations, nongovernmental organizations, US Government agencies during war or peace operations where DOD has complete control of the theater. However, the CMOC may be in a supporting role in military operations other than war where DOS or other organizations share or unilaterally control the theater.
- A CMOC may be organized to help integrate US military forces into both multinational forces and military-civil partnership efforts. It should coordinate US or multinational forces' goals and operations with those of host nations and appropriate relief or service organizations. A CMOC should serve as a vehicle for the exchange of information among participatory commands and to provide international support for assistance to countries in states of socio-economic or political transition.
- A CMOC may comprise or be augmented by either or both military and civilian personnel

## CIVIL RESERVE AIR FLEET

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representatives of any organization the commander, joint task force considers necessary to effectively coordinate CMO.

- Overall management of a CMOC may be assigned to a multinational force commander, shared by a US and a multinational commander, or shared by a US commander and a civilian agency head. In a US military-managed CMOC, the Operations Directorate of a joint staff is normally responsible for the management of, or participation in, the CMOC.
- The CMOC may be a suborganization of the JCMOTF and the CMOC may have suborganizations to accommodate military or geographic requirements.

### Related Terms

civil affairs; civil-military operations; joint civil-military operations task force

### Source Joint Publications

JP 3-57

Doctrine for Joint Civil Affairs

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## CIVIL RESERVE AIR FLEET

A program in which the Department of Defense uses aircraft owned by a US entity or citizen. The aircraft are allocated by the Department of Transportation to augment the military airlift capability of the Department of Defense (DOD). These aircraft are allocated, in accordance with DOD requirements, to segments, according to their capabilities, such as Long-Range International (cargo and passenger), Short-Range International, Domestic, Alaskan, Aeromedical, and other segments as may be mutually agreed upon by the Department of Defense and the Department of Transportation. The Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) can be incrementally activated by the Department of Defense in three stages in response to defense-oriented situations, up to and including a declared national emergency or war, to satisfy DOD airlift requirements. When activated, CRAF aircraft are under the mission control of the Department of Defense while remaining a civil resource under the operational control of the responsible US entity or citizen. Also called CRAF.

a. CRAF Stage I. This stage involves DOD use of civil air resources that air carriers will furnish to the Department of Defense to support substantially expanded peacetime military airlift requirements. The Commander, Air Mobility Command, may authorize activation of this stage and assume mission control of those airlift assets committed to CRAF Stage I.

b. CRAF Stage II. This stage involves DOD use of civil air resources that the air carriers will furnish to Department of Defense in a time of defense airlift emergency. The Secretary of Defense, or designee, may authorize activation of this stage permitting the Commander, Air Mobility Command, to assume mission control of those airlift assets committed to CRAF Stage II.

c. CRAF Stage III. This stage involves DOD use of civil air resources owned by a US entity or citizen that the air carriers will furnish to the Department of Defense in a time of declared national defense-oriented emergency or war, or when otherwise necessary for the national defense. The aircraft in this stage are allocated by the Secretary of Transportation to the Secretary of Defense. The Secretary of Defense may authorize activation of this stage permitting the Commander, Air Mobility Command, to assume mission control of those airlift assets committed to CRAF Stage III.

JP 1-02

**General.** The Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) is designed to augment airlift capability with US civil aircraft, aircrews, and support structure during CRAF activation. Although Air Mobility Command (AMC) assumes mission control of CRAF airlift assets during an activation, individual CRAF carriers retain operational control of their own assets. In this way, the military gains the use of civil aircraft and aircrews and access to the civil en route support structure. The CRAF is comprised of three segments shown in the figure below.

**International Segment.** This segment consists of long-range and short-range sections. The long-range section provides the largest capability with passenger and cargo aircraft. Aircraft must be extended-range capable (over water). The short-range section supports near offshore operations with both passenger and cargo aircraft.

**National Segment.** This segment consists of the Domestic Services and Alaska sections. The Domestic Services section provides passenger and cargo aircraft for domestic-only service using regional US air carriers with at least 75 seats (30,000 lbs allowable cabin load) and a cargo capability of at least 32,000 lbs. The Domestic Services section is used in CRAF Stage III (see below) only. The Alaska section provides cargo aircraft support to Alaska in CRAF Stage II and Stage III.

**Aeromedical Segment.** The Aeromedical segment consists of reconfigured Boeing 767 aircraft, which will be used to evacuate critical casualties from the area of responsibility/joint operations area. In addition, these aircraft will be used to move medical supplies and crews to the theater, thus permitting other aircraft to maximize the cargo flow. The Aeromedical segment is used in both CRAF Stage II and CRAF Stage III.

**Activation of Civil Reserve Air Fleet.** There are three stages of CRAF activation designed to meet varying levels of defense airlift needs. Commander in Chief, US Transportation Command may activate Stages I and II with the approval of the Secretary of Defense. The Secretary of Defense will issue the order to activate Stage III. The CRAF is activated in order to use commercial airlift assets to augment Department of Defense's military airlift capability.

- Stage I - Committed Airlift Expansion. This stage is activated to support substantially expanded peacetime military airlift requirements when AMC's military airlift capability cannot meet both the deployment and other airlift requirements simultaneously. It is comprised of long-range assets only.
- Stage II - Defense Airlift Emergency. This stage is activated to support a defense airlift emergency. It responds to requirements greater than Stage I but is less than full national mobilization. It is comprised of all three segments.
- Stage III - National Emergency. This stage is activated to support a declared national defense-oriented emergency or war, or when otherwise necessary for the national defense.





*The Civil Reserve Air Fleet augments airlift capabilities with US civil aircraft, aircrews, and support structure.*

### CRAF: A Middle-Aged Success

The Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF), a 43-year old program designed to augment the organic capability of the US Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) with civil aircraft, was called into service first time ever on 18 August 1990. On that date, Military Airlift Command (now Air Mobility Command (AMC)) activated the 38 cargo and passenger aircraft of Stage I to meet the initial surge requirements of Operation DESERT SHIELD. The Secretary of Defense followed 5 months later, on 16 January 1991, by activating CRAF Stage II, adding more aircraft to meet the pressing sustainment requirements of Operation DESERT STORM.

Established in 1952, CRAF was sized and structured to meet the threat of a Soviet invasion of Europe. Its purpose was “to augment US military airlift forces with civil air carriers to support emergency airlift requirements.” Under CRAF, US air carriers voluntarily commit cargo and passenger aircraft to support airlift requirements that exceed airlift capabilities. The carriers pledge specific aircraft by tail number to one of three stages of crisis escalation: Stage I — Committed Expansion; Stage II — Defense Airlift Emergency; or Stage III — National Emergency. The CRAF support is also divided into five functional segments: long-range international, short-range international, domestic, Alaskan, and aeromedical. Once activated, the carriers continue to operate the aircraft and provide full support, including fuel, spare parts, and maintenance. AMC, however, assumes mission control. Several carriers also have agreed to serve as senior lodgers during Stage III. In that capacity, they provide expanded ground support services to all aircraft and their crews, using designated commercial airports.

Each stage of CRAF is designed to meet the increased airlift requirements of escalating levels of emergency. The Commander in Chief, USTRANSCOM can call up Stage I aircraft on 24-hour notice to meet crisis requirements. The Secretary of Defense can activate Stage II aircraft, also on 24-hour notice,

during an emergency that is less than a full mobilization. The Secretary of Defense also can activate Stage III aircraft, under either of the following conditions: one, the President or Congress declares a Defense-oriented national emergency, or, two, in a situation short of a declared Defense-oriented national emergency. In Stage III, the air carriers have 48 hours to make their aircraft available to the government.

Although principally aimed at augmenting organic airlift capabilities during wartime, the CRAF Program is also used to allocate some of AMC's peacetime values to carriers that commit aircraft to, for example, the long-range international segment of CRAF, based upon aircraft type (cargo or passenger), payload, block speed, and range, etc. AMC then uses the mobilization values to establish "entitlements," expressed in annual dollar shares of its cargo or passenger business.

A "joint venture" concept provides another incentive for carriers to join the CRAF Program. Under this concept, carriers are not required to convert the mobilization values associated with their commitment into peacetime business. Instead, they can trade those mobilization values to their joint-venture CRAF partners that want to augment normal commercial business with military. The Civil Reserve Air Fleet augments airlift capabilities with US civil aircraft, aircrews, and support structure movements. The concept was established to induce carriers, particularly small-package carriers, to join CRAF that may not do so otherwise.

The process for CRAF activation begins when the combatant commanders specify their requirements, expressed in a variety of terms (military units, equipment end items, ammunition, resupply materiel, etc.), and the date they are needed. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) approves those requirements, and USTRANSCOM translates the requirements into time-phased deployment data and designates them for movement by either airlift or sealift. USTRANSCOM then provides the airlift deployment data to AMC to develop detailed lift requirements and the flight schedules necessary to meet them. After programming its organic lift capability, AMC determines the civil augmentation necessary, taking into consideration the amount currently available by expanding the scope of on-going contracts (expansion buy). AMC also assesses, as warranted, the CRAF stage that best meets the unsatisfied airlift requirements, notifies the carriers of possible CRAF activations, and either activates CRAF Stage I (with USTRANSCOM approval, sends a message to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (through USTRANSCOM) requesting declaration of an airlift or national emergency to activate either Stage II or III. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff then notifies the Secretary of Defense, who, if he concurs with the CJCS's position, apprises the Secretary of Transportation of his intent to activate CRAF. Once activated, the Chairman assigns airlift priorities to meet the CINC's requirements.

Shortly after the President's decision to launch a military response to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, US air carriers voluntarily began supporting the airlift requirements of Operation DESERT SHIELD through an AMC "expansion buy." They moved their first passengers on 7 August 1990. By the 17th, they had completed in excess of 100 passenger and cargo missions (i.e. international flights) involving more than 30 aircraft. On 18 August 1990, AMC activated the

38 aircraft from 16 carriers in CRAF Stage I. In one month, those aircraft flew 391 missions in support of Operation DESERT SHIELD. Over the next four months, the number of CRAF missions increased to 1,903.

On 16 January 1991, the Secretary of Defense authorized the activation of CRAF Stage II to meet the additional cargo airlift requirements of Operation DESERT STORM. Consequently, by 12 February, the daily CRAF mission capability increased to an average 23.4 missions per day, an 86 percent increase over support for Operation DESERT SHIELD.

The CRAF Program is a DOD success story. This program, first originated to satisfy Cold War requirements, has proven its worth through the years in satisfying peacetime airlift requirements that exceeded organic military lift capabilities. Further, during the 1990-91 Persian Gulf War, the US commercial carriers responded to both the program's incentives and the Stage I-II activations completing in excess of 4,700 missions to move units, equipment, and resupply materiel. This proved invaluable in providing AMC with the means to satisfy the combatant commander's surge, sustainment, and redeployment requirements.

**Source: Review of Strategic Mobility Programs, Volume 2: Civil Reserve Air Fleet, Bethesda: Logistics Management Institute, 1991**

### Related Terms

mobility; mobilization

### Source Joint Publications

JP 4-01.1      JTTP for Airlift Support to Joint Operations  
JP 4-05      Joint Doctrine for Mobilization Planning

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## CJCS ALERT ORDER

alert order

1. A crisis-action planning directive from the Secretary of Defense, issued by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that provides essential guidance for planning and directs the initiation of execution planning for the selected course of action authorized by the Secretary of Defense. 2. A planning directive that provides essential planning guidance and directs the initiation of execution planning after the directing authority approves a military course of action. An alert order does not authorize execution of the approved course of action.

JP 1-02

The focus of the course of action (COA) selection phase of crisis action planning is on the selection of a COA by the National Command Authorities (NCA) and the initiation of execution planning. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, reviews and evaluates the COAs provided in the supported commander's estimate and prepares recommendations and advice for consideration by the NCA. The NCA select a COA and direct that execution planning be accomplished. Upon receipt of the NCA decision, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff issues a CJCS ALERT ORDER implementing the NCA decision.

A CJCS ALERT ORDER is a formal, crisis action planning (CAP)-prescribed order approved by the Secretary of Defense and transmitted to the supported commander and other members of the joint planning and execution community (JPEC) to announce the COA selected by the NCA and to initiate execution planning. The CJCS ALERT ORDER describes the selected COA in sufficient detail to allow the supported commander, in coordination with other members of the JPEC, to conduct the detailed planning required to deploy forces. It will contain guidance to amplify or change earlier guidance provided in the CJCS WARNING ORDER.

The ALERT ORDER will be issued by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and requires Secretary of Defense authorization because it conveys the NCA decision on COA selection that might initiate execution planning. An ALERT ORDER will normally be issued following a decision by the NCA that conduct of military operations in support of national interests is a distinct possibility and will normally be issued following receipt of the COMMANDER'S ESTIMATE. In a rapidly developing situation, however, the ALERT ORDER may be issued immediately following recognition of a crisis without the prior exchange of information normally included in Phases I, II, and III of CAP procedures, or it may be omitted if a PLANNING ORDER has been issued.

The specific contents of the ALERT ORDER may vary widely, as with the WARNING ORDER or PLANNING ORDER, depending on the nature of the crisis and the degree of prior planning. An existing plan may be applicable as written, partially applicable, or adapted to fit the particular crisis. When no existing plan is adaptable to the crisis, the emergency preparation of an OPERATION ORDER may be necessary.

If required by circumstances, the ALERT ORDER may include a DEPLOYMENT PREPARATION ORDER or DEPLOYMENT ORDER; i.e., changes to alert status of units and movement of selected forces to pre-position for impending operations.

#### **Related Terms**

CJCS execute order; CJCS planning order; CJCS warning order; course of action; crisis action planning; execution planning

#### **Source Joint Publications**

JP 5-0                    Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations  
JP 5-03.1              Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Vol I: (Planning Policies and Procedures)

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## **CJCS EXECUTE ORDER**

### execute order

1. An order issued by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, by the authority and at the direction of the Secretary of Defense, to implement a National Command Authorities decision to initiate military operations.
  2. An order to initiate military operations as directed.
- JP 1-02

When the Secretary of Defense authorizes the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to direct the supported commander to implement the OPERATION ORDER (OPORD), the Chairman issues a CJCS EXECUTE ORDER. The CJCS EXECUTE ORDER directs the deployment and employment of forces, defines the timing for the initiation of operations, and conveys guidance not provided in earlier crisis action planning (CAP) orders and instructions. The supported commander, in turn, issues an EXECUTE ORDER to subordinate and supporting commanders that directs the execution of their OPORDs. Subordinate and

## CJCS PLANNING ORDER

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supporting commanders execute their OPORDs and conduct operations to accomplish objectives.

The EXECUTE ORDER will be issued by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to direct execution of an OPORD or other military operation to implement a National Command Authorities (NCA) decision. The EXECUTE ORDER will be issued by authority and direction of the Secretary of Defense. The EXECUTE ORDER will be issued upon decision by the NCA to execute a military operation. Under the full CAP procedures, an EXECUTE ORDER would normally result from an NCA decision, following execution planning initiated by a PLANNING or ALERT ORDER. In a particularly time-sensitive situation requiring an immediate response, an EXECUTE ORDER may be issued without prior formal crisis planning, as would normally take place in Phases I through V of CAP.

When prior execution planning has been accomplished through adaptation of an existing plan or the development of an emergency OPORD, most of the guidance necessary for execution will already have been passed to the implementing commands, either through an existing plan or by a previously issued WARNING ORDER, PLANNING ORDER, ALERT ORDER, DEPLOYMENT PREPARATION ORDER, DEPLOYMENT ORDER, or REDEPLOYMENT ORDER. Under these circumstances, the EXECUTE ORDER need only contain the authority to execute the planned operation and any additional essential guidance, such as the date and time for execution. Reference to previous planning documents is sufficient for additional guidance.

In the no-prior-warning response situation where a crisis event or incident requires an immediate response without any prior formal planning, the EXECUTE ORDER must pass all essential guidance that would normally be issued in the WARNING ORDER, PLANNING ORDER, and ALERT ORDER. Under such rapid reaction conditions, the EXECUTE ORDER will generally follow the same paragraph headings as the PLANNING or ALERT ORDER. If some information may be desirable but is not readily available, it can be provided in a subsequent message because the EXECUTE ORDER will normally be very time-sensitive.

### Related Terms

CJCS alert order; CJCS planning order; CJCS warning order

### Source Joint Publications

JP 5-0	Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations
JP 5-03.1	Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Vol I: (Planning Policies and Procedures)

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## CJCS PLANNING ORDER

### planning order

1. An order issued by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to initiate execution planning. The planning order will normally follow a commander's estimate and a planning order will normally take the place of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff alert order. National Command Authorities approval of a selected course of action is not required before issuing a Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff planning order. 2. A planning directive that provides essential planning guidance and directs the initiation of execution planning before the directing authority approves a military course of action.

JP 1-02

In some cases, a PLANNING ORDER is used to initiate execution planning activities before a course of action (COA) is formally selected by the National Command Authorities

(NCA). Used in this manner, the PLANNING ORDER saves time and allows the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) additional flexibility in directing military activities. The PLANNING ORDER will not normally be used to direct the deployment of forces or to increase force readiness. If force deployment is directed, the PLANNING ORDER will require the approval of the Secretary of Defense. Issuance of either the PLANNING ORDER or the ALERT ORDER marks the beginning of execution planning.

The PLANNING ORDER may be issued by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to initiate Phase V for the supported commander. It does not eliminate the CJCS requirement in Phase IV to obtain NCA approval of a COA before execution in Phase VI. The PLANNING ORDER is normally approved by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

A PLANNING ORDER is issued when execution planning is desired before NCA approval of a COA is obtained or to compress the phases of the crisis action planning (CAP) while obtaining NCA approval on a CJCS-recommended COA. A PLANNING ORDER is normally issued by record communication using a precedence of IMMEDIATE or FLASH, as appropriate.

At the Joint Staff level, the PLANNING ORDER generally equates to a planning directive in the deliberate planning process and will contain all readily available guidance pertaining to the crisis. The precise contents of the PLANNING ORDER may vary widely depending on the nature of the crisis and the degree of prior planning. Where little or no prior planning exists to meet a crisis, the supported commander will be given the guidance necessary to permit him to begin crisis planning. The PLANNING ORDER should be issued as soon as possible, even if detailed guidance is not available. Normally, the planning order will allocate major combat forces and strategic lift available for planning. Additional information should be issued as soon as possible in message form and reference the initial planning order.

The PLANNING ORDER defines the objectives, anticipated mission or tasks, pertinent constraints, and, if applicable, tentative combat forces available to the commander for planning and strategic lift allocations. Further guidance relating to the crisis, including any specific direction from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, will also be provided as necessary, but the supported commander will retain maximum flexibility in determining how he will carry out his assigned mission and tasks.

#### **Related Terms**

CJCS alert order; CJCS execute order; CJCS warning order

#### **Source Joint Publications**

JP 5-0            Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations  
JP 5-03.1        Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Vol I: (Planning Policies and Procedures)

### CJCS WARNING ORDER

#### warning order

1. A preliminary notice of an order or action which is to follow. 2. A crisis action planning directive issued by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that initiates the development and evaluation of courses of action by a supported commander and requests that a commander's estimate be submitted. 3. A planning directive that describes the situation, allocates forces and resources, establishes command relationships, provides other initial planning guidance, and initiates subordinate unit mission planning.

JP 1-02

When a crisis situation develops, an assessment is conducted that may result in the issuance of a CJCS WARNING ORDER. Courses of action (COAs) are developed based on an existing operation plan or operation plan in concept form, if applicable. The combatant commander proposes COAs and makes any recommendations when the Commander's Estimate is forwarded to the National Command Authorities (NCA). The NCA select a COA and, when directed, the Chairman issues a CJCS ALERT ORDER. The combatant commander now has the essential elements necessary for finalizing the construction of a campaign plan using the approved COA as the centerpiece of the plan.

The WARNING ORDER will be issued by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to initiate Phase III — Course of Action Development. If the crisis warrants change in the alert status of units or pre-positioning of units, then the WARNING ORDER can contain a DEPLOYMENT PREPARATION or DEPLOYMENT ORDER. The WARNING ORDER is normally approved by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. If the order contains deployment of forces, Secretary of Defense authorization is required. The WARNING ORDER will be issued at the earliest practicable time following recognition of a crisis.

The WARNING ORDER normally will be issued by record communication, using a precedence of IMMEDIATE or FLASH.

The WARNING ORDER of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff generally equates to a planning directive in the deliberate planning process and should contain all readily available guidance pertaining to the crisis. The precise contents of the WARNING ORDER may vary widely depending on the nature of the crisis and the degree of prior planning. Where little or no prior planning exists to meet a crisis, the supported commander will be provided with essential guidance necessary to permit him to commence crisis planning. The WARNING ORDER should be issued as soon as possible, even if detailed guidance is not available.

The WARNING ORDER defines the objectives, anticipated mission or tasks, pertinent constraints, command relationships, and, if applicable, tentative combat forces available to the commander for planning and strategic lift allocations. Further guidance relating to the crisis, such as changes to existing rules of engagement or any specific directions from the NCA, will also be provided as necessary, but maximum flexibility will be left to the supported commander in determining how to carry out the assigned mission and tasks.

#### **Related Terms**

CJCS alert order; CJCS execute order; CJCS planning order

#### **Source Joint Publications**

JP 5-0 Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations

JP 5-03.1 Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Vol I: (Planning Policies and Procedures)

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## CLOSE AIR SUPPORT

Air action by fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft against hostile targets which are in close proximity to friendly forces and which require detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of those forces. Also called CAS.

JP 1-02

**General.** Joint close air support (CAS) is CAS conducted through joint air operations (as described in Joint Pub 3-56.1, “Command and Control for Joint Air Operations”) or in the case of rotary-wing aircraft, through the establishment of a command relationship between components.

CAS is a tactical level operation and is planned and executed to accomplish military objectives assigned to tactical units or task forces. CAS planning focuses on the ordered arrangement and maneuver of combat elements in relation to each other and/or to the enemy to achieve combat objectives. Although CAS is a tactical operation, it is linked to the operational art through the air apportionment process.

CAS can be conducted at any place and time friendly combat forces are in close proximity to enemy forces. The word “close” does not imply a specific distance; rather, it is situational. The requirement for detailed integration because of proximity, fires, or movement is the determining factor. CAS provides firepower in offensive and defensive operations to destroy, disrupt, suppress, fix, or delay enemy forces.

At times, CAS is the best force available to mass lethal capability rapidly in order to exploit tactical opportunities or to save friendly lives. Each Service performs CAS within its organic capabilities, organization, and training. As a result, a variety of aircraft are capable of performing CAS. Some, however, are better designed and suited for the CAS mission than others. Regardless of Service, all aircraft capable of performing CAS must be fully integrated into joint operations to give the joint force commander flexibility in force employment.



*CAS is provided to ground commanders when the situation requires detailed integration of firepower against enemy forces.*

**CAS Usage.** Maneuver force commanders request CAS to augment organic supporting fires. They can use CAS to attack the enemy in a majority of weather conditions, day or night. Improvements in tactics, techniques, procedures, and equipment have improved the ability of aircraft to provide support. The speed, range, and maneuverability of aircraft allow them to attack targets other supporting arms cannot effectively engage because of limiting factors, such as target type, range, terrain, or the ground scheme of maneuver.

CAS provides commanders with uniquely flexible and responsive fire support. Properly employed, commanders focus the firepower of CAS at decisive places and times to achieve their tactical objectives. Using CAS, commanders can take full advantage of battlefield opportunities. The three-dimensional mobility and speed of aircraft provides commanders with a means to strike the enemy swiftly and unexpectedly. The maneuver force commander considers mission and concept of operations, enemy air defenses and the joint force's ability to counter them, integration with other supporting arms, and types of CAS assets available in planning for CAS.

CAS is integrated with other fire support measures to support maneuver forces. Whether conducting offensive or defensive operations, commanders focus CAS at key points throughout the depth of the battlefield. Priority for the assignment of CAS is to support the commander's intent and concept of operation. Commensurate with other mission requirements, supporting air commanders posture their assets to optimize support to requesting units.

**CAS Employment.** The organizational structure, missions, and the characteristics of CAS-capable aircraft determine how CAS is employed. In a joint force, the integration of CAS-capable aircraft allows maneuver force commanders to take advantage of the distinctly different, but complementary, capabilities of each platform to support the fire and maneuver of their units. Although fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft can both provide CAS, employment considerations differ. Traditional planning and employment methods for fixed-wing CAS may not be best for rotary-wing aircraft.

While attack helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft capabilities are complementary, neither type can fully replace the air support provided by the other. The range, speed, and ordnance



*Close air support operations provide flexible and responsive fire support at decisive places to assist commanders in achieving their tactical objectives.*

load of fixed-wing aircraft and the helicopter's excellent responsiveness and ability to operate in diverse conditions are distinct advantages peculiar to each.

**Conditions for Effective CAS.** (See figure below.)

**Air Superiority.** Air superiority permits CAS to function more effectively and denies that same advantage to the enemy. It may range from local or temporary air superiority to control of the air over the entire area of responsibility/joint operating area.

**Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD).** SEAD may be required for CAS aircraft to operate within areas defended by enemy air defense systems. Available means to suppress enemy air defense threats include destructive and disruptive means.

**Target Marking.** The requesting commander can improve CAS effectiveness by providing timely and accurate target marks. Target marking aids CAS aircrews in building situational awareness, locating, and attacking the proper target.

**Favorable Weather.** Favorable visibility improves aircrew effectiveness regardless of aircraft type. Adverse weather CAS is available through specially-equipped aircraft and radar beacons; however, radars or radar beacons may not work well in conditions of heavy precipitation. Before CAS missions are executed, minimum weather conditions will be met. The air unit commander determines the minimum weather required for CAS missions.

**Prompt Response.** To be effective, CAS must provide a timely response to the request. Streamlined request and control procedures improve responsiveness. Prompt response allows a commander to exploit fleeting battlefield opportunities. Techniques for improving response time include the use of forward operating bases to decrease the distance to the area of operations;

## CONDITIONS FOR EFFECTIVE CLOSE AIR SUPPORT

AIR SUPERIORITY

SUPPRESSION OF ENEMY AIR DEFENSES

TARGET MARKING

FAVORABLE WEATHER

PROMPT RESPONSE

AIRCREWS AND TERMINAL CONTROLLER SKILL

APPROPRIATE ORDNANCE

COMMUNICATIONS

COMMAND AND CONTROL

placing aircrews on ground or airborne alert status; and delegating launch and divert authority to subordinate units.

**Aircrew and Terminal Controller Skill.** CAS execution is complex. Aircrew and terminal controller skills influence mission success. Maintaining a high degree of skill requires that aircrews and terminal controllers practice frequently. Frequent training is essential to maintain the skill and currency required to successfully accomplish the CAS mission in a joint environment. In addition, training with all maneuver elements is essential.

**Appropriate Ordnance.** To achieve the desired level of destruction, neutralization, or suppression of enemy CAS targets, it is necessary to tailor the weapons load and arming and fuzing settings for the required results. For example, cluster and general purpose munitions would be effective against troops and vehicles in the open, whereas hardened, mobile, or pinpoint targets may require specialized weapons such as laser guided, electro-optical, infrared munitions, or aircraft with special equipment or capabilities. In all cases, the requesting commander needs to know the type of ordnance to be expended (especially cluster munitions).

