

IMAGERY INTELLIGENCE

Intelligence derived from the exploitation of collection by visual photography, infrared sensors, lasers, electro-optics, and radar sensors such as synthetic aperture radar wherein images of objects are reproduced optically or electronically on film, electronic display devices, or other media. Also called IMINT. JP 1-02

Imagery intelligence (IMINT) is derived from visual photography, infrared sensors, lasers, electro-optics, and radar sensors. IMINT systems can operate from land, sea, air, and/or space platforms. Imagery equipment is being improved constantly and combinations of sensors are being used to enhance the quality and timeliness of the intelligence product.

An increasing number of countries are starting to use photoreconnaissance satellites. In addition to being a major strategic collection capability, they are becoming an increasingly important operational and tactical capability. The traditional airborne IMINT platforms remain an important capability for those countries without access to satellite imagery.

Related Terms

intelligence; photographic intelligence.

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-54 Joint Doctrine for Operations Security

IMMEDIATE REQUESTS


Immediate Close Air Support (CAS) Requests.

Rationale and Methodology. Immediate requests arise from situations that develop once the battle is joined. Requesting commanders use immediate CAS to exploit opportunities or protect the force. (See figure below.) Because immediate requests respond to developments on a dynamic battlefield, they cannot be identified early enough to allow detailed coordination and planning, which may preclude tailored ordnance loads. If on-call CAS is unavailable, the Corps air liaison officer (ALO) advises the Corps G3/G3 Air to divert corps preplanned CAS missions or forward the request to the joint air operations center (JAOC). During the execution phase of the joint air tasking order, the joint force air component commander (JFACC)/joint force commander staff may need to redirect joint air missions to cover immediate requests for high priority CAS. The JFACC may also seek additional support from another component to cover the immediate request. However, diverting aircraft from preplanned scheduled CAS missions is a zero-sum game: preplanned requestors lose the same amount of firepower gained by the immediate requestor.

Channels. As seen in the second figure below, immediate requests are forwarded to the appropriate command post by the most rapid means available. Requests are broadcast directly from the tactical air control party (TACP) to the air support operations center/direct air support center using the applicable component communications nets. The TACP at each intermediate headquarters monitors the request and informs the G3/S3 Air, ALO/area of operation, and fire support coordinator. Based on the commander's intent, and after considering whether organic assets are available, appropriate, or sufficient to fulfill the request, they approve or deny the request. Silence by intermediate headquarters indicates approval.


Special Operation Forces (SOF) Request Channels. Due to the small size of SOF surface units and the nature of the mission, there is always a danger that a SOF surface unit may be

IMMEDIATE CAS REQUEST PROCESS



confronted with a combat situation posing immediate danger to the unit's very existence. SOF communication capabilities are usually adequate to link directly to component communications nets, who can divert or scramble CAS aircraft as required.

Immediate Airlift Requests. When air movement requirements are identified too late for normal air tasking order tasking cycle coordination, they are handled as immediate requests. Immediate requests are usually made to satisfy urgent employment, sustainment, or extraction requirements. Once identified at an appropriate level within a component, they are transmitted



directly to the JAOC, normally by a theater airlift liaison officer, through operational channels. This allows the JAOC to make preparations for the required missions, while the actual request is staffed expeditiously through logistic channels. Because the theater airlift force is normally fully employed, the joint movement center may fill validated immediate requests by redirecting sorties supporting planned requests.

Related Terms

close air support; theater airlift

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-09.3 JTTP for Close Air Support (CAS)

JP 3-17 JTTP for Theater Airlift Operations

IMPLEMENTATION

Procedures governing the mobilization of the force and the deployment, employment, and sustainment of military operations in response to execution orders issued by the National Command Authorities. JP 1-02

This function gives decision makers the tools to monitor, analyze, and manage plan execution. Planning is a cyclic process that continues throughout implementation. Of particular importance is the ability to redirect forces, adjust priorities, or influence events as the situation unfolds. Implementation usually ends with some type of replanning effort, such as redeployment or redirection of operations.

INDICATIONS AND WARNING

Related Terms

Joint Operation Planning and Execution System

Source Joint Publications

JP 5-0 Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations

INDICATIONS AND WARNING

Those intelligence activities intended to detect and report time-sensitive intelligence information on foreign developments that could involve a threat to the United States or allied military, political, or economic interests or to US citizens abroad. It includes forewarning of enemy actions or intentions; the imminence of hostilities; insurgency; nuclear/non-nuclear attack on the United States, its overseas forces, or allied nations; hostile reactions to United States reconnaissance activities; terrorists' attacks; and other similar events. JP 1-02

Indications and Warning (I&W) includes forewarning of adversary actions or intentions; the imminence of nuclear or nonnuclear attack on the US, its overseas forces, or allied nations; hostile reactions to US activities; terrorist attacks; and other similar events. The I&W process anticipates hostile operations and provides sufficient warning to enable US or allied efforts to preempt, counter, or moderate such actions. Warning notification is made to local commanders, US and allied military authorities at all levels, and the National Command Authorities.

Related Terms

intelligence

Source Joint Publications

JP 2-0 Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Operations

INDUSTRIAL BASE

The US industrial base includes domestic commercial production facilities and government-owned facilities. Some of the government-owned facilities are government operated and some are contractor operated. Foreign producers of essential components and parts must also be included, because foreign producers may be the only source for components of major equipment items. Because of the unique relationship existing between the US and Canada, the Canadian defense industry is recognized as part of a single North American defense industrial base. The capabilities of Canadian industry may be included in US industrial preparedness planning. The figure below lists these sources together with the options and actions required to expand their output.

Industrial base expansion includes actions to accelerate production within the existing industrial infrastructure, add new production lines and factories, and implement provisions of the Defense Priorities and Allocation System. Because many components of key military items of equipment are now procured from offshore sources, increased emergency procurement from these sources has become, of necessity, a major industrial mobilization option.

INDUSTRIAL MOBILIZATION: SOURCES AND OPTIONS

SITUATION	INDUSTRIAL BASE SOURCES	INDUSTRIAL MOBILIZATION OPTIONS	ACTIONS REQUIRED
Any level of emergency	DOMESTIC INDUSTRY		
	Commercial producers of goods and services	Accelerate production from current sources of goods and services.	Military Departments and Defense Logistics Agency contract for accelerated production from current producers of materiel based on planned or actual consumption rates and prioritized requirements of the combatant commanders:
		Expand production base capacity	Under provisions of Defense Priorities and Allocation System (DPAS), 50 USC app. 2071, obtain priority performance on DOD contracts and orders.
			Using DPAS authorities and streamlined acquisition procedures, increase industrial capacity for production of materiel and equipment required to sustain the
	DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL BASE		
	Government-owned / government-operated production facilities		Accelerate production rates or activate standby and laid-away production capacity government-owned / government-operated facilities and government-owned / contractor-operated facilities
	Government-owned / contractor-operated production facilities		
	FOREIGN INDUSTRY		
	Commercial producers of goods and services		Seek additional production from foreign suppliers.

DPAS Defense Priorities and Allocation System

Related Terms

mobilization

Source Joint Publications

JP 4-05 Joint Doctrine for Mobilization Planning

INDUSTRIAL PREPAREDNESS PROGRAM

Plans, actions, or measures for the transformation of the industrial base, both government-owned and civilian-owned, from its peacetime activity to the emergency program necessary to support the national military objectives. It includes industrial preparedness measures such as modernization, expansion, and preservation of the production facilities and contributory items and services for planning with industry.

JP 1-02

INFORMATION

The goal of the Industrial Preparedness Program (IPP) is to provide an industrial base capable of producing critical military items essential to the readiness and sustainment needs of the Armed Forces of the United States across the range of military operations. The Joint Industrial Mobilization Planning Process (JIMPP) is the deliberate planning tool that provides documented industrial mobilization plans and analytical processes to respond to a crisis or war. The process unifies industrial mobilization planning and analytical efforts by focusing on warfighting requirements and capabilities. The JIMPP is used by the Joint Staff, Services, and Defense agencies to:

- Estimate the capability of the industrial base to support execution of operation plans developed through deliberate planning or course of actions derived through crisis action planning;
- Establish a baseline national industrial mobilization capability assessment based on the potential military demands identified through the Joint Strategic Planning System;
- Coordinate the industrial mobilization planning of the Services;
- Identify and provide Department of Defense industrial mobilization requirements to the IPP.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 5-0 Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations

INFORMATION

1. Unprocessed data of every description which may be used in the production of intelligence. 2. The meaning that a human assigns to data by means of the known conventions used in their representation. JP 1-02

“One of the surest ways of forming good combinations in war should be to order movements only after obtaining perfect information of the enemy’s proceedings. In fact, how can any man say what he should do himself, if he is ignorant of what his adversary is about?”

“As it is unquestionably of the highest importance to gain this information, so it is a thing of the utmost difficulty, not to say impossibility, and this is one of the chief causes of the great difference between the theory and the practice of war.”

Jomini, *The Art of War*, 1838

The intelligence cycle is the process by which information is converted into intelligence and made available to users. To better understand intelligence and its cycle, it is important to recognize the clear and critical distinction between information and intelligence. Information is data that have been collected but not further developed through analysis, interpretation, or correlation with other data and intelligence. The application of analysis transforms information into intelligence. Both information and intelligence are important, and both may exist together in some form. They are not, however, the same thing, and thus they have different connotations, applicability, and credibility.

Information and intelligence from all sources, including counterintelligence, must be evaluated, correlated, and integrated into products that present the most complete, accurate,

and objective views possible. Joint operations in particular require complete and composite views of the situation and an adversary's land, sea, air, and space forces.

Having access to and using all sources of information and intelligence is essential to understanding the actual situation. Single-source intelligence analysis may lead to incomplete assessments. Use of the all-source concept and methodology will reduce the risks of deception. It will also become the basis for the nomination and development of countermeasures against hostile intelligence and operations. All-source intelligence fusion must begin with collection and production planning. Each source can provide useful information and cues for collection and exploitation through other sources.

Related Terms

combat information


Source Joint Publications

JP 2-0

Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Operations

INFORMATION DIFFERENTIAL

The joint campaign should fully exploit the information differential, that is, the superior access to and ability to effectively employ information on the strategic, operational and tactical situation which advanced US technologies provide our forces. (See figure below.) Space power is crucial, but does not operate alone, in assisting the joint force to enjoy superiority in command, control, communications, intelligence, navigation, and information processing. Weather, mapping, charting, geodesy, oceanography, and terrain analysis are all areas where the joint force should achieve significant advantages. The use of Allied signals intelligence



INFORMATION FUSION

as a key to victory in the Battle of the Atlantic in World War II provides a good example of exploiting such an information differential.

Related Terms

command and control warfare; information warfare

Source Joint Publications

JP 1 Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States

INFORMATION FUSION

The ultimate goal of command, control, communications, and computer systems is to produce a picture of the battlespace that is accurate and meets the needs of warfighters. This goal is achieved by fusing, i.e., reducing information to the minimum essentials and putting it in a form that people can act on. There is no one fusing of information that meets the needs of all warriors. However, with concise, accurate, timely, and relevant information, unity of effort is improved and uncertainty is reduced, enabling the force as a whole to exploit opportunities and fight smarter.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 6-0 Doctrine for Command, Control, Communications, and Computer (C4)
 Systems Support to Joint Operations

INFORMATION GATHERING

In military operations other than war involving in-depth coordination or interaction with nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and private voluntary organizations (PVOs) and most UN operations, the term “information gathering” should be used rather than the term “intelligence.” The term “information gathering” is also appropriate in peacekeeping operations because peacekeepers must be overt, neutral, and impartial. Non-military organizations may resent being considered a source of intelligence. These organizations may perceive that US forces are seeking to recruit members of their organizations for collection efforts, or turn the organizations into unknowing accomplices in some covert collection effort. NGOs and PVOs, by the very nature of what they do, become familiar with the culture, language, and sensitivities of a populace. This information is very valuable to military commanders as they seek to accomplish missions which focus not on destroying an enemy, but on providing aid and assistance to the populace of a foreign country. By using the term “information gathering,” military forces may be able to foster better communications with other agencies, and thereby benefit from their valuable knowledge.

Related Terms

intelligence; military operations other than war

Source Joint Publications


JP 3-07 Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War

INFORMATION GRID

The networks that result from open systems architectures are called information grids. They allow the warrior users to gain access, process, and transport information in near real time to anyone else on the network. Information grids refer to computer controlled networks

that provide virtual connectivity on the demand of the networks that provide virtual connectivity on the demand of the warrior; they support local and area network operations. (See figure below.) They are also the basic components of larger grid networks that, when interconnected, support regional, theater, and ultimately a global grid that is also referred to as the infosphere.

Computers control connectivity so quickly that wasteful and inefficient permanent or full period connectivity is no longer required; an example could be cellular telephone networks where mobile users maintain continuous virtual connectivity even though they are connected through numerous links and nodal switching centers as they move during the course of a single call. This allows a full range of user service to be distributed across vast areas — hence these distributed grid networks are also extremely redundant; individual users have hundreds of computer selectable paths available vice one or two, making their service many times more reliable.



Related Terms

command, control, communications, and computer (C4) systems

Source Joint Publications

JP 6-0 Doctrine for Command, Control, Communications, and Computer (C4) Systems Support to Joint Operations

INFORMATION PRIORITY

The prioritization of information is essential since command, control, communications, and computer (C4) systems have a finite capacity. Prioritization of specific types of information is the responsibility of the joint force commander (JFC), subordinate commanders, and staff planners that provides a benchmark from which discipline on information flow and processing within C4 networks can be maintained. Prioritization is also essential to sizing C4 network and nodal systems requirements (e.g., the level of C4 assets devoted to intelligence requirements

INFORMATION PROTECTION

may reduce network responsiveness to other users requiring a decision by the JFC during campaign and operation planning).

Related Terms

command, control, communications, and computer (C4) systems


Source Joint Publications

JP 6-0 Doctrine for Command, Control, Communications, and Computer (C4) Systems Support to Joint Operations

INFORMATION PROTECTION

Security of information and command, control, communications, and computer (C4) systems involves the procedural and technical protection of information and C4 systems major components (terminal devices, transmission media, switches, and control and management), and is an integral component of the joint force commander's command and control protection effort. (See figure below.) This is accomplished through application of information protection means including:

- Physical security of C4 system component facilities;
- Personnel security of individuals authorized access to C4 systems;
- Operations security (OPSEC) procedures and techniques protecting operational employment of C4 system components;
- Deception, deceiving the adversary about specific C4 system configuration, operational employment, and degree of component importance to mission accomplishment;



- Low probability of intercept (LPI) and low probability of detection (LPD) capabilities and techniques designed to defeat adversary attempts to detect and exploit C4 system transmission media;
- Emissions control procedures designed to support OPSEC and LPI/LPD objectives;
- Transmission security capabilities designed to support OPSEC and LPI/LPD objectives;
- Communications security capabilities to protect information transiting terminal devices and transmission media from adversary exploitation;
- Computer security capabilities to protect information at rest, being processed, and transitioning terminal devices, switches, networks, and control systems from intrusion, damage, and exploitation;
- C4 system design and configuration control (e.g., protected distribution systems, protection from compromising emanation (TEMPEST)) to mitigate the impact of information technology vulnerabilities;
- Identifying technological and procedural vulnerability analysis and assessment programs.

Related Terms

command, control, communications, and computer (C4) systems

Source Joint Publications

JP 6-0 Doctrine for Command, Control, Communications, and Computer (C4)
 Systems Support to Joint Operations

INFORMATION QUALITY

Many sources of information are imperfect and susceptible to distortion and deception. The seven criteria shown in the figure below help characterize information quality.

INFORMATION QUALITY CRITERIA

ACCURACY

Information that conveys the true situation

RELEVANCE

Information that applies to the mission, task, or situation at hand

TIMELINESS

Information that is available in time to make decisions

USABILITY

Information that is in common, easily understood format and displays

COMPLETENESS

All necessary information required by the decision maker

BREVITY

Information that has only the level of detail required

SECURITY

Information that has been afforded adequate protection where required

Related Terms

command, control, communications, and computer (C4) systems

Source Joint Publications

JP 6-0 Doctrine for Command, Control, Communications, and Computer (C4)
Systems Support to Joint Operations

INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS

Those items of information regarding the enemy and his environment which need to be collected and processed in order to meet the intelligence requirements of a commander. JP 1-02

Data is gathered in a variety of ways — from sensors (both active and passive), from command, control, communications, and computer (C4) systems, and through situation reports from senior, subordinate, or lateral commands. Information needs to be interpreted and correctly applied to be of use and is valuable only insofar as it contributes to knowledge and understanding. Warfighters understand things best in terms of ideas or images; a clear image of their commander’s intent and of the local situation can allow subordinates to seize the

initiative. In this regard, C4 systems play a critical role in the processing, flow, and quality of data to support information requirements throughout the joint force.

Related Terms

command, control, communications, and computer (C4) systems

Source Joint Publications

JP 6-0 Doctrine for Command, Control, Communications, and Computer (C4)
 Systems Support to Joint Operations


INFOSPHERE

General. The infosphere refers to the rapidly growing global network of military and commercial command, control, communications, and computer (C4) systems and networks linking information data bases and fusion centers that are accessible to the warrior anywhere, anytime, in the performance of any mission. The infosphere provides a worldwide, automated information exchange that supports joint forces, which is secure and transparent to the warrior. This emerging capability is highly flexible to support the rapid task organization and power projection. Information technology and the existence and growth of a global infosphere have irreversibly impacted the fundamental approach to warfare of massing effects rather than forces. This has not only propelled joint forces into the age of information, but also into information-based warfare with precision-guided weapon systems that detect and engage targets based on the electronic transfer of data.

Joint forces must quickly adapt to this increasingly complex and highly uncertain operating environment. For this reason, joint force commanders (JFCs) must be able to conceptually view the total joint force command and control system as a whole to employ it to the best advantage. The JFC can then identify how it should be structured, identify where improvements can be made, and focus and balance limited C4 resources to best advantage to control the flow, the processing, and the quality of information essential to speed joint force decisions and execution. The need for C4 systems that can deploy rapidly to meet crises worldwide has evolved into a demand for joint, interoperable systems.

The Infosphere Architecture. The Command, Control, Communications, Computers, And Intelligence For The Warrior vision put the Armed Forces of the United States on a course toward an open systems architecture referred to as the global grid (see figure below) that will provide virtual connectivity from anywhere to anywhere instantaneously on warrior demand. The architecture of grid networks can support both vertical and horizontal information flow to joint and multinational forces. Commanders at all levels require a distributed communications grid comprised of links employing any electronic transmission media overlaying an area of responsibility/joint operations area. Nodal points may be terrestrial, airborne, and/or space-based. Nodal points automatically store, relay, and process information. Voice, data, and imagery flows together in digitized form across all communication paths. Automated user terminals from man portable to more stationary types allow personnel to instantly connect in any fashion desired (e.g., electronic mail; instantly reconfigured (virtual) voice radio nets; imagery; connected sensor grids; or extended personal presence by creating synthetic environments such as virtual reality). The specific paths used to set-up virtual connectivity are controlled by computers.

The Warrior Vision of the Infosphere. The bottom line is a shared image of the battlespace between joint decision makers and warfighters at all levels and with instantaneous sensor to shooter connectivity. The JFC and subordinate leaders gain a coherent understanding of operational situations, regardless of the enemy's actions or responses, strategically,



operationally, or tactically. Commanders see the battlespace together as a team — they perceive and move ideas and knowledge in a timely and coherent fashion. The virtual grid also links sensors to shooters to allow rapid exploitation of opportunity and generate quick, decisive actions.

Related Terms

command, control, communications, and computer (C4) systems

Source Joint Publications

JP 6-0 Doctrine for Command, Control, Communications, and Computer (C4) Systems Support to Joint Operations

INITIATING DIRECTIVE

An order to the commander, amphibious task force, to conduct an amphibious operation. It is issued by the unified commander, subunified commander, Service component commander, or joint force commander delegated overall responsibility for the operation. JP 1-02

The initiating directive is an order to commander, amphibious task force (CATF) to conduct an amphibious operation. It is issued by the combatant commander, subunified commander, Service component commander, or joint task force commander delegated overall responsibility

for the operation. Copies of the initiating directive need to be furnished to all major subordinate and supporting commanders.

The initiating directive may not be a single comprehensive document. During crisis action planning, the information contained in the initiating directive may be found in several orders, such as, the warning order, alert order, planning order, and execute order. The initiating directive:

- establishes the amphibious task force (ATF);
- assigns a mission;
- provides forces to accomplish the mission;
- assigns assault shipping for both assault echelon and assault follow-on echelon;
- designates CATF, commander, landing force, and other commanders as appropriate;
- positively defines the amphibious operations area in terms of sea, land, and air space. The size must be sufficient to ensure accomplishment of the ATF mission as well as to provide sufficient area for the conduct of necessary air, land, and sea operations;
- provides code words for the operation name and for other key specifics about the operation;
- sets target dates for execution of the operation;
- provides special instructions on command relationships;
- provides special instructions pertaining to the planning, employment, allocation, and control of nuclear and chemical munitions;
- includes positive instructions governing the termination of the operation and, if feasible, command arrangements and disposition of forces to be effective at that time and information regarding operations to be conducted after termination of the amphibious operation;
- assigns responsibility and provides necessary coordination instructions for the conduct of supporting operations;
- provides cryptographic and operations security guidance;
- provides a concept for military deception operations to be conducted in support of the amphibious operation;
- provides other information considered necessary.

Related Terms

amphibious operation

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-02 Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations

INSTRUMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER

When the US undertakes military operations, the Armed Forces of the United States are only one component of a national-level effort involving the various instruments of national power: economic, diplomatic, informational, and military. The instruments of national power may be applied in any combination to achieve national strategic goals in operations other than war. The manner in which they are employed is determined by the nature of each situation. For operations other than war, the military instrument is typically tasked to support the diplomatic and work with the economic and informational instruments.

Related Terms

national security strategy

Source Joint Publications

JP 1 Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States
JP 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations

INSURGENCY

An organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through use of subversion and armed conflict. JP 1-02

Insurgencies attempt to exploit actual or perceived governmental weaknesses, such as failure to maintain law and order; inability to respond adequately to disasters; overreaction to civil disturbances; or failure to meet economic, political, ethnic, or social expectations.

Organizational structures for US support to insurgencies can be overt, low visibility, clandestine, or covert. Each support program is conducted as a special activity within the meaning of section 3.4(h) of Executive Order 12333, 4 December 1981, "US Intelligence Activities," and is subject to approval by the US Congress.

The US military principally trains and advises insurgent forces in unconventional warfare tactics, techniques, and procedures. These actions should be integrated with the programs of the other instruments of national power.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations

INTEGRATED PRIORITY LIST

A list of a combatant commander's highest priority requirements, prioritized across Service and functional lines, defining shortfalls in key programs that, in the judgment of the combatant commander, adversely affect the capability of the combatant commander's forces to accomplish their assigned mission. The integrated priority list provides the combatant commander's recommendations for programming funds in the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System process. Also called IPL. JP 1-02

With the exception of United States Special Operation Command's (USSOCOM's) special operations-unique requirements, the combatant commanders provide their requirements to the Services through their Service components and identify their highest priority needs to the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff by means of the Integrated Priority List. The Military Departments, Defense agencies, and USSOCOM develop their Program Objective Memorandums (POMs) based on the combatant command requirements and strategic concepts and guidance contained in the Defense Planning Guidance. The POMs express the Services' total requirements and include assessments of risk, as well as descriptions of how well the POMs support the requirements of the combatant commanders.

Related Terms

Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System

Source Joint Publications

JP 5-0 Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations

INTELLIGENCE

1. The product resulting from the collection, processing, integration, analysis, evaluation, and interpretation of available information concerning foreign countries or areas.
 2. Information and knowledge about an adversary obtained through observation, investigation, analysis, or understanding.
- JP 1-02

From the moment joint operations are contemplated, the joint force commander (JFC) launches a continuing, interactive process to develop and refine the commander's estimate of the situation. The Intelligence Directorate of a joint staff (J-2) and J-2 staff have pivotal responsibilities in this process, both in direct support of the commander and in interactions with the other J-staffs. At all stages, the J-2 and J-2 staff must contribute not only relevant intelligence but also a sophisticated understanding of how the adversary thinks.

Critical to operational success is gaining intelligence dominance of the battlespace. All sides will attempt to determine adversary capabilities, objectives, and operational concepts. All sides will deploy their collection and analysis capabilities and will endeavor to conduct successful deceptions in attempts to gain surprise and provide operations security. Gaining and maintaining this intelligence dominance enhances the JFC's flexibility by opening additional operational options.

Intelligence requirements are identified based on the JFC's guidance and direction, estimate of the situation, and objectives. The commander's requirements must be the principal driver of intelligence system components, organization, services, and products. Ultimately, satisfying these requirements will depend on the ability of each J-2 and their intelligence staffs at all levels of command to: employ joint force organic intelligence resources; identify and, when assigned, integrate additional intelligence resources such as the joint intelligence center; and apply national intelligence capabilities. (See the figure below.)

ULTRA, Too Much Intelligence?

Frederick the Great instructed his generals over two hundred years ago, "If you know the enemy's plans beforehand you will always be more than a match for him..." Seldom this century has this maxim proven more true than during the period 1939-1945 with ULTRA, the code name under which highly sensitive intelligence resulting from the solution of high grade codes and cyphers was passed between selected Allied individuals.

A decisive event in breaking the German cyphers and the subsequent evolution of ULTRA occurred when pre-war (1939) Polish intelligence officers, in concert with their government's attempts at defending against a German attack and therefore contributing to the cause of an Allied victory over Germany, turned over to the French and British duplicates of the German Enigma machine used for encoding messages.

Although the procurement of the German Enigma machine proved to be the most noted event in the development of special intelligence, other factors contributed as well. Material seized from German submarines and weather/supply ships, material taken from Italian submarines and documents captured in the North African desert war proved valuable as did German diplomatic material provided to the OSS by individuals involved in the internal opposition

to Hitler. In fact, by 1943 British cryptographers had also broken into the German “secret writing machine,” (the *geheimschreiber*) a different encoding system from Enigma.

The specifics of the evolution of the special intelligence system notwithstanding, the ULTRA network proved highly reliable giving those trusted with the secret a clear view of the enemy’s operations and intentions. Such capability was unprecedented in military history! — but also presented special problems. The historian, John Winton, summarizes this problem aptly:

“When one player consistently knows which cards his opponent holds, how much and how often dare he go on winning before his opponent begins to suspect and changes the cards or the game?”

Such was the dilemma of those read into the ULTRA secret. Consequently, their actions, at least in the early days, were fraught with caution. “Too much success could be dangerous,” Winton’s account surmises, “Too many U-boats sunk, for instance, at their remote refueling rendezvous might arouse the enemy’s suspicions and cause him to change cyphers which had been only broken after much labour over a long period of time. Worse, it might even cause him to doubt the inviolability of the Enigma coding machine.”

But, in spite of numerous events where the Allies felt certain that ULTRA would be compromised, Nazi planners stubbornly refused to doubt the inviolability of Enigma. Indeed, years passed before some German participants learned of the extent the Allies knew of their operations and intentions. Gerhardt Weinberg, in his general history of World War II, cites an international conference on signals intelligence held in the fall of 1978, where a number of participants who had played active roles in these events still found it hard to believe that their machine codes had been read by the Allies. Of course, it is possible that a signals officer within the Reich, in view of the uncanny “luck” the Allies seemed to hold in thwarting some German campaign plans, might have become suspicious of the security of German secrets. However, if true, none was so convinced to compile the evidence and report it. Weinberg, somewhat insightfully, offers this explanation:

“...in the intellectual climate of Nazi Germany, and more particularly in the Byzantine atmosphere of intrigue and jealousy in Hitler’s court, it would have been an exceptionally bold man who went to the Fuhrer’s bunker and, like he who drew aside Praim’s tent curtain at dead of night and told him half Troy was burned, informed Hitler that the Third Reich’s communications system for all three services, world-wide, must now be considered insecure and should be entirely reconstituted, from the basic essential upwards, with fresh codes and procedures...a gross breach of security by the Allies would be needed to convince Hitler and the many intelligence officers whose careers (to say nothing of their lives) depended upon the continuing belief that the Enigma was invulnerable.”

Hence, the ULTRA secret remained so. In fact by the end of the war, the information became so complete and comprehensive — not merely of military significance, but also political and economic — that the enemy could scarcely make a move without the Allies knowing of it and thereby enjoying the

advantage of meeting him at a controlled time and place. Indeed, without Special Intelligence the war most certainly would have been much more costly in terms of lives lost in the defense of freedom.

Sources: Winton, John, *Ultra at Sea*, New York: Morrow & Co., 1988
Weinberg, Gerhard L., *A World at Arms*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994

CENTRAL PRINCIPLE OF INTELLIGENCE

KNOW THE ADVERSARY

BASIC PRINCIPLES OF INTELLIGENCE

JOINT FORCE COMMANDER IS RESPONSIBLE FOR INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO OPERATIONS

SYNCHRONIZE INTELLIGENCE WITH OPERATIONS

USE THE SAME APPROACH FOR SUPPORT OF OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR AND WAR

J-2 SHOULD PARTICIPATE FROM THE OUTSET

ENSURE UNITY OF INTELLIGENCE EFFORT

RECOGNIZE COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AS A SOURCE OF INFORMATION

PRIORITIZE COMPONENT INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS

ATTRIBUTES OF INTELLIGENCE QUALITY

TIMELINESS

OBJECTIVITY

USABILITY

READINESS

COMPLETENESS

ACCURACY

RELEVANCE

Strategic intelligence is intelligence that is required for the formulation of strategy, policy, and military plans and operations at national and theater levels. Operational intelligence is intelligence required for planning and conducting campaigns and major operations to accomplish strategic objectives within theaters or areas of operations. Tactical intelligence is intelligence that is required for planning and conducting tactical operations.

Intelligence sources are the means or systems used to observe, sense, and record or convey information of conditions, situations, and events. As shown in the figure below, there are seven primary source types: imagery intelligence, signals intelligence, human intelligence, measurement and signature intelligence, open-source intelligence, technical intelligence, and counterintelligence.

INTELLIGENCE SOURCES	
IMINT	Intelligence
PHOTINT	Photo Intelligence
SIGINT	Intelligence
COMINT	Communications Intelligence
ELINT	Electronic Intelligence
FISINT	Foreign Instrumentation Signals Intelligence
TELINT	Telemetry Intelligence
RADINT	Radar Intelligence
HUMINT	Intelligence
MASINT	Intelligence
ACINT	Acoustical Intelligence
OPTINT	Optical Intelligence
ELECTRO- OPTICAL	Electro-optical Intelligence
IRINT	Infrared Intelligence
LASINT	Laser Intelligence
NUCINT	Nuclear Intelligence
RINT	Unintentional Radiation Intelligence
OSINT	Intelligence
TECHINT	Intelligence
CI	Counterintelligence

■ Denotes primary source type.

Related Terms

all-source intelligence; combat intelligence; imagery intelligence; medical intelligence; scientific and technical intelligence

Source Joint Publications

JP 2-0 Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Operations

INTELLIGENCE ARCHITECTURE

General. The joint intelligence architecture provides the means to interconnect collectors, producers, and customers in an information network. All intelligence made available to the network from any source is stored and communicated as data whether it is a text file, graphics, imagery, or formatted information. The data is stored on a standards compliant file server. The file server is the interface with the communications network.


In keeping with the spirit of command, control, communications, computers and intelligence (C4I) For The Warrior, the joint intelligence architecture is a dynamic, flexible structure providing global access to an information grid that consists of all intelligence sources at all echelons. The architecture facilitates the capability of the Defense Intelligence community to focus on supporting the joint force commander (JFC) and subordinate joint force components and to integrate support from non-Defense agencies and nongovernment organizations as needed. The joint intelligence architecture is configured to provide access to all intelligence sources from anywhere on the globe and to provide the baseline data that JFCs will need to support joint operations. This architecture conceptually describes equipment capabilities, information flow requirements, and responsibilities.

Principles. The Services and Department of Defense agencies responsible for organizing, training, and fielding intelligence systems and personnel must provide the Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, combatant commanders, and subordinate commanders as much flexibility as possible in assembling their intelligence support architectures. JFCs should be able to assemble an optimum mix of intelligence capabilities (personnel, procedures, and C4I), regardless of the source, and still receive adequate intelligence support. Intelligence systems, concepts, products, and language must be sufficiently interoperable for the exchange and use of data in any form and from any source among intelligence organizations and operating commands and forces. Interoperability principles are shown in the first figure below.

Formal Joint Intelligence Architecture. The second figure below depicts the joint intelligence architecture as a network of integrated work stations, file servers, and

INTELLIGENCE ARCHITECTURE PRINCIPLES

- C4I Interoperability
- Interoperability of Intelligence Data and Product
- Common Terminology and Symbols
- Standards
- Effective Training and Exercises
- Data Bases



communications links. These three elements must work together, compliant with common standards, to create the interoperable information environment required to support military operations. The network includes direct connectivity by some communications or communications relay link (landline, radio, satellite, and others as appropriate) and broadcast capability to support time-sensitive and “sensor-to- shooter” needs. The information grid concept allows data collected by whatever means to be communicated directly to a user or to a processing site or platform by the most efficient path, then passed on or through to the user as appropriate. A critical aspect of the information grid is its ability to make all intelligence, including direct collector-to-user information, accessible via standardized file servers to standards compliant work stations.

Some collected, unprocessed information can be transferred to a headquarters, regional, or field processing site directly via existing communications links that are outside the joint architecture. Such information is not useful prior to processing (e.g., encrypted information), or requires very high bandwidths that would overwhelm the communications links. In these instances, the information is first processed or selectively captured prior to transferring or making it available over the network (examples are certain raw signals intelligence and some types of imagery or video).

Related Terms

intelligence

Source Joint Publications

JP 2-0 Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Operations

INTERAGENCY OPERATIONS

Understanding Interagency Operations. The integration of political and military objectives and the subsequent translation of these objectives into demonstrable action have always been essential to success at all levels of operation. Clausewitz wrote: “The political objective is the goal, war is the means of reaching it, and means can never be considered in isolation from their purpose.” The new, rapidly changing global environment that is characterized by regional instability, the growth of pluralistic governments, and unconventional threats will require even greater interagency cooperation, with a fully functioning civil-military relationship. Military operations must be synchronized with those of other agencies of the US Government (USG) as well as with foreign forces, nongovernmental and private voluntary organizations, and regional and international organizations. These actions must be mutually supporting and proceed in a logical sequence. In order to successfully undertake interagency operations, the roles and relationships among various Federal agencies, combatant commands, state and local governments, country teams, and engaged organizations must be clearly understood. Whether military forces are involved in the detention of migrants in Guantanamo Bay, countering the flow of drugs from Latin America, stopping a tyrannical invader in the Middle East, providing humanitarian assistance to a storm-ravaged populace, or making peace on the Horn of Africa, success will depend to a large extent on the ability to blend and engage all elements of national power. Interagency coordination forges the vital link between the military instrument of that power and the economic, political and/or diplomatic, and informational entities of the USG as well as nongovernmental organizations. Successful interagency coordination enables these agencies, departments, and organizations to mount a coherent and efficient collective operation.

Synchronizing Interagency Operations. The common thread throughout all major operations, whether in war or military operations other than war, is the broad range of agencies — many with indispensable practical competencies and major legal responsibilities — that interact with the Armed Forces of the United States. The intrinsic nature of interagency coordination demands that commanders and joint planners consider all elements of national power and recognize which agencies are best qualified to employ these elements toward the objective. This consideration is especially necessary because the security challenges facing the US today are growing in complexity, requiring the skills and resources of many organizations. Because the solution to a problem seldom, if ever, resides within the capability of just one agency, campaign or operation plans must be crafted to leverage the core competencies of the myriad agencies, synchronizing their efforts with military capabilities toward a single objective. The National Command Authorities decide to employ the Armed Forces of the United States because they have deemed it necessary to use military means to meet national interests. The use of the military element of power as a component of the national security strategy takes the form of military objectives. These objectives need to be coordinated with associated diplomatic, economic, and informational objectives. The military often plays a supporting role to other national agencies. Though the Department of Defense (DOD) may have little or no choice regarding the agencies engaged in a particular operation or control over the individual agency agendas, understanding how military coordination efforts interface with other organizations toward mission accomplishment could provide the key to success in joint operations and unified actions.

A Forum of Expertise. Each organization brings its own culture, philosophy, goals, practices, and skills to the interagency table. This diversity is the strength of the interagency process,

providing a cross-section of expertise, skills, and abilities. In one coordinated forum, the process integrates many views, capabilities, and options.

Gathering the Right Resources. The challenge, not only to the Nation's leadership but to commanders at all levels, is to recognize what resources may apply to a problem and to bring them to the interagency table. All efforts must be coordinated despite philosophical and operational differences separating agencies. An atmosphere of cooperation can ultimately contribute to unity of effort. Pursuit of coordination and cooperation in the interagency process should be viewed as a means, not an end of the process. While some loss of organizational freedom of action is often necessary to attain full cooperation, a zeal for consensus should not compromise the authority, roles, or core competencies of individual agencies.

The Combatant Commander in Interagency Operations

Today, the combatant commands are operating in regions where some governments cannot control their cities, regions, and principal functions and institutions. As CINCs renew their regional strategies, an appreciation of the threat must consider the consequences of instability. Countering this will require the effective combination of all the elements of national power if we are to overcome the tyranny of transnational threats and internal disorder. Interagency cooperation will be the foundation for any strategic vision of peacetime engagement. The problem of "who's in charge?" still vexes interagency efforts. In the past, the concept of a designated lead agency has not carried with it the operational authority to enjoin cooperation. So, then, how will interagency efforts be drawn together to achieve synergism? Exacerbating the problems surrounding issues of authority and resourcing is the lack of an agreed interagency planning process that might synchronize interagency effort. The executive and legislative branches have not routinely provided interagency leadership with direct control over the resources necessary for interagency operations. Decentralized operations in the field require cogent strategies and plans to inform the operator of agency objectives, concepts for operating, and available resources. Agencies will continue to be prone to talking past each other as they plan and program according to different priorities, schedules and operating areas. Yet, as long as the CINCs are the only US Government officials with the wherewithal to pull together US interagency actions on a regional basis, they will need to continue to provide the leadership - even while in a supporting role.

**Source: William W. Mendel and David G. Bradford
Interagency Cooperation: A Regional Model
for Overseas Operations**

Strategic Direction. Coordinating the activities of the various USG agencies is fundamental to the efficient use of national resources. The US National Security Strategy defines the interaction between the DOD and other organizations in such critical operations as counterterrorism, counterdrug, and humanitarian assistance. The Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff carry out most interagency coordination for the DOD at the strategic level. This coordination sets the stage for directions to commanders at the operational and tactical levels.

Focus of Theater Operations. Every joint force operation involves close coordination with forces and agencies outside the chain of command. The guidance in Joint Pub 3-0, "Doctrine

for Joint Operations,” for joint force commanders (JFCs) is clear: “. . . ensure that joint operations are synchronized in time, space, and purpose with the actions of other military forces (multinational operations) and nonmilitary organizations (government agencies such as the US Agency for International Development, nongovernmental organizations such as religious relief agencies, corporations, international agencies such as the International Red Cross, and even the United Nations). Activities and operations with such nonmilitary organizations can be complex and may require considerable effort by JFCs and their staffs. . . .”

Related Terms

lead agency

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-08

Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations Vol. I

INTERNAL DEFENSE AND DEVELOPMENT

The full range of measures taken by a nation to promote its growth and to protect itself from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. It focuses on building viable institutions (political, economic, social, and military) that respond to the needs of society. Also called IDAD. JP 1-02

General. Foreign internal defense (FID) supports host nation (HN) internal defense and development (IDAD) programs. US military involvement in FID has traditionally been focused on helping another nation defeat an organized movement attempting to overthrow the government. US FID programs may address other threats to an HN’s internal stability, such as civil disorder, illicit drug trafficking, and terrorism. These threats may, in fact, predominate in the future as traditional power centers shift, suppressed cultural and ethnic rivalries surface, and the economic incentives of illegal drug trafficking continue. US military support to FID may include training, materiel, advice, or other assistance, including direct support and combat operations as authorized by the National Command Authorities, to HN forces in executing an IDAD program.

Commensurate with US policy goals, the focus of all US FID efforts is to support the HN’s program of IDAD. These national programs are designed to free and protect a nation from lawlessness, subversion, and insurgency by emphasizing the building of viable institutions that respond to the needs of society. The most significant manifestation of these needs is likely to be economic, social, informational, or political; therefore, these needs should prescribe the principal focus of US efforts. Nevertheless, military assistance is often necessary to provide the secure environment for these efforts to become effective. These needs of society remain relevant to threats posed through illegal drug trafficking, terrorism, and civil unrest that affect all aspects of a nation’s defense and development.

FID is the participation by the civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. From the US perspective, FID has assumed many forms as support to foreign nations has evolved. In all cases, however, FID refers to the US activities that support an HN’s IDAD strategy designed to protect against these threats.

The Role of FID in IDAD. It is important to frame the US FID effort in perspective with the overall span of US doctrine that it supports and to understand how it fits into the HN’s IDAD program. FID is a primary program used in supporting friendly nations operating in or threatened with potential hostilities.

US military support to FID should focus on assisting an HN in anticipating, precluding, and countering these threats or other potential threats. Emphasis on internal developmental programs as well as internal defense programs when organizing, planning, and executing military support to a FID program is an essential aspect. This assists the HN to address the root causes of instability in a proactive manner rather than reacting to threats.

US military involvement in FID has traditionally been focused toward counterinsurgency. Although much of the FID effort remains focused on this important area, US FID programs may aim at other threats to an HN's internal stability, such as civil disorder, illicit drug trafficking, and terrorism. These threats may, in fact, predominate in the future as traditional power centers shift, suppressed cultural and ethnic rivalries surface, and the economic incentives of illegal drug trafficking continue. Focus on the internal development portion of IDAD enables the FID program to address other areas than just counterinsurgency.

US military operations to support a FID program provide training, materiel, advice, or assistance to support local forces in executing an IDAD program rather than US forces conducting the IDAD mission for the HN. US FID efforts are always directed at supporting internal HN action programs aimed at bolstering IDAD. The fundamental principle of all FID efforts is that they foster internal solutions and assist IDAD programs for which the supported nation has ultimate responsibility and control.

US military efforts designed to defend nations against external aggression are extended through mutual defense treaties.

The HN IDAD Program. The HN IDAD program is always the centerpiece of any FID program. The entire FID effort is tailored to the needs of the individual nation and to effectively interface with the HN IDAD organization.

IDAD Principles. Although IDAD organizations will vary depending on the environment, resources available, and other factors, certain basic principles guide a successful IDAD program. These principles include unity of effort, maximum use of intelligence, minimum use of violence, and a responsive government. These may seem overly simplistic and obvious; however, if they are not applied properly, the result may be a disjointed effort that damages the legitimacy and stability of the HN government.

HN Organization for IDAD. Just as the US organizes to support a FID program, so must an HN organize to facilitate the extensive coordination required in a complex IDAD program. The concept generally requires an organization that is geographically organized into national and regional levels, where each level has its own functional structure. This concept facilitates management at both the macro and micro levels of those areas critical to accomplishing balanced development with the concomitant security, neutralization, and mobilization functions.

Strategy. The IDAD strategy is the full range of measures taken by a nation to promote its growth and to protect itself from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. The strategy focuses on building viable political, economic, military, and social institutions that respond to the needs of society. Its fundamental goal is to prevent an insurgency or other forms of lawlessness or subversion by forestalling and defeating the threat and by working to correct conditions that prompt violence. The government mobilizes the population to participate in IDAD efforts. Thus, IDAD is ideally a preemptive strategy; however, if an insurgency, illicit drug, terrorist, or other threat develops, IDAD becomes an active strategy to combat that threat. FID defense planners must understand the HN's IDAD strategy if they are to plan effectively to support it.