**Communications.** CAS requires dependable and interoperable communications between aircrews, air control agencies, terminal controllers, requesting commanders, and fire support agencies.

**Command and Control.** CAS requires an integrated, flexible command and control structure to process CAS requirements, assign assets, communicate taskings, deconflict fires and routing, coordinate support, establish airspace control measures, and update or warn of threats to CAS assets.

### Close Air Support in World War I

Despite the losses inflicted on attacking aircraft, aerial attack of front-line troops appeared, on the whole, to be quite effective. On November 23, 1917, for example, RFC D.H. 5 fighters (a type used almost exclusively for ground-attack duties) cooperated with advancing British tanks, attacking artillery positions at Bourlon Woods as the tanks advanced. Subsequent analysis concluded that “the aeroplane pilots often made advance possible when the attacking troops would otherwise have been pinned to the ground.” The critical problem affecting the quality of air support in the First World War was, interestingly, one that has appeared continuously since that time as well: communication between the air forces and the land forces. During these early operations, communication was virtually one-way. Infantry would fire flares or smoke signals indicating their position, or lay out panel messages to liaison aircraft requesting artillery support or reporting advances or delays. For their part, pilots and observers would scribble messages and send them overboard (on larger aircraft, crews carried messenger pigeons for the same purpose). Though by 1918 radio communication was beginning to make an appearance in front-line air operations — as evidenced by its employment on German ground-attack aircraft such as the Junker J1 and on Col. William Mitchell’s Spad XVI command airplane — it was still of such an uncertain nature that, by and large, once an airplane had taken off it was out of communication with the ground until it had landed. Thus attack flights — both Allied and German — tended to operate on what would now be termed a “prebriefed” basis: striking targets along the front of the basis of intelligence information available to the pilots before the commencement of the mission. The “on-call” and “divert” CAS operations associated with the Second World War and subsequent conflicts were not a feature of First World War air command and control, though

attack flights often loitered over the front watching for suitable targets of opportunity, as would their successors in the Second World War.

Source: Richard P. Hallion, Strike From The Sky, The History of Battlefield Air Attack 1911-1945, Smithsonian Institute Press, ©1989

### Related Terms

fire support

### Source Joint Publications

JP 3-09.3 JTTP for Close Air Support (CAS)

## CLOSE SUPPORT

That action of the supporting force against targets or objectives which are sufficiently near the supported force as to require detailed integration or coordination of the supporting action with the fire, movement, or other actions of the supported force. JP 1-02

See support.

## COALITION

An ad hoc arrangement between two or more nations for common action.


JP 1-02

*“Almost every time military forces have deployed from the United States it has been as a member of — most often to lead — coalition operations.”*

**General Robert W. RisCassi, USA: Principles for Coalition Warfare, Joint Force Quarterly: Summer 1993**

**Coalition Structure.** A coalition is an ad hoc arrangement between two or more nations for common action, for instance, the coalition that defeated Iraqi aggression against Kuwait in the Gulf War, 1990-1991. Coalitions are typically formed on short notice and can include forces not accustomed to working together. Establishing command relationships and operating procedures within the multinational force is often challenging. It involves complex issues that require a willingness to compromise in order to best achieve the common objectives. National pride and prestige can limit options for organization of the coalition command, as many nations prefer to not subordinate their forces to those of other nations. Though many command and control (C2) structures can be employed, coalitions are most often characterized by one of two basic structures: parallel command or lead nation command.

**Parallel Command.** Parallel command exists when nations retain control of their deployed forces. (See figure below.) If a nation within the coalition elects to exercise autonomous control of its force, a parallel command structure exists. Such structures can be organized with nations aligned in a common effort, each retaining national control; and nations aligned in a common effort, some retaining national control, with others permitting control of their forces by a central authority or another member force. Parallel command is the simplest to



establish and often the organization of choice. Coalition forces control operations through existing national chains of command. Coalition decisions are made through a coordinated effort of the political and senior military leadership of member nations and forces. It is common for other command structures to emerge as coalitions mature, but the parallel model is often the starting point. The figure above depicts the command relationships developed and employed by coalition forces for Operation DESERT STORM. These relationships represented a parallel command structure, with coordination facilitated by the Coalition Coordination, Communications, and Integration Center (C3IC). The C3IC was specifically established to facilitate exchange of intelligence and operational information, ensure coordination of operations among coalition forces, and provide a forum where routine issues could be resolved informally and collegially among staff officers.

**Lead Nation Command.** In this arrangement, the nation providing the preponderance of forces and resources typically provides the commander of the coalition force. The lead nation can retain its organic C2 structure, employing other national forces as subordinate formations. More commonly, the lead nation command is characterized by some integration of staffs. The composition of staffs is determined by the coalition leadership.



*Operation SUPPORT HOPE joint task force (JTF) officers explain airlift control element operations at Entebbe airport to the President of Uganda. A JTF, assembled in Entebbe, coordinated Ugandan support to the United Nations humanitarian relief effort to Rwanda.*

Combination. Lead nation and parallel command structures can exist simultaneously within a coalition. This combination occurs when two or more nations serve as controlling elements for a mix of international forces, such as the command arrangement employed by the Gulf War coalition. Western national forces were aligned under US leadership, while Arabic national forces were aligned under Saudi leadership.

**Coordination and Liaison.** Regardless of the command structure, coalitions require significant coordination and liaison. Differences in language, equipment, capabilities, doctrine, and procedures are some of the interoperability challenges that mandate close cooperation. Coordination and liaison are important considerations in alliances as well.

Robust liaison is critical to developing and maintaining unity of effort in coalition operations. Liaison exchange should occur between senior and subordinate commands and between lateral or like forces, such as between national special operations forces units or naval forces.

### The Gulf War, 1990-1991

**On 2 August 1990, Iraq invaded and occupied Kuwait. Much of the rest of the world, including most other Arab nations, united in condemnation of that action. On 7 August, the operation known as DESERT SHIELD began. Its principal objectives were to deter further aggression and to force Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait. The United Nations Security Council passed a series of resolutions calling for Iraq to leave Kuwait, finally authorizing “all necessary means,” including the use of force, to force Iraq to comply with UN resolutions.**

**The United States led in establishing a political and military coalition to force Iraq from Kuwait and restore stability to the region. The military campaign to accomplish these ends took the form, in retrospect, of a series of major operations. These operations employed the entire capability of the international military coalition and included operations in war and operations other than war throughout.**

The campaign — which included Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM and the subsequent period of postconflict operations — can be viewed in the following major phases.

**DEPLOYMENT AND FORCE BUILDUP** (to include crisis action planning, mobilization, deployment, and deterrence).

**DEFENSE** (with deployment and force buildup continuing).

**OFFENSE.**

**POSTWAR OPERATIONS** (to include redeployment).

**Deployment and Force Buildup.** While diplomats attempted to resolve the crisis without combat, the coalition's military forces conducted rapid planning, mobilization, and the largest strategic deployment since World War II. One of the earliest military actions was a maritime interdiction of the shipping of items of military potential to Iraq.

The initial entry of air and land forces into the theater was unopposed. The Commander in Chief, US Central Command (USCINCCENT), balanced the arrival of these forces to provide an early, viable deterrent capability and the logistic capability needed to receive, further deploy, and sustain the rapidly growing force. Planning, mobilization, and deployment continued throughout this phase.

**Defense.** While even the earliest arriving forces were in a defensive posture, a viable defense was possible only after the buildup of sufficient coalition air, land, and maritime combat capability. Mobilization and deployment of forces continued. Operations security (OPSEC) measures, operational military deceptions, and operational psychological operations were used to influence Iraqi dispositions, expectations, and combat effectiveness and thus degrade their abilities to resist USCINCCENT's selected course of action before engaging enemy forces. This phase ended on 17 January 1991, when Operation DESERT STORM began.

**Offense.** Operation DESERT STORM began with a major airpower effort — from both land and sea — against strategic targets; Iraqi air, land, and naval forces; logistic infrastructure; and command and control (C2). Land and special operations forces supported this air effort by targeting forward-based Iraqi air defense and radar capability. The objectives of this phase were to gain supremacy in the air, significantly degrade Iraqi C2, deny information to enemy commanders, destroy enemy forces and infrastructure, and deny freedom of movement. This successful air operation would establish the conditions for the attack by coalition land forces.

While airpower attacked Iraqi forces throughout their depth, land forces repositioned from deceptive locations to attack positions using extensive OPSEC measures and simulations to deny knowledge of movements to the enemy. Two Army corps moved a great distance in an extremely short time to positions from which they could attack the more vulnerable western flanks of Iraqi forces. US amphibious forces threatened to attack from eastern seaward approaches, drawing Iraqi attention and defensive effort in that direction.

On 24 February, land forces attacked into Iraq and rapidly closed on Iraqi flanks. Under a massive and continuous air component operation, coalition land forces

closed with the Republican Guard. Iraqis surrendered in large numbers. To the extent that it could, the Iraqi military retreated. Within 100 hours of the start of the land force attack, the coalition achieved its strategic objectives and a cease-fire was ordered.

**Postwar Operations.** Coalition forces consolidated their gains and enforced conditions of the cease-fire. The coalition sought to prevent the Iraqi military from taking retribution against its own dissident populace. Task Force Freedom began operations to rebuild Kuwait City.

The end of major combat operations did not bring an end to conflict. The coalition conducted peace enforcement operations, humanitarian relief, security operations, extensive weapons and ordnance disposal, and humanitarian assistance. On 5 April, for example, President Bush announced the beginning of a relief operation in the area of northern Iraq. By 7 April, US aircraft from Europe were dropping relief supplies over the Iraqi border. Several thousand Service personnel who had participated in Operation DESERT STORM eventually redeployed to Turkey and northern Iraq in this joint and multinational relief operation.

This postwar phase also included the major operations associated with the redeployment and demobilization of forces.

#### Related Terms

alliance; combined; multinational operations

#### Source Joint Publications

JP 3-0

Doctrine for Joint Operations

## COLLECTION

*“Great part of the information obtained in war is contradictory, a still greater part is false, and by far the greatest part is of a doubtful character.”*

**Clausewitz, On War, 1832**

Collection includes both the acquisition of information and the provision of this information to processing and/or production elements.

Collection Management Principles

- Joint force collection management must be able to task any joint force collection asset and obtain the aid of external resources (e.g., theater and national) in acquiring needed intelligence.
- Economies realized from centralization must not diminish the collection management element’s responsiveness to the requirements of the joint force.

Collection Guidelines (See figures below.)

- Intelligence Collection Activities. Collection resources supporting military operations should be allocated or tasked to satisfy anticipated and potential operational and tactical intelligence requirements of all command levels and elements of the joint force. Different types of collection capabilities may be needed so information from one source type can be tested or confirmed by others in order to subject the full range of enemy activity to observation. The collection system also needs some redundancy so the loss or failure of

## THE INTELLIGENCE CYCLE



one collection asset can be compensated for by duplicate or different assets capable of answering the intelligence need. To function effectively at the start of joint or multinational operations, responsibilities and procedures to optimize intelligence collection must be in existence and practiced during peacetime.

- Essential elements of information (EEI) and Intelligence Requirements. The joint force commander (JFC) is responsible for identifying and determining the EEI for the mission. In turn, the Intelligence Directorate of a joint staff (J-2) is responsible for identifying the intelligence shortfalls, stating them in terms of intelligence requirements, and then tasking collection assets, conducting exploitation/production, and ensuring dissemination. Identification of pre-planned EEI greatly enhances intelligence support to the joint force.
- Intelligence Requirements. At each level of command, senior intelligence officers must be aware of their command's intelligence requirements, as well as those of the next higher, adjacent, and subordinate commands. The collection or production capabilities of one component of a joint force may be able to satisfy another's requirements. Acting for the JFC, the J-2 (collection management) can task resources to collect, process, and exploit the information to fulfill the most important requirements of the joint force based on assigned or potential missions.
- The J-2 Must be Knowledgeable of Available Collection Resources. A corollary to the above is that the J-2 must be aware of the abilities, limitations, and leadtime required for

<b>COLLECTION</b>		
	<b>MANAGEMENT</b>	<b>OPERATIONS</b>
<b>JOINT STAFF J-2 / DIA</b>	COORDINATES AND LEVIES NATIONAL SYSTEM TASKING. RESPONDS TO RFI.	MONITORS NATIONAL SYSTEM TASKING, CONDUCTS LIAISON, RESPONDS TO RFI.
<b>COMBATANT COMMAND J-2</b>	PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY FOR COLLECTION MANAGEMENT. DEVELOPS THEATER COLLECTION PLAN.	COORDINATES THEATER SENSORS AND OTHER ASSETS, DECONFLICTS EEI, TASKS THEATER SENSORS.
<b>SUBORDINATE JOINT FORCE J-2</b>	IDENTIFIES, PRIORITIZES, VALIDATES RFI. DEVELOPS SYNCHRONIZED COLLECTION PLAN. TASKS COMPONENTS.	IDENTIFIES, PRIORITIZES, AND TASKS COLLECTION BY COMPONENTS.
<b>SUBORDINATE JOINT FORCE COMPONENTS</b>	IDENTIFY, PRIORITIZE EEI/ RFI. MANAGE ORGANIC CAPABILITIES. SUPPORT JTF.	COLLECT INTELLIGENCE AS TASKED. CONDUCT COLLECTION FROM TARGETS OF OPPORTUNITY.
<b>MILITARY SERVICES</b>	PROVIDE TRAINED PERSONNEL / INTEROPERABLE COLLECTION SYSTEM.	PROVIDE TRAINED PERSONNEL AND ASSETS.

tasking intelligence collection and production.

- Coordination of Collection Sources. Collection operations (including data exchange) of all collection sources should be synchronized and coordinated to allow cross-cuing and tipoff among collectors. The data collected should be integrated and correlated in all-source analysis, as appropriate. Resulting overlapping, multisource collection capabilities should be used to reduce the effects of enemy denial and deception measures and to improve the accuracy and completeness of intelligence.
- Collection Opportunity and Command and Control Warfare Tradeoffs. When determining intelligence operations, the JFC's staff and the components should identify and compare the longer term value of continued intelligence collection against enemy elements, with the immediate tactical value of destroying or countering a source of intelligence.

The J-2 and J-2 staff should monitor collection results and provide feedback to the JFC to assist in determining when specific targets can be nominated for attack. The J-2, in conjunction with national intelligence organizations and the components, should nominate a “no strike” target list to the Operations Directorate of a joint staff and keep it updated. The JFC will determine when and if these targets are to be attacked.

- Collection Operations Management (COM) Responsibilities. COM activities are driven by collection requirements. COM provides authoritative and coordinated direction and tasking of the broad array of technical sensor operations and human intelligence collection operations and their associated processing and dissemination resources.

### Related Terms

#### Source Joint Publications

JP 2-0

Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Operations

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## COMBAT

**Considerations Before Combat.** Considerations before combat are shown in the figure below.

General. Actions joint force commanders (JFCs) are able to take before the initiation of hostilities can assist in determining the shape and character of future operations. Most inclusive is preparing the theater, which involves intelligence and counterintelligence operations to understand clearly the capabilities, intentions, and possible actions of potential opponents, as well as the geography, weather, demographics, and culture(s) of the operational area. Additionally, the infrastructure required to deploy and support combat operations must be identified and emplaced as appropriate. In many cases, these actions enhance bonds between future coalition partners, increase understanding of the region, help ensure access when required, and strengthen future multinational military operations.

Preparing the Theater. At the advent of a crisis or other indication of potential military action, JFCs examine available intelligence estimates. As part of the intelligence preparation of the battlespace process, JFCs then focus intelligence efforts to refine estimates of enemy capabilities, dispositions, intentions, and probable actions within the context of the current

## CONSIDERATIONS BEFORE COMBAT

### Joint Force Commander's actions include...

- Preparing the Theater
- Isolating the Enemy
- Movement to Attain Operational Reach
- Special Operations
- Protection of Forces and their Freedom of Action
- Control of Space
- Constant Assessment of Physical Environment

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situation. They look for specific indications and warning of imminent enemy activity that may require an immediate response or an acceleration of friendly decision cycles.

JFCs direct reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition operations by elements of the joint force to further develop the situation and gain information critical to decision making. In some cases, such information can be gained by passive or unobtrusive means. In other cases, elements of the joint force may have to fight to gain the information desired. Armed reconnaissance operations conducted by manned systems have the potential to fight for information as well as process the information on site, providing commanders with real time intelligence. Special operations forces (SOF) can be employed for special reconnaissance or other human intelligence operations.

JFCs use a broad range of supporting capabilities to develop a current intelligence picture. These supporting capabilities include national intelligence and combat support agencies (for example, National Security Agency, Central Intelligence Agency, Central Imagery Office, Defense Intelligence Agency, and Defense Mapping Agency), which are coordinated in support of the JFC by the National Military Joint Intelligence Center.

Preparing the theater also includes organizing and, where possible, training forces to conduct operations throughout the theater. When it is not possible to train forces in the theater of employment, as with continental US (CONUS)-based forces with multiple taskings, maximum use should be made of regularly scheduled and ad hoc exercise opportunities. Joint task forces and components that are likely to be employed in theater operations should be exercised regularly during peacetime. Staffs should be identified and trained for planning and controlling joint operations. JFCs and the composition of their staffs should reflect the composition of the joint force to ensure those responsible for employing joint forces have thorough knowledge of their capabilities and limitations. The training focus for all forces and the basis for exercise objectives should be the combatant commander's joint mission essential task list.

JFCs establish and maintain access (including exercises, basing, transit, and overflight rights) to operational areas in which they are likely to operate. In part, this effort is national or multinational, involving maintenance of intertheater (between theaters) air and sea lines of communications (LOCs). Supporting combatant commanders can greatly enhance this effort. Either at the outset or as operations progress, JFCs establish and secure intratheater (within the theater) LOCs through the application of appropriate joint force.

**Isolating the Enemy.** With National Command Authorities (NCA) guidance and approval and with national support, JFCs strive to isolate enemies by denying them allies and sanctuary. The intent is to strip away as much enemy support or freedom of action as possible, while limiting the enemy's potential for horizontal or vertical escalation. JFCs may also be tasked to support diplomatic, economic, and informational actions as directed by the NCA.

JFC seeks to isolate the main enemy force from its strategic leadership and its supporting infrastructure. This isolation is accomplished by psychological operations and by interdicting critical command and control (C2) nodes, sources of sustaining resources, and transportation networks. This step serves to deny the enemy both physical and psychological support and may separate the enemy leadership and military from their public support.

**Movement to Attain Operational Reach.** Forces, sometimes limited to forward-presence forces, can be positioned within operational reach of enemy centers of gravity to achieve decisive force at the appropriate location. At other times, mobilization and strategic deployment systems can be called up to begin the movement of reinforcing forces from CONUS or other theaters to redress any unfavorable balance of forces and to achieve decisive force at the appropriate location.

JFCs carefully consider the movement of forces in such situations. At times, movement of forces can contribute to the escalation of tension, while at other times its deterrent effect can reduce those tensions.

**Special Operations.** During prehostilities, SOF can provide powerful operational leverage. Among their potential contributions, SOF can be employed to gather critical information, undermine a potential opponent's will or capacity to wage war, or enhance the capabilities of multinational forces. SOF can gain access and influence in foreign nations where the presence of conventional US forces is unacceptable or inappropriate. They can also ameliorate the underlying conditions that are provoking a crisis in an effort to preclude open hostilities from occurring.

**Protection.** JFCs must protect their forces and their freedom of action. This protection dictates that JFCs be aware of and participate as appropriate in regional political and diplomatic activities. JFCs, in concert with US ambassadors, may spend as much time on regional political and diplomatic efforts as on direct preparation of their forces for combat.

**Space.** Throughout all prebattle operations, JFCs continue to exploit the advantages that control of space provides. Intelligence and communications systems are maneuvered or activated as necessary to provide JFCs with an accurate and timely appraisal of the current situation, as well as the ability to respond rapidly to events and directives from the commander of a combatant command or from higher authority.

**Physical Environment.** Seasonal effects on terrain, weather, and sea conditions can significantly affect operations of the joint force and should be carefully assessed before and during operations. Mobility of the force, synchronization of operations, and ability to employ precision munitions can be affected by degraded conditions. Climatological and hydrographic studies and long-range forecasts help JFCs understand the most advantageous time and location for operations.

**Considerations at the Outset of Combat.** As combat operations commence, JFCs need to exploit full dimensional leverage to shock, demoralize, and disrupt opponents immediately. JFCs seek decisive advantage quickly, before close combat if possible.

**Force Projection.** The NCA may direct combatant commanders to resolve a crisis quickly, employing immediately available forward-presence forces, and, at the lowest level possible, to preclude escalation of the crisis. When this response is not enough, the projection of forces from CONUS or another theater may be necessary. When opposed, force projection can be accomplished rapidly by forcible entry coordinated with strategic airlift and sealift, and pre-positioned forces. For example, the ability to generate high intensity combat power from the sea can provide for effective force projection operations in the absence of timely or unencumbered access.

Force projection usually begins as a rapid response to a crisis. Alert may come with little or no notice, bringing with it tremendous stress on personnel and systems, accompanied by requests from the media for information. In any event, rapid, yet measured, response is critical.

Joint forces participate in force projection operations in both war and operations other than war. These operations may be either unopposed or opposed by an adversary. JFCs sequence, enable, and protect the arrival of forces to achieve early decisive advantage. An example of enabling and protecting the arrival of forces when access is initially unavailable is the seizure and defense of lodgment areas by naval forces, which would then serve as initial entry points for the continuous and uninterrupted flow of additional forces and materiel into the theater. To accomplish this decisive advantage, forcible entry operations may be required at the onset. When opposed, force projection can be accomplished rapidly by forcible entry coordinated



*Battle groups and task forces deployed worldwide provide combat power from the sea able to respond rapidly to crisis situations.*

with strategic airlift and sealift, and pre-positioned forces. Both types of operations demand a versatile mix of forces that are organized, trained, equipped, and poised to respond quickly.

The protection of forces will often be a friendly center of gravity during early entry operations. Therefore, early entry forces should deploy with sufficient organic and supporting capabilities to preserve their freedom of action and protect personnel and equipment from potential or likely threats.

JFCs introduce forces in a manner that enables rapid force buildup into the structure required for anticipated operations and simultaneous protection of the force. From a C2 perspective, echelonment is essential. Early entry forces should include the C2 capability to assess the situation, make decisions, and conduct initial operations.

Operations with allies and coalition members often require a robust liaison and communications capability. Linguists must be capable of communicating warfighting concepts between military forces of diverse cultures. Also, additional sufficient communications equipment may be required for non-US forces to enable interoperable communications.

**Dimensional Superiority.** JFCs will normally seek to secure air and maritime superiority early in the conduct of joint operations. Air and maritime superiority enable and enhance joint operations in all dimensions. Although air and maritime superiority are not ends in themselves, history shows that control of the sea and/or the air has been a pivotal wartime factor. World War II's Operation POINT BLANK established air superiority, which was considered a prerequisite for Operation OVERLORD. The Navy component commander or joint force maritime component commander is normally the supported commander for sea control operations, and the joint force air component commander (JFACC) is normally the supported commander for counterair operations.

Superiority battles are not limited to the air and maritime environments. JFCs seek to achieve superiority immediately in command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I) — space control is a necessary precursor to this superiority. They seek to lay open the enemy's intentions, capabilities, and actions to observation and assessment, while simultaneously depriving the enemy of similar information about the friendly force

and deceiving the enemy as to the veracity of the information obtained about the friendly force.

As another example of seeking early superiority before close combat, land commanders may seek to first achieve counterbattery or indirect fire superiority, thereby enhancing protection of their forces. Additionally, JFCs can seek to achieve a mobility differential by selectively attacking key enemy forces and transportation networks to degrade enemy maneuver.

**Direct Attack of Enemy Strategic Centers of Gravity.** Also as part of achieving decisive advantages early, joint force operations may be directed immediately against enemy centers of gravity. Where possible, specific operations may be conducted to directly attack strategic centers of gravity by air, missile, special operations, and other deep-ranging capabilities. When air operations constitute the bulk of the capability needed to directly attack enemy strategic centers of gravity or to conduct air superiority operations, JFCs will normally task JFACCs, as supported commanders, to conduct such operations.

There are several purposes to these attacks. They may in themselves be decisive. If they are not, they begin the offensive operation throughout the enemy's depth that can cause paralysis and destroy cohesion.

**Special Operations.** Special operations enhance the power and scope of full dimensional operations and tend to be asymmetrical in their application. Innovative special operations can directly and indirectly attack enemy centers of gravity that may be difficult to reach by conventional action. SOF frequently require support from other forces, but can support other forces in operations such as intelligence gathering, target acquisition and designation, and interdiction. SOF capabilities are diverse, but they need to be employed judiciously so as not to negate their effectiveness. They are a complement to, not a substitute for, conventional forces.

**Protection.** JFCs strive to conserve the fighting potential of the joint force. JFCs counter the enemy's firepower and maneuver by making personnel, systems, and units difficult to locate, strike, and destroy. They protect their force from enemy maneuver and firepower, including the effects of weapons of mass destruction. Air and maritime superiority operations; air defense; and protection of airports and seaports, LOCs, and friendly force lodgment all contribute to force protection. Operations security (OPSEC) and military deception are key elements of protection.

JFCs keep personnel healthy and maintain their fighting spirit. This protection includes guarding equipment and supplies from loss or damage. JFCs ensure systems are in place for adequate medical care, quick return of minor casualties to duty, and preventive medicine. Joint Pub 4-02, "Doctrine for Health Service Support in Joint Operations," discusses health support for joint operations.

JFCs make safety an integral part of all joint training and operations. Sustained, high-tempo operations put personnel at risk. Command interest, discipline, and training lessen those risks. Safety in training, planning, and operations is crucial to successful combat operations and the preservation of combat power.


JFCs make every effort to reduce the potential for fratricide — the unintentional killing or wounding of friendly personnel by friendly fire. The destructive power and range of modern weapons, coupled with the high intensity and rapid tempo of modern combat, increase the potential for fratricide. Commanders must be aware of those situations that increase the risk of fratricide and institute appropriate preventative measures. The primary mechanisms for limiting fratricide are command emphasis, disciplined operations, close coordination among

component commands, rehearsals, and enhanced situational awareness. Commanders should seek to minimize the potential for fratricide while not limiting boldness and audacity in combat.

**Sustained Combat Operations.** JFCs seek to extend operations throughout the breadth and depth of the operational area. As shown below, JFCs conduct sustained operations when a “coup de main” is not possible. During sustained operations, JFCs simultaneously employ air, land, sea, space, and SOF. During one major operation, one component or major category of operations, such as air operations, might be the main effort, with others in support. When conditions change, the main effort might shift to another component or function. Strategic attack and interdiction continue throughout to deny the enemy sanctuary or freedom of action. When prevented from concentrating, opponents can be attacked, isolated at tactical and operational levels, and defeated in detail. At other times, JFCs may cause their opponents to concentrate, facilitating their attack by friendly forces.