Concept. The IDAD strategy should integrate military and civilian programs into a coherent, comprehensive effort. Military actions provide a level of internal security that permits and

supports growth through balanced development. This development requires change to meet the needs of vulnerable groups of people. This change may in turn promote unrest in the society. The concept, therefore, includes measures to maintain conditions under which orderly development can take place.

Often, a government must overcome the inertia and shortcomings of its own political system before it can cope with the internal threats it is facing. This may involve the adoption of reforms during a time of crisis when pressures limit flexibility and make implementation difficult.

The successful IDAD strategist must realize that the true nature of the threat to the government lies in the enemy's political strength rather than military power. Although the government must contain the armed elements, concentration on the military aspect of the threat does not address the real danger. Any strategy that does not pay continuing, serious attention to the political claims and demands of the opposition is severely handicapped. Military and paramilitary programs are necessary for success but are not sufficient by themselves.

Functions. The IDAD program blends four interdependent functions to prevent or counter internal threats. (See figure below.) These functions are: balanced development, security, neutralization, and mobilization.


Balanced Development. Balanced development attempts to achieve national goals through political, social, and economic programs. It allows all individuals and groups in the society to share in the rewards of development, thus alleviating frustration. Balanced development satisfies legitimate grievances that the opposition attempts to exploit. The government must recognize conditions that contribute to the internal threat and instability and take preventive measures. Correcting conditions that make a society vulnerable is the long-term solution to the problem.

Security. Security includes all activities to protect the populace from the threat and to provide a safe environment for national development. Security of the populace and government resources is essential to countering the threat. Protection and control of the populace permit development and deny the enemy access to popular support. The security effort should establish an environment in which the local populace can provide for its own security with limited government support.

Neutralization. Neutralization is a political concept that makes an organized force irrelevant to the political process; is the physical and psychological separation of the threatening elements from the population; includes all lawful activities (except those that degrade the government's legitimacy) to disrupt, preempt, disorganize, and defeat the insurgent organization; can involve public exposure and the discrediting of leaders during a low-level of unrest with little political violence; can involve arrest and prosecution when laws have been broken; or can involve combat action when the enemy's violent activities escalate.

All neutralization efforts must respect the country's legal system. They must scrupulously observe constitutional provisions regarding rights and responsibilities. The need for security forces to act lawfully is essential not only for humanitarian reasons but also because this reinforces government legitimacy while denying the enemy an exploitable issue. Special emergency powers may exist by legislation or decree. Government agents must not abuse these powers because they might well lose the popular support they need. Denying the enemy an opportunity to seize on and exploit legitimate issues against the government discredits their leaders and neutralizes their propaganda.

Mobilization. Mobilization provides organized manpower and materiel resources and includes all activities to motivate and organize popular support of the government. This support is essential for a successful IDAD program. If successful, mobilization maximizes



manpower and other resources available to the government while it minimizes those available to the insurgent. Mobilization allows the government to strengthen existing institutions, to develop new ones to respond to demands, and promotes the government’s legitimacy.

Principles. Although each situation is unique, certain principles guide efforts in the four functional areas, to prevent or defeat an internal threat. Planners must apply the IDAD strategy and these principles to each specific situation. The principles are unity of effort, maximum use of intelligence, minimum use of violence, and a responsive government.

Unity of Effort. Unity of effort is essential to prevent or defeat any credible threat. Unity of effort means coordinated action and centralized control at all levels.

Maximum Use of Intelligence. Maximum use of intelligence requires that all operations be based on accurate, timely, and confirmed intelligence derived from reliable sources. Successful implementation of operations necessitates an extensive operational security and counterintelligence program to protect US FID operations and to counter and penetrate opposing force intelligence collection operations. Intelligence and counterintelligence operations must be designed so as to assess accurately the opposing force’s capabilities; to

provide timely warning to HN and US FID forces; and to penetrate and be prepared to compromise hostile operations on order. If the HN is not capable of performing these missions effectively upon the commitment of US FID forces, then US intelligence and counterintelligence elements must be deployed to accomplish these missions. In this event, the HN must develop its internal intelligence and security forces in order to perform these missions effectively. US elements may assist the HN in developing intelligence capability, within the confines of US Government directives, as deemed appropriate by the Country Team, US combatant commander, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Minimum Use of Violence. A threatened government must carefully examine all courses of action in response to the internal violence. The government should stress the minimum use of violence to maintain order. At times, the best way to minimize violence is to use overwhelming force; at other times, it is necessary to proceed with caution, extending the duration but limiting the intensity or scope of violence. In either case, discreet use of force is the guideline.

A Responsive Government. Positive measures are necessary to ensure a responsive government whose ability to mobilize manpower and resources as well as to motivate the people reflects its administrative and management capabilities. In many cases, the leadership must provide additional training, supervision, controls, and follow-up.

Organizational Guidance. This section presents a model for an organization to coordinate, plan, and conduct IDAD activities. Actual organizations may vary from country to country in order to adapt to existing conditions. Organizations should follow the established political organization of the nation concerned. The organization should provide centralized direction and permit decentralized execution of the plan. The organization should be structured and chartered so that it can coordinate and direct the IDAD efforts of existing government agencies; however, it should minimize interference with those agencies' normal functions. Examples of national and subnational organizations show how to achieve a coordinated and unified effort at each level.

National-Level Organization. The national-level organization plans and coordinates programs. Its major offices normally correspond to branches and agencies of the national government concerned with insurgency, illicit drug trafficking, and terrorist or other internal threats.

Subnational-Level Organization. Area coordination centers (ACCs) may function as combined civil-military headquarters at subnational, state, and local levels. ACCs plan, coordinate, and exercise operational control over all military forces, and control civilian government organizations within their respective areas of jurisdiction. The ACC does not replace unit tactical operations centers or the normal government administrative organization in the area of operations.

ACCs perform a twofold mission, they provide integrated planning, coordination, and direction for all internal defense efforts and they ensure an immediate, coordinated response to operational requirements.

Civilian Advisory Committees. Committees composed of influential citizens help coordination centers at all levels monitor the success of their activities and gain popular support. These committees evaluate actions affecting civilians and communicate with the people. They provide feedback for future operational planning. Involving leading citizens in committees such as these increases their stake in, and commitment to, government programs and social mobilization objectives.

INTERNATIONAL LAW

Related Terms

foreign internal defense

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-07 Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War
JP 3-07.1 JTTP for Foreign Internal Defense (FID)

INTERNATIONAL LAW

International law, including the law of armed conflict, affords occupying powers certain rights and responsibilities. These include the authority to establish civil administrations and to control or conduct governmental matters both during and after hostilities.

Related Terms

law of armed conflict

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-57 Doctrine for Joint Civil Affairs

INTEROPERABILITY

1. The ability of systems, units or forces to provide services to and accept services from other systems, units, or forces and to use the services so exchanged to enable them to operate effectively together. 2. The condition achieved among communications-electronics systems or items of communications-electronics equipment when information or services can be exchanged directly and satisfactorily between them and/or their users. The degree of interoperability should be defined when referring to specific cases.

JP 1-02


General. Unified action demands maximum interoperability. (See figure below.) The forces, units, and systems of all Services must operate together effectively. This effectiveness is achieved in part through interoperability, which includes collective effort to develop and use joint doctrine and joint tactics, techniques, and procedures; the development and use of joint plans; the conduct of joint training; and a materiel development and fielding process that provides materiel that is fully compatible with and complementary to systems of all Services. A key to successful interoperability is to ensure that planning processes are joint from their inception. Those responsible for systems and programs intended for joint use must establish working groups that fully represent the services and functions that will be affected and interoperability must be considered in all joint program reviews. Combatant commanders will ensure maximum interoperability and identify interoperability issues to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who has overall responsibility for the joint interoperability program.

Intelligence interoperability.

C4I Interoperability. The Intelligence Directorate of a joint staff should ensure command elements' and supporting organizations' intelligence systems and communications are compatible for exchange of data, information, and intelligence products. If components' intelligence systems cannot receive or exchange intelligence data, the systems are not interoperable. Interoperability of systems also relates to intelligence data processing and related equipment.

IMPORTANCE OF INTEROPERABILITY

Unified action demands maximum interoperability. The forces, units, and systems of all Services must operate together effectively.



Effectiveness is achieved through collective effort to develop and use joint doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures; the development and use of joint plans; the conduct of joint training; and a materiel development and fielding process that provides materiel that is fully compatible with and complementary to systems of all Services.

Intelligence Product Interoperability. Intelligence organizations producing joint intelligence should ensure that intelligence products are in a form, content, and language usable by all components of the joint force performing similar and related functions.

Common Terminology and Symbols. Intelligence organizations should understand and use concepts, language, terminology, names, and symbols common to all joint force components.

Standards. Factors that promote interoperability can be expressed in standards. Standards are sets of guidelines and criteria for continuity and similarity of data, protocols, formats, terminology, equipment, and signals that promote the exchange, understanding, and application of intelligence requirements and intelligence products among intelligence organizations and joint force commanders. Standards for interoperability should be developed and incorporated

INTERTHEATER

into intelligence systems, equipment, and procedures providing intelligence for joint operations. Standards need to be enforced in peacetime to facilitate transition to operations other than war or war.

Effective Training and Exercises. Intelligence interoperability problems reduce the ability of a joint force to attain unity of effort. Thus, an important concept is to use realistic training, exercises, and rehearsals of operations to demonstrate, test, and evaluate the joint interoperability of intelligence systems and intelligence products.

Data Bases. Ability of all echelons of the joint force to access archives and common data bases is key to successful intelligence operations.

Command, Control, Communications, and Computer (C4) Systems Interoperability. Joint and Service C4 systems must possess the interoperability necessary to ensure success in joint and combined operations. Interoperability is the condition achieved among C4 systems or items of C4 equipment when information or services can be exchanged directly and satisfactorily between them and their users. To ensure C4 systems' interoperability, all aspects of achieving it must be addressed throughout the life cycle of a system.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 0-2	Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)
JP 2-0	Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Operations
JP 6-0	Doctrine for Command, Control, Communications, and Computer (C4) Systems Support to Joint Operations

INTERTHEATER

Between theaters or between the continental US and theaters. JP 1-02

Intertheater or strategic airlift forces, under the combatant command (command authority) of Commander in Chief, US Transportation Command, primarily provide common-user airlift into, within, and out of theater bases from outside the theater. As a common-user force, strategic airlift is available to all authorized users including the Military Services, the combatant commands, other Department of Defense components, other US Government agencies, and, if requested by a US agency, foreign governments.

Related Terms

intratheater

Source Joint Publications


JP 4-01.1	JTTP for Airlift Support to Joint Operations
-----------	--

IN-TRANSIT VISIBILITY

The capability provided to a theater Combatant Commander to have visibility of units, personnel, and cargo while in transit through the Defense Transportation System. JP 1-02

In-transit visibility is the continuous updating of unit identities, mode of transport, and location during movement. Commander in Chief, US Transportation Command and the supported combatant commander track units, personnel, equipment, and materiel during the strategic phases of a deployment. The supported combatant commander also performs this

function within theater. The systems that comprise this interface are Global Transportation Network and Joint Operation Planning and Execution Systems. This will normally require detailed coordination and support from US Transportation Command for the strategic phases of deployment. This interface allows the geographic combatant commander to monitor and change deployment priorities. (See figure below.)



Related Terms

movement control

Source Joint Publications

JP 4-01.3 JTTP for Movement Control

INTRATHEATER

Within a theater.

JP 1-02

Intratheater Support. Specific guidance should be provided for employment of all available logistic infrastructure, including allied civilian and military support. In addition, the geographic combatant commander can assign logistic responsibility for the theater to the predominant user of a particular category of support (i.e., intratheater transportation is frequently an Army component responsibility).



A robust intratheater ground transportation system increases forward unit flexibility.

Related Terms

intertheater

Source Joint Publications

JP 4-0 Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations

ISOLATING THE ENEMY

With National Command Authorities (NCA) guidance and approval and with national support, joint force commanders (JFCs) strive to isolate enemies by denying them allies and sanctuary. The intent is to strip away as much enemy support or freedom of action as possible, while limiting the enemy's potential for horizontal or vertical escalation. JFCs may also be tasked to support diplomatic, economic, and informational actions as directed by the NCA.

The JFC seeks to isolate the main enemy force from its strategic leadership and its supporting infrastructure. This isolation is accomplished by psychological operations and by interdicting critical command and control nodes, sources of sustaining resources, and transportation networks. This step serves to deny the enemy both physical and psychological support and may separate the enemy leadership and military from their public support.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations

JOINT

Connotes activities, operations, organizations, etc., in which elements of two or more Military Departments participate. JP 1-02

The nature of modern warfare demands that we fight as a team. This does not mean that all forces will be equally represented in each operation. Joint force commanders (JFCs) choose the capabilities they need from the air, land, sea, space, and special operations forces at their disposal. The resulting team provides joint force commanders the ability to apply overwhelming force from different dimensions and directions to shock, disrupt, and defeat opponents. Effectively integrated joint forces expose no weak points or seams to enemy action, while they rapidly and efficiently find and attack enemy weak points. Joint warfare is team warfare.

The joint team of the Armed Forces of the United States comprises the members of each Service, active and reserve, and our supporting civilians. Although the Services organize, train, equip, and sustain forces, these forces are employed under JFCs. To help achieve our fullest combat potential, all American military leaders must integrate JFCs concepts and values into the operations of the Armed Forces of the United States. Service skills form the very core of our combat capability. Joint warfare does not lessen Service traditions, cohesion, or expertise. Successful joint operations are impossible without the capabilities developed and embodied in each Service; Service “cultures,” heroes, and professional standards are indispensable.

We must expand our tradition of joint victories, building on our extensive history of joint and multinational operations from as long ago as the Revolutionary War. Over time, the American experience in war increasingly demanded joint action. Today, we are making joint action practiced and routine. Whether we have years to plan and rehearse, as in the case of the Normandy invasion, months as in Operation DESERT STORM, or only a few days as in Operation URGENT FURY, the Armed Forces of the United States must always be ready to operate in smoothly functioning joint teams.

Related Terms

joint force, joint force commander

Source Joint Publications

JP 1 Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States

JOINT AIRBORNE ADVANCE PARTY

An advance ground party that provides terminal guidance, air traffic control, ground control measures, intelligence gathering, and surface weather observation in the objective area of an airlift operation. It may consist of US Air Force combat control team members and a US Army long-range surveillance team or similar forces. Also called JAAP. JP 1-02

Joint Airborne Advance Party (JAAP) support for airlift operations consists of a US Air Force Combat Control Team (CCT) and a US Army Long-Range Surveillance Team (LRST) or the US Marine Corps equivalent. It provides precise terminal instructions and navigational aids to airlift forces so that they land on the assigned airfield or landing zone. The JAAP


JOINT AIRBORNE ADVANCE PARTY

provides terminal guidance, air traffic control, ground control measures, intelligence collection, and surface weather observations in the objective area. (See figure below.)

The joint force commander (JFC) normally ensures specific mission tasks are developed for the JAAP during the planning phase of an airborne operation. Prior to employment, the JFC or designated representative ensures the JAAP has adequate time for isolation, joint planning, logistic planning, and mission preparation. During combat, security considerations may prohibit use of a JAAP in advance of the parachute assault by the main force. The decision to use the JAAP rests with the JFC.

When a JAAP is employed in advance of airborne forces, command and control is determined jointly and published in the operation order. Generally, the senior member of the LRST should be responsible for movement and disposition of the teams during infiltration and ground movement. Decisions regarding airfield, landing zone, drop zone, or extraction zone establishment and control are the responsibility of the senior CCT member. The ground force commander determines when initial security missions are completed and directs that follow-on units establish and maintain contact with the CCT. Decisions are passed to the CCT as well as the identity and location of units assuming security responsibilities. The JAAP may be inserted into an objective area by the following:

- Airdrop or airlanding in advance of the airborne forces. If airdropped, insertions are usually made by either high-altitude low-opening or high-altitude high-opening techniques.
- Airdrop or airlanding in the lead serial of an airborne assault.
- Infiltration by land or sea.



These employment methods provide the JFC options to support operations ranging from overt conventional to clandestine unconventional warfare and special operations.

Elements of the JAAP may operate either independently in the objective area or collectively from the same patrol base. They remain in contact with the JFC and airborne mission commander, share joint communications-electronics operating instructions, and conduct a linkup immediately prior to the airborne assault for intelligence or information transfer.

Related Terms

theater airlift

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-17

JTTP for Theater Airlift Operations

JOINT AIR OPERATIONS

Air operations performed with air capabilities/forces made available by components in support of the joint force commander's operation or campaign objectives, or in support of other components of the joint force. JP 1-02

General. Joint air operations are those air operations performed with air capabilities/forces made available by components in support of the joint force commander's (JFC's) operation or campaign objectives, or in support of other components of the joint force. Joint air operations do not include those air operations that a component conducts in direct support of itself.

Assigned, attached, and supporting forces may provide direct support to certain components while also providing the JFC an operational level force capability that can be employed separately as part of a broader operation. The JFC integrates the actions of assigned, attached, and supporting forces into unified area of responsibility (AOR)/joint operations area (JOA)-wide joint air operations.

In order to create synergism and avoid duplication of effort, the JFC synchronizes the actions of assigned, attached, and supporting capabilities/forces in time, space, and purpose. The JFC must exploit the unique characteristics of all capabilities/forces to achieve assigned objectives as rapidly and as effectively as possible.

The JFC will normally designate a joint force air component commander (JFACC) to exploit the capabilities of joint air operations. The JFACC directs this exploitation through a cohesive joint air operations plan (centralized planning) and a responsive and integrated control system (decentralized execution).

In cases where a JFACC is not designated, the JFC may plan, direct, and control joint air operations. If this option is exercised by the JFC, the JFC's staff will assist to provide direction and coordination of the capabilities/forces assigned to the joint force.

"Air power is indivisible. If you split it up into compartments, you merely pull it to pieces and destroy its greatest asset - its flexibility."

Field Marshal Montgomery

Tasking. The air capabilities/forces made available for JFACC or JFC (under the JFC staff option) planning and tasking are determined by the JFC, in consultation with component commanders, and based on the assigned objectives and the concept of operations. Component commanders make capabilities/forces available to the JFC for tasking to support the joint

force as a whole based on assigned component missions and JFC guidance. These capabilities/forces are tasked directly by the JFC or by the JFACC based on the JFC's air apportionment decision. Only the JFC has the authority to reassign, redirect, or reallocate a component's direct support air capabilities/forces. When a component does not have the organic air capabilities/forces to support their assigned mission, the JFACC or JFC will task available joint air capabilities/forces (through the joint air tasking order (ATO)) based on the JFC's air apportionment decision. An understanding of what defines component direct support air capabilities/forces and joint air capabilities/forces is necessary. Component direct support air capabilities/forces are those air capabilities/forces organic to a component that are used by the component to accomplish its assigned mission. When appropriate, they appear on the joint ATO for coordination and deconfliction purposes. Component capabilities/forces not available for joint air tasking must still comply with the airspace control order and special instructions.

Planning. Planning for joint air operations begins with understanding the joint force mission. The JFC's strategic appreciation of the political, economic, military, and social forces affecting the AOR/JOA and articulation of the strategic and operational objectives needed to accomplish the mission form the basis for determining components' objectives. The JFACC/JFC staff uses the mission, the JFC strategic appreciation and objectives, and the components' objectives to devise an air estimate of the situation. This estimate follows a systematic series of steps to formulate a course of action. When the JFACC's course of action is approved by the JFC, it becomes the basic concept of the joint air operations — stating “what” will be done. The “how” part is stated in the joint air operations plan and supporting plans. The JFACC's daily guidance ensures that joint air operations effectively support the




AV-8 Aircraft

joint force objectives while retaining enough flexibility to adjust to the dynamics of the range of military operations. The figure below describes the concept of how joint air operations are developed.

Joint air operations constitute an integral part of the JFC's operation or campaign plan. The JFACC is normally assigned responsibility for joint air operations planning and develops a joint air operations plan for employing that portion of the air effort made available to the

JFACC to accomplish the objectives assigned by the JFC. The joint air operation plan documents the JFACC's plan for integrating and coordinating joint air operations. The joint air operation plan encompasses operations of capabilities/forces from joint force components. The staff assigned to develop the plan should include representation from all components providing capabilities/forces.

A carefully selected staff of planners and weapon systems experts from each component enables consideration and understanding of all component capabilities/forces.



Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-56.1 Command and Control for Joint Air Operations

JOINT AIR OPERATIONS CENTER

A jointly staffed facility established for planning, directing, and executing joint air operations in support of the joint force commander's operation or campaign objectives. Also called JAOC.

JP 1-02

General. The first figure below represents a notional joint force air component commander (JFACC) organization. The JFACC's operations center will often be designated a joint air operations center (JAOC).

The JFACC's JAOC is structured to operate as a fully integrated facility and staffed to fulfill all of the JFACC's responsibilities. JFACC organizations may differ based on the specific area of responsibility/joint operations area requirements and operations. However, the two organizations or functions that should be common to all JAOCs are Combat Plans and Combat Operations. Planning "future joint air operations" is the responsibility of Combat Plans, which includes the responsibility of drafting the joint air operations plan to support the JFC's campaign or objectives and building the daily joint air tasking order (ATO). Execution of the daily joint ATO is carried out by Combat Operations. This organization closely follows the action of current joint air operations, shifting missions from their scheduled times or targets and making other adjustments as the situation requires.

Each of these JAOC organizations rely on expertise from other component liaisons (e.g., battlefield coordination element (BCE), naval and amphibious liaison element (NALE), Air Force liaison element (AFLE), special operations liaison element (SOLE), air mobility element (AME), strategic liaison team (STRATLAT), space liaison officer (SLO), Marine liaison officer) to coordinate requests or requirements and maintain an "up-to-date" picture of the other component operations. (See second figure below.)


Finally, the role of "intelligence" is extremely important and is an integral part of the daily function of Combat Plans and Combat Operations. Intelligence personnel monitor and assess adversary capabilities and intentions and provide assistance in target, weapon, and platform selection, conduct battle damage assessment, as well as, provide an up-to-date picture of the adversary, expected adversary operations, and the status and priority of assigned targets to assist in execution day changes.