**The Relationship Between Offense and Defense.** Although defense may be the stronger form of war, it is the offense that is normally decisive. In striving to achieve strategic objectives most quickly and at least cost, JFCs will normally seek the earliest opportunity to conduct decisive offensive operations.

Joint operations will normally include elements of both offense and defense. JFCs strive to apply the many dimensions of combat power simultaneously across the depth, breadth, and height of the operational area. To conduct such operations, JFCs normally achieve concentration in some areas or in specific functions and require economy of force in others. During initial entry operations, entry forces may be required to defend while force buildup occurs. Even in sustained offensive operations, selected elements of the joint force may need to pause, defend, resupply, or reconstitute, while other forces continue the attack. Further, force protection includes certain defensive measures throughout the campaign. Commanders at all levels must possess the mental agility to rapidly transition between offense and defense and vice versa.



The relationship between offense and defense, then, is an enabling one. Defensive operations, where required, enable JFCs to conduct or prepare for decisive offensive operations.

Linear and Nonlinear Operations.

*“The full dimensional joint campaign is in major respects ‘nonlinear.’ That is, the dominant effects of air, sea, space, and special operations may be felt more or less independently of the front line of ground troops. The impact of these operations on land battles, interacting with the modern dynamics of land combat itself, helps obtain the required fluidity, breadth, and depth of operations. In the same way, land operations can provide or protect critical bases for air, land, sea, and space operations and enable these operations to be supported and extended throughout the theater”*

### **Joint Pub 1, Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States**

As technology and doctrines have expanded the lethality, tempo, and depth of operations, the potential for conventional forces to conduct nonlinear operations has increased. Linearity refers primarily to the conduct of operations along lines of operations with identified forward line of own troops. In linear operations, emphasis is placed on maintaining the position of the land force in relation to other friendly forces. From this relative positioning of forces, security is enhanced and massing of forces can be facilitated. Also inherent in linear operations is the security of rear areas, especially LOCs between sustaining bases and fighting forces. World Wars I and II offer multiple examples of linear operations.

In the land context, nonlinear operations tend to be conducted from selected bases of operations (ashore or afloat), but without clearly defined lines of operations. Because rear areas are likewise not clearly defined, their security as well as that of LOCs are not priority concerns. Operation JUST CAUSE is an excellent example of a nonlinear operation. In such an operation, land forces orient more on their assigned objectives (for example, destroying an enemy force or seizing and controlling critical terrain or population centers) and less on their geographic relationship to other friendly forces. Maritime operations, special operations, and the operations of insurgent forces tend to be nonlinear. To protect themselves, individual forces conducting nonlinear operations rely more on situational awareness, mobility advantages, and freedom of action than on mass. Nonlinear operations place a premium on C4I, mobility, and innovative means for sustainment.

**Attack of Enemy Strategic Centers of Gravity.** JFCs seek to attack enemy strategic centers of gravity, employing the appropriate forces and capabilities of the joint force. Such operations typically continue throughout the overall joint operation. JFCs time their effects to coincide with effects of other operations of the joint force and vice versa. As with all operations of the joint force, attacks of enemy strategic centers of gravity should be designed to support the JFCs’ objectives and concept of operations, while limiting their potential negative effects on posthostilities efforts.

**Maneuver.** The principal purpose of maneuver is to gain positional advantage relative to enemy centers of gravity in order to control or destroy those centers of gravity. The focus of both land and naval maneuver is to render opponents incapable of resisting by shattering their morale and physical cohesion (their ability to fight as an effective, coordinate whole) rather than to destroy them physically through attrition. This condition may be achieved by attacking enemy forces and controlling territory, populations, key waters, and LOCs (in all dimensions). Land and naval maneuver (which includes the action of air assets organic to the surface force) is required to control population, territory, and key waters.

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There are multiple ways to attain positional advantage. A naval expeditionary force with airpower, cruise missile firepower, and amphibious assault capability, within operational reach of enemy centers of gravity, has positional advantage. Land force attack aviation, if able to strike at the opponent's centers of gravity, also has positional advantage. Maintaining dimensional superiority contributes to positional advantage by facilitating freedom of action.

Maneuver of forces relative to enemy centers of gravity can be key to the JFC's campaign or major operation. Maneuver is the means of concentrating forces at decisive points to achieve surprise, psychological shock, and physical momentum. Maneuver may also exploit the effects of massed and/or precision firepower or weapons of mass destruction. JFCs consider the contribution of special operations in attaining positional advantage. Through special reconnaissance, direct action, or support of insurgent forces, SOF may expose vulnerabilities and attack the enemy at tactical, operational, and strategic levels. At all levels of war, successful maneuver requires not only fire and movement but also agility and versatility of thought, plans, operations, and organizations. It requires designating and then, if necessary, shifting the main effort and applying the principles of mass and economy of force.

At the strategic level, deploying units to and positioning units within an operational area are forms of maneuver if such movement seeks to gain positional advantage. Strategic maneuver should place forces in position to begin the phases or major operations of a campaign. At the operational level, maneuver is a means by which JFCs set the terms of battle by time and location, decline battle, or exploit existing situations. Operational maneuver usually takes large forces from a base of operations to an area where they are in position to achieve operational objectives. As shown by the Commander in Chief, US Central Command's concept of operations in Operation DESERT STORM, the ability to maneuver must be a trait not only of combat forces but also of the logistic resources that support them. Once deployed into battle formations into the operational area, maneuver is typically considered tactical in nature.

The concept for maneuver, both naval and land, needs to be articulated in the JFC's concept of operations includes timing, sequencing, and method and location of entry into the operational area. Types of joint force maneuvers include forcible entry, sustained action at sea and from the sea, and sustained action on land.

**Forcible Entry.** Forcible entry is seizing and holding a military lodgment in the face of armed opposition. In many situations, forcible entry is the only method for gaining access into the operational area or for introducing decisive forces into the region. Forcible entry capabilities give JFCs unique opportunities for altering the nature of the situation, such as the opportunity for gaining the initiative at the outset of combat operations. Forcible entry operations can strike directly at enemy centers of gravity and can open new avenues for military operations. Forcible entry operations can horizontally escalate the operation, exceeding the enemy's capability to respond.

Forcible entry operations are normally joint operations and may include airborne, amphibious, and air assault operations, or any combination thereof. Forcible entry is normally complex and risky. These operations require detailed intelligence and unity of effort. Forces are tailored for the mission and echeloned to permit simultaneous deployment and employment. Forcible entry forces need to be prepared to fight immediately upon arrival and require robust C4I capabilities to move with forward elements.

OPSEC and deception are critical to successful forcible entry. Forcible entry relies on speed and surprise and is almost always employed in coordination with special operations. Forcible entry usually requires support from naval gunfire and/or aviation assets. Follow-on

forces need to be prepared to expand the operation, sustain the effort, and accomplish the mission.

SOF may precede forcible entry forces to identify, clarify, and modify conditions in the area of the lodgment. SOF may conduct the assaults to seize small, initial lodgments such as airfields or ports. They may provide fire support and conduct other operations in support of the forcible entry. They may conduct special reconnaissance and interdiction operations well beyond the lodgment.

The sustainment requirements and challenges for forcible entry operations can be formidable, but must not be allowed to become such an overriding concern that the forcible entry operation itself is jeopardized. JFCs carefully balance the introduction of logistic forces needed to support initial combat with combat forces required to establish, maintain, and protect the lodgment.

Forcible entry has been conducted throughout the history of the Armed Forces of the United States. Forcible entry is usually a complex operation and should therefore be kept as simple as possible in concept. Schemes of maneuver and coordination between forces need to be clearly understood by all participants. When airborne, amphibious, and air assault operations are combined, unity of effort is vital. Rehearsals are a critical part of preparation for forcible entry.

### Operation JUST CAUSE

**In the early morning hours of 20 December 1989, the Commander in Chief, US Southern Command, JTF Panama, conducted multiple, simultaneous forcible entry operations to begin Operation JUST CAUSE. By parachute assault, forces seized key lodgments at Torrijos-Tocumen Military Airfield and International Airport and at the Panamanian Defense Force (PDF) base at Rio Hato. The JTF used these lodgments for force buildup and to launch immediate assaults against the PDF.**

**The JTF commander synchronized the forcible entry operations with numerous other operations involving virtually all capabilities of the joint force. The parachute assault forces strategically deployed at staggered times from CONUS bases, some in C-141 Starlifters, others in slower C-130 transport planes. One large formation experienced delays from a sudden ice storm at the departure airfield — its operations and timing were revised in the air. H-hour was even adjusted for assault operations because of intelligence that indicated a possible compromise. SOF reconnaissance and direct action teams provided last-minute information on widely dispersed targets.**

**At H-hour the parachute assault forces, forward-deployed forces, SOF, and air elements of the joint force simultaneously attacked 27 targets — most of them in the vicinity of the Panama Canal Zone. Illustrating that JFCs organize and apply force in a manner that fits the situation, the JTF commander employed land and SOF to attack strategic targets and stealth aircraft to attack tactical and operational-level targets.**

**The forcible entry operations, combined with simultaneous and follow-on attack against enemy C2 facilities and key units, seized the initiative and paralyzed enemy decision making. Most fighting was concluded within 24 hours. Casualties were minimized. It was a classic coup de main.**

JFCs and their staffs should be familiar with Service doctrine on land and naval maneuver.

**Interdiction.** Interdiction is a powerful tool for JFCs. Interdiction diverts, disrupts, delays, or destroys the enemy's surface military potential before it can be used effectively against friendly forces. Interdiction-capable forces include land- and sea-based fighter and attack aircraft and bombers; ships and submarines; conventional airborne, air assault, or other ground maneuver forces; SOF; amphibious raid forces; surface-to-surface, subsurface-to-surface, and air-to-surface missiles, rockets, munitions, and mines; artillery and naval gunfire; attack helicopters; Electronic warfare (EW) systems; antisatellite weapons; and space-based satellite systems or sensors. The JFACC is the supported commander for the JFC's overall air interdiction effort.

Interdiction-capable commanders require access to C2 systems able to take advantage of real and near real time intelligence. Such intelligence is particularly useful in dealing with targets of near or immediate effect on surface forces or whose location was not previously known with sufficient accuracy.

Interdiction operations can be conducted by many elements of the joint force and can have tactical, operational, and strategic effects. Air, land, sea, space, and special operations forces can conduct interdiction operations as part of their larger or overall mission. For example, naval expeditionary forces charged with seizing and securing a lodgment along a coast may include the interdiction of opposing air, land, and naval forces as part of the overall amphibious plan.

### **Battle of the Bismarck Sea 2-4 March 1943**

**The Battle of the Bismarck Sea is an outstanding example of the application of firepower at the operational level — in this case, air interdiction.**

During the first part of 1943, the Japanese high command attempted to establish a line of defense in the Southwest Pacific, to run from Northeast New Guinea, through New Britain to the northern Solomon Islands. After a defeat at Wau, New Guinea (the intended right flank of this line), the Japanese command at Rabaul decided to reinforce its garrison at Lae, in the Huon Gulf of New Guinea. Relying on inclement weather to cover its move, a convoy of 8 destroyers and 8 transports carrying over 8,700 personnel and extensive cargo departed Rabaul at midnight of 28 February.

General MacArthur's Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA) intelligence had identified the likelihood of this reinforcement. Lieutenant General George C. Kenney's Allied Air Forces, SWPA, had stepped up long-range reconnaissance, forward positioning of air forces, and training in low-level strikes against shipping.


Late on 1 March the convoy was spotted moving westward off the northern coast of New Britain. Early on 2 March Lieutenant General Kenney's air forces attacked as the convoy was moving into the Dampier Strait. Multiple formations of B-17s attacked throughout the day, sinking two transports and damaging several others. By the morning of 3 March the convoy was nearing the Huon Peninsula on New Guinea. It was now within range of all of Kenney's Papuan-based aircraft. Clearing midmorning skies exposed the convoy. In a synchronized attack, 13 B-17 heavy bombers, 31 B-25 medium bombers, 12 A-20 light bombers, 28 P-38 fighters, and 13 Australian Beaufighters unleashed their firepower on the vulnerable Japanese ships. The attack continued throughout the day as more planes roared off the Moresby and Milne runways

to join the fight. Before nightfall, over 330 allied aircraft had participated and, except for 4 destroyers that had fled to the north, all ships were sunk, sinking, or badly damaged. During the night and the next day, bombers and PT boats finished the job.

MacArthur was jubilant. His press release stated, in part, “Our decisive success cannot fail to have the most important results on the enemy’s strategic and tactical plans. His campaign, for the time being at least, is completely dislocated.” Looking back on SWPA operations, MacArthur, in 1945, still regarded the Battle of the Bismarck Sea as “the decisive aerial engagement” of the war in his theater. The Japanese high command was shocked and aborted its second projected offensive against Wau, New Guinea. By relying on Kenney’s aggressive airmen, MacArthur demonstrated the major impact of interdiction on a theater campaign.

Synchronizing Maneuver and Interdiction. As shown in the figure below, synchronizing interdiction and maneuver (both land and sea) provides one of the most dynamic concepts available to the joint force. Interdiction and maneuver should not be considered separate operations against a common enemy, but rather complementary operations designed to achieve the JFC’s campaign objectives. Moreover, maneuver by land or naval forces can be conducted to interdict enemy surface potential. Potential responses to synchronized maneuver and interdiction can create an agonizing dilemma for the enemy. If the enemy attempts to counter the maneuver, enemy forces can be exposed to unacceptable losses from interdiction. If the enemy employs measures to reduce such interdiction losses, enemy forces may not be able to counter the maneuver. The synergy achieved by integrating and synchronizing interdiction and maneuver assists commanders in optimizing leverage at the operational level.

As a guiding principle, JFCs should exploit the flexibility inherent in joint force command relationships, joint targeting procedures, and other techniques to resolve the issues that can arise from the relationship between interdiction and maneuver. When maneuver is employed, JFCs need to carefully balance doctrinal imperatives that may be in tension, including the



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needs of the maneuver force and the undesirability of fragmenting theater/joint operations area (JOA) air assets. The JFC's objectives, intent, and priorities, reflected in mission assignments and coordinating arrangements, enable subordinates to exploit fully the military potential of their forces while minimizing the friction generated by competing requirements. Effective targeting procedures in the joint force also alleviate such friction. As an example, interdiction requirements will often exceed interdiction means, requiring JFCs to prioritize requirements. Land and naval force commanders responsible for synchronizing maneuver and interdiction within their areas of operations (AOs) should be knowledgeable of JFC priorities. Component commanders aggressively seek the best means to accomplish assigned missions. JFCs alleviate this friction through clear statements of intent for theater/JOA-level interdiction (that is, interdiction effort conducted relatively independent of surface maneuver operations). In doing this, JFCs rely on their vision as to how the major elements of the joint force contribute to accomplishing strategic objectives. The campaign concept articulates that vision. JFCs then employ a flexible range of techniques to assist in identifying requirements and applying resources to meet them. JFCs define appropriate command relationships, establish effective joint targeting procedures, and make apportionment decisions.

Interdiction is not limited to any particular region of the joint battle, but generally is conducted forward of or at a distance from friendly forces. Interdiction may be planned to create advantages at any level from tactical to strategic with corresponding impacts on the enemy and the speed with which interdiction affects front-line enemy forces. Interdiction deep in the enemy's rear area can have broad theater strategic or operational effects; however, deep interdiction normally has a delayed effect on land and naval combat which will be a direct concern to the JFC. Interdiction closer to land and naval combat will be of more immediate operational and tactical concern to maneuver forces. Thus, JFCs vary the emphasis upon interdiction operations and surface maneuvers depending on the strategic and operational situation confronting them. JFCs may choose to employ interdiction as a principal means to achieve the intended objective (with other components supporting the component leading the interdiction effort).

Where maneuver is part of the JFC's concept, JFCs may synchronize that maneuver and interdiction. For the joint force campaign level, JFCs synchronize maneuver and interdiction to present the enemy with the dilemma previously discussed. Indeed, JFCs may employ a scheme of maneuver that enhances interdiction operations or vice versa. For instance, actual or threatened maneuver can force an enemy to respond by attempting rapid maneuver or resupply. These reactions can provide excellent and vulnerable targets for interdiction.

All commanders should consider how their capabilities and operations can complement interdiction in achieving campaign objectives and vice versa. These operations may include actions such as deception operations, withdrawals, lateral repositioning, and flanking movements that are likely to cause the enemy to reposition surface forces making them better targets for interdiction.

Likewise, interdiction operations need to conform to and enhance the JFC's scheme of maneuver during the campaign. JFCs need to properly integrate maneuver and interdiction operations to place the enemy in the operational dilemma of either defending from disadvantageous positions or exposing forces to interdiction strikes during attempted repositioning.

JFCs are responsible for the conduct of theater/JOA operations. To facilitate these operations, JFCs may establish boundaries within the theater/JOA for the conduct of operations. Within the joint force theater of operations, all missions must contribute to the accomplishment of

the overall objective. Synchronization of efforts within land or naval AOs is of particular importance.

Land and naval commanders are directly concerned with those enemy forces and capabilities that can affect their near-term operations (current operations and those required to facilitate future operations). Accordingly, that part of interdiction with a near-term effect on land and naval maneuver normally supports that maneuver to enable the land or naval commander to achieve the JFC's objectives. In fact, successful operations may depend on successful interdiction operations, for instance, to isolate the battle or weaken the enemy force before battle is fully joined.

The size, shape, and positioning of land or naval force AOs will be established by JFCs based on their concept of operations and the land or naval force commander's requirement for depth to maneuver rapidly and to fight at extended ranges. Within these AOs, land and naval operational force commanders are designated the supported commander and are responsible for the synchronization of maneuver, fires, and interdiction. To facilitate this synchronization, such commanders designate the target priority, effects, and timing of interdiction operations within their AOs.

The supported commander should articulate clearly the vision of maneuver operations to those commanders that apply interdiction forces within the supported commander's boundaries to attack the designated interdiction targets or objectives. The supported commanders should clearly state how they envision interdiction enabling or enhancing their maneuver operations and what they want to accomplish with interdiction (as well as those actions they want to avoid, such as the destruction of key transportation nodes or the use of certain munitions in a specific area). However, supported commanders should provide supporting commanders as much latitude as possible in the planning and execution of their operations. Once they understand what the supported commanders want to accomplish and what they want to avoid, interdiction-capable commanders can normally plan and execute their operations with only that coordination required with supported commanders.

Joint force operations in maritime areas often require a higher degree of coordination among commanders because of the highly specialized nature of some naval operations, such as submarine and mine warfare. This type of coordination requires that the interdiction-capable commander maintain communication with the naval commander. As in all operations, lack of close coordination among commanders in naval operating areas can result in fratricide and failed missions, especially in those areas adjacent to naval forces. The same principle applies concerning joint force air component mining operations in areas where land or naval forces may maneuver.

Interdiction target priorities within the land or naval force boundaries are considered along with theater/JOA-wide interdiction priorities by JFCs and reflected in the apportionment decision. The JFACC will use these priorities to plan and execute the theater/JOA-wide interdiction effort. JFCs need to pay particular attention to, and give priority to, activities impinging on and supporting the maneuver of all forces. In addition to normal target nomination procedures, JFCs establish procedures through which land or naval force commanders can specifically identify those interdiction targets they are unable to strike with organic assets within their boundaries that could affect planned or ongoing maneuver. These targets may be identified, individually or by category, specified geographically, and/or tied to desired effects and time periods. The purpose of these procedures is to afford added visibility to, and allow JFCs to give priority to, targets directly affecting planned maneuver by land or naval forces.

**Joint Fire Support.** Joint fire support includes those fires that assist land and amphibious forces to maneuver and control territory, populations, and key waters. Joint fire support can include the lethal or destructive operations of close air support (by both fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft), naval gunfire, artillery, mortars, rockets, and missiles, as well as nonlethal or disruptive operations such as EW.

**Combat Assessment.** With the increasing complexity of modern warfare and its effects, the traditional bomb damage assessment has evolved through battle damage assessment (BDA) to combat assessment (CA). CA is the determination of the overall effectiveness of force employment during military operations. BDA is one of the principle subordinate elements of CA.

At the JFC level, the CA effort should be a joint program, supported at all levels, designed to determine if the required effects on the adversary envisioned in the campaign plan are being achieved by the joint force components to meet the JFC's overall concept. The intent is to analyze with sound military judgment what is known about the damage inflicted on the enemy to try to determine: what physical attrition the adversary has suffered; what effect the efforts have had on the adversary's plans or capabilities; and what, if any, changes or additional efforts need to take place to meet the objectives of the current major operations or phase of the campaign. CA requires constant information flows from all sources and should support all sections of the JFC staff and components.

CA is done at all levels in the joint force. JFCs should establish a dynamic system to support CA for all components. Normally, the joint force Operations Directorate (J-3) will be responsible for coordinating CA, assisted by the joint force intelligence officer. JFCs apportion joint force reconnaissance assets to support the CA intelligence effort that exceeds the organic capabilities of the component forces. The component commanders identify their requirements and coordinate them with the joint force J-3 or designated representative.

### **Related Terms**

#### **Source Joint Publications**

JP 3-0                      Doctrine for Joint Operations

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## **COMBATANT COMMAND**

A unified or specified command with a broad continuing mission under a single commander established and so designated by the President, through the Secretary of Defense and with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Combatant commands typically have geographic or functional responsibilities. JP 1-02

A combatant command is a unified or specified command with a broad continuing mission under a single commander established and so designated by the President, through the Secretary of Defense, and with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Combatant commands typically have geographic or functional responsibilities.

The Unified Command Plan defines geographic areas of responsibility (AORs) for selected combatant commands, including all associated land, water areas, and airspace. Such AORs are referred to as theaters. By establishing geographic combatant commands (theater commands), the National Command Authorities (NCA) decentralize the authority to plan, prepare, and conduct military operations within that theater to the geographic combatant commander, consistent with strategic guidance and direction.

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## COMBATANT COMMAND (COMMAND AUTHORITY)

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Other combatant commanders are assigned functional responsibilities such as transportation, special operations, or strategic operations. Functionally oriented combatant commands can operate across all geographic regions or can provide forces for assignment to other combatant commanders. These combatant commands can also conduct operations while reporting directly to the NCA.

Combatant commanders receive strategic direction from the NCA through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and are responsible to the Secretary of Defense for accomplishing assigned missions.

Combatant commanders may directly control the conduct of military operations or may delegate that authority and responsibility to a subordinate commander. Such an arrangement allows the subordinate commander to control operations while the combatant commander supports the operation with forces and resources. This relationship is frequently referred to as a two-tiered system, and was successfully employed in Operations URGENT FURY (Grenada, 1983), JUST CAUSE (Panama, 1989), and UPHOLD DEMOCRACY (Haiti, 1994).

The two types of combatant commands are unified and specified.

### Related Terms

combatant commander; combatant command (command authority); specified command; unified command

### Source Joint Publications

JP 0-2      Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)

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## COMBATANT COMMAND (COMMAND AUTHORITY)

Nontransferable command authority established by title 10 ("Armed Forces"), United States Code, section 164, exercised only by commanders of unified or specified combatant commands unless otherwise directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense. Combatant command (command authority) cannot be delegated and is the authority of a combatant commander to perform those functions of command over assigned forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics necessary to accomplish the missions assigned to the command. Combatant command (command authority) should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations. Normally this authority is exercised through subordinate joint force commanders and Service and/or functional component commanders. Combatant command (command authority) provides full authority to organize and employ commands and forces as the combatant commander considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions. Operational control is inherent in combatant command (command authority). Also called COCOM. JP 1-02

Combatant command (command authority) (COCOM) is the command authority over assigned forces vested only in the commanders of combatant commands by title 10, US Code, section 164, or as directed by the President in the Unified Command Plan (UCP), and cannot be delegated or transferred.

COCOM is the authority of a combatant commander to perform those functions of command over assigned forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning

tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations, joint training (or in the case of US Special Operations Command, training of assigned forces), and logistics necessary to accomplish the missions assigned to the command. COCOM should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations. Normally, this authority is exercised through subordinate joint force commanders and Service and/or functional component commanders.

COCOM provides full authority to organize and employ commands and forces as the combatant commander considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions. COCOM includes the authority to perform the following:

- Exercise or delegate operational control of assigned or attached forces.
- Exercise directive authority for logistic matters (or delegate directive authority for a common support capability).
- Give authoritative direction to subordinate commands and forces necessary to carry out missions assigned to the command, including authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics.
- Coordinate the boundaries of geographic areas specified in the UCP with other combatant commanders and with other US Government agencies or agencies of countries in the area of responsibility (AOR), as necessary to prevent both duplication of effort and lack of adequate control of operations in the delineated areas.
- Function, unless otherwise directed by the Secretary of Defense, as the US military single point of contact and exercise directive authority over all elements of the command in relationships with other combatant commands, Department of Defense (DOD) elements, US diplomatic missions, other US agencies, and agencies of countries in the AOR (if assigned). Whenever a combatant commander undertakes exercises, operations, or other activities with the military forces of nations in another combatant commander's AOR, those exercises, operations, and activities and their attendant command relationships will be as mutually agreed to between the commanders.
- Determine those matters relating to the exercise of COCOM in which subordinates must communicate with agencies external to the combatant command through the combatant commander.
- Coordinate with subordinate commands and components and approve those aspects of administration and support (including control of resources and equipment, internal organization, and training), and discipline necessary to carry out missions assigned to the command.
- Establish personnel policies to ensure proper and uniform standards of military conduct.
- Participate in the development and acquisition of the command's command, control, communications, and computer systems and direct their operation.
- Submit recommendations through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense concerning the content of guidance affecting the strategy and/or fielding of joint forces.
- Participate actively in the Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS) and the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES). Combatant commanders' comments are critical to ensuring that warfighting and peacetime operational concerns are emphasized in all JSPS and JOPES documents.
- Concur in the assignment (or recommendation for assignment) of officers as commanders directly subordinate to the combatant commander and to positions on the combatant command staff. Suspend from duty and recommend reassignment of any subordinate officer assigned to the combatant command.

- Convene general courts-martial in accordance with the Uniform Code of Military Justice.
- In accordance with laws and national and DOD policies, establish plans, policies, programs, priorities, and overall requirements for the intelligence activities of the command.
- When directed in the UCP or otherwise authorized by the Secretary of Defense, the commander of US elements of a multinational command may exercise COCOM of those US forces assigned to that command.

Directive Authority for Logistic Matters. Commanders of combatant commands may exercise directive authority for logistics (or delegate directive authority for a common support capability). The exercise of directive authority for logistics by a combatant commander includes the authority to issue directives to subordinate commanders, including peacetime measures, necessary to ensure the following: effective execution of approved operation plans; effectiveness and economy of operation; and prevention or elimination of unnecessary duplication of facilities and overlapping of functions among the Service component commands. A combatant commander's directive authority does not discontinue Service responsibility for logistic support; discourage coordination by consultation and agreement; or disrupt effective procedures, efficient utilization of facilities, or organization.

Unless otherwise directed by the Secretary of Defense, the Military Departments and Services continue to have responsibility for the logistic and administrative support of Service forces assigned or attached to joint commands, subject to the following guidance:

- Under peacetime conditions, the scope of the logistic and administrative authority exercised by the commander of a combatant command will be consistent with the peacetime limitations imposed by legislation, Department of Defense policy or regulations, budgetary considerations, local conditions, and other specific conditions prescribed by the Secretary of Defense or the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Where these factors preclude execution of a combatant commander's directive by component commanders, the comments and recommendations of the combatant commander, together with the comments of the component commander concerned, will normally be referred to the appropriate Military Department for consideration. If the matter is not resolved in a timely manner with the appropriate Military Department, it will be referred by the combatant commander, through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to the Secretary of Defense.
- Under crisis action, wartime conditions or where critical situations make diversion of the normal logistic process necessary, the logistic and administrative authority of combatant commanders enable them to use all facilities and supplies of all forces assigned to their commands as necessary for the accomplishment of their missions. Joint logistic doctrine and policy developed by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff establishes wartime logistic support guidance that will assist the combatant commander in conducting successful joint operations.
- A combatant commander will exercise approval authority over Service logistic programs (base adjustments, force beddowns, and other aspects as appropriate) within the command's area of responsibility that will have significant effects on operational capability or sustainability. When the combatant commander does not concur with a proposed Service logistic program action and coordination between the combatant commander and the Chief of the Service fails to result in an arrangement suitable to all parties, the combatant commander may forward the issue through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense for resolution.

**Related Terms**

combatant command; combatant commander; operational control; tactical control

**Source Joint Publications**

JP 0-2

Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)

**COMBATANT COMMANDER**

A commander in chief of one of the unified or specified combatant commands established by the President. JP 1-02

The term “combatant commander” refers to the commander in chief of both geographically and functionally organized combatant commands. The term “geographic combatant commander” refers to a combatant commander with a geographic area of responsibility assigned by the National Command Authorities (NCA). Functional combatant commanders support geographic combatant commanders or may conduct operations in direct support of the NCA.

Based on guidance and direction from the NCA, combatant commanders prepare strategic estimates, strategies, and plans to accomplish the missions assigned by higher authority. Supporting combatant commanders and their subordinates ensure that their actions are consistent with the supported commander’s strategy.

Unless otherwise directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense, the authority, direction, and control of the commander of a combatant command, with respect to the commands and the forces assigned to that command, are shown in the figure below.

If a combatant commander at any time considers his authority, direction, or control with respect to any of the commands or forces assigned to the command to be insufficient to command effectively, the commander will promptly inform the Secretary of Defense through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Unless otherwise directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense, commanders of the combatant commands exercise authority over subordinate commanders as follows:

- Commanders of commands and forces assigned to a combatant command are under the authority, direction, and control of, and are responsible to, the commander of the combatant command on all matters for which the commander of the combatant command has been assigned authority.
- The commander of a command or force assigned to a commander of a combatant command will communicate with other elements of the Department of Defense (DOD) on any matter for which the commander of the combatant command has been assigned authority in accordance with procedures, if any, established by the commander of the combatant command.
- Other elements of the DOD will communicate with the commander of a command or force assigned to a commander of a combatant command on any matter for which the commander of the combatant command has been assigned authority in accordance with procedures, if any, established by the commander of the combatant command.
- The commander of a subordinate command or force will advise the commander of the combatant command, if so directed, of all communications to and from other elements of the DOD on any matter for which the commander of the combatant command has not been assigned authority.

## GENERAL FUNCTIONS OF A COMBATANT COMMANDER

- Giving authoritative direction to subordinate commands and forces necessary to carry out missions assigned to the command, including authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics.
- Prescribing the chain of command to the commands and forces within the command.
- Organizing commands and forces within that command as necessary to carry out missions assigned to the command.
- Employing forces within that command as necessary to carry out missions assigned to the command.
- Assigning command functions to subordinate commanders.
- Coordinating and approving those aspects of administration, support (including control of resources and equipment, internal organization, and training), and discipline necessary to carry out missions assigned to the command.
- Exercising the authority with respect to selecting subordinate commanders, selecting combatant command staff, suspending subordinates, and convening courts-martial as delineated in chapter 6, title 10, US Code.

### Related Terms

combatant command; combatant command (command authority)

### Source Joint Publications

JP 0-2            Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)  
JP 3-0            Doctrine for Joint Operations

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## COMBATANT COMMANDER'S LOGISTIC CONCEPT

Although the commanders of Service component commands provide logistic resources, combatant commanders are responsible for ensuring that the overall plan for using these resources supports the theater concept of operations.

**The Logistic System.** A critical element of a theater logistic system is timely integration of intertheater and intratheater transportation of personnel and supplies in the theater

distribution system. The means to move people and equipment forward and to evacuate them to the rear is fundamental to successful theater operations. The logistic system ranges from continental US (CONUS) or the deployed support base through a theater port of entry and on to the forward areas of the theater. Key elements of the logistic system are illustrated in the first figure below.

Considerations in developing a logistic system are shown in the second figure below and discussed in the text following.

Geography. The planner must examine the impact of topography, climate, and external factors affecting the logistic system, especially the impact on the various segments of the transportation system, including all waterways, rail, roads, pipelines, and airways.

*"Victory is the beautiful, bright-colored flower. Transport is the stem without which it could never have blossomed."*

Winston Churchill: The River War, vii 1899

Transportation. Many factors should influence the time-phased selection of transportation modes to meet operational requirements. For example, sealift is by far the most efficient mode for bulk tonnage; airlift is often the most expedient for people or for rapid movement of equipment and supplies when time is critical. On land, rail (for bulk tonnage) and pipeline (for bulk liquids) are more efficient than trucks.

Logistic Capability. The ability of the base infrastructure to receive, warehouse, and issue logistic resources influences the efficiency of the entire logistic system (for example, through the use of specialized container handling equipment). Infrastructure also limits the size of the force that can be supported.

Logistic Enhancements. Plans should include means to reduce the impact of logistic bottlenecks. Some examples are opening or gaining access to high-capacity ports, expanding airfield parking aprons, additional materials handling equipment, and expedient airfield matting. Improved use of commercial International Organization for Standardization

### KEY ELEMENTS OF THE LOGISTIC SYSTEM

#### LINES OF COMMUNICATIONS (LOCs)

The LOCs consists of all the routes (land, water, and air) that connect an operating military force with a theater base of operations and along which supplies and military forces move.

#### THEATER TRANSPORTATION NETWORK

The ports, bases, airports, rail heads, pipeline terminals, and trailer transfer points that serve as the reception and transshipment points for the LOCs.

#### UNITS

Specified units are responsible for operating the seaports, bases, and airports.

#### HOST-NATION SUPPORT

Desired civil and military assistance from allies that includes: en route support, reception, onward movement, and sustainment of deploying US forces.

## CONSIDERATIONS IN DEVELOPING A LOGISTIC SYSTEM

Geography  
Transportation  
Logistic Capability  
Logistic Enhancements  
Logistic Infrastructure Protection  
Echelon of Support  
Assignment of Responsibility  
Availability of Wartime Host-Nation Support

containers vice breakbulk can aid in port clearance; but planners should realize such a container policy may create problems elsewhere.

**Logistic Infrastructure Protection.** Provisions must be made for security of the logistic system because it is an integral part of combat power.

**Echelon of Support.** The logistic system must be responsive to the needs of the most forward combat forces. It must start from CONUS and extend to the forward area of operations, providing supplies and services when and where they are needed.

**Assignment of Responsibility.** Combatant commanders should assign responsibility for operating the seaports, bases, and airports to the Service components (or host nations), if applicable.


**Availability of Wartime Host-Nation Support.** The level of assistance in terms of transportation resources, labor, facilities, and materiel that can be provided by allied nations affects the amount of airlift and sealift that may be devoted to initial movement of combat forces or sustainment.

**Theater Concept of Logistic Support.** The concept of logistic support should derive from the estimate of logistic supportability of one or more courses of action (COAs). The combatant commander's (CINC's) directorate for logistics prepares these estimates for each alternative COA proposed by either the operations or planning directorate. The estimate of logistic supportability for the selected COA along with the logistic system framework considerations outlined above may be refined into the concept of logistic support for an operation or campaign.

The concept of logistic support is the envisioned manner in which the capabilities and resources of the CINCs' components will be employed to provide supply, maintenance, transportation, and engineering services. It is the organization of capabilities and resources into an overall theater warfare support concept.

The concept of logistic support should specify how operations will be supported. It should give special attention to the major lines of communications (LOCs) to be developed, as well as wartime host-nation support to be provided by each allied nation. If there is to be a communications zone to support air or land operations or a network of intermediate and advanced bases to support naval operations within a theater, the general organization and functions should be laid out. Supporting paragraphs should cover any topics the CINC believes are necessary and may include the following:

- **Logistic Authority and Control of Logistic Flow.** The figure below lists some of the responsibilities assigned by Department of Defense directive or discussed in joint publications.
- **Guidance on Harmonization.** Multiple Military Services (US and allied nations) may operate simultaneously within the theater and the LOCs approaching the theater. Coordination of functions among all affected commands, nations, and agencies is essential to avoid confusion and unnecessary duplication. The combatant commanders should provide general guidance, by function and area, wherever needed to ensure unity of effort.



## COMBAT ASSESSMENT

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- Logistic Command, Control, Communications, and Computers (C4) Systems. In addition to standard operating procedures for C4 systems, consideration should be given to backup plans or manual procedures in the event of possible C4 system outages or incompatible interfaces during combined operations.
- Intratheater Support. Specific guidance should be provided for employment of all available logistic infrastructure, including allied civilian and military support. In addition, the geographic combatant commander can assign logistic responsibility for the theater to the predominant user of a particular category of support (i.e., intratheater transportation is frequently an Army component responsibility).

### Related Terms

#### Source Joint Publications

JP 4-0

Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations

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## COMBAT ASSESSMENT

The determination of the overall effectiveness of force employment during military operations. Combat assessment is composed of three major components, (a) battle damage assessment, (b) munitions effects assessment, and (c) reattack recommendation. The objective of combat assessment is to identify recommendations for the course of military operations. The Operations Directorate (J-3) is normally the single point of contact for combat assessment at the joint force level, assisted by the joint force Intelligence directorate (J-2). Also called CA.

JP 1-02

With the increasing complexity of modern warfare and its effects, the traditional bomb damage assessment has evolved through battle damage assessment (BDA) to combat assessment (CA). CA is the determination of the overall effectiveness of force employment during military operations. BDA is one of the principle subordinate elements of CA. At the joint force commander (JFC) level, the CA effort should be a joint program, supported at all levels, designed to determine if the required effects on the adversary envisioned in the campaign plan are being achieved by the joint force components to meet the JFC's overall concept. The intent is to analyze with sound military judgment what is known about the damage inflicted on the enemy to try to determine: what physical attrition the adversary has suffered; what effect the efforts have had on the adversary's plans or capabilities; and what, if any, changes or additional efforts need to take place to meet the objectives of the current major operations or phase of the campaign. CA requires constant information flows from all sources and should support all sections of the JFC staff and components.

CA is done at all levels in the joint force. JFCs should establish a dynamic system to support CA for all components. Normally, the joint force Operations Directorate (J-3) will be responsible for coordinating CA, assisted by the joint force Intelligence Directorate. JFCs apportion joint force reconnaissance assets to support the CA intelligence effort that exceeds the organic capabilities of the component forces. The component commanders identify their requirements and coordinate them with the joint force J-3 or designated representative.

**Related Terms**

battle damage assessment; targeting cycle

**Source Joint Publications**JP 3-0                    Doctrine for Joint Operations

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**COMBAT INTELLIGENCE**

That knowledge of the enemy, weather, and geographical features required by a commander in the planning and conduct of combat operations.                    JP 1-02

The joint force commander (JFC) determines the strategic and operational objectives for the theater of operations. The Intelligence Directorate (J-2) determines the intelligence requirements and direction of the intelligence effort in support of the JFC's objectives. The intelligence effort is critical to the mission. Its nature, orientation, and scope depend on the commander's decision on the relative importance of intelligence in accomplishing the mission. The J-2 should refine the concept of intelligence operations to reflect changes in the commander's mission, estimate of the situation, and objectives. JFCs, with their J-2s, must ensure that intelligence objectives are correct, adequately stated, understood, synchronized, prioritized, and translated into actions that will provide the intelligence needed to accomplish the mission. Intelligence actions must be synchronized with other warfare disciplines to ensure integrated and responsive support throughout all phases of the operation.

Acquiring intelligence is the responsibility of the commander. Commanders, Operations Directorates, J-2s, and intelligence staffs developing strategy and operations and assigning mission responsibilities have the earliest view of intelligence requirements and the intelligence efforts that must commence at the inception of operations and missions. The determination of strategy and operations becomes the beginning point for intelligence needed to attain military objectives. It is at these earliest determinations that senior intelligence staffs must understand the combat intelligence requirements both for their commands and their subordinate commands, identify the commands and forces' organic intelligence capabilities and shortfalls, access theater and/or national systems to cover shortfalls, and ensure intelligence is provided or available to those who need it. This command responsibility also includes planning for logistic support to command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence; intelligence personnel; and equipment. Assignment of appropriate movement priority within the time-phased force and deployment list is essential to ensuring that required intelligence support will be available when needed to support joint operations.

**Related Terms**

intelligence

**Source Joint Publications**JP 2-0                    Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Operations

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**COMBAT SEARCH AND RESCUE**

A specific task performed by rescue forces to effect the recovery of distressed personnel during war or military operations other than war. Also called CSAR.                    JP 1-02

Each Service and US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) is responsible for performing combat search and rescue (CSAR) in support of their own operations, consistent

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with their assigned functions. In so doing, each Service and USSOCOM should take into account the availability and capability of the CSAR-capable forces of the others, including the US Coast Guard.

The joint force commander (JFC) may task Service and special operations component members of a joint force to participate in the operation of the joint search and rescue center (JSRC) and provide trained personnel to staff the center. JFCs have primary authority and responsibility for CSAR in support of US forces within their operational areas, including civilian personnel, such as Civil Reserve Air Fleet crew members and deployed technical representatives. When planning and executing this responsibility, JFCs should ensure that appropriate host nation policies, laws, regulations, and capabilities are taken into consideration.

JFCs normally delegate responsibility to recover personnel to the joint force component commanders. Additionally, the JFC should establish a JSRC to monitor recovery efforts; to plan, coordinate, and execute joint search and rescue (SAR) and CSAR operations; and to integrate CSAR operations with other evasion, escape, and recovery operations within the geographical area assigned to the joint force. Joint SAR and CSAR operations are those that have exceeded the capabilities of the component commanders in their own operations and require the efforts of two or more components of the joint force to accomplish the operation. Established subordinate JFCs such as commanders of subordinate unified commands and standing joint task force (JTF) commanders also should establish a standing JSRC (or its functional equivalent). Contingency JTF commanders should establish a JSRC (or its functional equivalent) in the earliest stages of forming the JTF.

In those joint operations in which there is significant involvement by joint force components and their staffs, the JFC normally should establish the JSRC by tasking one of the component commanders to designate their component rescue coordination center to function also as the JSRC. The designated component should possess the necessary forces and capabilities, such as command, control, communications, intelligence, and surveillance, to plan and execute expeditiously joint CSAR operations. The JFC should give the designated component commander the authority and responsibility that the JFC deems necessary for operating the JSRC so as to properly provide joint CSAR capability for the joint force. The designated component commander designates the JSRC Director, who has overall responsibility for operation of the JSRC.

If a joint operation is limited in nature and there is no significant involvement by joint force component forces or their staffs, the JFC may establish a JSRC (or its functional equivalent) as part of the JFC's staff. In this case, the JFC normally should designate a JSRC Director as the JFC's representative with overall responsibility for operation of the JSRC.

The health service support (HSS) capabilities of CSAR units vary from component to component, but are generally limited. Certain component CSAR units are dedicated to CSAR operations while others perform CSAR as a secondary mission. Marine Corps aviation units currently do not conduct CSAR, they do, however, possess the capability to conduct tactical recovery of aircraft and personnel, which may involve ground units as well. This mission has a different emphasis and application than the traditional CSAR mission.

Joint force CSAR HSS capabilities are limited to recovering or evacuating the sick or injured from low- to medium-threat environments. They provide medically supervised evacuation of the sick and injured from both peacetime and wartime situations. HSS personnel on rescue aircraft are capable of providing emergency medical treatment (EMT) for traumatic injuries as well as continuing treatment of life-threatening injuries or diseases during transportation.

Although CSAR units require HSS similar to other units, supported geographic combatant commanders must establish a flexible HSS system to meet the demands of CSAR operations. A majority of CSAR HSS requirements can be met by the component surgeon; however, several key issues must be emphasized in any joint CSAR HSS plan.

Adequate intelligence for the theater is critical to the success of CSAR operations. Support requirements for CSAR operations are shown in the figure below.

Some CSAR units do not deploy with organic flight surgeon support. Other units require flight surgeon support for technical assistance in the areas of EMT and administration of medication, continuing medical care and education, and CSAR mission support requirements.

## **SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS FOR COMBAT SEARCH AND RESCUE (CSAR) OPERATIONS**

- Replenishment of used or outdated medical supplies (medication and material).
- Oxygen supplies.
- Medical equipment maintenance.
- Narcotic storage and control.
- Storage of temperature-sensitive medical material.
- Optical fabrication.
- Blood supply, storage, and distribution.

### **Related Terms**

evasion and escape; search and rescue

### **Source Joint Publications**

JP 3-50.2      Doctrine for Joint Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR)  
JP 4-02        Doctrine for Health Service Support in Joint Operations

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## **COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT**

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The essential capabilities, functions, activities, and tasks necessary to sustain all elements of operating forces in theater at all levels of war. Within the national and theater logistic systems, it includes but is not limited to that support rendered by service forces in ensuring the aspects of supply, maintenance, transportation, health services, and other services required by aviation and ground combat troops to permit those units to accomplish their missions in combat. Combat service support encompasses those activities at all levels of war that produce sustainment to all operating forces on the battlefield. JP 1-02

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## COMBAT SUSTAINMENT

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All levels of logistics involve combat service support and affect the sustainability of forces in the combat zone. Combat service support (CSS) is the essential logistic functions, activities, and tasks necessary to sustain all elements of operating forces in an area of operations. At the tactical level of war, CSS includes but is not limited to that support rendered by service troops in ensuring the operational and tactical levels of supply, maintenance, transportation, health services, and other services required by aviation and ground combat troops to permit those units to accomplish their missions in combat. Operational logistics encompasses those activities at the operational level of war that link strategic objectives to tactical objectives on the battlefield.

### Related Terms

logistics

### Source Joint Publications

JP 3-02      Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations  
JP 4-0      Doctrine for Logistics Support of Joint Operations

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## COMBAT SUSTAINMENT

Combat sustainment theater airlift operations involve the combat movement of supplies, materiel, and personnel to reinforce or resupply units already engaged in combat operations. Combat sustainment planning usually assumes that user requirements and general threat situations allow little or no flexibility in the delivery times, locations, and configurations of specific loads. Flight schedules and load plans are usually driven by emergency combat requirements, and perhaps the user's inability to receive and handle large increments of sustainment materiel. Thus, the efficient utilization of allowable cabin loads (ACLs) and support resources is only a secondary consideration. For example, a unit with limited organic transportation and/or storage capabilities might require daily resupply increments, even though the daily loads underutilize the ACLs of the supporting air transports. On the other hand, such circumstances might justify adding vehicles to a unit's table of organization and equipment if that would allow airlift planners to consolidate several sorties into one. Given the exceptional risks involved for scarce and perhaps irreplaceable theater airlift assets, combat sustainment requests should normally be restricted to absolutely essential requirements. Combat sustainment usually involves individual aircraft or small formations employing combat tactics to deliver loads to terminals in close proximity to the enemy; it may also be conducted as an air flow operation, depending on requirements and threats. Only essential backhaul requirements justify the increased risks for theater airlift assets involved in these operations. Priority consideration should be given to retrograde of critical repairable items from forward areas to rear echelon repair activities.

### Related Terms

### Source Joint Publications

JP 3-17      JTTP for Theater Airlift Operations

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## COMBATTING TERRORISM

Actions, including antiterrorism (defensive measures taken to reduce vulnerability to terrorist acts) and counterterrorism (offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism), taken to oppose terrorism throughout the entire threat spectrum.

JP 1-02

Combatting terrorism involves actions taken to oppose terrorism from wherever the threat. It includes antiterrorism (defensive measures taken to reduce vulnerability to terrorist acts) and counterterrorism (offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism). (See figure below.)

Antiterrorism programs form the foundation for effectively combatting terrorism. The basics of such programs include training and defensive measures that strike a balance among the protection desired, the mission, infrastructure, and available manpower and resources. The US Government may provide antiterrorism assistance to foreign countries under the provisions of Chapter II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.

Counterterrorism provides response measures that include preemptive, retaliatory, and rescue operations. Normally, counterterrorism operations require specially trained personnel capable of mounting swift and effective action. The Department of Defense provides specially trained personnel and equipment in a supporting role to governmental lead agencies. Counterterrorism is a principal special operations mission. Department of State (DOS), Department of Justice (DOJ) (specifically, the Federal Bureau of Investigation), or the Department of Transportation (DOT) (specifically the Federal Aviation Administration) receive lead agency designation according to terrorist incident location and type. DOS is the lead agency for incidents that take place outside the United States; DOJ is the lead agent for incidents that occur within the United States; and DOT is the lead agent for incidents aboard aircraft “in flight” within the special jurisdiction of the United States. The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs resolves any uncertainty on the designation of lead agency or responsibilities.

#### Related Terms

antiterrorism; counterterrorism

#### Source Joint Publications

JP 3-07 Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War

## COMBATting TERRORISM

### ANTITERRORISM

**Defensive measures taken to reduce vulnerability to terrorist attacks**

**Includes training and defensive measures that strike a balance among the protection desired, mission, infrastructure, and available manpower and resources**

### COUNTERTERRORISM


**Offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism**

**Provides response measures that include preemptive, retaliatory, and rescue operations**

### COMBAT ZONE

1. That area required by combat forces for the conduct of operations.
  2. The territory forward of the Army rear area boundary.
- JP 1-02

Geographic combatant commanders may also establish combat zones and combat and communications zones (COMMZs), as shown in the figure below. The combat zone is an area required by forces to conduct large-scale combat operations. It normally extends forward from the land force rear boundary. The COMMZ contains those theater organizations, lines of communications (LOCs), and other agencies required to support and sustain combat forces. The COMMZ usually includes the rear portions of the theaters of operations and theater of war and reaches back to the continental US base or perhaps to a supporting combatant commander's area of responsibility. The COMMZ includes airports and seaports that support the flow of forces and logistics into the operational area. It is usually contiguous to the combat zone but may be separate — connected only by thin LOCs — in very fluid, dynamic situations.



## Related Terms

communications zone

## Source Joint Publications

JP 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations

## COMBINED

Between two or more forces or agencies of two or more allies. (When all allies or services are not involved, the participating nations and services shall be identified, e.g., Combined Navies.) JP 1-02

An operation conducted by forces of two or more nations is termed a “multinational” operation. An operation conducted by forces of two or more nations in a formal arrangement is termed an “alliance” operation. An alliance is a result of formal agreements between two or more nations for broad, long-term objectives. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is one example. These alliance operations are technically combined operations, though in common usage combined is often used as synonym for all multinational operations. Military action in a temporary or informal arrangement for common interests is termed a “coalition” operation. Though the description of “multinational” will always apply to such forces and commanders, they can also be described as “allied,” “combined,” “alliance,” or “coalition,” as appropriate.

### OVERLORD: A Classic Joint and Combined Operation

**Two years of preparation enhanced by the team-building leadership of General Dwight D. Eisenhower led to unity of effort in the Normandy campaign.**

**Thanks to unremitting Allied air offensives, by the spring of 1944 air superiority had been achieved throughout the European theater of war. Allied maritime superiority was assured with victory in the Battle of the Atlantic. These preconditions allowed great synergy to emerge from the integration of air, land, sea, and special operations forces in Operation OVERLORD. Combined military deception operations reinforced this synergy by causing the Germans to focus defenses outside the Normandy invasion area.**

**From mid-April through June 1944 massive air bombardment interdicted railroads and bridges leading to the lodgement area. Special operations forces (US, United Kingdom (UK), Free French, and Belgian) operating with the French Resistance enhanced these operations; during and after D-day, naval gunfire contributed to the interdiction effort as well. During the night of 5 June, tactical airlift forces carried pathfinders and airborne forces to commence the airborne operations. These airborne landings served to confuse the enemy and block key causeways, road junctions, and bridges leading to the amphibious assault area.**

**Meanwhile, other Allied air forces screened the sea flanks of the English Channel from enemy submarines, and helped suppress the enemy surface naval threat by constant attacks on E-boat installations. On 6 June 1944, naval gunfire support (often directed by fast flying Royal Air Force Spitfires) proved indispensable to destroying German fortifications, troop concentrations, and**

land minefields. Simultaneously, underwater demolition teams comprised of Sailors and Army engineers cleared paths through the vast array of German obstacles blocking the seaward approaches. By D+12, over 2,700 ships and 1,000 transport aircraft had landed 692,000 troops, 95,000 vehicles, and 228,000 tons of supplies.

This effective joint and combined operation owed much to unity of command. Eisenhower's command structure, the beneficiary of Allied experiences in North Africa and the Mediterranean, included a deputy of another Service and nation; subordinate commands for air, land, and naval forces; and (after much dispute) what we would today call operational control over US and UK strategic air forces.

This stood in sharp contrast to the fragmented German command structure. Von Rundstedt did not control naval and air forces in his theater, including paratroop, air defense, and coast artillery units. Nor did he control all land forces (for instance, he was unable to obtain permission on 6 June to counterattack with immediately available armored divisions).

### Related Terms

alliance; coalition

### Source Joint Publications

JP 1	Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States
JP 0-2	Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)
JP 3-0	Doctrine for Joint Operations

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## COMMAND

1. The authority that a commander in the Military Service lawfully exercises over subordinates by virtue of rank or assignment. Command includes the authority and responsibility for effectively using available resources and for planning the employment of, organizing, directing, coordinating, and controlling military forces for the accomplishment of assigned missions. It also includes responsibility for health, welfare, morale, and discipline of assigned personnel.
2. An order given by a commander; that is, the will of the commander expressed for the purpose of bringing about a particular action.
3. A unit or units, an organization, or an area under the command of one individual.
4. To dominate by a field of weapon fire or by observation from a superior position. JP 1-02

Command and control is the exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of a mission. Command, in particular, includes both the authority and responsibility for effectively using available resources to accomplish assigned missions.

Command at all levels is the art of motivating and directing people and organizations into action to accomplish missions. Command requires visualizing the current state of friendly and enemy forces, then the future state of those forces that must exist to accomplish the mission, then formulating concepts of operations to achieve that state. Joint force commanders (JFCs) influence the outcome of campaigns and major operations by assigning missions; designating the priority effort(s); prioritizing and allocating resources; assessing risks to be

taken; deciding when and how to make adjustments; committing reserves; staying attuned to the needs of subordinates and seniors; and guiding and motivating the organization toward the desired end.