Liaisons. Effective liaison between forces is essential for coordinated joint air operations. The joint force commander (JFC) and component commanders will exchange liaison elements to assist and coordinate planning and execution of joint air operations. Liaison elements provide senior level interface for air, land, sea, space, and special operation forces. These elements consist of experienced warfare specialists who provide component planning and tasking expertise, coordination capabilities, and the ability to deconflict component operations and joint air operations. A brief summary follows of typical liaison elements.

Battlefield Coordination Element. The Army component commander establishes a BCE to act as the interface between the component commander and the JFACC or the Air Force component commander. The BCE is collocated with the JAOC or the Air Force component air operations center. The BCE processes land force requests for air support, monitors and interprets the land battle situation for the JAOC, and provides the necessary interface for the exchange of current operational and intelligence data. The BCE expedites the exchange of information through face-to-face coordination with elements of the JAOC and coordinates air defense and airspace control matters. The BCE is organized into sections which are incorporated throughout the JAOC (e.g., plans, intelligence, operations, fusion, air defense artillery and Army airspace command and control, and airlift).

Special Operations Liaison Element. The joint force special operation component commander (JFSOCC) provides a SOLE to the JFACC/JFC staff or appropriate Service component air command and control facility to coordinate and synchronize special operations forces (SOF) air and surface operations with joint air operations. A major SOLE responsibility is shared asset coordination/deconfliction. The SOLE must consider airborne fire support and reconnaissance, command and control platforms, aerial refueling, as well as deconfliction

NOTIONAL JFACC ORGANIZATION (JAOC)



of deep operations. The SOLE chief works directly for the JFSOCC and places liaison officers throughout the JAOC staff. Under the direction of the SOLE chief, these liaison officers provide SOF air and ground operations expertise throughout the JAOC. Because the JFSOCC and the JFACC share a common environment, the deep battlefield, SOF aviation



and surface assets must be integrated into joint air operations planning and execution to provide for synergy, integration, coordination, and deconfliction.

The JFSOCC's Air Force component is known as the Air Force Special Operations Component. When there are joint special operations aviation assets in theater (which may include Army and Navy special operations aviation assets), the JFSOCC normally designates a joint special operations air component commander (JSOACC). The JSOACC normally will be the commander with the preponderance of assets and/or greatest ability to plan, coordinate, allocate, task, control, and support the assigned joint special operations aviation assets. Special operations air assets are organic to the JFSOCC. Their tasking is derived from the JFSOCC and will be coordinated with the JFACC/JFC staff and entered into the ATO.

In addition to specific JFSOCC objectives supporting the JFC's intent, SOF can act as a significant joint force multiplier by contributing to joint air operations. The senior SOF liaison may seek JFSOCC guidance and approval to contribute to joint air operations in four broad areas. First, SOF can act as an economy of force measure, striking targets which allow joint air to strike higher priority targets. Second, SOF may be able to conduct surgical operations beyond the capabilities of joint air capabilities/forces (e.g., against weapons of mass destruction production or storage facilities inaccessible to joint air capabilities/forces due to environmental or dispersal concerns). Third, because of unique training and multiple air/ground combat power delivery capabilities, SOF may combine with joint air operations in a synergistic attack (e.g., terminal guidance operations). Finally, SOF may enhance joint

air operations with still other unique personnel and platform capabilities, such as providing a tailored joint special operations task force, under the tactical control of the JFACC, to assist in locating deep targets.

Space Liaison Officer. US Space Command (USSPACECOM) component personnel deploy to assist the JFACC/JFC staff in requesting and using support from space assets. The senior SLO also serves as the Senior Space Liaison to the JAOC, providing direct coordination between the JAOC and USSPACECOM Theater Support Team. Personnel deployed may be from Air Force Forward Space Support to Theater Teams and/or the Naval Space Support Team.

Naval and Amphibious Liaison Element. The NALE is responsive to the JAOC on matters pertaining to Navy and Marine amphibious operations. The NALE processes Navy force and Marine landing force requests for air support and monitors and interprets the maritime battle situation for the JAOC. The NALE provides the necessary interface for the exchange of current operational and intelligence data between components and the JAOC. The NALE also coordinates maritime requirements for air defense, long-range interdiction, and long-range requirements and monitors Navy and Marine airspace and air traffic control requirements and changes. The NALE provides feedback to the JAOC and components on current and future joint air operations concerning integration of force requirements.

Air Mobility Element. The AME is responsible for the detailed planning and coordinating for all strategic airlift operations in theater. The AME is part of the theater airlift system and should be collocated within the JAOC. Should it become necessary to temporarily assign strategic airlift assets to fulfill the theater airlift mission requirements, then the AME will be the focal point and tasking authority for these missions. JFCs should rely on their JFACC to plan and control theater airlift operations. If a JFACC is not designated, the Air Force Component Commander should plan and control theater airlift. Normally, the planning and control for theater airlift operations will be conducted by specialized airlift sections embedded within functional staff sections of the JAOC.

Strategic Liaison Team. The STRATLAT provides a small number of advisors for the JFC and the JFACC skilled in nuclear planning and coordination. The STRATLAT will be provided by United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) upon JFC request and will report to and be collocated with the JFC and/or the appropriate component commander(s). When provided, this team will be subordinate to the JFC. The JFC should rely on this team to assist in the preparation of nuclear request and execution messages and for the unique targeting and effects information for nuclear weapons. The STRATLAT will coordinate with the mission planning facilities of USSTRATCOM to optimize the utilization of nuclear weapons, if authorized by the National Command Authorities for use.

Air Force Liaison Element. The AFLE provides an interface between the Commander, Air Force Forces and the JFACC for coordinating and synchronizing Air Force units in support of joint air operations. Normally, the AFLE is composed of personnel and equipment for a General Purpose Numbered Air Force's staff and component organizations. AFLE manning is based on a cadre concept with personnel selected for their battle management expertise and a knowledge of command and control concepts and procedures. Additional personnel augment the cadre who are specialists knowledgeable in the capabilities and tactics of the aircraft, intelligence, or weapons systems being employed. The AFLE can be tailored to perform a variety of missions and management functions to match the contingency or operation.

Related Terms

air operations center; joint air operations


Source Joint Publications

JP 3-56.1 Command and Control for Joint Air Operations

JOINT AIR TASKING CYCLE

A joint air tasking cycle is used to provide for the efficient and effective employment of the joint air capabilities/forces made available. The cycle (see figure below) provides a repetitive process for the planning, coordination, allocation, and tasking of joint air missions/sorties, within the guidance of the joint force commander (JFC). The cycle accommodates changing tactical situations or JFC guidance, as well as requests for support from other component commanders. The joint air tasking cycle is an analytical, systematic approach that focuses targeting efforts on supporting operational requirements. Much of the day-to-day joint air tasking cycle is conducted through an interrelated series of information exchanges (through designated component liaison officers and/or messages), which provide a means of requesting and scheduling joint air missions. Note: A timely joint air tasking order (ATO) is critical — other joint force components conduct their planning and operations based on a prompt, executable joint ATO, and are dependent on its information.


There are usually three joint ATOs at any time: (1) the joint ATO in execution (today's plan), (2) the joint ATO in production (tomorrow's plan), and (3) the joint ATO in planning



(the following day’s plan). The joint air tasking cycle begins with the JFC’s air apportionment process and culminates with the combat assessment of previous missions/sorties. The figure below is a notional joint air tasking timeline, which may be modified to fit the particular situation.

The full joint ATO cycle from JFC guidance to the start of joint ATO execution is dependent on the JFC’s procedures. Notionally, this spans a 30-72 hour period. Each actual joint ATO period usually covers a 24-hour period (0600-0600 for illustrative purposes in this document). The precise timeframes for the joint air tasking cycle must be specified in the JFC’s operation plans or the joint force air component commander’s (JFACC’s) joint air operations plan.

The execution phase of the joint air tasking cycle will notionally consist of 24-hour periods with start and end times as specified by joint air operations plans. The joint ATO embodies JFC objectives and intent in a joint air tasking directive. The joint ATO matches specific



JOINT BASE

targets compiled by the JFACC/JFC staff with the capabilities/forces made available to the JFACC for the given joint ATO day.

Related Terms

air tasking order; combat assessment

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-56.1 Command and Control for Joint Air Operations

JOINT BASE

For purposes of base defense operations, a joint base is a locality from which operations of two or more of the Armed Forces of the Department of Defense are projected or supported and which is manned by significant elements of two or more Services or in which significant elements of two or more Services are located. JP 1-02

Classification of Bases. The commander of a combatant command will determine (unless determined by higher authority) and announce the classification of bases in his area in accordance with policies established by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. A base may be a single-Service base or a joint base. A joint base may be either one in which one Service has primary interest or one in which two or more Services have coequal interest.

The establishment of a joint base on a shoreline in the joint rear area presents special advantages and challenges to those responsible for the functions inherent in the base's mission and for its defense. The advantages include the availability of the assets of more than one Service component for use by commanders in fulfilling their responsibilities. The special challenges may include the fact that facilities like ports and harbors are usually located in heavily populated areas. Command arrangements may be complicated by diverse purposes when multiple Service components use the same facilities. For example, the following installations may be in close geographical proximity: a common-user water terminal; support base for a Marine air-ground task force; naval base supporting and sustaining fleet operations and/or naval coastal warfare operations, naval advanced logistic support site, and naval forward logistic site; and Air Force base operating an aerial port of debarkation.

Related Terms

base defense

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-10 Doctrine for Joint Rear Operations
JP 3-10.1 JTTP for Base Defense

JOINT BLOOD PROGRAM OFFICE

Each theater has a standard jointly operated blood distribution system. A joint blood program office (JBPO) is established within the joint force surgeon's office and functions as part of the staff. The JBPO is the single manager for blood products in the combatant command and is responsible for management and coordination of the total joint blood products requirements and capabilities in the theater. Each theater is subdivided and coordinated by an Area Joint Blood Program Office (AJBPO). Responsibilities of the JBPO and AJBPOs are numerous as follows:

- They will monitor compliance with Department of Defense blood program policies.
 - They must coordinate component blood programs.
-
-

- They plan and execute blood program exercises.
- The JBPO manages the wartime theater blood distribution system.
- Blood transshipment centers (BTCs), operated by the Air Force, are established in each theater and are located at major airheads. The BTCs serve as the central receiving point of blood products from the continental US for distribution within the theater.
- Each medical treatment facility (MTF) is responsible for locating and notifying its respective AJBPO for coordination of blood requirements and submission of blood reports and requests. MTFs will be notified by the AJBPO which blood supply unit is their supplier of blood and blood products.

Related Terms

health service support

Source Joint Publications

JP 4-02

Doctrine for Health Service Support in Joint Operations

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

"It is a matter of record that the strategic direction of the war, as conducted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was fully as successful as were the operations which they directed . . . The proposals or the convictions of no one member were as sound, or as promising of success, as the united judgments and agreed decisions of all the members."

Ernest J. King: The US Navy at War, 1945

"The Joint Chiefs of Staff system is unique among all known systems for the strategic direction of a war. It has brought victory where other systems have failed. It has withstood the all important test of war."

Arleigh Burke: Speech in Minneapolis, 6 October 1956

The term "Joint Chiefs of Staff" refers collectively to:

- the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff;
- the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff;
- the Chief of Staff, US Army;
- the Chief of Naval Operations;
- the Chief of Staff, US Air Force;
- The Commandant of the Marine Corps.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the principal military adviser to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense.

The other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are military advisers to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense.

When the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff provides advice to the President, the National Security Council, or the Secretary of Defense, any member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff may submit advice or an opinion in disagreement with that of the Chairman or in addition to the advice provided by the Chairman. If a member submits such advice or opinion, the Chairman will present that advice or opinion at the same time that the Chairman's advice is presented. The Chairman will also, as considered appropriate, inform the President, the National Security Council, or the Secretary of Defense of the range of military advice and opinion with respect to any matter.

The members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, individually or collectively, in their capacity as military advisers, will provide advice to the President, the National Security Council, or the Secretary of Defense on a particular matter when the President, the National Security Council, or the Secretary of Defense requests such advice, or when the Chairman or a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff recognizes a matter of national security that merits being addressed. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, assisted by the Joint Staff, constitute the immediate military staff of the Secretary of Defense.

Each Chief of Service has an Operations Deputy and a Deputy Operations Deputy. The Director, Joint Staff, presides over meetings of the Operations Deputies, and the Vice Director, Joint Staff, presides over meetings of the Deputy Operations Deputies. The Director and the Operations Deputies, or the Vice Director and the Deputy Operations Deputies, collectively recommend actions to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

To the extent it does not impair their independence in the performance of duties as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, each member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, except the Chairman, will inform their respective Secretary regarding military advice rendered by members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on matters affecting their Military Department.

The duties of the Chiefs of the Services as members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff take precedence over all their other duties. After first informing the Secretary of Defense, a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff may make such recommendations to Congress relating to the Department of Defense as the member may consider appropriate.

When there is a vacancy in the office of the Chairman, or in the absence or disability of the Chairman, the Vice Chairman acts as, and performs the duties of, the Chairman until a successor is appointed or the absence or disability ceases. When there is a vacancy in the offices of both Chairman and Vice Chairman, in the absence or disability of both the Chairman and the Vice Chairman, or when there is a vacancy in one such office and in the absence or disability of the officer holding the other, the President will designate another member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to act as, and perform the duties of, the Chairman until a successor to the Chairman or Vice Chairman is appointed or the absence or disability of the Chairman or Vice Chairman ceases.

An Organizational History

Although the separate military services are almost as old as the nation, the Joint Chiefs of Staff traces its beginnings only to World War II. Soon after American entry into that war, President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill created the combined Chiefs of Staff to provide strategic direction to the US-British war effort. The President then formed the US Joint Chiefs of Staff as the American representatives to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

From this seemingly simple beginning as counterparts to the British on the combined Chiefs of Staff, the JCS almost immediately assumed the role of corporate leadership of the American military organization. Under the authority and responsibility of the President as Commander in Chief, the JCS undertook the coordination and strategic direction of the Army and Navy.

Initially the American JCS consisted of three men: the Army Chief of Staff, the Commanding General of the Army Air Forces, and the Commander in Chief of the US Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations. Soon after the JCS assumed direction of the war, the Chief of Staff to The Commander in Chief of the Army

and Navy, or the chairman of the JCS, was added to serve as “go-between” with the President and the service chiefs. Throughout World War II, the JCS operated without a formal charter on the assumption that such a charter might inhibit the Joint Chiefs from doing what was necessary to win the war. In fact, the JCS owed its World War II existence and powers solely to letters exchanged by the service chiefs of the Army and Navy.

The National Security Act of 1947, which established the National Security Council and created the Air Force as a separate military department, legitimized the Joint Chiefs of Staff by establishing it as a permanent organization within the national defense establishment and by providing it with a joint staff of a hundred officers. This act designated the Joint Chiefs as the principal military advisors to the President and the Secretary of Defense and gave them several general responsibilities and prerogatives. The chiefs were directed to prepare joint strategic and logistic plans for the services and were given the authority to assign logistic responsibilities to the services, to establish unified commands, and to formulate training and educational policies for the armed services.

Source: Korb, Lawrence J., The Joint Chiefs of Staff: The First Twenty-five Years, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1976, 14-17

Related Terms

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Joint Staff

Source Joint Publications

JP 0-2 Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)

JOINT CIVIL-MILITARY ENGINEERING BOARD

The Joint Civil-Military Engineering Board (JCMEB) is a temporary board activated by the commander of a combatant command (CINC) and staffed by personnel from the component commands and Department of Defense agencies or activities in support of the CINCs. The JCMEB:

- establishes policies, procedures, priorities, and overall direction for civil-military construction and engineering requirements in the theater;
- arbitrates all issues referred by the Joint Facilities Utilization Board and, if directed, assumes responsibility for the preparation of the Civil Engineering Support Plan;
- coordinates its activities with the regional or theater construction managers having responsibility for the assigned area of responsibility. Construction and engineering requirements the JCMEB cannot satisfy from within the joint force resources will be elevated to the next appropriate level for support.

Related Terms

joint facilities utilization board


Source Joint Publications

JP 4-04 Joint Doctrine for Civil Engineering Support

JOINT CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS TASK FORCE

A Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force (JCMOTF) is normally a US joint force organization, similar in organization to a joint special operations task force or joint task force, flexible in size and composition depending on mission circumstances. (See figure below.) It may be developed to meet a specific civil-military operation (CMO) contingency mission, supporting humanitarian or nation assistance operations, a theater campaign of limited duration, or a longer duration CMO concurrent with or subsequent to regional or general conflict, depending on National Command Authorities (NCA) or theater guidance. In rarer instances, a JCMOTF could be formed as a standing organization, depending on NCA or theater guidance and resource availability. A JCMOTF may be formed in theater, in the continental US, or in both locations, depending on scope, duration, or sensitivity of the CMO requirement and associated policy considerations. Joint commanders may organize JCMOTFs to perform some or all of the following CMO-relevant functions:

- Provide command and control or direction of military host-nation advisory, assessment, planning, and other assistance activities by joint US forces.
- Help establish US or multinational and military-to-civil links for greater understanding and efficiency of cooperative assistance arrangements.
- Perform essential coordination or liaison with host-nation agencies, Country Team, United Nation agencies, other US government (USG) agencies, and deployed US, multinational, and host-nation military forces and supporting logistics organizations.
- Assist in the planning and conduct of civil information programs to publicize positive results and objectives of military assistance projects, to build civil acceptance and support of US operations, and to promote indigenous capabilities contributing to recovery and economic-social development.
- Plan and conduct joint and multinational CMO training exercises.
- Allocate resources and sustain and coordinate combat support or combat service support elements, including necessary medical, transportation, military police, engineer, and associated maintenance and communications capabilities.
- Advise and assist in strengthening or stabilizing civil infrastructures and services and otherwise facilitate transition to peacekeeping or consolidation operations and associated hand-off to other USG agency, international organization, or host-nation responsibility.
- Assess or identify host-nation civil support, relief, or funding requirements to the commander of combatant command (CINC) or joint force commander (JFC) for transmission to supporting CINCs, Military Services, or other responsible USG agencies.
- Advise the CINC or JFC on policy; funding; multinational, foreign, or host-nation sensitivities; and their effect on theater strategy and/or campaign and operational missions.



Related Terms

civil-military operations center

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-57

Doctrine for Joint Civil Affairs

JOINT COMMUNICATIONS SUPPORT ELEMENT

The Joint Communications Support Element (JCSE) is a unique communications organization under the operational control of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Headquartered at MacDill Air Force Base, the JCSE consists of an active duty element of about 500 personnel and two Air National Guard Joint Communications Support Squadrons. JCSE's primary mission is to provide tactical communications support for two simultaneously deployed joint task forces and two joint special operations task forces. The JCSE possesses a wide range of tactical communications capabilities tailored to meet a variety of contingency missions. The unit is staffed with personnel from all the Services and is equipped with a wide array of tactical and commercial communications equipment.

Related Terms


Source Joint Publications

JP 6-0 Doctrine for Command, Control, Communications, and Computer (C4)
Systems Support to Joint Operations

JOINT DEPLOYABLE INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT SYSTEM

A transportable workstation and communications suite that electronically extends a joint intelligence center to a joint task force or other tactical user. Also called JDISS. JP 1-02

As shown in the figure below, the joint deployable intelligence support system (JDISS) provides the standard workstation server software configuration.



JDISS is the Department of Defense Intelligence Information System reference model. The basic backbone for the dissemination of intelligence to and from deployed JDISS nodes is via the Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communication System (JWICS) network, depicted in the figure below. Where JWICS is not required or not available, JDISS has a versatile communications capability that can be connected to whatever circuit is available. The architecture optimizes flexibility to focus intelligence efforts efficiently and assure that support is maximized for a theater engaged in military operations.

JOINT WORLDWIDE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM

The Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System is a sensitive compartmented information portion of the Defense Information System Network. It incorporates advanced networking technologies that permit point-to-point or multipoint information exchange involving voice, text, graphics, data, and video teleconferencing.

All-source intelligence dissemination in support of joint operations at the national, theater, and subordinate joint force levels will be via JWICS and JDISS. These systems support the production, dissemination, and display of fused intelligence critical to theater battle management. The architecture provides access to data from national, theater and tactical intelligence organizations and sources primarily from a “push-pull” system. A “pull” concept will result in joint force commanders (JFCs) receiving only high-quality, relevant intelligence based on their mission and phase of the operation. The “pull” capability is designed to prevent communications circuit saturation. In addition, time-sensitive intelligence will be “pushed” to JFCs and components via dedicated broadcasts in response to preplanned essential elements of information. Automated data processing interoperability with force level systems will be accomplished by JDISS integration. Through JWICS connectivity, intelligence production at the national level can be shared in near real time with the JFC. Automated processing and seamless connectivity at all levels allow intelligence analysts at all levels access to imagery and multiple data bases while concurrently producing intelligence products in response to specific mission requirements. This up, down, and across echelon interface among strategic, operational, and tactical intelligence organizations is the backbone for joint intelligence dissemination.

Related Terms

Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communication System

Source Joint Publications

JP 2-0 Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Operations

JOINT DOCTRINE

Fundamental principles that guide the employment of forces of two or more Services in coordinated action toward a common objective. It will be promulgated by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in coordination with the combatant commands, Services, and Joint Staff.

JP 1-02

THE ROLE OF DOCTRINE

“At the very heart of war lies doctrine. It represents the central beliefs for waging war in order to achieve victory....It is the building material for strategy. It is fundamental to sound judgment.”

General Curtis E. LeMay, USAF3. Quoted in Air Force Manual 1-1, Basic Doctrine (Washington, DC: Department of the Air Force, 1984), frontispiece.

“Doctrine provides a military organization with a common philosophy, a common language, a common purpose, and a unity of effort.”

General George H. Decker, USA, speech given at the US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 16 December 1960, quoted in Robert D. Heinl, Jr., Dictionary of Military and Naval Quotations (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1966), 95.

“Doctrine [is] every action that contributes to unity of purpose... it is what warriors believe in and act on.”

Captain (retired) Wayne P. Hughes, Jr., USN Fleet Tactics: Theory and Practice (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1986), 28.