The related tools for implementing command decisions include communications, computers, and intelligence. Space-based systems provide commanders capabilities such as surveillance, navigation, and location that greatly facilitate command. The precision with which these systems operate significantly upgrades the speed and accuracy of the information that commanders exchange, both vertically and laterally.

Effective command at varying operational tempos requires reliable, secure, and interoperable communications. Communications planning increases options available to JFCs by providing the communications systems necessary to pass critical information at decisive times. These communication systems permit JFCs to exploit tactical success and facilitate future operations. Nonetheless, command style is dictated by the commander, not by the supporting communication system.

### **Related Terms**

combatant command; combatant command (command authority); command and control

### **Source Joint Publications**

JP 3-0

Doctrine for Joint Operations

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## **COMMAND AND CONTROL**

The exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission. Command and control functions are performed through an arrangement of personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, and procedures employed by a commander in planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling forces and operations in the accomplishment of the mission. Also called C2. JP 1-02

Command and control (C2) is the exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of a mission. Command, in particular, includes both the authority and responsibility for effectively using available resources to accomplish assigned missions.

Command at all levels is the art of motivating and directing people and organizations into action to accomplish missions. Command requires visualizing the current state of friendly and enemy forces, then the future state of those forces that must exist to accomplish the mission, then formulating concepts of operations to achieve that state. Joint force commanders (JFCs) influence the outcome of campaigns and major operations by assigning missions; designating the priority effort(s); prioritizing and allocating resources; assessing risks to be taken; deciding when and how to make adjustments; committing reserves; staying attuned to the needs of subordinates and seniors; and guiding and motivating the organization toward the desired end.

Control is inherent in command. To control is to regulate forces and functions to execute the commander's intent. Control of forces and functions helps commanders and staffs compute requirements, allocate means, and integrate efforts. Control is necessary to determine the status of organizational effectiveness, identify variance from set standards, and correct deviations from these standards. Control permits commanders to acquire and apply means to accomplish their intent and develop specific instructions from general guidance. Ultimately, it provides commanders a means to measure, report, and correct performance.

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## COMMAND AND CONTROL OF LOGISTICS

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Control serves its purpose if it allows commanders freedom to operate, delegate authority, place themselves in the best position to lead, and synchronize actions throughout the operational area. Moreover, the C2 system needs to support the ability of commanders to adjust plans for future operations, even while focusing on current operations. Skilled staffs work within command intent to direct and control units and resource allocation to support the desired end. They also are alert to spotting enemy or friendly situations that may require changes in command relationships or organization and advise the commander accordingly.

The related tools for implementing command decisions include communications, computers, and intelligence. Space-based systems provide commanders capabilities such as surveillance, navigation, and location that greatly facilitate command. The precision with which these systems operate significantly upgrades the speed and accuracy of the information that commanders exchange, both vertically and laterally.

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Liaison is an important aspect of joint force C2. Liaison teams or individuals may be dispatched from higher to lower, lower to higher, laterally, or any combination of these. They generally represent the interests of the sending commander to the receiving commander, but can greatly promote understanding of the commander's intent at both the sending and receiving headquarters.

### Related Terms

command; control; command channel; command, control, communications, and computer systems

### Source Joint Publications

JP 3-0      Doctrine for Joint Operations

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## COMMAND AND CONTROL OF LOGISTICS

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Unity of command is essential to coordinate national and theater logistic operations. Logistics is a function of command. To exercise control at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war, commanders must also exercise control over logistics. For a given area and for a given mission, a single command authority should be responsible for logistics.

Sound logistic planning forms the foundation for strategic, operational, and tactical flexibility and mobility. To influence the relative combat power of his force, the commander must have adequate control of the command's logistic support capability.

The logistic support system must be in harmony with the structure and employment of the combat forces it supports. This unity of effort is best attained under a single command authority. Wherever feasible, peacetime chains of command and staffs should be organized during peacetime to avoid reorganization during war. This includes Reserve component forces (US and host nation) that may be assigned specific theater missions. Commanders must be able to call forward, in a timely manner, those assets needed to initiate and sustain war.

**Related Terms****Source Joint Publications**

JP 4-0

Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations

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**COMMAND AND CONTROL PROTECTION**

**General.** Command and control (C2) protection maintains effective C2 of own forces by turning to friendly advantage or negating adversary efforts to deny information to, influence, degrade, or destroy the friendly C2 system. Synchronized command and control warfare (C2W) operations should enable a joint force commander (JFC) to operate “inside” an adversary’s decision cycle by allowing the JFC to process information through the C2 decision cycle faster than an adversary commander. Initiative is fundamental to success in military operations. In C2W, both C2-attack and C2-protect operations contribute to gaining and maintaining military initiative.

**Psychological Operation.** Psychological operation’s (PSYOP’s) main objective in C2-protect is to counter the adversary’s hostile propaganda against the joint force. Discrediting the source of mass media attacks against the operations of the US/multinational forces is critical to maintaining a favorable world opinion of the operations. Countering adversary propaganda is a coordinated effort requiring centralized planning and synchronized execution at all levels. Other PSYOP activities to support C2-protect operations include:

- Persuading the adversary forces that US high-technology can be used to identify and neutralize their efforts and that their whole military force and its infrastructure will suffer if they persist in antagonizing friendly forces.
- When called upon, PSYOP operations can target individual intelligence and C2 nodes to assist in C2-protect operations.

**Military Deception.** Military deception can help protect the joint force from adversary C2-attack efforts. Deception that misleads an adversary commander about friendly C2 capabilities and/or limitations contributes to C2-protect. An adversary commander who is deceived about friendly C2 capabilities and limitations may be more likely to misallocate resources in an effort to attack or exploit friendly C2 systems.

**Electronic Warfare.** Each of the three divisions of electronic warfare (EW) can also make a contribution to friendly C2-protect efforts.

- Electronic warfare support (ES), supported by signals intelligence (SIGINT) data, can be used to monitor for impending adversary attack on friendly C2-nodes. ES, in the form of signal security monitoring, can be used to identify potential sources of information for an adversary to obtain knowledge about friendly C2 systems.
- Electronic attack, whether jamming, electromagnetic deception, or directed energy weapons/antiradiation missiles can be used to defend a friendly force from adversary C2-attack.
- Electronic protection should be used in C2-protect to safeguard friendly forces from exploitation by adversary ES/SIGINT operations. Frequency deconfliction through the use of the joint restricted frequency list is also a key to a successful coordinated defense against adversary C2-attack operations.

**Intelligence Role.** Traditional military defensive means, implemented at the component level, should defend against adversary efforts to employ physical destruction and EW against friendly C2 systems. However, the JFC should take measures to protect friendly C2 systems from adversary PSYOP, operations security (OPSEC), and military deception operations.

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## COMMAND AND CONTROL SUPPORT SYSTEM

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Even a technically unsophisticated adversary may use PSYOP, OPSEC, and/or military deception efforts against friendly C2 systems to influence friendly perceptions. Protecting the joint force from adversary OPSEC, PSYOP, and military deception is largely dependent on measures taken by the intelligence community supporting the joint force. The JFC has many sources to “sense” the operational area, including information from his own forces on a wide range of activities, such as the status of friendly forces as well as intelligence provided by many sources, from tactical to national. Although there is no way to guarantee that adversary OPSEC, PSYOP, and/or military deception measures do not distort the JFC’s perception of the battlefield, there are certain measures that can be taken within the intelligence community that should complicate the adversary’s efforts to manipulate friendly perceptions. These measures include:

- training intelligence analysts about military deception methods and to consider the possibility of military deception when analyzing collected intelligence information;
- enforcing information security procedures;
- training intelligence analysts to recognize their own cultural biases and to use analytical procedures that should minimize the impact of those biases;
- cooperating with counterintelligence efforts through active coordination with the counterintelligence support officer.

### Related Terms

command and control warfare

### Source Joint Publications

JP 3-13.1      Joint Doctrine for Command and Control Warfare (C2W)

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## COMMAND AND CONTROL SUPPORT SYSTEM

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Command and control (C2) must be viewed from a common perspective to understand the role of command, control, communications, and computers (C4) systems that support C2.

The command and control support (C2S) system gives the joint force commander (JFC) the means to exercise authority and direct assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission. The JFC uses information to support decision making and coordinate actions that will influence friendly and enemy forces to the JFC’s advantage.

Information integrates joint force components, allowing them to function effectively across vast distances. Therefore, the structure of the joint force drives specific information flow and processing requirements. The information requirements of the joint force drive the general architecture and specific configuration of the C2S system.

The C2S system must overlay the joint force to provide the means through which the JFC and subordinate commanders drive the joint force toward specific mission objectives. The C2S forces that compose the C2S system (e.g., reconnaissance, surveillance, intelligence, fire support coordination, air control, electronic warfare, C4 systems, sensor management, signals intelligence, deception, space systems, and others) should be task-organized and arrayed to collect, transport, process, and protect information as well as deny the enemy the same capability.

Modern military forces’ growing dependence upon C2 presents vulnerabilities that can be exploited by the capabilities of joint forces. Command and control warfare (C2W) seeks to deny the adversary the ability to command force disposition and employment while protecting the friendly joint force from similar efforts. The objective is to degrade the adversary’s unity of effort and decrease their tempo of operations while simultaneously increasing that of the joint force.

In short, the joint force must have information to operate. This information should be relevant, essential, timely, and in a form that warriors quickly understand and can use to act. The C2S system is the JFC's principal tool used to collect, transport, process, and disseminate this information. The C2S system also supports the implementation of C2W. C4 systems form the information exchange and decision support subsystems of a C2S system. In time of war, C4 systems support a continuous flow of data to provide real time battlespace information anywhere, anytime, on demand. C4 systems also have the broader role of supporting other functions within joint forces and the Department of Defense forming the overall Defense Information Infrastructure.

#### **Related Terms**

command and control

#### **Source Joint Publications**

JP 6-0            Doctrine for Command, Control, Communications, and Computer (C4)  
                      Systems Support to Joint Operations

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### **COMMAND CHANNEL**

Joint force commanders are provided staffs to assist them in the decision making and execution process. The staff is an extension of the commander; its sole function is command support, and its only authority is that which is delegated to it by the commander. A properly trained and directed staff will free the commander to devote more attention to directing subordinate commanders and maintaining a picture of the situation as a whole. The staff should be composed of the smallest number of qualified personnel who can do the job.

The command channel is the term used to describe the chain of command from commanders to subordinates through which command is exercised. The staff channel is the term used to describe the channel by which commanders interact with staffs. It also describes the channel by which staff officers contact their counterparts at higher, adjacent, and subordinate headquarters. These staff-to-staff contacts are for coordination and cooperation only. Higher headquarters staff officers exercise no independent authority over subordinate headquarters staffs, although staff officers normally honor requests for information.

#### **Related Terms**

#### **Source Joint Publications**

JP 0-2            Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)

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### **COMMAND, CONTROL, COMMUNICATIONS, AND COMPUTER SYSTEMS**

Integrated systems of doctrine, procedures, organizational structures, personnel, equipment, facilities, and communications designed to support a commander's exercise of command and control across the range of military operations. Also called C4 systems. JP 1-02

**General.** Command of joint forces in war is an intense and competitive process. The joint force commander (JFC) is not only faced with making tough decisions in complex situations, but must do this in an environment of uncertainty and limited time. Command is as much a problem of information management as it is of carrying out difficult and complex warfighting tasks. Command, control, communications, and computer (C4) systems supporting US military

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forces must have the capability to rapidly adapt to the warfighters demands; to make available the information that is important; provide it where needed; and ensure that it gets there in the right form and in time to be used. The fundamental objective of C4 systems is to get the critical and relevant information to the right place in time to allow forces to seize on opportunity and meet the objectives across the range of military operations.

**Enduring Elements.** Over time, superior command and control (C2) systems have enabled victorious commanders to maintain the unity of effort to apply their forces' capabilities at the critical time and place to win. Two characteristics have remained constant: the human element and the need for relevant, timely, and accurate information. The human element, with its ability to sort what's important, absorb the essentials, and react to the information, remains a constant factor over time.

*"War is a process that pits the opposing wills of two commanders against each other. Great victories of military forces are often attributed to superior firepower, mobility, or logistics. In actuality, it often is the commander who makes good decisions and executes these decisions at a superior tempo who leads his forces to victory. Therefore, victory demands that commanders effectively link decisionmaking to execution through the concept of command and control. Warfare will continue to evolve and command and control processes, organization, and supporting systems will continue to change, but the basic concept of command and control will remain the key to the decisive application of combat power. More than ever before, a command and control system is crucial to success and must support shorter decision cycles and instantaneous flexibility across vast distances of time and space."*

### **Fleet Marine Force Manual 3, Command and Control**


Today, improved technology in mobility, weapons, sensors, and C4 systems continue to reduce time and space, increase tempo of operations, and generate large amounts of information. If not managed, this may degrade the reactions of warfighters and ultimately the warfighting force. It is essential to employ C4 systems that are designed to complement human capabilities and limitations.

**The Role of C4 Systems in C2.** C2 must be viewed from a common perspective to understand the role of C4 systems that support C2. The figure below provides an overview of the relationship between information and the command and control support (C2S) system.

The C2S system gives the JFC the means to exercise authority and direct assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission. The JFC uses information to support decision making and coordinate actions that will influence friendly and enemy forces to the JFC's advantage.

Information integrates joint force components, allowing them to function effectively across vast distances. Therefore, the structure of the joint force drives specific information flow and processing requirements. The information requirements of the joint force drive the general architecture and specific configuration of the C2S system.

The C2S system must overlay the joint force to provide the means through which the JFC and subordinate commanders drive the joint force toward specific mission objectives. The C2S forces that compose the C2S system (e.g., reconnaissance, surveillance, intelligence, fire support coordination, air control, electronic warfare, C4 systems, sensor management, signals intelligence, deception, space systems, and others) should be task-organized and arrayed to collect, transport, process, and protect information as well as deny the enemy the same capability.




Modern military forces’ growing dependence upon C2 presents vulnerabilities that can be exploited by the capabilities of joint forces. Command and control warfare (C2W) seeks to deny the adversary the ability to command force disposition and employment while protecting the friendly joint force from similar efforts. The objective is to degrade the adversary’s unity of effort and decrease their tempo of operations while simultaneously increasing that of the joint force.

In short, the joint force must have information to operate. This information should be relevant, essential, timely, and in a form that warriors quickly understand and can use to act. The C2S system is the JFC’s principal tool used to collect, transport, process, and disseminate this information. The C2S system also supports the implementation of C2W. C4 systems form the information exchange and decision support subsystems of a C2S system. (See figure below.) In time of war, C4 systems support a continuous flow of data to provide real time battlespace information anywhere, anytime, on demand. C4 systems also have the broader role of supporting other functions within joint forces and the Department of Defense forming the overall Defense Information Infrastructure.

**Functions of C4 Systems.** C4 systems support the following functions:

- **Collect.** Acquiring or gathering and initial filtering of information based on a planned need, determining time sensitivity, and putting the information into a form suitable for transporting.
- **Transport.** Moving or communicating the information to appropriate receptacles for processing.
- **Process.** Storing, recalling, manipulating, filtering and fusing data to produce the minimum essential information in a usable form on which the warfighter can take appropriate actions.



- Disseminate. Distributing processed information, to the appropriate users of the information.
- Protect. Ensuring the secure flow and processing of information and access only by authorized personnel.

**Fundamental Objectives of C4 Systems.** The fundamental objectives are listed in the figure below and are described in the following text:

Produce Unity of Effort. C4 systems should help a military force and its supporting elements to combine the thoughts and impressions of multiple commanders and key warfighters. This allows the views of many experts to be brought to bear on any given task.



Multimission space-based platforms provide real time information exchange.

## FUNDAMENTAL OBJECTIVES OF COMMAND, CONTROL, COMMUNICATIONS, AND COMPUTER SYSTEMS

- Exploit Total Force Capabilities
- Properly Position Critical Information
- Produce Unity of Effort
- Information Fusion

**Exploit Total Force Capabilities.** C4 systems must be planned as extensions of human senses and processes to help people form perceptions, react, and make decisions. This allows people to be effective during high-tempo operations. C4 systems must be immediately responsive, simple, and easily understandable, especially for systems planned for use during situations involving great stress.

**Properly Position Critical Information.** C4 systems must be able to respond quickly to requests for information and to place and maintain the information where it is needed. This not only reduces critical delays but also reduces the impact on communications networks.

**Information Fusion.** The ultimate goal of C4 systems is to produce a picture of the battlespace that is accurate and meets the needs of warfighters. This goal is achieved by fusing, i.e., reducing information to the minimum essentials and putting it in a form that people can act on. There is no one fusing of information that meets the needs of all warriors. However, with concise, accurate, timely, and relevant information, unity of effort is improved and uncertainty is reduced, enabling the force as a whole to exploit opportunities and fight smarter.

**C4 Principles.** To ensure the continuous and uninterrupted flow and processing of information, joint warfighters must have C4 systems that are interoperable, flexible, responsive, mobile, disciplined, survivable, and sustainable. (See figure below.)

**Interoperable.** Joint and Service C4 systems must possess the interoperability necessary to ensure success in joint and combined operations. Interoperability is the condition achieved among C4 systems or items of C4 equipment when information or services can be exchanged directly and satisfactorily between them and their users. To ensure C4 systems' interoperability, all aspects of achieving it must be addressed throughout the life cycle of a system.

**Flexible.** Flexibility is required to meet changing situations and diversified operations with a minimum of disruption or delay. Flexibility can be obtained by system design (standardization), using commercial facilities, mobile or transportable C4 systems, or pre-positioned facilities. Although certain standard C4 systems (e.g., the Global Command and Control System, or the Defense Information Systems Network (DISN)) must operate under rather strict standards, systems requirements and designs should consider the planners' needs to tailor systems to meet strategic, operational, and tactical requirements. Flexible systems will allow planners to more readily integrate all levels of joint and Service C4 systems into plans. The connectivity that can be achieved and maintained from flexible systems is particularly important in providing commanders' contingency needs. Flexibility is a necessary adjunct to other principles of interoperability, survivability, and compatibility.

## COMMAND, CONTROL, COMMUNICATIONS, AND COMPUTERS PRINCIPLES

- ⊕ **Interoperable**
- ⊕ **Flexible**
- ⊕ **Responsive**
- ⊕ **Mobile**
- ⊕ **Disciplined**
- ⊕ **Survivable**
- ⊕ **Sustainable**

**Responsive.** C4 systems must respond instantaneously to the warriors' demands for information. To be responsive, systems must be reliable, redundant, and timely. C4 systems must be available when needed and must perform as intended. The reliability of C4 systems is achieved by designing equipment and systems with low failure rates and error correction techniques, standardizing equipment, establishing standardized procedures and supervising their execution, countering computer attacks and electromagnetic jamming and deception, and establishing effective logistic support programs.

**Mobile.** The horizontal and vertical flow and processing of information must be continuous to support the rapid deployment and employment of joint military forces. Warriors at all levels must have C4 systems that are as mobile as the forces, elements, or organizations they support without degraded information quality or flow. More than ever before, modular design and micro-electronics can make C4 systems lighter, more compact, and more useful to warfighters.

**Disciplined.** C4 systems and associated resources available to any JFC are limited and must be carefully used to best advantage. Discipline begins with the JFC focusing and balancing the joint force command and control infrastructure based on predetermined needs for critical information (minimum essential information critical to decision making and mission execution). This ensures that limited C4 systems and their associated forces and resources are employed to best advantage.

The JFC and joint staff must ensure that the flow, processing, and quality of information is deliberately controlled. This requires the planned complementary employment of all information related forces and systems. The C2S system must overlay the rest of the joint force to provide the means through which the JFC and subordinate commanders drive the joint force toward specific mission objectives. The C2S forces that comprise the C2S system should be task-organized and arrayed to collect, transport, process, and protect information as well as support C2W operations that deny the enemy the same capability. Control and management of C2S forces is therefore crucial to the JFC's ability to implement effective C2 within the joint force. The control and management of C4 networks and nodal operations is central to this effort.

The prioritization of information is essential since C4 systems have a finite capacity. Prioritization of specific types of information is the responsibility of the JFC, subordinate commanders, and staff planners that essentially provides a benchmark from which discipline on information flow and processing within C4 networks can be maintained. Prioritization is also essential to sizing C4 network and nodal systems requirements (e.g., the level of C4 assets devoted to intelligence requirements may reduce network responsiveness to other users requiring a decision by the JFC during campaign and operation planning).

**Survivable.** National policy dictates the survivability of both the national command centers and the C4 systems through which decisions are transmitted to the forces in the field. It is not practical or economically feasible to make all C4 systems or elements of a system equally survivable. The degree of survivability for C4 systems supporting the function of C2 should be commensurate with the survival potential of the associated command centers and weapon systems. C4 systems survivability can be achieved through application of techniques such as dispersal of key facilities, multiplicity of communication modes, hardening (electrical and physical), or a combination of these techniques.

The JFC ensures that both offensive and defensive C2W actions are employed to protect friendly C2. These actions are referred to as C2-protect operations. Since C4 networks and associated nodal systems are crucial to the joint force C2S system, they present a high value target to the enemy and must be protected to maintain the integrity of the joint force C2 infrastructure. C4 systems defense includes measures to ensure the security of information and C4 systems through information protection, intrusion/attack detection and effect isolation, and incident reaction to restore information and system security.

**Sustainable.** C4 systems must provide continuous support during any type and length of joint operation. This requires the economical design and employment of C4 systems without sacrificing operational capability or survivability. The following are specific examples:

- Consolidation of functionally similar facilities, which are closely located, under one command or Service.
- Integration of special purpose and dedicated networks into the DISN switched systems, provided they can offer equal or better service.
- Careful planning, design, and procurement of facilities and systems.
- Efficient management and operating practices and effective communications discipline.
- Maximum use of the DISN common-user subsystems.
- Judicious use of commercial services.

**Other relevant principles.** The principles listed above are by no means the complete set of C4 systems principles; other principles or terms have been identified. Subject to the interpretation and discretion of the user, these are either encompassed in those listed above or applied when appropriate. These principles include: integration, maintainability, mobility, modularity, planning, prioritization procedures, readiness, responsibility, responsiveness, simplicity, and supportability.

### **Related Terms**

command and control

### **Source Joint Publications**

JP 6-0            Doctrine for Command, Control, Communications, and Computer (C4)  
                      Systems Support to Joint Operations

### COMMANDER, AMPHIBIOUS TASK FORCE

The US Navy officer designated in the initiating directive as commander of the amphibious task force. Also called CATF. JP 1-02



*The commander of an amphibious task force may exercise tactical control over attached forces for specific operations.*

The commander, amphibious task force (CATF) exercises authority through the commanders of the task organizations, who exercise authority through their respective chains of command. Within the amphibious objective area (AOA), CATF is given specific authority, as prescribed by the commander having overall authority for the operation. The CATF will exercise the degree of control prescribed in the initiating directive over forces not a part of the amphibious task force (ATF) when such forces are operating within the AOA after the arrival of the advance force or the ATF. When such forces are merely passing through the AOA, control will be exercised only to the extent of preventing or minimizing mutual interference and in accordance with Joint Pub 0-2, “Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)” regarding support by transient forces under emergency conditions.

Subject to the overall authority of CATF, responsibility for conduct of operations ashore and for security of all personnel and installations located within the area of operations ashore is vested in the commander, landing force (CLF). CLF’s authority includes operational control of all forces, including airborne and/or air assault forces, operating ashore within the landing area, or as directed by the commander who issued the initiating directive.

#### **Related Terms**

amphibious operation; commander, landing force

#### **Source Joint Publications**

JP 3-02      Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations

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## COMMANDER, LANDING FORCE

The officer designated in the initiating directive for an amphibious operation to command the landing force. Also called CLF. JP 1-02

The commander, landing force (CLF) is either an Army or Marine officer who is in overall charge of the landing forces (which may include aviation units) from the issuance of the initiating directive until the conditions established in that directive have been met and the amphibious operation is terminated. The CLF is a subordinate of the commander, amphibious task force (CATF) within the amphibious task force. During the planning phase of the operation, however, the CLF and CATF enjoy coequal status for planning their respective portions of the operation. Planning matters on which the CATF and the CLF and commanders of other forces are unable to agree are referred to their common superior for decision.

### Related Terms

amphibious operation; commander, amphibious task force

### Source Joint Publications

JP 3-02      Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations

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## COMMANDER'S CONCEPT

See concept of operations.

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
## COMMANDER'S ESTIMATE

The COMMANDER'S ESTIMATE, submitted by the supported commander in response to a CJCS WARNING ORDER, provides the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with time-sensitive information for consideration by the National Command Authorities (NCA) in meeting a crisis situation. Essentially, it reflects the supported commander's analysis of the various courses of action (COAs) that may be used to accomplish the assigned mission and contains recommendations as to the best COA. (See figure below.) Although the estimative process at the supported commander's level may involve a complete, detailed estimate by the supported commander, the estimate submitted to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff will normally be a greatly abbreviated version providing only that information essential to the NCA and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in arriving at a decision to meet a crisis.

Supporting commanders normally will not submit a COMMANDER'S ESTIMATE to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; however, they may be requested to do so by the supported commander. They may also be requested to provide other information that could assist the supported commander in formulating and evaluating the various COAs.

The COMMANDER'S ESTIMATE will be submitted as soon as possible after receipt of the CJCS WARNING ORDER but no later than the deadline established by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the WARNING ORDER. Although submission time is normally 72 hours, extremely time-sensitive situations may require that the supported commander respond in 4 to 8 hours. Follow-on information or revisions to the COMMANDER'S ESTIMATE should be submitted as necessary to complete, update, or refine information included in the initial estimate.

The supported commander may submit a COMMANDER'S ESTIMATE at the commander's own discretion, without a CJCS WARNING ORDER, to advise the NCA and



Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the commander's evaluation of a potential crisis situation within the area of responsibility. This situation may be handled by a SITUATION REPORT instead of a COMMANDER'S ESTIMATE.

The essential requirement of the COMMANDER'S ESTIMATE submitted to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is to provide the NCA, in a timely manner, with viable military COAs to meet a crisis. Normally, these will center on military capabilities in terms of forces available, response time, and significant logistic considerations. In the estimate, one COA will be recommended. If the supported commander desires to submit alternative COAs, an order of priority will be established. All COAs in the WARNING ORDER will be addressed.

The estimate of the supported commander will include specific information to the extent applicable. The following estimate format is desirable but not mandatory and may be abbreviated where appropriate.

**Mission.** State the assigned or deduced mission and purpose. List any intermediate tasks, prescribed or deduced, that the supported commander considers necessary to accomplish the mission.