“Doctrine establishes a particular way of thinking about war and a way of fighting...doctrine provides the basis for harmonious actions and mutual understanding.”

Fleet Marine Force Manual 1, Warfighting (Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, 1989), 43.

General. Military leaders understand the nature and utility of doctrine. Military doctrine presents fundamental principles that guide the employment of forces. It provides the distilled insights and wisdom gained from our collective experience with warfare. However, doctrine cannot replace clear thinking or alter a commander’s obligation to determine the proper course of action under the circumstances prevailing at the time of decision.

Though neither policy nor strategy, joint doctrine deals with the fundamental issue of how best to employ the national military power to achieve strategic ends. As such, it represents authoritative guidance for the joint employment of the armed forces. A large body of joint doctrine (and its supporting tactics, techniques, and procedures) has been and is being developed by the Armed Forces of the United States through the combined effort of the Joint Staff, Services, and combatant commands. Because we operate and fight jointly, we must all learn and practice joint doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures; feed back to the doctrine process the lessons learned in training, exercises, and operations; and ensure Service doctrine and procedures are consistent. This is critical for our present and future effectiveness. Joint doctrine offers a common perspective from which to plan and operate, and fundamentally shapes the way we think about and train for war.

Joint Doctrine and Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (JTTP) Overview. The purpose of joint doctrine and JTTP is to enhance the combat effectiveness of US forces. Joint doctrine and JTTP will not contain policy. Policy will be established in other Chairman of

the Joint Chiefs of Staff documents and can only be referenced in joint publications. Only publications approved by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff will be referred to as “joint publications.” Publications involving two or more Services that have not been reviewed and approved by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff will be referred to as “multi-Service” and will identify the participating Services (e.g., Army and Air Force doctrine or Army, Navy, and Air Force procedures).

Joint doctrine (or JTTP) applies to the commanders of combatant commands, subunified commands, joint task forces, and subordinate components of these commands. These principles and guidance also may apply when significant forces of one Service are attached to forces of another Service or when significant forces of one Service support forces of another Service. Joint doctrine is used to guide the joint employment of joint forces, provide the national position for multinational doctrine consistent with existing security procedures, provide a basis for joint training, provide instructional material for the military education system, and inform US Government agencies concerning the employment of US joint forces.

Joint doctrine is written for those who provide strategic direction to joint forces (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, commanders of combatant commands), employ joint forces (combatant commanders, commanders of subunified commands, or commanders of joint task forces (JTFs)), and support or are supported by joint forces (combatant commands, subunified commands, JTFs, component commands, Services, and supporting agencies).

Joint doctrine can be developed by the Chiefs of the Services, combatant commanders, and Directors, Joint Staff directorates. It will be written to reflect extant capabilities. Joint tactics, techniques, and procedures are written for those who implement joint doctrine such as commanders of joint forces, commanders of subordinate commands, and commanders at echelons where joint forces interact.

In developing joint doctrine and JTTP, extant Service and multinational doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures will be considered. Once approved, joint doctrine provides the national position for combined doctrine development consistent with existing security procedures. Service doctrine must be consistent with approved joint doctrine.

Related Terms

doctrine; joint publication; joint tactics, techniques, and procedures

Source Joint Publications

JP 1 Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States

JP 1-01 Joint Publication System, Joint Doctrine and JTTP Development Program

JOINT ENGAGEMENT ZONE

Joint engagement zone (JEZ) operations involve multiple air defense weapon systems of one or more Service components, simultaneously and in concert, engaging enemy airpower in the same airspace. However, successful JEZ operations depend on correctly identifying friendly, neutral, and enemy aircraft. Positive control may ensure that real time engagement taskings are based on comprehensive situational awareness. Under procedural control, all air defense systems must be capable of accurately discerning between enemy, neutral, and friendly air vehicles in a highly complex environment before full joint engagement operations could occur. If these conditions cannot be met, separate zones for missile and fighter engagement should be established. JEZ, without effective command and control, is extremely difficult to implement. In maritime air operations, airspace control will tend toward procedural control, with aircraft bearing the burden of following promulgated procedures to avoid fratricide.

JOINT ENGINEER PLANNING AND EXECUTION SYSTEM

Such an arrangement allows a layered series of engagements by both friendly aircraft and surface missile systems.

Related Terms

weapon engagement zone

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-52 Doctrine for Joint Airspace Control in the Combat Zone

JOINT ENGINEER PLANNING AND EXECUTION SYSTEM

The Joint Engineering Planning and Execution System (JEPES) provides a common automated system for the civil engineer planners at the unified commands and their components to determine the feasibility of the civil engineering force, construction material, and facilities to support operation plans (OPLANs). Further, it is used to:

- Generate time-phased facility requirements based on an OPLAN;
- Analyze and assess engineering support by comparing facility requirements to in-theater facility assets and host-nation, contract, and troop engineering capability;
- Provide facility feasibility assessment, manpower, materiel, and nonunit cargo requirements for other processes.

The JEPES replaces the Civil Engineering Support Plan Generator as a planning tool to develop data to assist commander of a combatant command (CINC) and Service component staffs in determining their civil engineering support requirements and documenting their Civil Engineering Support Plan (CESP). JEPES is a computer model that should be used by CINC planners to estimate theater-level wartime requirements for facilities, construction material, and civil engineering capability in support of deployed US forces. JEPES should be used wherever possible in the planning process in order to provide consistent civil engineering support planning across all combatant commands.

The primary purpose of JEPES is to assist CINC and component planners in determining whether an OPLAN provides sufficient civil engineering capabilities at the correct locations and at the appropriate times to support deployment, mission accomplishment, and sustainment of OPLAN forces. Specifically, the civil engineering and facility requirements generated by JEPES are intended to aid engineer planners in preparing the CESP.

The civil engineering requirements generated by JEPES serve as the starting point for planning specific wartime construction projects. JEPES requirements are, however, based on many assumptions and simplifications of reality.

JEPES provides assistance to planners in determining civil engineering support requirements and shortfalls during operation planning. Planners need not use JEPES if the deviation from CINC and Service standards in JEPES can be justified. Planners must explain in the CESP the method used to determine their civil engineering support requirements and shortfalls if they elect not to use JEPES.

Related Terms

civil engineering support

Source Joint Publications

JP 4-04 Joint Doctrine for Civil Engineering Support

JOINT FACILITIES UTILIZATION BOARD

A joint board that evaluates and reconciles component requests for real estate, use of existing facilities, inter-Service support, and construction to ensure compliance with Joint Civil-Military Engineering Board priorities. JP 1-02

The commander of a combatant command (CINC) is responsible for the coordination of planning, programming, and construction of facilities within the command. Additionally, the CINC should determine the priorities in the programming of facilities necessary to support the mission. Contingency construction project requests in overseas areas require validation by the CINC. The CINC may establish a Joint Facilities Utilization Board (JFUB) to assist in managing facilities. The JFUB has many responsibilities including the following:

- The JFUB evaluates and reconciles component requests for real estate, use of existing facilities, inter-Service support, and construction to ensure compliance with Joint Civil Military Engineering Board (JCMEB) priorities.
- The JFUB is activated on the order of a joint force commander and chaired by the Logistics Directorate, with members from component commands and any required special activities (e.g., legal and civil affairs).
- The JFUB also provides administrative support and functions as the executive agency for the tasking of the JCMEB.

Related Terms

Joint Civil Military Engineering Board

Source Joint Publications


JP 4-04 Joint Doctrine for Civil Engineering Support

JOINT FORCE

A general term applied to a force composed of significant elements, assigned or attached, of two or more Military Departments, operating under a single joint force commander. JP 1-02

General. Unified action of the Armed Forces of the United States starts with unified direction. For US military operations, unified direction is normally accomplished by establishing a joint force, assigning a mission or objective to the joint force commander (JFC), establishing command relationships, assigning or attaching appropriate forces to the joint force, and empowering the JFC with sufficient authority over the forces to accomplish the assigned mission. “Joint force” is a general term applied to a force composed of significant elements, assigned or attached, of two or more Military Departments, operating under a single JFC. Joint forces are established at three levels: unified commands, subordinate unified commands, and joint task forces.

Authority to Establish. In accordance with the Unified Command Plan, combatant commands are established by the President through the Secretary of Defense, with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Commanders of unified commands may establish subordinate unified commands when so authorized by the Secretary of Defense through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint task forces can be established by the Secretary of Defense, a combatant commander, subordinate unified commander, or an existing joint task force commander. (See figure below.)



Basis for Establishing Joint Forces. Joint forces can be established on either a geographic area or functional basis.

Establishing a joint force on a geographic area basis is the most common method to assign responsibility for continuing operations. The commander of a combatant command established on an area basis is assigned a geographic area by the establishing authority. The title of the areas and their delineation are prescribed in the establishing directive. A JFC assigned a geographic area is considered an area commander. Note: Only commanders of combatant commands are assigned area of responsibilities (AORs). Subordinate joint force commanders are normally assigned joint operations areas (JOAs).

- The boundaries defining these AORs are not intended to delineate restrictive geographic AORs. Commanders may operate forces wherever required to accomplish their missions.
- The Unified Command Plan contains descriptions of the geographic boundaries assigned to combatant commanders. It provides that, unless otherwise directed by the Secretary of Defense, when significant operations overlap the boundaries of two combatant commands, a joint task force will be formed and assigned an appropriate JOA. Command of this joint task force will be determined by the National Command Authorities and forces transferred to the appropriate combatant commander.
- Each area commander will be kept apprised of the presence, mission, movement, and duration of stay of forces within the AOR/JOA other than those assigned to the area command. Also, the area commander will be apprised of the command channels under

which these transient forces will function. The authority directing movement or permanent location of transient forces is responsible for providing this information.

- Forces not assigned to an area commander are often assigned missions that require them to cross AOR/JOA boundaries. In such cases, it is the duty of the joint force area commander to assist the operations of these forces to the extent of existing capabilities and consistent with other assigned missions. Area commanders may be assigned specific responsibilities with respect to installations or activities exempted from their control, such as logistic support or area defense, particularly if enemy forces should traverse the area commander's AOR/JOA to attack the exempted installation or activity.
- Transient forces within the assigned AOR of a combatant commander are subject to the area commander's orders in some instances, e.g., for coordination for emergency defense or allocation of local facilities. However, transient forces are not part of the area commander's command, and the area commander is not in their normal chain of command.


Sometimes a joint force based solely on military functions without respect to a specific geographic region is more suitable in order to fix responsibility for certain types of continuing operations (e.g., the unified commands for transportation, space, special operations, and strategic operations). The commander of a joint force established on a functional basis is assigned a functional responsibility by the establishing authority.

- When defining functional responsibilities, the focus should be on the effect desired or service provided. The title of the functional responsibility and its delineation are prescribed in the establishing directive.
- The missions or tasks assigned to the commander of a functional command may require that certain installations and activities of that commander be partially or wholly exempt from the command authority of an area commander in whose area they are located or within which they operate. Such exemptions must be specified by the authority who establishes the functional command. Such exemptions do not relieve the commanders of functional commands of the responsibility to coordinate with the affected area commanders.

Organizing Joint Forces. A JFC has the authority to organize forces to best accomplish the assigned mission based on the concept of operations. (See figure below.) The organization should be sufficiently flexible to meet the planned phases of the contemplated operations and any development that may necessitate a change in plan. The JFC will establish subordinate commands, assign responsibilities, establish or delegate appropriate command and support relationships, and establish coordinating instructions for the component commanders. Sound organization should provide for unity of effort, centralized planning, and decentralized execution. Unity of effort is necessary for effectiveness and efficiency. Centralized planning is essential for controlling and coordinating the efforts of the forces. Decentralized execution is essential because no one commander can control the detailed actions of a large number of units or individuals. When organizing joint forces with multinational forces, simplicity and clarity are critical. Complex or unclear command relationships or organization are counterproductive to developing synergy among multinational forces.

The composition of the JFC's staff will reflect the composition of the joint force to ensure those responsible for employing joint forces have thorough knowledge of total force capabilities and limitations.

All joint forces include Service component commands because administrative and logistic support for joint forces are provided through Service component commands. Service forces may be assigned or attached to subordinate joint forces without the formal creation of a Service component of that joint force. The JFC also may conduct operations through the



Service component commanders or, at lower echelons, Service force commanders. This relationship is appropriate when stability, continuity, economy, ease of long-range planning, and scope of operations dictate organizational integrity of Service forces for conducting operations.

The JFC can establish functional component commands to conduct operations. Functional component commands can be appropriate when forces from two or more Military Departments must operate in the same dimension or medium or there is a need to accomplish a distinct aspect of the assigned mission. Joint force land, air, maritime, and special operations component commanders are examples of functional components. (NOTE: Functional component commands are component commands of a joint force and do not constitute a “joint force” with the authorities and responsibilities of a joint force even when composed of forces from two or more Military Departments.) When a functional component command employs forces from more than one Service, the functional component commander’s staff must be joint, and requires advanced planning for efficient operation. Joint staff billets for needed expertise and individuals to fill those billets should be identified, and those individuals should be used when the functional component command is formed for exercises or actual operations.

Most often, joint forces are organized with a combination of Service and functional component commands with operational responsibilities. Joint forces organized with Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps components will have special operations forces (if assigned) organized as a functional component. The JFC defines the authority and responsibilities of the Service and functional component commanders; however, the Service responsibilities (i.e., administrative and logistic) of the components must be given due consideration by the JFC.

The JFC has full authority to assign missions, redirect efforts, and direct coordination among subordinate commanders. JFCs should allow Service tactical and operational assets and groupings to function generally as they were designed. The intent is to meet the needs of the JFC while maintaining the tactical and operational integrity of the Service organizations.

Related Terms

joint force commander

Source Joint Publications

JP 0-2 Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)

JOINT FORCE AIR COMPONENT COMMANDER

The joint force air component commander derives authority from the joint force commander who has the authority to exercise operational control, assign missions, direct coordination among subordinate commanders, redirect and organize forces to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of the overall mission. The joint force commander will normally designate a joint force air component commander. The joint force air component commander's responsibilities will be assigned by the joint force commander (normally these would include, but not be limited to, planning, coordination, allocation, and tasking based on the joint force commander's apportionment decision). Using the joint force commander's guidance and authority, and in coordination with other Service component commanders and other assigned or supporting commanders, the joint force air component commander will recommend to the joint force commander apportionment of air sorties to various missions or geographic areas. Also called JFACC. JP 1-02

General. The joint force commander (JFC) will normally designate a joint force air component commander (JFACC). The JFC will base the decision to designate a JFACC on several factors such as the JFC's overall mission, concept of operations, the missions and tasks assigned to subordinate commanders, forces available, duration and nature of joint air operations desired, and the degree of unity of command and control of joint air operations required. The JFC will normally assign JFACC responsibilities to the component commander having the preponderance of air assets and the capability to plan, task, and control joint air operations.

The authority and command relationships of the JFACC are established by the JFC. These typically include exercising operational control over assigned and attached forces and tactical control over other military capabilities/forces made available for tasking. The JFC may also establish supporting and supported relationships between components to facilitate operations. The JFC normally assigns missions and issues mission-type orders to all components. With receipt of the mission goes the authority to conduct operations in accordance with the JFC's intent and concept of the operation.

Responsibilities. The responsibilities of the JFACC are assigned by the JFC. These include, but are not limited to planning, coordination, allocation, and tasking of joint air operations based on the JFC's concept of operations and air apportionment decision. (See figure below.)

Specific JFACC responsibilities normally include the following:

- Developing a joint air operations plan to best support joint force objectives as assigned by the JFC or higher authority.

JFACC RESPONSIBILITIES

- Developing a joint air operations plan to best support joint force objectives
- Recommending to the JFC apportionment of the joint air effort, after consulting with other component commanders
- Providing centralized direction for the allocation and tasking of capabilities/forces made available
- Controlling execution of joint air operations as specified by the JFC
- Coordinating joint air operations with operations of other component commanders and forces assigned to or supporting the JFC
- Evaluating the results of joint air operations
- When assigned by the JFC, performing the duties of the airspace control authority and/or performing the duties of the area air defense commander
- Functioning as a supported and supporting commander, as directed by the JFC

JFC— joint force commander

- Recommending to the JFC apportionment of the joint air effort, after consulting with other component commanders, by percentage and/or by priority that should be devoted to the various air operations and/or geographic areas for a given period of time.
- Providing centralized direction for the allocation and tasking of capabilities/forces made available based on the JFC air apportionment.
- Controlling execution of joint air operations as specified by the JFC, to include making timely adjustments to targeting and tasking of available joint capabilities/forces. If circumstances require the JFACC to change the planned joint air operations during execution, the JFACC will notify the affected component commanders or JFC, as appropriate.
- Coordinating joint air operations with operations of other component commanders and forces assigned to or supporting the JFC (e.g., combat search and rescue operations, the joint force special operations component commander, and if designated, the joint special operations air component commander for integration, synchronization, and deconfliction with special operations).
- Evaluating the results of joint air operations and forwarding combat assessments to the JFC to support the overall combat assessment effort.
- Performing the duties of the airspace control authority (ACA), when assigned that responsibility by the JFC.
- Performing the duties of the area air defense commander (AADC), when assigned that responsibility by the JFC.

- Functioning as the supported commander for counterair operations, strategic attack operations, when joint air operations constitute the bulk of the capability needed to directly attack enemy strategic centers of gravity, theater airborne reconnaissance and surveillance, and the JFC's overall air interdiction effort.
 - Interdiction target priorities within the land or naval force areas of operations (AOs) are designated by the land and naval force commanders.
 - These priorities are considered along with the JFC's area of responsibility (AOR)/joint operation area (JOA)-wide interdiction priorities and reflected in the air apportionment decision. The JFACC will use these priorities to plan and execute the AOR/JOA-wide interdiction effort.
- Functioning as a supporting commander, as directed by the JFC, for operations such as close air support, air interdiction within the land and naval force AOs, and maritime support.

Airspace Control Considerations and the JFACC/ACA/AADC Relationship. The responsibilities of the JFACC, ACA, and AADC are interrelated and should normally be assigned to one individual. The functions and responsibilities of the JFACC, ACA, and AADC must be integrated in order to unite joint air operations with joint airspace control and joint air defense operations in support of the JFC's campaign. Designating one component commander as JFACC, AADC, and ACA may simplify coordination required to develop and execute fully integrated joint air operations. If conditions do not permit this assignment, then close coordination between all three positions is essential.

If appointed the AADC, the JFACC is responsible for integrating the joint force air defense effort. Air defense operations must be coordinated with other tactical operations on and over both land and sea. If appointed the ACA, the JFACC is responsible for developing, coordinating, and publishing airspace control procedures and for operating the airspace control system in the area of responsibility (AOR)/joint operation area (JOA).


The JFACC Organization. The figure below represents a notional JFACC organization. The JFACC's operations center will often be designated a joint air operations center (JAOC).

The JFACC's JAOC is structured to operate as a fully integrated facility and staffed to fulfill all of the JFACC's responsibilities. JFACC organizations may differ based on the specific AOR/JOA requirements and operations. However, the two organizations or functions that should be common to all JAOCs are Combat Plans and Combat Operations. Planning "future joint air operations" is the responsibility of Combat Plans, which includes the responsibility of drafting the joint air operations plan to support the JFC's campaign or objectives and building the daily joint air tasking order (ATO). Execution of the daily joint ATO is carried out by Combat Operations. This organization closely follows the action of current joint air operations, shifting missions from their scheduled times or targets and making other adjustments as the situation requires.

Each of these JAOC organizations rely on expertise from other component liaisons (e.g., battlefield coordination element (BCE), naval and amphibious liaison element (NALE), Air Force liaison element, special operations liaison element (SOLE), air mobility element, strategic liaison team, space liaison officer, Marine liaison officer) to coordinate requests or requirements and maintain an "up-to-date" picture of the other component operations.

Finally, the role of "intelligence" is extremely important and is an integral part of the daily function of Combat Plans and Combat Operations. Intelligence personnel monitor and assess adversary capabilities and intentions and provide assistance in target, weapon, and platform selection, conduct battle damage assessment, as well as, provide an up-to-date picture of the adversary, expected adversary operations, and the status and priority of assigned targets to assist in execution day changes.

NOTIONAL JFACC ORGANIZATION (JAOC)



LEGEND:
 COORDINATION 
 C2 

- if assigned by JFC

“Once the command of the air is obtained by one of the contending armies, the war must become a conflict between a seeing host and one that is blind.”

H.G. Wells

Component Liaison. The components have ready access to the JFACC and staff through the component liaisons. These liaisons work for their respective component commanders and work with the JFACC and staff.

Senior Component Liaisons. Senior component liaisons serve as conduits for direct coordination between the JFACC and their respective component commanders. Senior liaisons possess the credibility and authority to represent their component commander on time-sensitive and critical issues. They must be equipped and authorized to communicate directly with their respective component commander. The senior liaisons have the responsibility of presenting component perspectives and considerations regarding planning and executing joint air operations.

Coordination Elements. Each component normally provides liaison elements (BCE, NALE, SOLE, and others as appropriate) that work within the JAOC. These liaison elements consist of experienced warfare specialists who provide component planning and tasking expertise and coordination capabilities. These experts help integrate and coordinate their component’s participation in joint air operations (e.g., special operations force) and coordinate and deconflict component direct support air operations with joint air operations.

JFACC Staff. The JFACC’s staff should be organized and manned so that component representation reflects the composition of the joint force. This representation will provide the JFACC with the expertise needed to effectively employ the capabilities/forces made available. Functional component staffs require advanced planning for efficient operations. JFACC staff billets for needed expertise and individuals to fill those billets should be identified. Such individuals should be identified and trained during peacetime and used when JFACC staffs are formed for exercises and actual operations to ensure an effective transition to combat operations. JFACC staffs should include appropriate component representation at all levels.

Functional Area and Mission Experts. Functional area experts (such as intelligence, logistics, airspace, plans, and communications) provide the critical and unique expertise in support, plans, and execution functions, as appropriate for the employment scenario. Mission experts (air-to-air, air-to-ground, reconnaissance, air refueling, and others as appropriate) provide the technical warfighting expertise required to plan and employ capabilities/forces made available by the components. Functional and mission experts from other components representing weapon systems made available by the JFC for joint air tasking will provide manning throughout the JAOC (i.e., combat operations, combat plans) and at all levels of command.

Preparation. For each specific operation, the nucleus of the JFACC staff should be trained in JFACC operations and be representative of the joint force. Staff augmentation with manning as identified above ensures joint representation throughout the JFACC’s staff and JAOC. The JFACC, in coordination with other component commanders, will determine specific manning requirements based on scenario requirements, force list, and personnel availability.

JFACC Assignments and Transition. Procedures for joint air operations are designed to exploit the flexibility of air power to achieve joint force objectives while providing support to component operations. Joint air operations scenarios may vary, and each scenario requires extensive planning when transition of JFACC responsibilities is necessary.

In large-scale joint air operations, the assignment of JFACC ashore is normally desirable because of enhanced logistic, communication, and facility capacities on land. The JFACC should be sea-based when any one of the following conditions are present:

- Maritime forces provide the preponderance of air capability.
- Land-based facilities or sufficient infrastructure does not exist.
- A secure land-based area is not available.
- Ground support forces are forced to withdraw.

JFACC Transition. Effective joint air operations planning must contain provisions to transition JFACC responsibilities between platforms or between components afloat or ashore.

Planned Transition. The JFACC should develop a plan for transition of JFACC duties to another component, if required or considered likely to occur. Planned JFACC transitions are possible as a function of buildup or scale down of joint force operations. When transition of JFACC responsibilities is complete, the component passing responsibilities should continue monitoring joint air planning, tasking, and control circuits, and remain ready to reassume JFACC responsibilities until the gaining component has demonstrated operational capability.

Unplanned Transition. During unplanned shifts of JFACC responsibility, as a possible result of battle damage or major command and control equipment failure, a smooth transition is unlikely. Therefore, the JFC should predesignate alternates (both inter- and intra-component) and establish preplanned responses/options to the temporary or permanent loss of JFACC capability. Frequent backup and exchange of data bases is essential to facilitate a rapid resumption of operations should an unplanned transition be required.

Transition Events. The following are events that may cause the JFACC responsibilities to shift:

- Coordination requirements related to joint ATO planning and execution exceed the component capability;
- Buildup or relocation of forces shifts preponderance of air assets to another component commander and the JFC decides that the other component is in a better position (location, command and control capability, or other considerations) to accomplish the JFACC responsibilities;
- Command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence capability to support the current JFACC becomes unresponsive or unreliable;

Considerations. The figure below shows considerations to aid in transition planning and decisions.

JFACC TRANSITION CONSIDERATIONS

- **Continuous, uninterrupted, and unambiguous guidance and direction** for joint air operations must be the primary objective of any JFACC transition.
- All JFACC operations facilities should possess **appropriate C4I capabilities** to ensure shift of JFACC duties is as transparent to the components as possible (joint ATO dissemination and receipt should be unchanged).
- **Specific procedures** for coordinating and executing planned and unplanned shifts of JFACC should be published in the joint air operations plan.
- The oncoming JFACC must have **adequate communications, connectivity, manning, intelligence support, and command and control capability** prior to assuming JFACC responsibilities.
- The oncoming JFACC must have a **current joint ATO, special instructions, ACO, joint integrated prioritized target list (JIPTL), force disposition, adversary situation, and order of battle.**
- The oncoming JFACC must have the **JFC's objectives** to conduct supporting joint air operations.
- The oncoming JFACC must establish timely, reliable, and secure **communications links** with all appropriate coordination cells associated with the JFC mission to facilitate continuous and dynamic exchange of information and joint air support.
- The oncoming JFACC must be completely familiar with the **area air defense and airspace control plans.** If also designated the AADC, the JFACC must be ready to assume the responsibility for air defense operations. When designated the ACA, the JFACC must also be ready to assume that responsibility.

Related Terms

joint force land component commander; joint force maritime component commander; joint force special operations component commander

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-56.1 Command and Control for Joint Air Operations


JOINT FORCE COMMANDER

A general term applied to a combatant commander, subunified commander, or joint task force commander authorized to exercise combatant command (command authority) or operational control over a joint force. Also called JFC. JP 1-02

General. Unified action of the Armed Forces of the United States starts with unified direction. For US military operations, unified direction is normally accomplished by establishing a joint force, assigning a mission or objective to the joint force commander, establishing command relationships, assigning or attaching appropriate forces to the joint force, and empowering the joint force commander (JFC) with sufficient authority over the forces to accomplish the assigned mission.

JFC is a general term applied to a combatant commander, subunified combatant commander, or joint task force commander. A JFC has the authority to organize forces to best accomplish the assigned mission based on the concept of operations. (See figure below.) The organization should be sufficiently flexible to meet the planned phases of the contemplated operations and any development that may necessitate a change in plan. The JFC will establish subordinate commands, assign responsibilities, establish or delegate appropriate command and support relationships, and establish coordinating instructions for the component commanders.

Organization of Forces. Sound organization should provide for unity of effort, centralized planning, and decentralized execution. Unity of effort is necessary for effectiveness and



efficiency. Centralized planning is essential for controlling and coordinating the efforts of the forces. Decentralized execution is essential because no one commander can control the detailed actions of a large number of units or individuals. When organizing joint forces with multinational forces, simplicity and clarity are critical. Complex or unclear command relationships or organization are counterproductive to developing synergy among multinational forces.

Service and Functional Component Commands. The composition of the JFC's staff will reflect the composition of the joint force to ensure those responsible for employing joint forces have thorough knowledge of total force capabilities and limitations. All joint forces include Service component commands because administrative and logistic support for joint forces are provided through Service component commands. Service forces may be assigned or attached to subordinate joint forces without the formal creation of a Service component of that joint force. The JFC also may conduct operations through the Service component commanders or, at lower echelons, Service force commanders. This relationship is appropriate when stability, continuity, economy, ease of long-range planning, and scope of operations dictate organizational integrity of Service forces for conducting operations.

The JFC can establish functional component commands to conduct operations. Functional component commands can be appropriate when forces from two or more Military Departments must operate in the same dimension or medium or there is a need to accomplish a distinct aspect of the assigned mission. Joint force land, air, maritime, and special operations component commanders are examples of functional components.

Most often, joint forces are organized with a combination of Service and functional component commands with operational responsibilities. Joint forces organized with Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps components will have special operations forces (if assigned) organized as a functional component. The JFC defines the authority and responsibilities of the Service and functional component commanders; however, the Service responsibilities (i.e., administrative and logistic) of the components must be given due consideration by the JFC.

The JFC has full authority to assign missions, redirect efforts, and direct coordination among subordinate commanders. JFCs should allow Service tactical and operational assets and groupings to function generally as they were designed. The intent is to meet the needs of the JFC while maintaining the tactical and operational integrity of the Service organizations.

Related Terms

joint force

Source Joint Publications

JP 0-2

Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)

JOINT FORCE COMMANDER'S ELECTRONIC WARFARE STAFF

The Joint Force Commander's Electronic Warfare Staff (JCEWS) provides electronic warfare (EW) expertise, planning, and coordination for joint activities, including joint suppression of enemy air defenses operations. The JCEWS coordinates with key staff officers, component commands, and other elements as required. The JCEWS is comprised of personnel from each of the components of the joint force. It is headed by the Operations Directorate (J-3) electronic warfare officer and includes an Intelligence Directorate representative to facilitate intelligence updates and a Command, Control, Communications, and Computer (C4) Systems Directorate representative to monitor or direct frequency deconfliction.

JOINT FORCE SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMPONENT COMMANDER

EW depends on all-source, timely intelligence. Signals intelligence (both communications intelligence-and electronics intelligence-derived intelligence products, particularly data bases) may be especially useful to joint EW planners. Primary intelligence support for EW is from the electronic order of battle (EOB) and signal data bases such as the Electronic Warfare Integrated Reprogramming Data Base. Direct support by national and Service agency analysts is also provided. EW planners on the JCEWS derive EW targeting information from the EOB and use this information to request that other joint organizations allocate joint force resources to execute EW missions against the identified target. The JCEWS may nominate command and control targets to the command and control warfare (C2W) cell for consideration/incorporation into the C2W cell's master target nomination list, which is submitted into the target nomination process established by the J-3 officer. Other types of EW mission requests should be made by the JCEWS through the Service or functional component commander who controls the assets necessary to execute the mission.

Related Terms

electronic warfare

Source Joint Publications


JP 3-01.4 JTTP for Joint Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (J-SEAD)
JP 3-13.1 Joint Doctrine for Command and Control Warfare (C2W)

JOINT FORCE SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMPONENT COMMANDER


The commander within a unified command, subordinate unified command, or joint task force responsible to the establishing commander for making recommendations on the proper employment of special operations forces and assets, planning and coordinating special operations, or accomplishing such operational missions as may be assigned. The joint force special operations component commander is given the authority necessary to accomplish missions and tasks assigned by the establishing commander. The joint force special operations component commander will normally be the commander with the preponderance of special operations forces and the requisite command and control capabilities. Also called JFSOCC. JP 1-02

In accordance with the principles set forth in Joint Pub 0-2, "Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)," the joint force commander may choose to organize special operations forces (SOF) for particular operations along joint force special operations component commander (JFSOCC), special operations command (SOC), Service component, or functional lines. In certain circumstances, a functional organization may better fit the demands of a specific SOF mission, especially given the limited number of SOF assets. Several different Service elements of the SOF possess similar capabilities. For example, Army special forces, Air Force special tactics team, and Navy sea-air-land team can employ comparable amphibious tactics and airborne infiltration techniques, and the Army and Air Force both operate rotary special operations (SO) aircraft with similar capabilities. Consideration should be given to aligning JFSOCC (SOC or joint special operations task force (JSOTF)) forces executing similar missions under a single, functional (vice necessarily Service) component commander. (See figures below.) Since the JFSOCC may need to conduct a range of discrete operations or support extended SO, he may choose to exercise either centralized or decentralized control of assets. This flexibility would allow the JFSOCC to establish, for example, various aviation

SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES PEACETIME COMMAND AND CONTROL



SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES OPERATIONAL COMMAND AND CONTROL



JOINT FORCE SURGEON

task organizations ranging from a central pool of all air assets to small, tailored aircraft and support packages assigned to a JSOTF or other subordinate SO commands, as appropriate.

A functional joint special operations air component commander provides organization and resource allocation for managing limited aircraft assets of different types and from different Services. JFSOCC requirements for air support flow through a single point of contact so that all requests may be satisfied by the best available air asset. Further, planning, coordination, and deconfliction are centralized. The liaison for this coordination and deconfliction is as important between the JFSOCC and the conventional theater component commands as it is between JFSOCC forces themselves.

Related Terms

special operations

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-05 Doctrine for Joint Special Operations

JOINT FORCE SURGEON

A general term applied to an individual appointed by the joint force commander to serve as the theater or joint task force special staff officer responsible for establishing, monitoring, or evaluating joint force health service support. See also health service support. JP 1-02

General. A joint force surgeon (JFS) should be appointed for each combatant command, subunified command, and joint task force. As a specialty advisor, the JFS reports directly to the joint force commander (JFC). The JFS will coordinate health service support (HSS) matters for the JFC. The JFS section should be jointly staffed and should be of sufficient size to effectively facilitate joint coordination of HSS initiatives, regionalization, standardization and interoperability, development of the HSS plan, and review of subordinate plans and operations.

Responsibilities. As depicted in the figure below, JFSs need to assess component command HSS requirements and capabilities, both quantitatively and qualitatively, and provide guidance to enhance the effectiveness of HSS through shared use of assets. JFSs should have the responsibility to:

- assist the combatant commander in formulating a recommended patient evacuation policy within the geographic area;
- assist the component commands in identifying HSS requirements of each component and assigning cross-Service support where practical;
- advise the JFC concerning HSS aspects of combat operations, intratheater rest, rotation, and reconstitution policies, preventive medicine, and other medical factors that could affect operations;
- inform the JFC on the status of HSS units, highlighting problems and other areas of interest or concern;
- monitor the status of patient beds, blood products, health service logistics, HSS staffing, and other issues affecting medical readiness;
- inform the JFC concerning the status of HSS and any assistance required by and provided to the civilian populace, US nationals, and enemy prisoners of war;
- advise supporting civil affairs forces on humanitarian and civic assistance activities within the joint force operations area;

- coordinate HSS provided to or received from allies or other friendly nations;
- coordinate medical intelligence support for HSS organizations;
- supervise the activities of the Theater Patient Movement Requirements Center and the Joint Blood Program Office;
- prepare the HSS annex to joint force plans;

RESPONSIBILITIES FOR JOINT HEALTH SUPPORT SERVICES (HSS)

COMBATANT COMMANDERS

Combatant commanders are responsible for coordinating and intergrating HSS within their theaters.

JOINT FORCE SURGEON (JFS)

The JFS coordinates matters for the JFC

Facilitates:

- Joint coordination of HSS initiatives
- Regionalization
- Standardization and interoperability
- Development of HSS plan
- Review of subordinate plans and operations

Assess component command HSS requirements and capabilities

Provides guidance to enhance effectiveness of HSS

Monitors the status of:

- Patient beds
- Blood products
- Health service logistics
- HSS staffing

Advises the JFC and informs on status of HSS units

Coordinates medical intelligence and support for HSS organizations (including assistance from allies)

Supervises the activities of the Theater Patient Movement Requirements Center and the Joint Blood Program Center

Prepares the HSS annex to joint force plans

Prepares bed requirement estimates

Liaison must be established between the JFS and each component surgeon

JFC— joint force commander

JOINT INTELLIGENCE ARCHITECTURE

- prepare bed requirement estimates based on the casualty estimates provided by the appropriate staff and extracted from the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System medical planning module;
- in conjunction with the joint force's legal office, advise the JFC on HSS aspects of the Geneva Conventions.

Related Terms

health service support

Source Joint Publications

JP 4-02 Doctrine for Health Service Support in Joint Operations

JOINT INTELLIGENCE ARCHITECTURE

A dynamic, flexible structure that consists of the National Military Joint Intelligence Center, the theater joint intelligence centers, and subordinate joint force joint intelligence centers. This architecture encompasses automated data processing equipment capabilities, communications and information flow requirements, and responsibilities to provide theater and tactical commanders with the full range of intelligence required for planning and conducting operations. JP 1-02

"In establishing a JIC at each combatant command, we have improved the quality of intelligence support to the warfighter while decreasing the resources required to produce such support."

CJCS Report on the Roles, Missions, and Functions of the Armed Forces of the United States, February 1993

General. The joint intelligence architecture provides the means to interconnect collectors, producers, and customers in an information network. All intelligence made available to the network from any source is stored and communicated as data whether it is a text file, graphics, imagery, or formatted information. The data is stored on a standards compliant file server. The file server is the interface with the communications network.

In keeping with the spirit of Command, Control, Communications, Computers And Intelligence (C4I) For The Warrior, the joint intelligence architecture is a dynamic, flexible structure providing global access to an information grid that consists of all intelligence sources at all echelons. The architecture facilitates the capability of the Defense Intelligence community to focus on supporting the joint force commander (JFC) and subordinate joint force components and to integrate support from non-Defense agencies and nongovernment organizations as needed. The joint intelligence architecture is configured to provide access to all intelligence sources from anywhere on the globe and to provide the baseline data that JFCs will need to support joint operations. This architecture conceptually describes equipment capabilities, information flow requirements, and responsibilities.

Principles. The Services and Department of Defense agencies responsible for organizing, training, and fielding intelligence systems and personnel must provide the Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, combatant commanders, and subordinate commanders as much flexibility as possible in assembling their intelligence support architectures. JFCs should be able to assemble an optimum mix of intelligence capabilities (personnel, procedures, and C4I), regardless of the source, and still receive adequate intelligence support. Intelligence systems, concepts, products, and language must be sufficiently interoperable for the exchange

INTELLIGENCE ARCHITECTURE PRINCIPLES

- Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence Interoperability
- Standards
- Data Bases
- Effective Training and Exercises
- Common Terminology and Symbols
- Interoperability of Intelligence Data and Product

and use of data in any form and from any source among intelligence organizations and operating commands and forces. Interoperability principles are shown in the figure above.

C4I Interoperability. The Director for Intelligence should ensure command elements' and supporting organizations' intelligence systems and communications are compatible for exchange of data, information, and intelligence products. If components' intelligence systems cannot receive or exchange intelligence data, the systems are not interoperable. Interoperability of systems also relates to intelligence data processing and related equipment.

Intelligence Product Interoperability. Intelligence organizations producing joint intelligence should ensure that intelligence products are in a form, content, and language usable by all components of the joint force performing similar and related functions. For example, if one component requires maps with Military Grid Reference System (MGRS) (which also includes universal transverse mercator) coordinates while another cooperating component uses charts with geographic coordinates, location information should be expressed with both MGRS and geographic coordinates.

Common Terminology and Symbols. Intelligence organizations should understand and use concepts, language, terminology, names, and symbols common to all joint force components.

Standards. Factors that promote interoperability can be expressed in standards. Standards are sets of guidelines and criteria for continuity and similarity of data, protocols, formats, terminology, equipment, and signals that promote the exchange, understanding, and application of intelligence requirements and intelligence products among intelligence organizations and JFCs. Standards for interoperability should be developed and incorporated into intelligence systems, equipment, and procedures providing intelligence for joint operations. Standards need to be enforced in peacetime to facilitate transition to operations other than war or war.


Effective Training and Exercises. Intelligence interoperability problems reduce the ability of a joint force to attain unity of effort. Thus, an important concept is to use realistic training, exercises, and rehearsals of operations to demonstrate, test, and evaluate the joint interoperability of intelligence systems and intelligence products.

Data Bases. Ability of all echelons of the joint force to access archives and common data bases is key to successful intelligence operations.

Communications. To maximize the utility of the architecture, systems must meet standards of connectivity using standard communications protocols and standard encryption devices that must be available at all echelons. The architecture has the flexibility to accommodate,

not to replace, existing indication and warning and direct support systems. It is intended to overlay additional capabilities using existing communications carriers.

The joint intelligence architecture uses the Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System (JWICS) and Joint Deployable Intelligence Support System (JDISS) as the joint standard and foundation for commonality among support systems. As shown in the figure below, JWICS satisfies the requirement for secure, high-speed, multimedia transmission services for intelligence information. JWICS incorporates advanced networking technologies that permit greater throughput and capacity, making possible the use of applications that take advantage of multimedia technologies including video teleconferencing. Each JWICS node can create, receive, transmit, and store video images as well as voice, text, graphics, and data. Information can be either broadcast or shared interactively among JWICS subscribers on a point-to-point or multipoint basis. The JWICS circuit can be managed via allocation of bandwidth, allowing simultaneous use of the link for multiple applications. JWICS is an integral part of the sensitive compartmented information portion of the Defense Information Systems Network.



All-source intelligence dissemination in support of joint operations at the national, theater, and subordinate joint force levels will be via JWICS and JDISS. (See figure below.) These systems support the production, dissemination, and display of fused intelligence critical to theater battle management. The architecture provides access to data from national, theater and tactical intelligence organizations and sources primarily from a “push-pull” system. A “pull” concept will result in JFCs receiving only high-quality, relevant intelligence based on their mission and phase of the operation. The “pull” capability is designed to prevent communications circuit saturation. In addition, time-sensitive intelligence will be “pushed” to JFCs and components via dedicated broadcasts in response to preplanned essential elements of information. Automated data processing interoperability with force level systems will be accomplished by JDISS integration. Through JWICS connectivity, intelligence production at the national level can be shared in near real time with the JFC. Automated processing and seamless connectivity at all levels allow intelligence analysts at all levels access to imagery

JOINT DEPLOYABLE INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT SYSTEM

A transportable workstation and communications suite that electronically extends a joint intelligence center to a joint task force or other tactical user.

and multiple data bases while concurrently producing intelligence products in response to specific mission requirements. This up, down, and across echelon interface among strategic, operational, and tactical intelligence organizations is the backbone for joint intelligence dissemination.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 2-0 Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Operations


JOINT INTELLIGENCE CENTER/JOINT INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT ELEMENT

The intelligence center of the joint force headquarters. The joint intelligence center is responsible for providing and producing the intelligence required to support the joint force commander and staff, components, task forces and elements, and the national intelligence community. Also called JIC. JP 1-02

General. Secretary of Defense memorandum, 15 March 1991, "Strengthening Defense Intelligence," inter alia, established the joint intelligence center (JIC) as the primary intelligence organization providing support to joint warfighting at all levels. The JIC concept fuses the main support capabilities of all Service, Combat Support Agency, and combat units into a one stop shopping center for intelligence support. Although in reality, a particular JIC cannot be expected to completely satisfy every request for information; it can coordinate support from other intelligence organizations above and below its echelon. A subordinate joint force is supported by a joint intelligence support element (JISE), a tailored subset of a theater JIC.

All JICs/JISEs provide intelligence support to operational forces and perform common functions. The figure below provides a representative JIC organization wherein all major joint intelligence functional areas and liaison relationships are presented. As shown, the JIC is the principal Intelligence Directorate (J-2) organization supporting joint operations.


The JIC/JISE is, by design, scalable and can expand to meet the needs of the joint force commander (JFC). During noncrisis periods, JIC manning is normally retained at the minimum level required to perform essential functions such as indication and warning, current intelligence, collection management, delegated general military intelligence production, and



support to the commander. As crises develop, JICs at each echelon bring together personnel and equipment needed to manage intelligence support requirements. JISEs are established to meet the particular needs of subordinate joint forces. Collection, production, and dissemination resources are focused on the crisis. Liaison with intelligence production agencies and communications staffs identifies critical shortfalls, and action to correct deficiencies is accomplished. Because the JIC is the focal point for intelligence support to joint operations, augmentation personnel are drawn from many sources, including Reserves, as shown in the figure below.

At the national level, the National Military Joint Intelligence Center is the focal point for all defense intelligence activities in support of joint operations. Combatant commands have JICs focused on their geographic or functional responsibilities. A subordinate joint force, when established, also normally forms a JISE as the focus for intelligence in support of the JFC, joint staff, and components.