**Situation and Courses of Action.** This paragraph is the foundation of the estimate and may encompass considerable detail. Because the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is concerned primarily with the results of the estimate rather than the analysis, for purposes of the estimate submitted, include only the minimum information necessary to support the recommendation. **Considerations Affecting the Possible Courses of Action.** Include only a brief summary, if applicable, of the major factors pertaining to the characteristics of the area and relative combat power that have a significant impact on the alternative COAs.

**Enemy Capability.** Highlight, if applicable, the enemy capabilities and psychological vulnerabilities that can seriously affect the accomplishment of the mission, giving information that would be useful to the NCA and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in evaluating various COAs.

**Own Courses of Action.** List COAs that offer suitable, feasible, and acceptable means of accomplishing the mission. If specific COAs were prescribed in the WARNING ORDER, they must be included. For each COA, the following specific information should be addressed: combat forces required (e.g., 2 tactical fighter squadrons, 1 airborne brigade. List actual units if known.); force provider; destination; required delivery dates; coordinated deployment estimate; employment estimate; and strategic lift requirements, if appropriate.

**Analysis of Opposing Courses of Action.** Highlight enemy capabilities that may have significant impact on US COAs.

**Comparison of Own Courses of Action.** For the submission to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, include only the final statement of conclusions and provide a brief rationale for the favored COA. Discuss the advantages and disadvantages of the alternative COAs if significant in assisting the NCA and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in arriving at a decision.

**Recommended Course of Action.** State the supported commander's recommended COA.

### **Related Terms**

#### **Source Joint Publications**

JP 5-03.1      Joint Operation Planning and Execution System, Vol I: (Planning Policies and Procedures)

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## **COMMANDER'S INTENT**

The commander's intent describes the desired end state. It is a concise expression of the purpose of the operation, not a summary of the concept of operations. It may include how the posture of units at that end state facilitates transition to future operations. It may also include the commander's assessment of the enemy commander's intent.

Joint force commanders (JFCs) begin to form their intent as they analyze the mission assigned by a superior commander. Together, with the higher headquarters' order, the JFC's intent is the initial impetus for the entire planning process. JFCs initially provide their intent verbally to the staff with the restated mission and planning guidance. JFCs refine their intent as they consider staff estimates and complete the commander's estimate. The intent statement may also contain an assessment of where and how the commander will accept risk during the operation.

The JFC's intent helps subordinates pursue the desired end state without further orders, even when operations do not unfold as planned. Thus, the commander's intent provides focus for all subordinate elements. The intent statement is usually written, but could be verbal when time is short. It should be concise and clear. The intent should be able to focus subordinate commanders on the purpose of the operation and describe how it relates to future operations. A JFC's order should contain the intent statement of the next senior commander in the chain of command.

### **Related Terms**

end state

#### **Source Joint Publications**

JP 3-0      Doctrine for Joint Operations

### COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS

The interrelated responsibilities between commanders, as well as the authority of commanders in the chain of command. JP 1-02

*"I was informed that all the causes of delay had been reported through the 'usual channels,' but as far as those on the spot were aware nothing very much seems to have happened. It would seem best therefore to start from the other end of the 'usual channels' and sound backwards to find where the delay in dealing with the matter has occurred."*

**Winston Churchill: Note for General Ismay, 26 January 1941**


Command is central to all military action, and unity of command is central to unity of effort. Inherent in command is the authority that a military commander lawfully exercises over subordinates and confers authority to assign missions and to demand accountability for their attainment. Although commanders may delegate authority to accomplish missions, they may not absolve themselves of the responsibility for the attainment of these missions. Authority is never absolute; the extent of authority is specified by the establishing authority, directives, and law. (See first figure below.)

Joint force commanders (JFCs) are provided staffs to assist them in the decision making and execution process. The staff is an extension of the commander; its sole function is command support, and its only authority is that which is delegated to it by the commander. A properly trained and directed staff will free the commander to devote more attention to directing subordinate commanders and maintaining a picture of the situation as a whole. The staff should be composed of the smallest number of qualified personnel who can do the job.

The command channel is the term used to describe the chain of command from commanders to subordinates through which command is exercised. The staff channel is the term used to describe the channel by which commanders interact with staffs. It also describes the channel by which staff officers contact their counterparts at higher, adjacent, and subordinate headquarters. These staff-to-staff contacts are for coordination and cooperation only. Higher headquarters staff officers exercise no independent authority over subordinate headquarters staffs, although staff officers normally honor requests for information.

The authority vested in a commander must be commensurate with the responsibility assigned. There are various levels of authority used for US military forces, four are command relationships: combatant command (command authority) (COCOM), operational control (OPCON), tactical control, and support. The other authorities are coordinating authority: administrative control, and direct liaison authorized.

Unity of command is the interlocking web of responsibility which is a foundation for trust, coordination, and the teamwork necessary for unified military action. It requires clear delineation of responsibility among commanders up, down, and laterally. An overview of command relationships is shown in the second figure below. All Service forces (except as noted in title 10, US Code, Section 162) are assigned to combatant commands by the Secretary of Defense "Forces for Unified Commands" memorandum. A force assigned or attached to a combatant command may be transferred from that command only as directed by the Secretary of Defense and under procedures prescribed by the Secretary of Defense and approved by the President. Establishing authorities for subordinate unified commands and joint task forces



# COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS

## Combatant Command (command authority) (COCOM)

*(Unique to Combatant Commander)*

- Budget/PPBS Input
- Assignment of subordinate commanders
- Relations with DOD Agencies
- Convene courts-martial
- Directive authority for logistics
- Authoritative direction for all military operations and joint training
- Organize and employ commands and forces
- Assign command functions to subordinates
- Establish plans/requirements for intelligence activity
- Suspend from duty subordinate commanders

When  
**OPCON**  
is delegated

When  
**TACON**  
is delegated

**Local direction and control of movements or maneuvers to accomplish mission**

When  
**SUPPORT**  
relationship is delegated

**Aid, assist, protect, or sustain another organization**

may direct the assignment or attachment of their forces to those subordinate commands as appropriate.

As shown in the figure below, forces, not command relationships, are transferred between commands. When forces are transferred, the command relationship the gaining commander will exercise (and the losing commander will relinquish) over those forces must be specified.

The combatant commander exercises COCOM over forces assigned or reassigned by the National Command Authorities (NCA). Subordinate JFCs will exercise OPCON over assigned or reassigned forces. Forces are assigned or reassigned when the transfer of forces will be permanent or for an unknown period of time, or when the broadest level of command and control is required or desired. OPCON of assigned forces is inherent in COCOM and may be delegated within the combatant command by the commander in chief of the combatant command or between combatant commands by the Secretary of Defense.

The combatant commander normally exercises OPCON over forces attached by the NCA. Forces are attached when the transfer of forces will be temporary. Establishing authorities for subordinate unified commands and joint task forces will normally direct the delegation of OPCON over forces attached to those subordinate commands.

In accordance with the “Forces for Unified Commands” and the “Unified Command Plan,” except as otherwise directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense, all forces operating within the geographic area assigned to a combatant command shall be assigned or attached to and under the command of the commander of that command. Forces directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense may conduct operations from or within any geographic area as required for accomplishing assigned tasks, as mutually agreed by the commanders concerned

## ASSIGNMENT AND TRANSFER OF FORCES TO A JOINT FORCE

- Forces, not command relationships, are transferred between commands. When forces are transferred, the command relationship the gaining commander will exercise (and the losing commander will relinquish) over those forces must be specified.
- When the transfer of forces to a joint force will be permanent (or for an unknown but long period of time) the forces should be reassigned. Combatant commanders will exercise combatant command (command authority) and subordinate joint force commanders (JFCs) will exercise operational control (OPCON) over reassigned forces.
- When transfer of forces to a joint force will be temporary, the forces will be attached to the gaining command and JFCs will exercise OPCON or tactical control, as appropriate, over the attached forces.
- Establishing authorities for subordinate unified commands and joint task forces direct the assignment or attachment of their forces to those subordinate commands as appropriate.

or as directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense. Transient forces do not come under the chain of command of the area commander solely by their movement across area of responsibility/joint operations area boundaries.

### Related Terms

#### Source Joint Publications

JP 0-2 Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)

## COMMUNICATIONS


A method or means of conveying information of any kind from one person or place to another. JP 1-02

**Command, Control, Communications, and Computer Systems (C4) Management.** Joint C4 management indicates the exercise of systems and technical control over assigned communications systems. C4 management allows the planners to maintain an accurate and detailed status of the C4 network down to the modular level. C4 management combines

centralized control with decentralized execution and provides effective and efficient C4 support for the joint force commander’s (JFC’s) informational requirements.

**Management Organizations**

- C4 Division. The C4 Directorate (J-6) assists the commander in carrying out supervisory responsibilities for communications, electronics, and automated information systems. The J-6 is responsible to the JFC for fulfilling the staff functions on all C4 matters. This includes the development of C4 architectures and plans, as well as policy and guidance for the integration and installation of operational C4 systems. The J-6 formulates policy and guidance for all communication assets supporting the JFC. The J-6 and his or her staff assist the JFC in publishing C4 plans, annexes, and operating instructions. They review C4 plans prepared by subordinate component commanders, manage the frequency spectrum within the operational area, and coordinate with host-nation authorities.
- Joint Communications Control Center (JCCC). The J-6 establishes a JCCC to manage all communications systems deployed during joint operations and exercises. Components and subordinate joint force commanders establish C4 control centers to serve as their single point of contact and responsibility for joint C4 matters. The JCCC, as an element of the J-6, exercises control over all deployed communications systems. The JCCC serves as the single control agency for the management and operational direction of the joint communications network. As discussed in detail in the CJCSM 6231 series, the JCCC performs planning, execution, technical direction, and management functions. The figure below depicts a notional JCCC.
- Services and Component Management. Components and assigned support organizations should designate a single office within their communications staffs to coordinate with the joint force staff J-6. Component C4 organizations should formulate and publish plans, orders, and internal operating instructions for the use of their component C4 systems.



## Joint C4 in the Gulf War

The communications network established to support Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM was the largest in history. A flexible and responsive command, control, and communications system was installed in record time — and it maintained a phenomenal 98 percent readiness rate. The final architecture provided connectivity with the NCA, US sustaining bases, CENTCOM, other Coalition forces, and subordinate component elements. This was not an easy task.

In addition to equipment differences among various Coalition members, there were differences among US forces. Ultimately, several generations of equipment and many different command and staff elements were melded. At the height of the operation, this hybrid system supported more than 700,000 telephone calls and 152,000 messages a day. Additionally, more than 35,000 frequencies were managed and monitored daily to ensure radio communication nets were free of interference from other users.

On 8 August, in support of the rapid deployment of US forces, CENTCOM deployed the first contingent of communications equipment and personnel to provide crucial links between the in-theater forces and CINCCENT at MacDill AFB. Included in the initial communications package was a super high frequency (SHF) multichannel satellite terminal, several ultra high frequency (UHF) single-channel tactical satellite (TACSAT) terminals, and associated terminal equipment, to provide secure voice, facsimile and Defense Switched Network (DSN), Automatic Digital Network (AUTODIN), and Worldwide Military Command and Control System connectivity to the initial deployed headquarters elements. The Joint Communications Support Element (JCSE) was among the first of these deployments (The JCSE is responsible to the CJCS for providing tactical communications to JTF headquarters and SOCOM.) At the same time, communications equipment from the XVIII Airborne Corps, I MEF, and the 9th Air Force began arriving and links were established quickly.

The rapidly deployable JCSE provided the primary communications support to CENTCOM and SOCCENT during the initial deployment. JCSE resources included UHF and SHF SATCOM radios, line-of-sight radios, High Frequency (HF) radios, and circuit and message switches. Throughout Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM, JCSE communications provided continuous transmission and switching support for CENTCOM headquarters, linking the command with its components and the NCA. The final JCSE resources were deployed in mid-January in response to a requirement to support the CENTCOM Alternate command post, and to provide Ground Mobile Force/Defense Satellite Communications System (GMF/DSCS) satellite support to UK forces.

The Saudi national telephone service augmented early deploying communications packages. There were very limited in-place Defense Communications System (DCS) facilities anywhere in Southwest Asia (SWA) and, although the Saudi telecommunications system is modern and reliable, it has neither the capacity nor the geographical dispersion to support a large military force. Available international telephone access also was only a small part of the total requirement.

Parallel to the rapid buildup of combat forces in SWA was the deployment of organic tactical communications systems from Army, USMC and USAF units to tie components and subordinate commands into a joint voice and message switching network. Because of the high demand for limited airlift resources, initial forces arrived with minimum essential communications capabilities, usually single channel UHF SATCOM and sporadic access to the local commercial telephone system using secure telephone units (STU-III). This level of communications support would have been insufficient to conduct operations had hostilities begun immediately. The network continued to expand, however, as air and surface transports brought more communications equipment into the theater. The arrival of heavy tropospheric scatter and line-of-sight radio equipment (which provided the bulk of the intra-theater connectivity) improved multiple path routing, adding robustness to the joint network.

By November, there was more strategic connectivity (circuits, telephone trunks and radio links) in the AOR than in Europe. By the time Operation DESERT STORM began, networks that included satellite and terrestrial communications links provided 324 DSN voice trunks into US and European DSN switches, along with 3 AUTODIN circuits to CONUS and European AUTODIN switches, supporting 286 communications centers. The Defense Data Network (DDN) was extended to the tactical level, providing high-speed packet switched data communications. At its peak, the joint communications network included 118 GMF satellite terminals, 12 commercial satellite terminals, 61 TRI-TAC voice and 20 TRI-TAC message switches. (This was the first major operational employment of the jointly developed TRI-TAC equipment.)


Source: DOD Final Report to Congress:  
Conduct of the Persian Gulf War,  
April 1992

**Army Communications Organizations.** The Army communications organizational structure extends from the Service headquarters level down to the Army division and separate combat brigade. At the Department of the Army (DA), the Director of Information Systems for Command, Control, and Communications is responsible for the overall planning, programming, and budgeting of Army communications/information systems that support both strategic and tactical requirements worldwide. The responsibility includes those Defense Communications System (DCS) facilities that are assigned to the Army for engineering, installation, operation, and maintenance.

The Army communications organizations are designed around Army strategic missions as assigned by the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan and the DA, and the tactical communications required to support deployed Army forces from the Army level down to the smallest unit. Strategic communications are designed to support the Army mission of operating and maintaining assigned portions of the Defense Information Systems Network worldwide. Additionally, in Europe, the Pacific, and the continental US, the mission is to provide Army forces and other Services with connectivity into the DCS through Army communications systems and voice and message switches. Tactical communications in support of all Army forces are provided by tactical mobile communications units from separate signal bridges that provide communications in support of Army and other non-Army corps units. Support to corps, divisions, and below is provided by organic signal brigades and battalions designed to meet the operational requirements of their units.

United States Army Information Systems Command (USAISC) has the principal responsibility of engineering, installing, operating, and maintaining all Army DCS facilities and the communications for theater army at Echelons Above Corps (EAC). Subordinate to USAISC are the Army signal commands and brigades that implement DCS and EAC communications missions for their respective areas of operations. USAISC is also responsible for supporting post communications facilities that include local switching and distribution systems. (See figure below.)

From a tactical standpoint, communications units below Army level are organic to the supported command (corps, division, or separate brigade). At most Army corps, a signal brigade composed of several signal battalions supports the corps headquarters and provides communications between the corps and its subordinate commands. Each division and separate combat brigade contains an organic signal battalion or company to provide its communications systems. These units are normally organized to support a Division Main, Tactical Command Post, Division Artillery, or Division Support Command. They use Mobile Subscriber



Equipment to provide communications access nodes that connect the combat brigades across the division. For a separate combat brigade, a signal company or reinforced communications platoon normally will provide the same type of communications support. Responsibility for communications support is from higher echelons to lower organizations.

Other units having large-scale communications systems to support unique operations in a corps or division are the military intelligence brigades (corps level) or Combat Electronic-Warfare Intelligence battalions (division level) and the Air Defense Artillery (brigade and battalion level) that have dedicated communications systems to support their assigned units when dispersed across the battlefield.

**Navy Communications Organizations.** The Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), as the Navy's Chief of the Service, is responsible for recruiting, organizing, training, equipping, and providing naval forces for assignment to combatant commands, and for administering and supporting these forces. Providing communications support to the forces is the responsibility of several organizations subordinate to the CNO. The first figure below shows the structure of naval communications within the Department of the Navy.

The Directorate of Space and Electronic Warfare (N-6) is the principal Navy staff responsible to the CNO for command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I). The N-6 is charged with oversight and development of the technological systems and organizational support systems that focus on the command and control of forces by naval commanders. Primary responsibilities include the Naval C4I strategy and developing systems that support C4I For The Warrior and doctrine governing related space, information warfare, and C4I systems.


Subordinate to the N-6 is the Naval Computer and Telecommunications Command (NCTC). The NCTC is charged with the administrative and technical oversight of the Navy's shore-based naval telecommunications facilities — Naval Computer and Telecommunications Area Master Stations (NCTAMS), Naval Computer and Telecommunications Stations, and other computer and telecommunications shore sites. The NCTC has administrative control of all shore-based telecommunications facilities worldwide, oversees the operations of the naval portion of the DCS, and maintains administrative and logistical oversight of the Naval Telecommunications Integration Center and the Naval Electronic Spectrum Center.

A NCTAMS is the transmission and switching hub for routing all fleet-originated traffic into the DCS and for distributing DCS and internal Navy traffic to fleet units. At the tactical unit level, a ship's communications officer is responsible for all telecommunications activities. At a naval base, Naval Computer and Telecommunications Centers or Detachments furnish base telecommunication and computer services and provide entry into the DCS. The NCTAMS is administratively subordinate to the Commander, NCTC.

**Air Force Communications Organizations.** Air Force Communications Organizations are shown in the second figure below. The Office of the Chief of Staff of the Air Force is organized with a Deputy Chief of Staff for C4 referred to as SC. The SC is responsible to the Chief of Staff of the Air Force for architecture and technical policy, joint interoperability matters, future concepts, monitoring programs, and budgets for the Air Force C4 infrastructure.


The Air Force Pentagon Communications Agency (AFPCA) is responsible for supporting Air Force communications in the Pentagon and the Washington, D.C. area. They were reorganized in March, 1995 under the single agency manager for Pentagon Technical Services, but will continue to function as AFPCA. The Air Force Frequency Management Agency is responsible for all matters involving frequency management.

The Air Force C4 Agency is responsible for carrying out policy directed by the Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff for C4. As the technical arm of Headquarters US Air Force/SC, it



ensures C4 integration across the Air Force.

The 3 Combat Communications Group (CCG) at Tinker AFB, OK, and the 5 CCG at Warner Robins AFB, GA, are subordinate to the Air Combat Command at Langley AFB, VA. The 1 Combat Communications Squadron (CCS) and 644 CCS are subordinate to US Air Forces Europe and Pacific Air Forces, respectively. Additionally, Air National Guard and Air Reserve Forces Combat Communications Squadrons are also employed when required. CCG/CCS missions will be to deploy equipment and personnel to augment initial communications capabilities already in theater. Their assets provide a more robust mixture of Tri-Service Tactical Communications (TRI-TAC) and commercial communications equipment than is often found in a theater of operations. Capabilities provide long haul communications capabilities to include ground mobile forces (GMF) satellite, tropospheric and line of sight (LOS) microwave, digital and analog switching, record communications,



and technical control capabilities. Under the Theater Deployable Communications program, older TRI-TAC equipment will be replaced with advanced digital equipment which includes multi-band capable satellite terminals capable of backward compatibility with GMF terminals while also being capable of using commercial satellite bands. In addition to the more robust communications capabilities, the CCGs and CCSs provide deployed Air Traffic Control capabilities to support bare base operations.

**Marine Corps Communications Organizations.** The Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC) has the primary responsibility for recruiting, organizing, training, equipping, and providing Marine forces for assignment to combatant commands. The Service administers and supports those forces, including C4, through a senior staff and subordinate commands.


As shown in the first figure below, the CMC’s principal military staff assistant for communications and intelligence functions is the Assistant Chief of Staff for C4I. The C4I Department located at Headquarters, Marine Corps is responsible for all matters regarding these functional areas, to include planning, programming, budgeting, directing, and operations.

In addition to the headquarters staff, two large Marine Corps support commands have communications responsibilities: the Marine Corps Systems Command and the Marine Corps Combat Development Center located at Quantico, VA. They are responsible for developing C4I-related doctrine, training and education, equipment acquisition strategies, technical development, and hardware and software program oversight.

All US Marine Corps operational forces are organized for combat as Marine air-ground task forces (MAGTFs). Regardless of size, each MAGTF consists of a command element, a ground combat element, an aviation combat element, and a combat service support element. All have communications requirements and support organizations. The second figure below illustrates the structure of a notional US Marine Corps operational backbone communications structure.

Organic telecommunications and intelligence support to the Marine expeditionary force (MEF) headquarters is provided by a Surveillance, Reconnaissance, and Intelligence Group


## US MARINE CORPS COMMUNICATIONS AND INTELLIGENCE OVERVIEW



(SRIG). Within SRIGs are a communications battalion, a radio battalion, and other tactical surveillance and intelligence organizations.

The communications battalion, the major communications unit within a MEF, is charged with providing common-user, general service message, and other telecommunications support as required to the MEF headquarters. This includes, but is not limited to, multi-channel satellite, single channel satellite, multi-channel terrestrial, and single channel terrestrial transmissions systems, along with circuit, packet, and message switching services. The communications battalion also provides necessary equipment to interface with the DCS, the Naval Telecommunications System, joint task force (JTF) systems, and multinational military systems as required. The communications battalion may be augmented as directed for joint operations by JTF-provided communications equipment and systems. A communications battalion is located with each MEF — the 7th with III MEF on Okinawa, Japan; the 8th with II MEF at Camp Lejeune, NC; and the 9th with I MEF at Camp Pendleton, CA.

NOTIONAL US MARINE CORPS OPERATIONAL BACKBONE COMMUNICATIONS STRUCTURE



MAGTF Special Compartmented Intelligence (SCI) communications terminal support is provided by dedicated Special Security Communications Teams from the SRIG's radio battalion. The communications battalion, however, provides most of the trunking and switching support for SCI circuits within the MEF.

Each Marine aircraft wing has an organic communications squadron, each Marine division an organic communications company, and each service support group a communications company. These communications units provide internal communication to their respective organizations; the MEF's communication battalion provides common-user external communications.

The traditional staff functions of communications-electronics and computer systems have been combined in all Marine tactical organizations from the MEF headquarters to the battalion/squadron level into one principal staff officer titled either the G-6 or S-6, depending on the size of the unit. For example, a MEF has a G-6, while an infantry battalion has an S-6.

**Coast Guard Communications Organizations.** Although the Coast Guard is attached to the Department of Transportation, it has participated, as an arm of the US Navy, in every national conflict. It routinely participates in various Department of Defense (DOD) activities and in Navy fleet and joint exercises. The Coast Guard is headquartered in Washington,

D.C., and has an Atlantic and Pacific area headquarters, ten district headquarters, ten air stations, and twelve communications and long-range electronic aid to navigation (LORAN) stations that provide C4 support worldwide. The Coast Guard Office of Command, Control, and Communications manages communications organizations that routinely interact with the Services, as do subordinate units engaged directly in operations involving the joint community. The Coast Guard is directly connected with all major DOD common-user systems such as Defense Data Network, Defense Switched Network, and Defense Commercial Telecommunications Network. Additionally, it plays a very active role in the counterdrug community and has C4 access to systems supporting that effort.

In addition to major systems connectivity, the Coast Guard has mobile/transportable systems such as ultra high frequency (UHF) tactical satellite (TACSAT) and LOS radio systems that provide secure and nonsecure connectivity at the operator level. This is important to the day-to-day operations where it and the military community routinely interact. Examples include search and rescue, aids to navigation, and maritime law enforcement. Major missions under the latter category include customs and immigration issues such as those recently experienced with Haitian refugees, and daily operations in the areas of smuggling and narcotics enforcement.

Organizationally, several communications responsibilities exist in the mission area of aids to navigation that are especially important to the Navy and Air Force. These include the long-range electronic aid to navigation known as LORAN-C, Differential Global Positioning System, and OMEGA. In a related mission, the Coast Guard has an important role in Global Positioning System (GPS) management. Specifically, it operates the GPS Information Center that provides civil users of that system with system status and other GPS satellite information. In that regard, it works directly with the US Space Command in the development of the DOD Operational Capability Reporting Management System regarding the interface of the military with the nonmilitary GPS community.

**Special Operations Forces Communications Organizations.** Special operations forces (SOF) have unique missions that include direct action, strategic reconnaissance, unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, counterterrorism, psychological operations, and civil affairs. The execution of these missions often requires communications and intelligence systems support that is distinctly different from that required by conventional forces.

Located at MacDill AFB in Tampa, FL, US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) is the combatant command with oversight of the special operations community. In normal circumstances, the orientation of USSOCOM is support, not operational control. It does so with the help of its four component commands, which similarly have intelligence and communications staffs, but also have units and capabilities that can be tasked to support communications missions.

SOF units require lightweight, highly mobile, and efficient communications that have a low probability of detection and interception. SOF units have organic communications capability to connect tactical headquarters to small deployed elements operating in the field. Communications normally consist of UHF satellite and high frequency (HF) or UHF/very high frequency LOS communications equipment. USSOCOM acquired communications systems under a program called "Crashout," that provide an initial deployable communications Joint Special Operations Task Force package. These packages include commercial and military transmission, cryptographic, terminal equipment, power generation assets, UHF TACSAT, international maritime commercial satellite, HF radios, secure telephone unit III, and computer terminals.

**Related Terms**

command, control, communications, and computer systems; telecommunications


**Source Joint Publications**

JP 6-02      Joint Doctrine for Employment of Operational/Tactical Command, Control, Communications, and Computer Systems

**COMMUNICATIONS ZONE**

Rear part of theater of operations (behind but contiguous to the combat zone) which contains the lines of communications, establishments for supply and evacuation, and other agencies required for the immediate support and maintenance of the field forces. JP 1-02

Geographic combatant commanders may also establish combat zones and communications zones (COMMZs), as shown in the figure below. The COMMZ contains those theater organizations, lines of communications (LOCs), and other agencies required to support and sustain combat forces. The COMMZ usually includes the rear portions of the theaters of operations and theater of war and reaches back to the continental US base or perhaps to a



supporting combatant commander’s area of responsibility. The COMMZ includes airports and seaports that support the flow of forces and logistics into the operational area. It is usually contiguous to the combat zone but may be separate — connected only by thin LOCs — in very fluid, dynamic situations.

**Related Terms**

combat zone

**Source Joint Publications**

JP 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations

**COMPATIBILITY**

Capability of two or more items or components of equipment or material to exist or function in the same system or environment without mutual interference. JP 1-02

Compatibility is the capability of two or more items or components of equipment or material to exist or function in the same system or environment without mutual interference. Electromagnetic compatibility, including frequency supportability, must be considered at the earliest conceptual stages and throughout the planning, design, development, testing and evaluation, and operational life of all systems.