Functions. The JIC/JISE allows for efficient access to the entire Department of Defense intelligence infrastructure in support of joint operations. JICs/JISEs perform common functions although the degree to which they engage in specific functions varies according to command missions. The command’s J-2 and JIC/JISE are normally collocated, and it is the prerogative of command to define JIC functions and responsibilities, particularly with respect to the J-2 staff. In many cases, a responsibility may be shared between the J-2 staff and JIC/JISE. For example, the J-2 staff may be responsible for setting forth collection requirements, while the JIC may have the duties of implementing those requirements and managing their fulfillment.



Related Terms

joint intelligence architecture

Source Joint Publications

JP 2-0

Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Operations

JOINT LOGISTICS

The art and science of planning and carrying out, by a joint force commander and staff, logistic operations to support the protection, movement, maneuver, firepower, and sustainment of operating forces of two or more Services of the same nation. JP 1-02

Joint logistics is a complex, interdependent concept that can apply leverage (plus or minus) to a combatant commander's combat power. An understanding of the combatant commander's concept of operations and early involvement by the logistic staff will ensure that national and theater deployment and sustainment requirements are balanced with logistic capabilities. Logistic planning considerations aid the combatant commander in providing guidance to staff planners and assessing the adequacy and feasibility of campaign and operation plans. Joint doctrine discusses sustainment planning which is directed toward providing and maintaining levels of personnel, materiel, and consumables required to sustain the planned levels of combat activity for the estimated duration and at the desired level of intensity. Sustainment planning is the responsibility of the combatant commanders in close coordination with the Services and Defense agencies.

Joint theater logistics is applying logistic resources to generate and support theater combat power. The combatant commander's theater logistic concepts include balancing objectives, scheme of maneuver, and operations timing. It includes the concept of extending operational reach and logistic applications that apply to the theater. Combatant commanders must ensure that their campaign plans fully integrate operational and logistic capabilities. The combatant commanders must maintain an interrelationship between operations and logistics by insisting on close cooperation and early-on understanding of the missions assigned to subordinate commanders. The influence of the combatant commander is essential in bridging any operations-logistic gap.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 4-0 Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations

JOINT LOGISTICS-OVER-THE-SHORE

Joint logistics-over-the-shore (JLOTS) operations are defined as logistics-over-the-shore (LOTS) operations conducted jointly by two or more Service component forces of a commander of a unified command. Generally, JLOTS will exist in all but limited support operations.

LOTS is the loading and unloading of ships without the benefit of fixed port facilities in either friendly or undefended territory and, in time of war, during phases of theater development. LOTS operations are conducted over unimproved shorelines, through fixed ports not accessible to deep draft shipping, and through fixed ports that are inadequate without the use of LOTS capabilities.

The scope of JLOTS operations extends from acceptance of ships for offload through the arrival of equipment and cargo at inland staging and marshalling areas. Forces assigned to conduct the JLOTS operation are organized by the joint force commander. The JLOTS forces are normally organized along functional lines with Service elements integrated under

the operational control of the JLOTS commander. The composition of the JLOTS operational staff should contain appropriate representation of participating Service components. Each Service's senior officer or noncommissioned officer within the JLOTS organization should be afforded access to the JLOTS commander, and, via the JLOTS commander, to higher Service component commanders to address Service concerns or unique administrative requirements. In order to conduct effective JLOTS operations when called on to do so, JLOTS training and exercises need to be periodically conducted.

Related Terms

logistics-over-the-shore

Source Joint Publications

JP 4-01.6 Joint Logistics-Over-The-Shore Operations

JOINT MATERIEL PRIORITIES AND ALLOCATION BOARD

The Joint Materiel Priorities and Allocation Board is responsible for:

- modifying and recommending priorities for allocations of materiel assets for the fulfillment of logistic requirements of the theater (both US and allied forces);
- reviewing, acting on, or forwarding requests for modifications in force and activity designators to the Joint Staff;
- reviewing, acting on, or forwarding requests to establish or change the priorities in the master urgency list to the Joint Staff;
- preparing recommendations to the Joint Staff on modifications to priorities and allocations of resources assigned to other combatant commanders.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 4-0 Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations

JOINT MILITARY NET ASSESSMENT

The Joint Military Net Assessment (JMNA) is prepared by the Chairman in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the combatant commanders. It is submitted annually to the Secretary of Defense for his approval and submission to Congress in conjunction with the submission of the defense budget. The JMNA fulfills the Secretary of Defense's statutory duty to submit to Congress an annual comprehensive net assessment of the defense capabilities and programs of the Armed Forces of the United States and its allies compared with those of potential adversaries.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 5-0 Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations

JOINT MORTUARY AFFAIRS OFFICE

Plans and executes all mortuary affairs programs within a theater. Provides guidance to facilitate the conduct of all mortuary programs and to maintain data (as required) pertaining to recovery, identification, and disposition of all US dead and missing in the assigned theater. Serves as the central clearing point for all mortuary affairs and monitors the deceased and missing personal effects program. Also called JMAO. JP 1-02

Joint Mortuary Affairs Office (JMAO). Commanders of geographic combatant commands will establish a JMAO within their commands to provide oversight of mortuary affairs support. During military operations other than war, peacetime mass-fatality, or politically sensitive incidents, the commander determines if, when, and for how long the JMAO will be activated. The JMAO oversight responsibilities include the following:

- providing procedures concerned with search for, recovery and evacuation, tentative identification, and return of remains and personal effects. This includes providing guidance to Service components and to subordinate joint force or single-Service commands on the disposition of remains of those personnel assigned or attached to multinational forces;
- maintaining inventory data on Service component command mortuary affairs equipment and materials;
- coordinating with Service component commands for data on the recovery status of deceased and missing personnel when requested by combatant command casualty reporting agencies;
- coordinating interment, disinterment, and reinterment of remains within the area of responsibility. In wartime, this includes providing a recommendation to the respective geographic combatant commander regarding when remains can no longer be returned to continental US (CONUS);
- coordinating the establishment of suboffices, as required, to supervise mortuary affairs activities on a Service component, subordinate joint force, or geographic basis;



Deceased personnel are quickly evacuated to the Mortuary Affairs Collection Point.

- providing procedural guidance concerning transfer of enemy, enemy and friendly civilian, allied, and allied civilian remains and their personal effects (PE) to the custody of another government, including maintenance of records required by the Geneva Convention for the Protection of War Victims;
- designating port of embarkation holding facilities and surface and aerial evacuation of remains and PE;
- coordinating with the Chief, JMOA, Commander in Chief, US Transportation Command and the Armed Forces Medical Examiner to determine the CONUS port-of-entry military mortuary for Service component's return of remains;
- coordinating the development of the mortuary affairs support plan;
- maintaining a central records point for deceased and PE;
- maintaining liaison with the Joint Public Affairs Office.

The JMAO will continue to function after periods of military operations to oversee Service efforts to resolve the status and effect the evacuation of remains and PE not previously accomplished. The geographic combatant commander determines if the JMAO will continue to function in support of efforts to process remains and PE of non-US military personnel. The JMAO ensures that Service components forward all records to respective Service headquarters. The component's Service headquarters coordinates transfer of remains and records to parent Service control in CONUS. Parent Service headquarters are responsible for final archiving of records. The JMAO assists Service headquarters in coordinating these actions.

Related Terms

logistics

Source Joint Publications

JP 4-06

JTTP for Mortuary Affairs in Joint Operations

JOINT MOVEMENT CENTER

The center established to coordinate the employment of all means of transportation (including that provided by allies or host nations) to support the concept of operations. This coordination is accomplished through establishment of transportation policies within the assigned area of responsibility, consistent with relative urgency of need, port and terminal capabilities, transportation asset availability, and priorities set by a joint force commander. JP 1-02


The geographic combatant commander has a wide range of options for performing movement control. He may direct subordinate joint force commander and Service components to perform their own movement control. He may establish a theater Joint Transportation Board (JTB) or a Joint Movement Center (JMC), or both. However, to ensure a fully integrated and responsive transportation system, the combatant commander should consider assigning responsibility for theater transportation movement control to a single joint office, the JMC. This JMC must be equipped with sufficient communication and automation capability to ensure adequate interface between strategic and theater transportation systems and the combatant commander's staff. This organization must be skilled in coordinating and directing theater transportation operations in support of unit movements and/or logistic resupply operations. The combatant commander's logistics staff would form the nucleus of a movement control organization, but to properly execute a theater movement control mission, an additional pre-designated, fully trained joint organization is required. Ideally, such an organization would

JOINT MOVEMENT CENTER

be identified as a force deployment option in an operation plan (OPLAN) and be established early in the theater to coordinate arrival, theater expansion, and operations movement planning and execution.

If the geographic combatant commander establishes a JMC, it should coordinate the employment of all means of theater transportation (including that provided by allies or host nations (HNs)) to support the concept of operations. The JMC should also be the single coordinator of strategic movements between the combatant commander and US Transportation Command. In addition, it oversees the execution of theater transportation priorities. The JMC should be responsible for planning movement operations and for monitoring the overall performance of the theater transportation system. The JMC conducts cyclic reviews of apportionment decisions and acts on emergency transportation requests. When there is no theater JTB, the JMC is the primary advisor to the geographic combatant commander in the apportionment process. The JMC identifies the variance between forecasted requirements and current capabilities of all modes to assist in the planning process. It expedites action and coordination for immediate movement requirements to ensure effective and efficient use of transportation resources.

The JMC is organized functionally and designed with a peacetime nucleus. It expands in proportion to the size of the force and the desires of the geographic combatant commander. A fully developed JMC should have an Administrative Section and two divisions such as a Plans and Programs Division and an Operations Division. Advisory members from functional areas that impact movement planning and execution augment the JMC, as needed. The figure below shows a suggested organization.



The geographic combatant commander should first use his own staff and Service component staff personnel resources to form the nucleus of a JMC. The commander should consider including manning to coordinate requirements for contracting with HN authorities for use of available civil transportation and facilities. When expanding a JMC, the geographic combatant commander must consider the structure of his dominant force and component-unique movement control requirements. The combatant commander may also draw on reserve personnel to augment the JMC. Reserve augmentation personnel should participate in exercises to assure they are familiar with the procedures of a joint force headquarters. Geographic combatant commanders should ensure reserve augmentation forces are properly sequenced in either an exercise or actual time-phased force and deployment data. Finally, the combatant commander may coordinate through the Commander in Chief, US Atlantic Command and the Commander in Chief, US Transportation Command on the creation of a JMC force deployment option package that could be easily inserted into an OPLAN. Likewise, if this JMC augmentation package is established, it must be provided the opportunity to train with the combatant commander's and Service components' staffs.

Related Terms

movement control

Source Joint Publication

JP 4-01.3 JTTP for Movement Control

JOINT OPERATION PLANNING

Planning for contingencies which can reasonably be anticipated in an area of responsibility or joint operations area of the command. Planning activities exclusively associated with the preparation of operation plans, operation plans in concept format, campaign plans, and operation orders (other than the single integrated operation plan) for the conduct of military operations by the combatant commanders in response to requirements established by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint operation planning is coordinated at the national level to support Secretary of Defense Contingency Planning Guidance, strategic requirements in the National Military Strategy, and emerging crises. As such, joint operation planning includes mobilization planning, deployment planning, employment planning, sustainment planning, and redeployment planning procedures. Joint operation planning is performed in accordance with formally established planning and execution procedures. JP 1-02

General. Joint operation planning is directed toward the employment of military forces within the context of a military strategy to attain specified objectives for possible contingencies. Joint operation planning is conducted within the chain of command that runs from the National Command Authorities (NCA) to the combatant commanders and is primarily the responsibility of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the combatant commanders. At the national level, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in coordination with the Chiefs of the Services, is principally responsible for the unified planning to employ the armed forces in support of national security objectives. Joint operation planning includes the preparation of plans (e.g., operation plans and campaign plans) and orders (e.g., operation orders) by the combatant commanders as well as those joint planning activities that support the development of these operation plans or orders. These activities also incorporate the functions of the Military

Departments and Services. Joint operation planning is a sequential process performed simultaneously at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war.

Strategic Planning. At the strategic level, joint operation planning involves the development of strategic military objectives and tasks in support of national security strategy and the development of force and materiel requirements necessary to accomplish those tasks. Strategy is the art and science of developing and employing armed forces and other instruments of national power in a synchronized fashion to secure national objectives. The NCA translates policy into national strategic military objectives. These military objectives facilitate theater strategic planning. A geographic combatant commander usually participates in discussions with the NCA through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and with allies and coalition members. The combatant commanders plan at the strategic level of war through participation in the development of national military strategy, the development of theater estimates, and theater strategies. The theater strategy is thus an element that relates to both US national strategy and operational activities within the theater.

Operational Planning. Joint operation planning at the operational level links the tactical employment of forces to strategic objectives. The focus at this level is on operational art — the employment of military forces to attain strategic and/or operational objectives through the design, organization, integration, and conduct of strategies, campaigns, major operations, and battles. Operational art determines when, where, and for what purpose major forces will be employed and should influence the enemy disposition before combat. It governs the deployment of those forces, their commitment to or withdrawal from battle, and the arrangement of battles and major operations to achieve operational and strategic objectives.


Tactical Planning. At the tactical level of planning, tactics is the employment of units in combat. It includes the ordered arrangement and maneuver of units in relation to each other and to the enemy in order to use their full potential. Tactics are employed to fight and win engagements and battles.

Scope of Joint Operation Planning. As shown in the figure below, joint operation planning encompasses planning for the full range of activities required for conducting joint operations. These activities include the mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment, and redeployment of forces.

Mobilization Planning. Primarily the responsibility of the Services, mobilization planning is directed toward assembling and organizing national resources to support national objectives in time of war and for military operations other than war. Mobilization planning includes bringing all or part of the Armed Forces of the United States to the necessary state of readiness to meet the requirements of the specific contingency. Mobilization planning may include planning for the activation of all or part of the Reserve components, as well as assembling and organizing personnel, supplies, and materiel.

Deployment Planning. Deployment planning is the responsibility of the supported combatant commanders in close coordination with the United States Transportation Command. Deployment planning is planning to move forces and their sustainment resources from their original locations to a specific operational area to conduct joint operations outlined in a given plan. It involves planning for the continental US (CONUS), intertheater (strategic), and intratheater movement of forces and the required resources to sustain them. Strategic deployment planning focuses on the intertheater movement of forces and resources using national, allied and coalition strategic deployment capabilities.


Employment Planning. Employment planning prescribes how to apply force/forces to attain specified military objectives. Employment planning concepts are developed by the combatant commanders through their component commands. Employment planning provides



the foundation and determines the scope of mobilization, deployment, sustainment, and redeployment planning.

Sustainment Planning. Sustainment planning is directed toward providing and maintaining levels of personnel, materiel, and consumables required to sustain the planned levels of combat activity for the estimated duration and at the desired level of intensity. Sustainment planning is the responsibility of the combatant commanders in close coordination with the Services and Defense agencies.

Redeployment Planning. Redeployment planning is directed toward the transfer of units, individuals, or supplies deployed in one area to another area, or to another location within the area, or to the CONUS for the purpose of further employment. The demobilization of Reserve forces is considered during redeployment planning. The figure below represents the types of joint operation plans and the planning processes.



Related Terms

execution planning; Joint Operation Planning and Execution System.

Source Joint Publications

JP 5-0 Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations

JOINT OPERATION PLANNING AND EXECUTION SYSTEM

A continuously evolving system that is being developed through the integration and enhancement of earlier planning and execution systems: Joint Operation Planning System and Joint Deployment System. It provides the foundation for conventional command and control by national- and theater-level commanders and their staffs. It is designed to satisfy their information needs in the conduct of joint planning and operations. Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) includes joint operation planning policies, procedures, and reporting structures supported by communications and automated data processing systems. JOPES is used to monitor, plan, and execute mobilization, deployment, employment, and sustainment activities associated with joint operations. Also called JOPES. JP 1-02

General. The joint operation planning process is a coordinated joint staff procedure used by commanders to determine the best method of accomplishing assigned tasks and to direct the actions necessary to accomplish those tasks. Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) is used to conduct joint planning. JOPES facilitates the building and maintenance of operation plans (OPLANS) and concept plans (with or without time-phased force and deployment data). It aids in the development of effective options and operation orders through adaptation of OPLANS or plan creation in a no-plan scenario. JOPES provides policies and procedures to ensure effective management of planning operations across the spectrum of mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment, and redeployment. As part of the Worldwide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS), JOPES supports the deployment and transportation aspects of joint operation planning and execution. (The Global Command and Control System is replacing the WWMCCS.)

JOPEs Functions. JOPEs contains five basic planning functions — threat identification and assessment, strategy determination, course of action development, detailed planning, and implementation, as shown in the figure below.

Threat Identification and Assessment. This function involves detecting actual and potential threats to national security, alerting decision makers, and then determining threat capabilities and intentions. This function supports all organizational levels during planning and execution. It gives information for strategic planning and resource allocations at the national level, by developing courses of action (COAs) and detailed planning at the operational level, and monitoring and adjusting operations during execution.

Strategy Determination. This function furnishes direction from the national level for developing COAs. It assists the National Command Authorities (NCA) and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) in formulating appropriate options to counter the threat. Strategy determination involves formulating politico-military assessments, clearly defining political and military objectives or end states, developing strategic concepts and options, apportioning forces and other resources, and formulating planning guidance.


COA Development. COA development support includes JOPEs functions that help the supported commander's staff develop and test alternative COAs based on NCA/CJCS task assignments, guidance, and force and resource allocation. This facilitates development of the CINC's Strategic Concept in deliberate planning and the commander's estimate in crisis action planning.

Detailed Planning. This function supports preparation of the approved concept of operations or COA for implementation. It facilitates the following:

- Development and time-phasing of detailed force lists and required sustainment.
- Development of directives, schedules, and orders.
- Determination of support requirements, including medical, civil engineering, air refueling, host-nation support, and transportation needs.
- Identification and resolution of force and resource shortfalls and constraints.

The result is development of detailed, fully integrated mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment, and redeployment activities based on the approved concept of operations or COA.

Implementation. This function gives decision makers the tools to monitor, analyze, and manage plan execution. Planning is a cyclic process that continues throughout implementation. Of particular importance is the ability to redirect forces, adjust priorities, or influence events



JOINT OPERATIONS

as the situation unfolds. Implementation usually ends with some type of replanning effort, such as redeployment or redirection of operations.

Related Terms

campaign planning; crisis action planning; deliberate planning; joint operation planning.

Source Joint Publications

JP 5-0 Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations

JOINT OPERATIONS

A general term to describe military actions conducted by joint forces, or by Service forces in relationships (e.g., support, coordinating authority), which, of themselves, do not create joint forces. JP 1-02

“Joint operations” are military actions conducted by joint forces or Service forces in relationships (e.g., support, coordinating authority), which, of themselves, do not create joint forces. The requirement to plan and conduct joint operations demands expanded intellectual horizons and broadened professional knowledge. Leaders who aspire to joint command must not only have mastered the essentials of their own Service capabilities, but also must understand the fundamentals of combat power represented by the other Services. Beyond that, they must have a clear sense of how these capabilities are integrated for the conduct of joint and multinational operations. This individual professional growth, reinforced by military education and varied Service and joint assignments, leads to a refined capability to command joint forces in peace and war.

Related Terms

joint

Source Joint Publications


JP 1 Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States
JP 0-2 Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)

JOINT OPERATIONS AREA

An area of land, sea, and airspace, defined by a geographic combatant commander or subordinate unified commander, in which a joint force commander (normally a joint task force commander) conducts military operations to accomplish a specific mission. Joint operations areas are particularly useful when operations are limited in scope and geographic area or when operations are to be conducted on the boundaries between theaters. Also called JOA. JP 1-02

To assist in the coordination and deconfliction of joint action, joint force commanders (JFCs) may define operational areas or joint areas. (See figure below.) The size of these areas and the types of forces employed within them depend on the scope and nature of the crisis and the projected duration of operations. For operations somewhat limited in scope and duration, geographic combatant commanders can employ a joint operations area (JOA). A JOA is an area of land, sea, and airspace, defined by a geographic combatant commander or subordinate unified commander, in which a JFC (normally a joint task force commander) conducts military operations to accomplish a specific mission. JOAs are particularly useful

OPERATIONAL AREAS WITHIN A THEATER



This example depicts a combatant commander's AOR, also known as a theater. Within the AOR, the CINC has designated a theater of war with two subordinate theaters of operations. Also within the theater of war is a JSOA. To handle a situation outside the theater of war, the CINC has established a JOA, within which a JTF will operate. JOAs could also be established within the theater of war or theaters of operations.

when operations are limited in scope and geographic area. JOAs are also appropriate when operations are to be conducted on the boundaries between theaters.

Related Terms

area of responsibility; joint special operations area

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations

JOINT PETROLEUM OFFICE

The geographic combatant commander has the predominant fuels responsibility within a theater, and this responsibility is discharged by the Joint Petroleum Office (JPO). The JPO works in conjunction with its Service components and the Defense Fuel Supply Center to plan, coordinate, and oversee all phases of bulk petroleum support for US forces employed or planned for possible employment in the theater.

Related Terms

bulk petroleum

Source Joint Publications

JP 4-03 Joint Bulk Petroleum Doctrine

JOINT PLANNING AND EXECUTION COMMUNITY

Those headquarters, commands, and agencies involved in the training, preparation, movement, reception, employment, support, and sustainment of military forces assigned or committed to a theater of operations or objective area. It usually consists of the Joint Staff, Services, Service major commands (including the Service wholesale logistics commands), unified commands (and their certain Service component commands), subunified commands, transportation component commands, joint task forces (as applicable), Defense Logistics Agency, and other Defense agencies (e.g., Defense Intelligence Agency) as may be appropriate to a given scenario. Also called JPEC.


JP 1-02

General. Planning for joint operations is continuous throughout the range of military operations. As such, joint operation planning employs an integrated process entailing similar policies and procedures during war and military operations other than war, providing for orderly and coordinated problem solving and decision making. In its peacetime application, the process is highly structured to support the thorough and fully coordinated development of deliberate plans. In crisis, the process is shortened, as necessary, to support the dynamic requirements of changing events. In wartime, the process adapts to accommodate greater decentralization of joint operation planning activities. In all its applications, the basic process remains fundamentally unchanged and provides a consistent and logical approach for integrating the activities of the National Command Authorities (NCA), Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, combatant commanders, and all other members of the Joint Planning and Execution Community (JPEC) in a coherent planning and execution process to attain military objectives.