**Related Terms**

interchangeability

**Source Joint Publications**

JP 6-0 Doctrine for Command, Control, Communications, and Computer (C4) Systems Support to Joint Operations

**COMPLIANCE WITH JOINT DOCTRINE**

Operation plans will comply with joint doctrine as stated in approved and test publications contained in the Joint Publication System. Incorporation of appropriate joint doctrine when preparing operation plans facilitates crisis action planning and the execution of operations.

**Related Terms**

acceptability; adequacy; feasibility

**Source Joint Publications**

JP 5-0 Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations

**COMPONENT COMMANDS**

**General.** The role of component commanders in a joint force merits special attention. Component commanders are first expected to orchestrate the activity of their own forces, branches, and warfare communities — itself a demanding task. In addition, effective component commanders understand how their own pieces fit into the overall design and best support the joint force commander’s plans and goals. Component commanders also should understand how they can support and be supported by their fellow component commanders. Leaders who possess this extra dimension of professionalism have the potential to become great component commanders. At the tactical level, a combat example of this attitude follows:

### THE MEDAL OF HONOR IS AWARDED TO LIEUTENANT THOMAS G. KELLY UNITED STATES NAVY

While serving as Commander River Assault Division 152 on the afternoon of 15 June 1969 during combat operations against enemy aggressor forces in the Republic of Vietnam, Lieutenant Kelley was in charge of a column of eight river assault craft which were extracting one company of United States Army infantry troops on the east bank of the Ong Muong Canal in Kien Hoa Province, when one of the armored troop carriers reported a mechanical failure of a loading ramp. At approximately the same time, Viet Cong forces opened fire from the opposite bank of the canal. After issuing orders for the crippled troop carrier to raise its ramp manually, and for the remaining boats to form a protective cordon around the disabled craft, Lieutenant Kelley, realizing the extreme danger to his column and its inability to clear the ambush site until the crippled unit was repaired, boldly maneuvered the monitor in which he was embarked to the exposed side of the protective cordon in direct line with the enemy's fire, and ordered the monitor to commence firing. Suddenly, an enemy rocket scored a direct hit on the coxswain's flat, the shell penetrating the thick armor plate, and the explosion spraying shrapnel in all directions. Sustaining serious head wounds from the blast, which hurled him to the deck of the monitor, Lieutenant Kelley disregarded his severe injuries and attempted to continue directing the other boats. Although unable to move from the deck or to speak clearly into the radio, he succeeded in relaying his commands through one of his men until the enemy attack was silenced and the boats were able to move to an area of safety.

**Service Components.** All joint forces include Service components. Administrative and logistic support for joint forces are provided through Service components. The joint force commander (JFC) also may conduct operations through the Service component commanders, or at lower echelons, Service force commanders. Service forces may be assigned or attached to subordinate joint forces without the formal creation of a Service component of that joint force. This relationship is appropriate when stability, continuity, economy, ease of long-range planning, and scope of operations dictate organizational integrity of Service components. These conditions apply when most of the required functions in a particular dimension are unique to a single-Service force, or when Service force capabilities or responsibilities do not significantly overlap.

Conducting operations through Service components has certain advantages, which include clear and uncomplicated command lines. Logistics remain a Service responsibility, with the exception of arrangements described in Service support agreements or as otherwise directed by the combatant commander.


Responsibilities of the Service component commander include the following:

- Making recommendations to the JFC on the proper employment of the forces of the Service component.
- Accomplishing such operational missions as may be assigned.
- Selecting and nominating specific units of the parent Service component for assignment to subordinate forces. Unless otherwise directed, these units revert to the control of the Service component commander when such subordinate forces are dissolved.
- Other responsibilities as discussed in Joint Pub 0-2, "Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)."

Regardless of the organizational and command arrangements within joint commands, Service component commanders retain responsibility for certain Service-specific functions and other matters affecting their forces, including internal administration, training, logistics, and Service intelligence operations.

The relationship between commanders of Service forces is determined by the JFC. In addition to logistic support arrangements, one component may support another with forces or operations in a variety of command relationships as previously described.

**Functional Components.** JFCs may establish functional components to provide centralized direction and control of certain functions and types of operations when it is feasible and necessary to fix responsibility for certain normal, continuing functions, or when it is appropriate and desirable to establish the authority and responsibility of a subordinate commander. These conditions apply when the scope of operations requires that the similar capabilities and functions of forces from more than one Service be directed toward closely related objectives and unity of command and effort are primary considerations. For example, when the scope of operations is large, and JFCs need to divide their attention between major operations or phases of operations that are functionally dominated — and synchronize those operations — it may be useful to establish functionally oriented commanders responsible for the major operations. JFCs may conduct operations through functional components or employ them primarily to coordinate selected functions. (NOTE: Functional component commands are component commands of a joint force and do not constitute a “joint force” with the authorities and responsibilities of a joint force as described in this document even when composed of forces from two or more Services.)



## COMPOSITE WARFARE COMMANDER

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Functional componentcy can be appropriate when forces from two or more Services operate in the same dimension or medium. A joint force land component commander (JFLCC) is one example. Functional component staffs should be joint with Service representation in approximate proportion to the mix of subordinate forces. Functional component staffs require advanced planning for efficient operations. Joint staff billets for needed expertise and individuals to fill those billets should be identified. Such individuals should be used when joint staffs are formed for exercises and actual operations. Liaison elements from and to other components facilitate coordination.

The nature of operations, mix of Service forces, and command and control capabilities are normally primary factors in selecting the functional component commander. Functional component commanders — such as the joint force air component commander (JFACC), the JFLCC, the joint force maritime component commander, and the joint force special operations component commander (JFSOCC) — have the responsibilities of both superior and subordinate commanders as described in Joint Pub 0-2, “Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF).”

The JFC must designate the military capability that will be made available for tasking by the functional component commander and the appropriate command relationship(s) the functional component commander will exercise over that military capability (e.g., a JFSOCC normally has operational control of assigned forces and a JFACC is normally delegated tactical control of the sorties or other military capability made available). JFCs may also establish a supporting and/or supported relationship between components to facilitate operations. Regardless, the establishing JFC defines the authority and responsibilities of functional component commanders based on the concept of operations and may alter their authority and responsibilities during the course of an operation.

**Combination.** Most often, joint forces are organized with a combination of Service and functional components with operational responsibilities. Joint forces organized with Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force components will still have special operations forces organized as a functional component. JFCs will normally designate a JFACC, whose authority and responsibilities are defined by the establishing JFC based on the JFC’s concept of operations. The figure above depicts possible components in a joint force. It is presented as an example only.

### Related Terms

functional component command, Service component command

### Source Joint Publications

JP 1                      Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States  
JP 3-0                    Doctrine for Joint Operations

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## COMPOSITE WARFARE COMMANDER

The officer in tactical command is normally the composite warfare commander. However the composite warfare commander concept allows an officer in tactical command to delegate tactical command to the composite warfare commander. The composite warfare commander wages combat operations to counter threats to the force and to maintain tactical sea control with assets assigned; while the officer in tactical command retains close control of power projection and strategic sea control operations. JP 1-02

The composite warfare commander (CWC) concept allows the officer in tactical command (OTC) to aggressively wage combat operations against air, surface, and subsurface threats

while carrying out the primary mission of his force. (See figure below.) The CWC concept is capable of flexible implementation and application to any naval task force or task group operating at sea. In particular, the concept is applicable to the battle force that consists of two or more carrier battle groups and associated supporting units.

Control by negation may be exercised by a subordinate commander while operating under the CWC concept. Control by negation is a command and control (C2) philosophy in which the subordinate commander has freedom of action to direct and execute those operations necessary to accomplish assigned and implied missions, unless specific actions and operations are overridden by a superior commander.

The OTC usually fulfills responsibilities as the CWC. The OTC-CWC exercises overall responsibility for C2 of the force and is responsible for the accomplishment of the mission and allocation of warfighting assets. Subordinated to the OTC-CWC are four principal warfare commanders: antiair warfare commander (AAWC); strike warfare commander (SWC); antisurface warfare commander (ASUWC); and antisubmarine warfare commander (ASWC).

The warfare commanders are responsible for collecting, evaluating, and disseminating tactical information and, at the discretion of the OTC-CWC, are delegated tactical authority to use assigned forces to respond to threats. Supporting the OTC-CWC and the warfare commanders are the submarine element coordinator, which is a cell of the ASWC staff that, when assigned, is responsible for coordinating the actions of direct support submarines; and the air element coordinator, who is responsible for managing and coordinating the distribution of carrier aircraft and keeping the OTC-CWC and other warfare commanders and coordinators apprised of carrier air operations.

The supporting coordinators differ from the warfare commanders in one very important respect: when authorized by the OTC-CWC, the warfare commanders have tactical control



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## CONCENTRATION

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of assigned resources and may autonomously initiate action. The supporting coordinators execute policy but do not initiate autonomous actions.

In addition to the coordinators discussed above, a specifically identified cell of the OTC-CWC's staff is the electronic warfare coordinator. This cell plans, and when authorized, implements and executes electronic warfare and command, control, and communications countermeasures policy.

The OTC can implement the CWC procedures outlined in NWP 10-1, "Composite Warfare Commander's Manual," to the extent required by the mission and threat. Fundamental provisions associated with implementation of CWC procedures are as follows:

- The OTC is normally the CWC. Designated warfare commanders are responsible to the OTC-CWC for the conduct of anti-air warfare (the AAWC), strike warfare (the SWC), anti-surface warfare (the ASUWC), and anti-submarine warfare (the ASWC). Other designated subordinates act as coordinators to assist in the management of specified sensors and warfighting assets of the force in support of the warfare commanders and the OTC-CWC.
- A wide range of options are available to the OTC-CWC in delegating authority to the warfare commanders for the conduct of anti-air warfare, strike warfare, anti-surface warfare, and anti-submarine warfare operations. These options range from full delegation of authority to no delegation at all, depending on the threat and the tactical situation. The OTC-CWC of a multicarrier battle force might use every element of the concept, including supporting CWCs, while the OTC-CWC of a small task group might use only a few of the elements; i.e., an AAWC and ASWC. Regardless of the amount of authority delegated, the CWC always retains the option to control by command override.

### Related Terms

#### Source Joint Publications

JP 3-02      Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations

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## CONCENTRATION

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Concentration of military power is a fundamental consideration. We should strive to operate with overwhelming force, based not only on the quantity of forces and materiel committed, but on the quality of their planning and skillfulness of their employment. Properly trained and motivated forces with superior technology, executing innovative, flexible, and well-coordinated plans, provide a decisive qualitative edge. Careful selection of strategic and operational priorities aids concentration at the decisive point and time. Action to affect the enemy's dispositions and readiness prior to battle and to prevent enemy reinforcement of the battle by land, sea, or air also promotes concentration. The purpose of these and related measures is to achieve strategic advantage and exploit that advantage to win quickly, with as few casualties as possible.

### Related Terms

#### Source Joint Publications


JP 1      Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States

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CONCEPT DEVELOPMENT

The concept development phase of deliberate planning is accomplished by the supported commander responsible for developing the plan. Concept development follows six steps: mission analysis, planning guidance development, staff estimates, commander’s estimate, commander of a combatant command’s (CINC’s) Strategic Concept, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff review. (See figure below.)

The assigned task is analyzed, a mission statement is developed, and planning guidance is prepared and issued to the staff as well as subordinate and supporting commands in step one. During step two, alternative courses of action (COAs) are developed and distributed for staff



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## CONCEPT OF INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

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estimates of supportability to be completed in step three. In step four, alternative COAs are war-gamed, analyzed, and compared to produce a commander's estimate containing the commander's decision on the preferred COA. The selected COA is then expanded into the CINC's Strategic Concept that is submitted to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for review and approval. When approved, the CINC's Strategic Concept provides the basis for plan development.

### Related Terms

commander's estimate; CINC's strategic estimate; deliberate planning

### Source Joint Publications

JP 5-0      Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations

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## CONCEPT OF INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

A verbal or graphic statement, in broad outline, of a Intelligence Directorate of a joint staff's (J-2's) assumptions or intent in regard to intelligence support of an operation or series of operations. The concept of intelligence operations, which complements the commander's concept of operations, is contained in the intelligence annex of operation plans. The concept of intelligence operations is designed to give an overall picture of intelligence support for joint operations. It is included primarily for additional clarity of purpose.

In developing the concept of intelligence operations for each commander of a combatant command's operation and concept plans, the combatant command J-2 should address in detail the support desired during the initial stages of a crisis from national, theater, and supporting intelligence organizations. The intelligence annex for these plans should also identify specific criteria to be met before designated intelligence staffs assume responsibility for intelligence support initially provided by other organizations.

### Related Terms

concept of operations; intelligence

### Source Joint Publications

JP 2-0      Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Operations

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## CONCEPT OF LOGISTIC SUPPORT

A verbal or graphic statement, in a broad outline, of how a commander intends to support and integrate with a concept of operations in an operation or campaign.

JP 1-02

The concept of logistic support should derive from the estimate of logistic supportability of one or more courses of action (COAs). The commander of a combatant command's (CINC's) directorate for logistics prepares these estimates for each alternative COA proposed by either the operations or planning directorate. The estimate of logistic supportability for the selected COA along with logistic system framework considerations may be refined into the concept of logistic support for an operation or campaign.

The concept of logistic support is the envisioned manner in which the capabilities and resources of the CINCs' components will be employed to provide supply, maintenance, transportation, and engineering services. It is the organization of capabilities and resources into an overall theater warfare support concept.

The concept of logistic support should specify how operations will be supported. It should give special attention to the major lines of communications to be developed, as well as wartime

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host-nation support to be provided by each allied nation. If there is to be a communications zone to support air or land operations or a network of intermediate and advanced bases to support naval operations within a theater, the general organization and functions should be laid out.

### **Related Terms**

course of action

### **Source Joint Publications**

JP 4-0

Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations

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## **CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS**

A verbal or graphic statement, in broad outline, of a commander's assumptions or intent in regard to an operation or series of operations. The concept of operations frequently is embodied in campaign plans and operation plans; in the latter case, particularly when the plans cover a series of connected operations to be carried out simultaneously or in succession. The concept is designed to give an overall picture of the operation. It is included primarily for additional clarity of purpose. Also called commander's concept. JP 1-02


The concept of operations or commander's concept describes how the joint force commander (JFC) visualizes the operation will unfold based on the selected course of action. (See figure below.) This concept expresses what, where, and how the joint force will affect the enemy or the situation at hand. The commander provides sufficient detail for the staff and subordinate commanders to understand what they are to do without further instructions. In the concept of operations, JFCs describe the overall objectives of the joint force, the missions assigned to components of the force, and how the components will work together to accomplish the mission.

To reinforce intent and priorities, commanders typically designate a main effort (for each phase, if the campaign has more than one phase). This designation is as true in the offense as it is in the defense and also applies in operations other than war. These designations provide focus to the operation, set priorities and determine risks, promote unity of effort, and facilitate an understanding of the commander's intent.

The joint campaign plan is based on the commander's concept or concept of operations. The formulation of the commander's concept is the intellectual core of the campaign plan, which presents a broad vision of the required aim or "end state" (the commander's intent) and how operations will be sequenced and synchronized to achieve conflict termination objectives (including required postconflict measures). Accordingly, the campaign plan itself can be brief, though implementing orders will usually be longer.

JFCs are the most vital cog in the campaign planning process — they bring experience, knowledge, and vision. They and their staffs need to develop early in the planning process four parts to their overall commander's concept:

- the operational concept itself, based on the theater strategy, which is the scheme for the entire operation;
- the logistic concept, which provides a broad picture of how the joint force as a whole will be supported (the operational concept may stretch but not break the logistic concept).
- the deployment concept (sequencing of operational capabilities and logistic support into the objective area).



- and the organizational concept (external and internal command relationships, and, if required, organization for deployment).

**Related Terms**

course of action

**Source Joint Publications**

JP 1 Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States  
JP 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations

**CONCEPT PLAN**

An operation plan in concept format. Also called CONPLAN. JP 1-02

**Concept Plan (CONPLAN) Without Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data (TPFDD).** A CONPLAN is an operation plan in an abbreviated format that would require considerable expansion or alteration to convert it into an operation plan, campaign plan, or operation order. A CONPLAN contains the commander of a combatant command’s (CINC’s) Strategic Concept, Annexes A-D and K, and other annexes and appendixes either required by the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) or deemed necessary by the CINC to complete planning. CONPLANs are generally developed to meet common type missions that may develop rapidly and require implementation of like action but under markedly different

circumstances; e.g., noncombatant evacuation operations. Unless specified in the JSCP, detailed support requirements are not calculated and TPFDD files are not prepared.

**CONPLAN With TPFDD.** A CONPLAN with TPFDD is a CONPLAN that requires more detailed planning for phased deployment of forces. Detailed planning may be required to support a contingency of compelling interest and critical to national security but is not likely to occur in the near term. These conditions require planning associated with the warfighting/employment aspects of the plan for a clear understanding of the CINC's concept of operations. Phasing, centers of gravity, and commander's intent enhance a clear understanding of what forces are required and when they have to be deployed (e.g., TPFDD) in order to achieve the national objective. A CONPLAN with TPFDD may also be required where the primary purpose is force movement planning in support of alliances. In this case campaign planning principles should be considered and incorporated to the maximum extent possible. Recognizing, however, that the level of detail contained in these plans is dependent upon similarly detailed alliance planning that these CONPLANs support, a campaign orientation may not be possible in all cases.

**Related Terms**

joint operation planning; operation plan

**Source Joint Publications**

JP 5-0                      Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations

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**CONNECTIVITY**

The comprehensive linking of command, control, communications and computer (C4) systems establishes a level of connectivity which enables communication to and from the joint force and its users. To the maximum extent possible, the hardware and software interfaces should be transparent to the system user. The continued flow of information should not depend on action by an intermediate user.

**Related Terms**

communications

**Source Joint Publications**

JP 6-02                      Joint Doctrine for Employment of Operational/Tactical Command, Control, Communications, and Computer Systems

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**CONTINGENCY PLANNING GUIDANCE**

The Contingency Planning Guidance (CPG) fulfills the Secretary of Defense's statutory duty to provide annually to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff written policy guidance for joint operation planning. The Secretary provides this guidance with the approval of the President after coordination with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The CPG is the primary source document for the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan.

**Related Terms**

joint strategic capabilities plan

**Source Joint Publications**

JP 5-0                      Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations

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## CONTROL

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## CONTROL

1. Authority which may be less than full command exercised by a commander over part of the activities of subordinate or other organizations. 2. In mapping, charting, and photogrammetry, a collective term for a system of marks or objects on the Earth or on a map or a photograph, whose positions or elevations, or both, have been or will be determined. 3. Physical or psychological pressures exerted with the intent to assure that an agent or group will respond as directed. 4. An indicator governing the distribution and use of documents, information, or material. Such indicators are the subject of intelligence community agreement and are specifically defined in appropriate regulations. JP 1-02

Control is inherent in command. To control is to regulate forces and functions to execute the commander's intent. Control of forces and functions helps commanders and staffs compute requirements, allocate means, and integrate efforts. Control is necessary to determine the status of organizational effectiveness, identify variance from set standards, and correct deviations from these standards. Control permits commanders to acquire and apply means to accomplish their intent and develop specific instructions from general guidance. Ultimately, it provides commanders a means to measure, report, and correct performance.

Control serves its purpose if it allows commanders freedom to operate, delegate authority, place themselves in the best position to lead, and synchronize actions throughout the operational area. Moreover, the command and control system needs to support the ability of commanders to adjust plans for future operations, even while focusing on current operations. Skilled staffs work within command intent to direct and control units and resource allocation to support the desired end. They also are alert to spotting enemy or friendly situations that may require changes in command relationships or organization and advise the commander accordingly.

### Related Terms

administrative control; combatant command (command authority); command; command and control system; operational control; tactical control

### Source Joint Publications

JP 3-0      Doctrine for Joint Operations

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## CONTROL AND COORDINATING MEASURES

Joint force commanders employ various maneuver and movement control and fire support coordinating measures to facilitate effective joint operations. These measures include boundaries, phase lines, objectives, coordinating altitudes to deconflict air operations, air defense areas, amphibious objective areas, submarine operating patrol areas, and minefields.

### Related Terms

boundary

### Source Joint Publications

JP 3-0      Doctrine for Joint Operations

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## CONTROL AND REPORTING CENTER

A mobile command, control, and communications radar element of the US Air Force theater air control system subordinate to the air operations center. The control and reporting center possesses four Modular Control Equipment operations modules and integrates a comprehensive air picture via multiple data links from air-, sea-, and land-based sensors as well as from its surveillance and control radars. It performs decentralized command and control of joint operations by conducting threat warning, battle management, theater missile defense, weapons control, combat identification, and strategic communications. Also called CRC. JP 1-02

Control and reporting centers are ground-based airspace control/air defense facilities that provide safe passage and radar control and surveillance for close air support aircraft transiting to and from target areas.

### Related Terms

theater air control system

### Source Joint Publications

JP 3-09.3      JTTP for Close Air Support (CAS)

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## COORDINATING ALTITUDE

A procedural airspace control method to separate fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft by determining an altitude below which fixed-wing aircraft will normally not fly and above which rotary-wing aircraft normally will not fly. The coordinating altitude is normally specified in the airspace control plan and may include a buffer zone for small altitude deviations. JP 1-02

A coordinating altitude is a procedural method to separate fixed- and rotary-winged aircraft by determining an altitude below which fixed-wing aircraft normally will not fly and above which rotary-wing aircraft normally will not fly. It may include a buffer zone for small altitude deviations and extend from the forward edge of the communications zone to the forward line of troops. The coordinating altitude does not restrict either fixed- or rotary-winged aircraft when operating against or in the immediate vicinity of enemy ground forces. Fixed- or rotary-winged aircraft planning extended penetration of this altitude will notify the appropriate airspace control facility. However, approval acknowledgment is not required prior to fixed-wing aircraft operating below the coordinating altitude or rotary-wing aircraft operating above the coordinating altitude.

- **Uses.** Coordinating altitude allows procedural separation of aircraft types.
- **Considerations.** See-and-avoid procedures are used during visual meteorological conditions.
- **Point of Contact.** The coordinating altitude is normally specified in the airspace control plan, which is approved by the joint force commander.

### Related Terms

### Source Joint Publications

JP 3-52      Doctrine for Joint Airspace Control in the Combat Zone

### COORDINATING AUTHORITY

A commander or individual assigned responsibility for coordinating specific functions or activities involving forces of two or more Military Departments or two or more forces of the same Service. The commander or individual has the authority to require consultation between the agencies involved, but does not have the authority to compel agreement. In the event that essential agreement cannot be obtained, the matter shall be referred to the appointing authority. Coordinating authority is a consultation relationship, not an authority through which command may be exercised. Coordinating authority is more applicable to planning and similar activities than to operations. JP 1-02

Coordinating authority may be exercised by commanders or individuals at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command. Coordinating authority is the authority delegated to a commander or individual for coordinating specific functions and activities involving forces of two or more Military Departments or two or more forces of the same Service. The commander or individual has the authority to require consultation between the agencies involved but does not have the authority to compel agreement. The common task to be coordinated will be specified in the establishing directive without disturbing the normal organizational relationships in other matters. Coordinating authority is a consultation relationship between commanders, not an authority by which command may be exercised. It is more applicable to planning and similar activities than to operations. Coordinating authority is not in any way tied to force assignment. Assignment of coordinating authority is based on the missions and capabilities of the commands or organizations involved.

#### **Related Terms**

administrative control; direct liaison authorized.

#### **Source Joint Publications**

JP 0-2            Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)

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### CORRIDOR SUPPRESSION

Corridor suppression is a type of localized suppression of enemy air defenses. All components may request joint suppression of enemy air defenses support for corridor suppression. The missions shown in the figure below may require corridor suppression.

## MISSIONS REQUIRING CORRIDOR SUPPRESSION

Missions transiting the forward line of own troops (FLOT)

Air missions supporting tactical airlift or combat search and rescue operations

Support of special operations

Helicopter operations forward of the FLOT

### Related Terms

opportune suppression

### Source Joint Publications

JP 3-01.4 JTTP for Joint Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (J-SEAD)

## COUNTERDRUG

Those active measures taken to detect, monitor, and counter the production, trafficking, and use of illegal drugs. Also called CD. JP 1-02

In counterdrug operations, Department of Defense (DOD) supports federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies in their efforts to disrupt the transfer of illegal drugs into the US. The National Defense Authorization Act of 1989 assigned three major counterdrug responsibilities to DOD.

- To act as the single lead agency for detecting and monitoring aerial and maritime transit of illegal drugs into the US by emphasizing activities in the cocaine source countries, streamlining activities in the transit zone, and re-focusing activities in the US to concentrate on the cocaine threat at critical border locations.
- To integrate the command, control, communications, computer, and intelligence assets of the US that are dedicated to interdicting the movement of illegal drugs into the US.
- To approve and fund State governors' plans for expanded use of the National Guard to support drug interdiction and enforcement agencies.

In addition, the 1993 DOD Authorization Act added the authority for the DOD to detect, monitor, and communicate the movement of certain surface traffic within 25 miles of the US boundary inside the US. Other DOD support to the National Drug Control Strategy includes support to law enforcement agencies (federal, state, and local) and cooperative foreign governments by providing intelligence analysts and logistical support personnel; support to interdiction; internal drug prevention and treatment programs; and research and development. An example of DOD support to counterdrug operations was the establishment of Joint Task Force 6, in 1989, to provide counterdrug support along the Southwest border of the US.

Related Terms


Source Joint Publications

JP 3-07 Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other than War

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

Information gathered and activities conducted to protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted by or on behalf of foreign governments or elements thereof, foreign organizations, or foreign persons, or international terrorist activities. Also called CI. JP 1-02

Counterintelligence (CI) is a discipline that is separate and distinct from foreign intelligence and supports military commanders, operational planners, and the traditional intelligence disciplines. An overview of the concept of CI is provided in the figure below. CI supports military operations and planning during peacetime operations and at all levels of operations other than war and war. The type and methods of CI support differ at various organizational levels within the Department of Defense (DOD). CI develops information on the threat posed to plans, strategies, resources, programs, operations, and systems by foreign intelligence services and intelligence collection by foreign groups, including terrorists and drug traffickers. CI is responsible for the identification, neutralization, and/or exploitation of this threat. CI also determines the ability and willingness of host-nation forces to protect DOD resources and personnel. CI consists of four functions: operations, investigations, collection, and analysis. As such, CI plays a significant force protection role as well as conducting functions complementing intelligence such as analysis and collection.



Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 2-0 Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Operations

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**COUNTERTERRORISM**

Offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism. Also called CT. JP 1-02

**General.** Counterterrorism (CT) provides response measures that include preemptive, retaliatory, and rescue operations. Normally, CT operations require specially trained personnel capable of mounting swift and effective action. Department of Defense (DOD) provides specially trained personnel and equipment in a supporting role to governmental lead agencies. CT is a principal special operations mission. Department of State (DOS), Department of Justice (DOJ) (specifically, the Federal Bureau of Investigation), or the Department of Transportation (DOT) (specifically the Federal Aviation Administration) receive lead agency designation according to terrorist incident location and type. DOS is the lead agency for incidents that take place outside the US; DOJ is the lead agent for incidents that occur within the US; and DOT is the lead agent for incidents aboard aircraft “in flight” within the special jurisdiction of the US. The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs resolves any uncertainty on the designation of lead agency or responsibilities.

**Special Operations Forces (SOF) in CT.** The primary mission SOF in CT is to apply highly specialized capabilities to preempt or resolve terrorist incidents abroad. Certain SOF are specifically organized, trained, equipped, and tasked to perform CT as a primary mission. CT missions may also be performed by other SOF or selected conventional Armed Forces of the United States under extremely urgent and in extremis circumstances when principal National Command Authorities-designated SOF are not readily available. If the mission has not been executed by the in extremis force once the designated force arrives on scene, passing mission responsibility must be exercised with care. The in extremis force will have acquired critical and perishable information and will have developed an experience base of great value to the relieving force.

SOF conduct CT operations that include aspects of unconventional warfare, direct action, and special reconnaissance missions to effect: hostage rescue, recovery of sensitive materiel from terrorist organizations, and attack on the terrorist infrastructure.

Because of the very low profile of most terrorist organizations, identifying targets for CT missions can be extremely difficult. Although a preemptive strike against terrorists may be preferred, CT missions must often be conducted after the terrorists have initiated a terrorist act.

Additionally, as a subset of foreign internal development, designated SOF units may also train selected host nation forces to perform CT missions. The level of special operations force participation in this program is determined by US and host-nation policy and legal considerations.

#### **Related Terms**

antiterrorism; combatting terrorism; terrorism

#### **Source Joint Publications**

JP 3-05            Doctrine for Joint Special Operations  
 JP 3-07            Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War

### COUNTRY TEAM

The senior, in-country, United States coordinating and supervising body, headed by the Chief of the United States diplomatic mission, and composed of the senior member of each represented United States department or agency, as desired by the Chief of the US diplomatic mission. JP 1-02

**General.** The Country Team Concept (seen in the figure below) denotes the process of in-country, interdepartmental coordination among key members of the US diplomatic mission. The Department of State (DOS) developed this concept of embassy management in the early 1950s, although it wasn't until 1974 that the term Country Team received its first official mention in Public Law 93-475. The composition of a Country Team varies widely, depending on the desires of the chief of mission, the in-country situation, and the number and levels of US departments and agencies present. The principal military members of the Country Team are the Defense Attaché and the chief of the Security Assistance Organization (SAO). Although the US area military commander (the combatant commander or a subordinate) is not a member of the diplomatic mission, he may participate or be represented in meetings and coordination conducted by the Country Team.

**The Members of the Country Team.** The following discussion provides an outline of typical Country Team representatives and explains the military elements important to the foreign internal defense mission.

The Ambassador is the personal representative of the President of the United States. Ambassadorial authority extends to all elements of the mission and all official US Government (USG) activities and establishments within the host country. A presidential letter is used to outline the authority granted to the Ambassador to execute his or her duties. Mentioned in this letter, the only exceptions to the Ambassador's authority over USG activities are the control of military elements under the separate command of a combatant commander or the control of elements of another US Mission or personnel assigned to an international agency. Within this authority, the Ambassador coordinates much of the foreign internal defense (FID) effort in the assigned country. The Ambassador accomplishes this task either through the assigned SAO or through his Country Team. There is a close coordinating relationship between the Ambassador, the represented USG agencies, and the combatant commander.


The US DOS is generally represented on the Country Team by the following positions:

- The Deputy Chief of Mission is the second in command, serves as executive officer and chief of staff, and directs the mission in the Ambassador's absence (then called the Charge D'Affairs).
- The Political Counselor directs the political section and is often third in command of the mission. The political section may also contain a political/military officer to assist in the coordination of military activities supporting FID programs.
- The Commercial Attaché is trained by the Department of Commerce and promotes US commercial interests.

US Information Agency (USIA) (US Information Service overseas) is represented by the following positions:

- The Public Affairs Officer is the ranking USIA officer in country responsible for implementing the US information program throughout the host nation (HN).
- The Information Officer is responsible for relations with the press and media.

## THE COUNTRY TEAM CONCEPT



■ BECOMES CHARGE D'AFFAIRS WHEN AMBASSADOR IS OUT OF THE COUNTRY OR WHEN AN AMBASSADOR HAS NOT YET BEEN APPOINTED

The Agency for International Development is represented by the in-country director of US Agency for International Development. The director directs the nonmilitary US developmental efforts in the HN.

Other USG departments, agencies, and interests may be represented by the following:

- Treasury Attaché;
- Agricultural Attaché;
- Labor Attaché;
- Civil Air Attaché;
- Science Attaché;
- Drug Enforcement Administration Representative;
- Director of the Peace Corps.

The DOD organization and representation within the diplomatic mission and Country Team can range from as little as an envoy, to a full complement of Service attaches, or a major SAO. In nations with active FID programs, there is likely to be a larger military presence with most of these resources centered in the SAO.

The US Defense Representative (USDR) is the representative for the Secretary of Defense and the Ambassador's liaison for all matters relating to administrative and security coordination for all DOD personnel and organizations in the HN that are not assigned to, attached to, nor under the command of a combatant commander. The USDR is designated by the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy with the concurrence of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the appropriate combatant commander with area responsibility for the country to which the USDR is assigned. The position is advisory only, thus the USDR does not have either command or tasking authority. The USDR will normally be the senior military officer assigned to permanent duty and responsibility in the country. The appointment of the Defense Attache (DATT) or the security assistance officer as the USDR does not change either the scope of their primary responsibilities or their accountability to established rating officials.

DATT is normally the senior Service attache assigned to the embassy. The DATT and other Service attaches comprise the Defense Attache Office (USDAO) and serve as valuable liaisons to their HN counterparts. USDAOs are operated by the Defense Intelligence Agency. The attaches also serve the Ambassador and coordinate with, and represent, their respective Military Departments on Service matters. The attaches assist the FID program by exchanging information with the combatant commander's staff on HN military, social, economic, and political conditions. In many countries, the functions of an SAO are carried out within the USDAO under the direction of the DATT.

### **Related Terms**

#### **Source Joint Publications**

JP 3-07.1      JTTP for Foreign Internal Defense (FID)

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**COURSE OF ACTION**

1. A plan that would accomplish, or is related to, the accomplishment of a mission. 2. The scheme adopted to accomplish a task or mission. It is a product of the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System concept development phase. The supported commander will include a recommended course of action in the commander's estimate. The recommended course of action will include the concept of operations, evaluation of supportability estimates of supporting organizations, and an integrated time-phased data base of combat, combat support, and combat service support forces and sustainment. Refinement of this data base will be contingent on the time available for course of action development. When approved, the course of action becomes the basis for the development of an operation plan or operation order. Also called COA. JP 1-02

**Course of Action (COA) Development.** COA development support includes Joint Operation Planning and Execution System functions that help the supported commander's staff develop and test alternative COAs based on National Command Authorities/Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff task assignments, guidance, and force and resource allocation. This facilitates development of the commander of a combatant command's Strategic Concept in deliberate planning and the commander's estimate in crisis action planning.

**Detailed Planning.** This function supports preparation of the approved concept of operations or COA for implementation. It facilitates the following:

- Development and time-phasing of detailed force lists and required sustainment.
- Development of directives, schedules, and orders.
- Determination of support requirements, including medical, civil engineering, air refueling, host-nation support, and transportation needs.
- Identification and resolution of force and resource shortfalls and constraints.

The result is development of detailed, fully integrated mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment, and redeployment activities based on the approved concept of operations or COA.

**Implementation.** This function gives decision makers the tools to monitor, analyze, and manage plan execution. Planning is a cyclic process that continues throughout implementation. Of particular importance is the ability to redirect forces, adjust priorities, or influence events as the situation unfolds. Implementation usually ends with some type of replanning effort, such as redeployment or redirection of operations.

**Related Terms**

CINC's strategic concept; commander's estimate; concept of logistics support; concept of operations

**Source Joint Publications**

JP 5-0                      Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations

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**CRISIS**

An incident or situation involving a threat to the United States, its territories, citizens, military forces, possessions, or vital interests that develops rapidly and creates a condition of such diplomatic, economic, political, or military importance that commitment of US military forces and resources is contemplated to achieve national objectives. JP 1-02

Combatant command strategic planning in peacetime provides the framework for employing forces in peacetime and in response to crises. Combatant command planners develop peacetime assessments that ease transition to crisis or war as well as to postconflict. Peacetime intelligence and logistic assessments, for example, are essential for force projection operations and rapid transition to combat operations. When directed by the National Command Authorities (NCA) to conduct military operations, the combatant commanders refine peacetime strategies and modify existing plans or develop campaign plans as appropriate. The result, expressed in terms of military objectives, military concepts, and resources (ends, ways, and means), provides guidance for a broad range of activities.

The NCA may direct combatant commanders to resolve a crisis quickly, employing immediately available forward-presence forces, and, at the lowest level possible, to preclude escalation of the crisis. When this response is not enough, the projection of forces from the continental US or another theater may be necessary. When opposed, force projection can be accomplished rapidly by forcible entry coordinated with strategic airlift and sealift, and prepositioned forces. For example, the ability to generate high intensity combat power from the sea can provide for effective force projection operations in the absence of timely or unencumbered access.

**Related Terms****Source Joint Publications**

JP 3-0      Doctrine for Joint Operations

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**CRISIS ACTION PLANNING**

1. The Joint Operation Planning and Execution System process involving the time-sensitive development of joint operation plans and orders in response to an imminent crisis. Crisis action planning follows prescribed crisis action procedures to formulate and implement an effective response within the time frame permitted by the crisis. 2. The time-sensitive planning for the deployment, employment, and sustainment of assigned and allocated forces and resources that occurs in response to a situation that may result in actual military operations. Crisis action planners base their plan on the circumstances that exist at the time planning occurs. Also called CAP. JP 1-02

**General.** A crisis is defined, within the context of joint operation planning and execution as an INCIDENT or SITUATION involving a threat to the US, its territories, citizens, military forces, and possessions or vital interests that develops rapidly and creates a condition of such diplomatic, economic, political, or military importance that commitment of US military forces and resources is contemplated to achieve national objectives. An adequate and feasible military

response to a crisis demands a flexible adaptation of the basic planning process that emphasizes the time available, rapid and effective communications, and the use of previously accomplished joint operation planning whenever possible. In crisis situations, the Joint Planning and Execution Community (JPEC) follows formally established crisis action planning (CAP) procedures to adjust and implement previously prepared joint operation plans or to develop and execute operation orders (OPORDs) where no useful joint operation plan exists for the evolving crisis. A campaign plan may also be developed if warranted by the scope of contemplated operations. CAP procedures provide for the rapid and effective exchange of information and analysis, the timely preparation of military courses of action (COAs) for consideration by the National Command Authorities (NCA), and the prompt transmission of NCA decisions to supported commanders.

**CAP versus Deliberate Planning.** CAP procedures provide for the transition from planning of military operations to their execution. Deliberate planning supports crisis action planning by anticipating potential crises and developing joint operation plans that facilitate the rapid development and selection of a COA and execution planning during crises. Deliberate planning prepares for hypothetical crises based on the best available information and using forces and resources available for the planning period. It relies heavily on assumptions regarding the political and military circumstances that will exist when the plan is implemented. These ambiguities make it unlikely that any joint operation plan will be usable without modification as a given crisis unfolds because every crisis situation cannot be anticipated. However, the detailed analysis and coordination accomplished in the time available for deliberate planning can expedite effective decision making and execution planning during a crisis. As the crisis unfolds, assumptions and projections are replaced with facts and actual conditions. Therefore, CAP includes the consideration and exploitation of deliberate joint operation planning whenever possible. A comparison of CAP and deliberate planning procedures is shown in the first figure below.

**The Six CAP Phases.** CAP and its execution are accomplished within a flexible framework of six phases as summarized in the second figure below. These six phases integrate the workings of the NCA and the JPEC into a single unified process that sequentially provides for the identification of a potential requirement for military response; the assessment of the requirement and formulation of strategy; the development of feasible COAs by the supported commander; the selection of a COA by the NCA; and, when directed by the NCA, implementation of the approved COA by the supported commander.

**Situation Development.** During the initial phase of crisis action planning, events that have potential national security implications are detected, reported, and assessed to determine whether a military response may be required. The focus of this phase of crisis action planning is on the combatant commander in whose area the event occurs and who will be responsible for the execution of any military response. The combatant commander may be the first to detect and report the event to the National Military Command Center (NMCC). However, crisis action planning may be initiated by a report to the NMCC from any of the national means used to continuously monitor the worldwide situation. If not included within the initial report, the supported commander prepares and submits an assessment of the event to the NCA and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). The assessment normally includes amplifying information regarding the situation, actions being taken, forces available, expected time for earliest commitment of forces, and major constraints on the employment of forces. If the time sensitivity of the situation is such that normal CAP procedures cannot be followed, the commander's assessment may also include a recommended COA. It then serves as the commander's estimate normally prepared in a subsequent phase of CAP. The

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## COMPARING CRISIS ACTION PROCEDURES WITH DELIBERATE PLANNING PROCEDURES

	CRISIS ACTION PLANNING	DELIBERATE PLANNING
Time available to plan	Hours or days	18-24 months
JPEC involvement	For security reasons, possibly very limited to close-hold procedures	Participates fully
Phases	6 Phases from situation development to execution	5 Phases from initiation to supporting plans
Document assigning task	Warning order to CINC: CINC assigns tasks with evaluation request message	JSCP to CINC: CINC assigns tasks with planning or other written directive
Forces for Planning	Allocated in the Warning, Planning, Alert, or Execute order	Apportioned in JSCP
Early planning guidance to staff	Warning order from CJCS; CINC's evaluation request	Planning Directive issued by CINC after planning guidance step of concept development phase
Commander's estimates	Communicates recommendations of CINC to the CJCS-NCA	Communicates the CINC's decision to staff and subordinate commanders
Decision of COA	NCA decide COA	CINC decides COA with review by CJCS
Execution Document	Execute order	When operation plan is implemented, it is converted to an OPORD, and executed with an Execute order
Products	Campaign Plan (if reqd) with supporting OPORDs or OPORD with supporting OPORDs	OPLAN or CONPLAN with supporting plan

## SUMMARY OF CRISIS ACTION PLANNING PHASES

PHASE I SITUATION DEVELOPMENT	PHASE II CRISIS ASSESSMENT	PHASE III COURSE OF ACTION DEVELOPMENT	PHASE IV COURSE OF ACTION SELECTION	PHASE V EXECUTION PLANNING	PHASE VI EXECUTION
<b>EVENT</b>					
EVENT OCCURS WITH POSSIBLE NATIONAL SECURITY IMPLICATIONS	CINC'S REPORT/ ASSESSMENT RECEIVED	CJCS SENDS WARNING ORDER	CJCS PRESENTS REFINED AND PRIORITIZED COA'S TO NCA	CINC RECEIVES ALERT ORDER OR PLANNING ORDER	NCA DECIDE TO EXECUTE OPORD
<b>ACTION</b>					
MONITOR WORLD SITUATION	INCREASE AWARENESS	DEVELOP COA'S	CJCS ADVICE TO NCA	CINC DEVELOPS OPORD	CJCS SENDS EXECUTE ORDER BY AUTHORITY OF SECDEF
RECOGNIZE PROBLEM	INCREASE REPORTING	CINC ASSIGNS TASKS TO SUBORDINATES BY EVALUATION REQUEST MESSAGE	CJCS MAY SEND PLANNING ORDER TO BEGIN EXECUTION	REFINE TPFDD	CINC EXECUTES OPORD
SUBMIT CINC'S ASSESSMENT	JS ASSESS SITUATION	CINC REVIEWS EVALUATION RESPONSE MESSAGE	PLANNING BEFORE SELECTION OF COA BY NCA	FORCE PREPARATION	JPEC REPORTS EXECUTION STATUS
	JS ADVISE ON POSSIBLE MILITARY ACTION	CREATE / MODIFY TPFDD			BEGIN REDEPLOYMENT PLANNING
	NCA-CJCS EVALUATION	USTRANSCOM PREPARES DEPLOYMENT ESTIMATES			
		EVALUATE COA'S			
<b>OUTCOME</b>					
ASSESS THAT EVENT MAY HAVE NATIONAL IMPLICATIONS	NCA/CJCS DECIDE TO DEVELOP MILITARY COA	CINC SENDS COMMANDER'S ESTIMATE WITH RECOMMENDED COA	NCA SELECT COA	CINC SENDS OPORD	CRISIS RESOLVED
REPORT EVENT TO NCA/CJCS			CJCS RELEASES NCA COA SELECTION IN ALERT ORDER		REDEPLOYMENT OF FORCES

1. CAP phases are scenario dependent since actual planning time can vary from hours to months. Therefore, phases may be conducted sequentially concurrently, compressed, or eliminated altogether.

2. The NCA, in coordination with the CJCS, may elect to return to situation monitoring at any point during CAP.

situation development phase ends when the supported commander's assessment is submitted to the NCA and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

**Crisis Assessment.** During the crisis assessment phase of crisis action planning, the NCA, the Chairman, and the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff analyze the situation through available intelligence and determine whether a military option should be prepared. This phase is characterized by increased information and intelligence gathering, NCA review of options, and preparatory action by the JPEC. The phase begins with the receipt of the supported commander's report and assessment of the event. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, assesses the situation from a military perspective and provides advice to the NCA on possible military options. The NCA identify national interests and objectives and consider possible diplomatic, informational, economic, and military alternatives to achieve objectives. The flexibility of the CAP provides the latitude for the NCA to remain in this phase pending additional information, return to the pre-crisis situation, or progress to the next phase of CAP. The crisis assessment phase ends with a strategic decision by the NCA to return to the precrisis situation, or to have military options developed for consideration and possible use. The NCA decision provides strategic guidance for joint operation planning and may include specific guidance on the COAs to be developed.

**COA Development.** The COA development phase of crisis action planning implements an NCA decision or CJCS planning directive to develop military options. In response to that decision, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff issues a planning guidance directive to the supported commander directing the preparation of COAs. Normally, the directive will be a CJCS WARNING ORDER, but other CAP-prescribed orders may be used if the nature and timing of the crisis mandate acceleration of the planning. The directive establishes command relationships and identifies the mission and any planning constraints. It either identifies forces and strategic mobility resources and establishes tentative timing for execution, or it requests the supported commander develop these factors. If the NCA direct development of a specific COA, the directive will describe the COA and request the supported commander's assessment. In response to the directive, the supported commander, with the support of subordinate and supporting commanders, develops and analyzes COAs. Joint operation plans are reviewed for applicability and used when needed. Based on the combatant commander's guidance, supporting commanders, subordinate joint force commanders, and component commanders begin time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD) development. Time permitting, a TPFDD is generated for each COA. US Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) reviews the proposed COAs and prepares deployment estimates. The Services monitor the development of COAs and begin planning for support forces, sustainment, and mobilization. The supported commander analyzes the COAs and submits his recommendations to the NCA and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The supported commander's estimate describes the selected COAs, summarizes the supported commander's evaluation of the COAs, and presents recommendations. The COA development phase of CAP ends with the submission of the supported commander's estimate.

**COA Selection.** The focus of the COA selection phase is on the selection of a COA by the NCA and the initiation of execution planning. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, reviews and evaluates the COAs provided in the supported commander's estimate and prepares recommendations and advice for consideration by the NCA. The NCA select a COA and direct that execution planning be accomplished. Upon receipt of the NCA decision, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff issues a CJCS ALERT ORDER implementing the NCA decision. A CJCS

ALERT ORDER is a formal, CAP-prescribed order approved by the Secretary of Defense and transmitted to the supported commander and other members of the JPEC to announce the COA selected by the NCA and to initiate execution planning. The CJCS ALERT ORDER describes the selected COA in sufficient detail to allow the supported commander, in coordination with other members of the JPEC, to conduct the detailed planning required to deploy forces. It will contain guidance to amplify or change earlier guidance provided in the CJCS WARNING ORDER. In some cases, a PLANNING ORDER is used to initiate execution planning activities before a course of action is formally selected by the NCA. Used in this manner, the PLANNING ORDER saves time and allows the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff additional flexibility in directing military activities. The PLANNING ORDER will not normally be used to direct the deployment of forces or to increase force readiness. If force deployment is directed, the PLANNING ORDER will require the approval of the Secretary of Defense. Issuance of either the PLANNING ORDER or the ALERT ORDER marks the beginning of execution planning.



*The availability of strategic mobility resources to respond to deployment and sustainment requirements is a primary consideration in establishing a course of action and its execution planning.*

**Execution Planning.** An NCA-approved COA is transformed into an OPORD during the execution planning phase of CAP. In this phase, the JPEC performs the detailed planning necessary to execute the approved COA when directed by the NCA. If required by the situation, the supported commander will initiate campaign planning or refine a campaign plan already in development. This should guide the development of the OPORD. Actual forces, sustainment, and strategic mobility resources are identified and the concept of operations is described in OPORD format. Following CAP procedures and using capabilities provided through Joint Operation Planning and Execution System and Worldwide Military Command and Control System, the supported commander develops the OPORD and supporting TPFDD by modifying an existing operation plan, expanding an existing concept plan (with or without TPFDD), or developing a new plan. Supporting commanders providing augmenting forces identify and task specific units and provide movement requirements. Component commanders identify and update sustainment requirements in coordination with the Services.

USTRANSCOM develops transportation schedules to support the requirements identified by the supported commander. A transportation schedule does not mean that the supported commander's TPFDD or COA is transportation feasible; rather, the schedules developed are the most effective and realistic given the numbers and types of assets and their location in relation to C-day and L-hour. The Services determine mobilization requirements and plan for the provision of nonunit sustainment. Force preparation action is accomplished throughout the JPEC in accordance with deployment postures directed by the Secretary of Defense, and deployability posture reporting is initiated. The Chairman and the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff monitor execution planning activities, resolve shortfalls when required, and review the supported commander's OPORD for feasibility and adequacy. The execution planning phase terminates with an NCA decision to implement the OPORD. In those instances where the crisis does not progress to implementation, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff provides guidance regarding continued planning under either crisis action or deliberate planning procedures. If the NCA decide to execute the OPORD, planning enters its final phase: execution.

**Execution.** The execution phase begins when the NCA decide to execute a military option in response to the crisis. During this phase, a military response is implemented and operations are conducted by the supported commander until the crisis is resolved. When the Secretary of Defense authorizes the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to direct the supported commander to implement the OPORD, the Chairman issues a CJCS EXECUTE ORDER. The CJCS EXECUTE ORDER directs the deployment and employment of forces, defines the timing for the initiation of operations, and conveys guidance not provided in earlier CAP orders and instructions. The supported commander, in turn, issues an EXECUTE ORDER to subordinate and supporting commanders that directs the execution of their OPORDs. Subordinate and supporting commanders execute their OPORDs and conduct operations to accomplish objectives. The supported commander monitors movements, assesses and reports the achievement of objectives, and continues planning as necessary. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff monitors the deployment and employment of forces, acts to resolve shortfalls, and directs action needed to ensure successful termination of the crisis. USTRANSCOM manages common-user global air, land, and sea transportation, reporting the progress of deployments to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the supported commander. The execution phase of crisis action planning continues until the crisis is terminated or the mission is terminated and force redeployment has been completed. If the crisis is prolonged, the process may be repeated continuously as circumstances change and missions are revised. If the crisis expands to major conflict or war, crisis action planning will evolve into, and be absorbed within, the larger context of implementation planning for the conduct of the war.

### Related Terms

deliberate planning; joint operation planning; Joint Operation Planning and Execution System

### Source Joint Publications

JP 5-0      Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations

During the crisis assessment phase of crisis action planning (CAP), the National Command Authorities (NCA), the Chairman, and the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff analyze the situation through available intelligence and determine whether a military option should be prepared. This phase is characterized by increased information and intelligence gathering,

NCA review of options, and preparatory action by the Joint Planning and Execution Community. The phase begins with the receipt of the supported commander's report and assessment of the event. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, assesses the situation from a military perspective and provides advice to the NCA on possible military options. The NCA identify national interests and objectives and consider possible diplomatic, informational, economic, and military alternatives to achieve objectives. The flexibility of the CAP provides the latitude for the NCA to remain in this phase pending additional information, return to the pre-crisis situation, or progress to the next phase of CAP. The crisis assessment phase ends with a strategic decision by the NCA to return to the precrisis situation, or to have military options developed for consideration and possible use. The NCA decision provides strategic guidance for joint operation planning and may include specific guidance on the courses of action to be developed.

#### **Related Terms**

crisis action planning

#### **Source Joint Publications**

JP 5-0            Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations

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## **CRISIS RESPONSE**

US forces need to be able to respond rapidly either unilaterally or as a part of a multinational effort. Crisis response may include, for example, employment of overwhelming force in peace enforcement, a single precision strike, or emergency support to civil authorities. The ability of the US to respond rapidly with appropriate military operations other than war (MOOTW) options to potential or actual crises contributes to regional stability. Thus, MOOTW may often be planned and executed under crisis action circumstances.

#### **Related Terms**

military operations other than war

#### **Source Joint Publications**

JP 3-07            Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War

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## **CRITICAL ITEM**

An essential item which is in short supply or expected to be in short supply for an extended period. JP 1-02

Critical supplies and materiel should be identified early in the planning process. Critical items are supplies vital to the support of operations that are in short supply or are expected to be in short supply. Special handling of requisitions or requests for transportation and critical items may be indicated.

#### **Related Terms**

logistics

#### **Source Joint Publications**

JP 4-0            Doctrine for Logistic Support to Joint Operations

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## **CULMINATION**

Culmination has both offensive and defensive application. In the offense, the culminating point is the point in time and space at which an attacker's combat power no longer exceeds

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## CURRENT INTELLIGENCE

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that of the defender. Here the attacker greatly risks counterattack and defeat and continues the attack only at great peril. Success in the attack at all levels is to secure the objective before reaching culmination. A defender reaches culmination when the defending force no longer has the capability to go on the counter-offensive or defend successfully. Success in the defense is to draw the attacker to culmination, then strike when the attacker has exhausted available resources and is ill-disposed to defend successfully.

Synchronization of logistics with combat operations can forestall culmination and help commanders control the tempo of their operations. At both tactical and operational levels, theater logistic planners forecast the drain on resources associated with conducting operations over extended distance and time. They respond by generating enough military resources at the right times and places to enable their commanders to achieve strategic objectives before reaching their culminating points. If the commanders cannot do so, they should rethink their concept of operations.

### **Related Terms**

operational art

### **Source Joint Publications**

JP 3-0      Doctrine for Joint Operations

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## CURRENT INTELLIGENCE

Intelligence of all types and forms of immediate interest which is usually disseminated without the delays necessary to complete evaluation or interpretation. JP 1-02

Current intelligence provides updated support for ongoing operations across the range of military operations. It involves the integration of current, all-source intelligence and information into concise, objective reporting on the current situation in a particular area. It usually contains predictive judgments on how the situation will develop and what the implications are for planning and executing military operations.

### **Related Terms**

intelligence

### **Source Joint Publications**

JP 2-0      Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Operations