Interoperable planning and execution systems are essential to effective planning for joint operations. The activities of the entire planning community must be integrated through an interoperable joint system that provides for uniform policies, procedures, and reporting structures supported by modern communications and computer systems. The system designed to provide interoperability is the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES). JOPES encompasses the entire JPEC. JOPES is, first and foremost, policies and procedures that guide joint operation planning efforts. JOPES Automated Data Processing provides computer support, primarily for transportation planning associated with deployment operations.

The headquarters, commands, and agencies involved in planning for the mobilization, training, preparation, movement, reception, employment, support, and sustainment of forces assigned or committed to a theater of war or theater of operations are collectively termed the JPEC. The JPEC consists of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Joint Staff, the Services, the combatant commands and their component commands, subunified commands, joint task forces (JTFs) (if established), and Defense agencies. (See figure below.)

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, manages the joint operation planning process. In peacetime, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff assigns planning tasks and resources, establishes planning relationships, and approves joint operation plans. In crisis and war, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff orchestrates the development of strategic options and courses of action (COAs), resolves conflicts in resources, provides



recommendations and risk assessments to the NCA, conveys NCA decisions to the combatant commanders, and monitors the deployment and employment of forces.

Services. The Services and United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) provide interoperable forces for assignment to the combatant commanders and provide for logistic support to the combatant commanders. USSOCOM's responsibility to equip special operations forces (SOF) is limited to special operations-peculiar equipment, materiel, supplies and services, and Service-common equipment specified in appropriate written agreements. The Services also maintain reserve forces and prepare for the expansion of capabilities in time of war. For joint operation planning, the Services and USSOCOM make recommendations regarding the apportionment of forces and resources to the Joint Staff and, upon approval, identify the specific units and support to be allocated to the combatant commanders' joint operation plans. The Services prepare detailed mobilization, sustainment, and mobility plans containing the identification of the actual forces and support allocated.

Combatant Commands. The combatant commanders are principally responsible for the preparation and implementation of joint operation plans. During peacetime, they participate in the development of national military and theater strategies and develop operation plans in the deliberate planning process. This is a continual process. During crises, they expand and refine existing plans or develop new plans, and recommend COAs. When military operations

JOINT PLANNING DOCUMENT

are required in time of conflict, combatant commanders conduct joint operations. Campaigns are planned and conducted when the contemplated military operations exceed the scope of a single major joint operation or battle.

Service Component Commands. The Service component commands perform joint planning functions both within the chain of command and under the administrative control of the Military Departments. Within the chain of command, the Service component commands recommend the proper force composition and employment of Service forces, provide Service forces and support information for joint planning, and prepare component-level operation plans or operation orders in support of taskings assigned to the combatant commands. Under administrative control, the Service component commands prepare and execute administrative and logistic plans to support operating forces.

Special Operations Component Commands. Combatant commanders with geographic responsibilities establish theater special operations commands (SOCs) as subordinate unified commands to serve as the joint force special operations component commander (JFSOCC) of their unified command. Similarly, subordinate joint force commanders may establish a joint special operations task force commander to serve as the JFSOCC of a subordinate joint force. This individual typically exercises operational control or tactical control over assigned and attached forces in order to enhance unity of effort of special operations throughout the joint force. USSOCOM provides similar support to the theater SOCs that the Services provide to their respective Service component commands within the combatant commands. The JFSOCC reports to the joint force commander and is the principal adviser for special operations within the joint force. The JFSOCC provides recommendations on organization and employment considerations for SOF and, when directed, prepares component-level operation plans.

Subordinate Joint Commands. When established, subunified commands and JTFs perform joint planning functions similar to those of the combatant commands for specified missions or designated joint operations areas. Such functions are accomplished under the direction of the authority that established the subordinate command.

Related Terms

joint operation planning

Source Joint Publications

JP 5-0 Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations

JOINT PLANNING DOCUMENT

The Joint Planning Document supports the National Military Strategy by providing concise programming priorities, requirements, or advice to the Secretary of Defense for consideration during preparation of the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG). Published as stand-alone documents addressing specific functional areas, joint planning document volumes are coordinated and collaborated with the Chiefs of the Services, combatant commanders and Defense agencies, and serve as a conduit for input to the DPG.

Related Terms

defense planning guidance; national military strategy

Source Joint Publications

JP 5-0 Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations

JOINT PUBLICATION

Publication of joint interest prepared under the cognizance of Joint Staff directorates and applicable to the Military Departments, combatant commands, and other authorized agencies. It is approved by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in coordination with the combatant commands, Services, and Joint Staff. Also called JP. JP 1-02

Only publications approved by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff will be referred to as “joint publications.” Publications involving two or more Services that have not been reviewed and approved by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff will be referred to as “multi-Service” and will identify the participating Services (e.g., Army and Air Force doctrine or Army, Navy, and Air Force procedures).

Related Terms

joint doctrine; joint tactics, techniques, and procedures.

Source Joint Publications

JP 1-01 Joint Publication System, Joint Doctrine and JTTP Development Program

JOINT REAR AREA

A specific land area within a joint force commander’s area of operations designated to facilitate protection and operation of installations and forces supporting the joint force. JP 1-02

General. A joint rear area (JRA) is a specific land area within a joint force commander’s (JFC’s) operational area designated by the JFC to facilitate protection and operation of installations and forces supporting the joint force. The size of a JRA may vary considerably and is highly dependent on the size of the operational area, logistic support requirements, threat, or scope of the joint operation. A JRA is usually to the rear of the combat zone, but it is not necessarily contiguous to the combat zone. The airspace above the JRA is normally not included in the JRA; airspace is normally considered a combat zone governed by airspace control procedures.

A JRA may be collocated with the communications zone but normally would not include a naval area of operations (AO). Operations in sea areas are considered to be part of a combat zone and will not normally be included in a JRA. When a naval AO and a JRA meet along a coastline, the high water mark will normally designate the boundary between the two. Ports and harbors (but not the built-up areas around them) are normally included in the naval AO.

A JRA in a joint operation may adjoin the rear areas of one or more of the combat forces making up the combat power of the joint force. A JRA can be adapted to any modern environment. In any circumstance, a JRA may be segmented and may contain isolated pockets of relatively secure support areas that may collectively make up a JRA.

Concurrent with the designation of a JRA, the geographic combatant commander or subordinate JFC normally designates a joint rear area coordinator (JRAC). The JRAC is responsible for coordinating and maintaining the overall security of the JRA as directed by the JFC. The JRAC is a critical link in coordinating security, establishing reliable intelligence and counterintelligence support, and ensuring secure and survivable communications with

JOINT REAR AREA

all forces operating in the JRA. The area air defense commander (AADC) is responsible for the defense of the airspace above the JRA.

General of the Army William T. Sherman on the Nature of the Rear Area

“I never saw the rear of an army engaged in battle but [when observing troops in the rear] I feared that some calamity had happened at the front - the apparent confusion, broken wagons, crippled horses, men lying about dead and maimed, parties hastening to and fro in seeming disorder, and a general apprehension of something dreadful about to ensue; all these signs, however, lessened as I neared the front, and there the contrast was complete - perfect order, men and horses full of confidence, and it was not unusual for general hilarity, laughing, and cheering. Although cannon might be firing, the musketry clattering, and the enemy's shot hitting close, there reigned a general feeling of strength and security that bore a marked contrast to the bloody signs that had drifted rapidly to the rear; therefore, for comfort and safety, I surely would rather be at the front than the rear line of battle.”

Source: The Memoirs of General W. T. Sherman, 1885

Operations. Operations occurring within the JRA either protect the JRA or support the joint force. They are best described as broad functions and include, but are not limited to, the items shown in the figure below.

Security. The security function addresses those measures or activities used to protect against hostile threats in order to ensure survival and sustainment of mission capability. It also includes the specific category of security operations that contributes to the security of the

OPERATIONS WITHIN THE JOINT REAR AREA

Security
Communications
Intelligence
Sustainment
Area Management
Movements
Infrastructure Development
Host-Nation Support

joint force. Security is the principal concern of this publication. Other functions are discussed as they relate to the security of the JRA. Security includes area damage control.

Communications. A command, control, communications, and computer system should be established throughout the JRA that will provide for interoperable, secure, reliable, and redundant communications.

Intelligence. Effective intelligence support, merged with counterintelligence and law enforcement agency information, is essential to conducting successful security operations in the JRA. Current intelligence and counterintelligence estimates focused on the JRA should incorporate intelligence from all US, multinational, and host nation (HN) sources.

Sustainment. The primary mission of many of the forces in the JRA is to sustain the joint force. All security and counterintelligence activities are focused on providing a secure JRA in which force sustainment can continue. The time support units spend performing security and self defense operations may detract from their ability to meet support requirements.

Area Management. The effective utilization and positioning of military assets in the JRA is critical to successful operations. Both mission support and security should be considered when positioning assets throughout the JRA.

Movements. The planning, routing, scheduling, control, and security of the movement of personnel and materiel in the JRA is vital to the support of the joint force. The JFC normally centralizes transportation movement control at the highest level by designating a joint movement center where it can be exercised to ensure that common-user transportation resources are allocated to support command missions and priorities.



Flightline security in the JRA is vital to deploying joint force personnel and materiel.

Infrastructure Development. The availability of adequate and secure facilities in the JRA for elements of the joint force is essential. Close coordination with HN forces and governing agencies is required for use of their facilities or for construction of new facilities on their territory as well as forces necessary to establish and maintain security of the facilities. The required level of base development should be established as early as possible in order to prevent overloading of transportation modes with excess construction material.

Host-Nation Support (HNS). A viable and friendly HN can provide invaluable civil and/or military assistance to US forces throughout the range of military operations. This assistance,

backed by mutual agreements between nations, can significantly contribute to support of the joint force and security of the JRA. The completion of a range of HN agreements is required in order to define relationships and roles explicitly in areas of strategic interest to the US. When more than one HN is involved, careful management is required to ensure that specific national restrictions are met. Joint operations areas encompassing more than one HN may require significantly different restrictions and sensitivities for each nation involved. Violations could result in loss of HNS, which could significantly affect US forces' ability to achieve national objectives. Operations may occur in a foreign nation whose sovereignty remains viable and where HNS agreements are in effect. In such cases, responsibility for selected JRA functions may be passed to the HN. In any case, overall responsibility for JRA operations remains with the JFC.

Joint Rear Area Coordinator (JRAC). Establishing and maintaining security in the JRA, although vital to the survivability and success of the joint force, is nevertheless an economy of force mission. The JFC dedicates assets for force protection operations in proportion to the severity of the threat in order to conserve resources and prevent degradation of support, which is the primary mission of most of the forces in the JRA. In a low-threat environment, where the inherent defensive capabilities of bases and support or HN forces are generally adequate to deter the threat and the focus of most security efforts is on thorough security planning, the JFC may determine that a JRAC working closely with appropriate commanders, staff, and HN commands has sufficient authority to manage the overall security of the JRA.

JRAC Selection Options. The JFC may designate a subordinate commander or a member of the JFC's staff as the JRAC. The JFC considers mission requirements, force capabilities, the nature of the JRA, and the threat in determining the JRAC.

General JRAC Responsibilities. The JRAC is responsible for coordinating the overall security of the JRA in accordance with JFC directives and priorities. The JRAC accomplishes this by coordinating with appropriate JRA commanders to ensure that they maintain the security of their respective AOs in order to facilitate sustainment, HNS, infrastructure development, and movements of the joint force. The JRAC also ensures that commanders establish reliable intelligence support and practice area management within their AOs with due consideration of security requirements. Additionally, the JRAC establishes secure and survivable communications with all forces and commands operating in or transiting the JRA. The JRAC is also responsible for ensuring that the surface area security requirements and priorities for the JRA are integrated in the overall security requirements of the joint force and are coordinated with the area air defense commander who is responsible for defending the airspace over the joint rear area.

Security Integration Responsibilities. Although other agencies or components may have primary responsibility for specific JRA functions, the JRAC is responsible for coordinating the security aspects of all functions throughout the JRA. The JRAC's overall coordination responsibility for security of the JRA does not lessen the responsibility that component elements residing or operating in the JRA have for their own security.

Specific JRAC Responsibilities. Specific responsibilities across the range of military operations include coordinating with appropriate commanders and staff to ensure that the following applies:

- The security posture in the JRA supports the JFC's concept of operations and is adaptable to support future operations.
- The overall JRA security plan is developed and coordinated with appropriate US, multinational, and HN commands in accordance with JFC directives and guidelines.

- The chain of command established by the JFC and the degree of authority granted to the JRAC are adequate for the mutual protection and security of all US personnel and assets in the JRA.
- Sufficient response forces are identified to respond to anticipated threats to the JRA.
- the intelligence, counterintelligence, and law enforcement networks are responsive to the needs of commanders operating in the JRA.
- Objective criteria are developed and disseminated for assessing the criticality and vulnerability of bases in the JRA in order to prioritize security improvements and position reaction forces or area damage control assets.
- Coordination with the AADC has been completed to ensure that air defense requirements for the JRA are integrated into US, multinational, and/or HN air defense plans in accordance with JFC priorities and concept of operations.



One of the most important JRAC responsibilities is to ensure an adequate NBC defense.

- Positioning and stationing of units and facilities in the JRA are made with due consideration for security.
- Defense plans incorporate adequate provisions and procedures for nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) defense, to include NBC warning and reporting procedures.
- Appropriate liaison is established with multinational and HN commands for coordination of security issues.
- All relevant international and domestic (US and HN) legal guidelines impacting on security within the JRA (such as HNS agreements, Law of War guidance, status-of-forces agreements, and rules of engagement) are disseminated to appropriate command levels.
- Civil Affairs and Judge Advocate support are available to assist in resolution of security issues.
- Development and positioning of infrastructure are made with due consideration of security requirements.
- Component commander(s) in the JRA coordinate security at the boundaries of their AOs (if the JRA is divided) to ensure coordinated JRA security efforts.
- Threat estimates to the JRA are developed and disseminated to appropriate commands in a timely manner.

JOINT SEARCH AND RESCUE CENTER

- A tactical combat force, if established by the JFC, is positioned and given the appropriate mission in accordance with JFC directives.
- Any additional security forces (US, multinational, and/or HN) are properly integrated into an overall JRA defense plan.
- Key lines of communications through the JRA are protected to support current and future operations.
- Key movements and sustainment operations have priority for security, mine detection and clearing, and area damage control assets.
- Liaison is established with the naval coastal warfare commander to coordinate security operations. (NOTE: If it is necessary to plan and/or execute an amphibious operation in the JRA, the JRAC also establishes liaison with the Commander, Amphibious Task Force (CATF), and the Commander, Landing Force (CLF), as required. The JRAC's authority will not infringe on the authority granted the CATF and CLF.)

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-10 Doctrine for Joint Rear Area Operations

JOINT SEARCH AND RESCUE CENTER

A primary search and rescue facility suitably staffed by supervisory personnel and equipped for planning, coordinating, and executing joint search and rescue and combat search and rescue operations within the geographical area assigned to the joint force. The facility is operated jointly by personnel from two or more Service or functional components or it may have a multinational staff of personnel from two or more allied or coalition nations (multinational search and rescue center). The joint search and rescue center should be staffed equitably by trained personnel drawn from each joint force component, including US Coast Guard participation where practical. Also called JSRC. JP 1-02

Joint Search and Rescue Center (JSRC). (See figure below.) The JSRC is a primary search and rescue (SAR) facility suitably staffed by supervisory personnel and equipped for planning, coordinating, and executing joint SAR and combat search and rescue (CSAR) operations within the geographical area assigned to the joint force. The facility is operated jointly by personnel from two or more Service or functional components or it may have a multinational staff of personnel from two or more allied or coalition nations (multinational SAR center). The JSRC should be staffed equitably by trained personnel drawn from each joint force component, including US Coast Guard participation where practical. During peacetime, standing JSRCs normally assist in developing integrated evasion and recovery concepts of operations to support operation plans (OPLANs), operation plan in concept format (CONPLANs), and peacetime operations. The standing JSRCs also coordinate training and exercises in order to provide a trained joint staff element for combat operations that is capable and ready to plan, coordinate, and execute joint CSAR missions as tasked by the joint force commander (JFC).

Responsibilities and Functions. Other typical CSAR-related JSRC responsibilities and functions in peacetime and combat are listed below.

Peacetime Operations

- Develop joint force CSAR standing operating procedures (SOPs).

SEARCH AND RESCUE CENTERS

Joint Force Commanders

Joint Search and Rescue Center: Plans, coordinates, and executes joint search and rescue operations within the geographical area assigned to the joint force.

Component Commanders

Rescue Coordination Center (RCC): Coordinates all component combat search and rescue activities including coordination with the joint search and rescue center and other component RCCs.

- Develop CSAR communications plans.
- Establish reporting requirements for the JSRC and component rescue coordination centers (RCCs).
- Assist in the development of CSAR appendixes to Annex C (Operations) to OPLANs, CONPLANs, and operation orders (OPORDs). Ensure the CSAR appendixes are linked to related appendixes for casualty affairs, medical, repatriation, and mortuary affairs.
- Coordinate and deconflict component evasion and recovery (E&R) plans and review them for supportability.
- Develop an integrated personnel recovery concept of operations to support peacetime operations.
- Conduct or provide on-the-job training and informal training for JSRC personnel and component RCC augmentation personnel.
- Organize and conduct CSAR mission training exercises for the joint force.
- Coordinate peacetime SAR activities to provide realistic training for the JSRC in operational procedures.
- Develop a plan to transition from peacetime to combat operations.
 - Develop augmentation personnel requirements.
 - Establish additional communications support requirements.
 - Establish dedicated intelligence support requirements, to include joint force joint intelligence center (JIC)/joint intelligence support element support requirements.

Combat Operations

- Develop a joint force CSAR threat decision matrix tailored to the current threat analysis.
- Develop and disseminate special instructions to be included in air tasking orders to specify the primary theater CSAR and recovery guidance, concepts, and specific procedures to be followed by all high-risk combatants.
- Alert appropriate components of the location where isolated personnel are known or believed to be located.
- Coordinate with national, theater JIC, host-nation, and component intelligence resources to gather information relating to the location and status of isolated personnel and the threat that may affect their successful recovery.

- Coordinate with the joint force psychological operations (PSYOP) officer on ways to influence favorably the local population regarding CSAR efforts.
- Coordinate and deconflict mutual CSAR support operations by joint force components and multinational forces.
- Monitor all CSAR incidents prosecuted by component RCCs.
- Maintain a data base and file on each isolated person until recovery is complete. Forward all files and the data base to the Joint Services Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape Agency once the recovery mission is complete and the JFC no longer has a requirement to maintain the files. The files should not be destroyed.

Other JSRC Responsibilities

- Coordinates JFC tasking of other component RCCs to execute CSAR missions when notified that a component RCC is unable to do so or requires support.
- Coordinates with component commands for use of nondedicated CSAR resources when appropriate.
- Coordinates for use of special operations forces with the operations directorate or section (J-3) and the joint force special operations component as appropriate.
- Coordinates development of a CSAR task force with component CSAR controllers when appropriate.
- Coordinates with the intelligence directorate or section (J-2) and/or the special operations component to alert E&R nets, where established and activated, to assist isolated personnel.
- Alerts all forces operating in the area of the CSAR incident to report any evidence of isolated personnel.
- Determines if current operations will provide temporary air superiority in the vicinity of the isolated personnel, resulting in collateral support of the CSAR effort.

Joint Search and Rescue Center Authority. The JFC should grant authority to the JSRC commensurate with CSAR responsibilities assigned. For example, JFCs may exercise their authority to task component forces committed to conduct joint CSAR operations through the JSRC. If the JFC has tasked a component commander to designate the component RCC to function also as the JSRC, the JFC should give the necessary authority to that component commander, who subsequently may grant the necessary authority to the JSRC director. If the JSRC is serving as part of the JFC staff, the JFC should give the necessary authority to the JSRC director. Following are examples of types of authority the JFC may give to the designated component commander or to the JSRC:

The JFC may grant authority to the designated component commander or to the JSRC to task component commands to support CSAR missions of another component when that component needs assistance or cannot accomplish the mission. The supporting component commanders should take such actions to fulfill the tasking as is within existing capabilities, consistent with priorities and requirements of other assigned tasks. In cases where these supporting component commanders have conflicts with assigned tasks that cannot be resolved, those commanders may address their concerns with the JFC for resolution.

During joint operations, the JSRC is the focal point of all joint CSAR coordination. The JSRC should have authority to conduct joint CSAR coordination to all levels of command.

- Authority to coordinate and deconflict support provided to component CSAR operations.
- Authority to develop and promulgate joint force CSAR SOPs.
- Authority to develop and promulgate joint force CSAR communications plans. These plans are included in SAR appendixes to the operations annexes of OPLANs and OPORDs and should be coordinated with the joint force command, control, communications, and computer systems directorate (J-6) for deconfliction.

- Authority to establish reporting requirements for the JSRC and component RCCs.
- Authority to monitor all CSAR operations prosecuted within the JFC's area of responsibility/joint operations area.
- Authority to review CSAR and E&R appendixes to component OPLANs, CONPLANs, and OPORDs.
- Authority to establish operational interfaces with other joint force staff sections and elements as considered appropriate and necessary. These interfaces could include but are not limited to J-2, J-3, logistics directorate, strategic plans and policy directorate, J-6, air operations supporting arms, PSYOP, and other sections and elements, as appropriate.
- Authority to establish coordination with CSAR agencies and forces from multinational forces, as appropriate.

Related Terms

combat search and rescue

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-50.2 Doctrine for Joint Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR)

JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONS AIR COMPONENT COMMANDER

The commander within the joint force special operations command responsible for planning and executing joint special air operations and for coordinating and deconflicting such operations with conventional nonspecial operations air activities. The joint special operations air component commander normally will be the commander with the preponderance of assets and/or greatest ability to plan, coordinate, allocate, task, control, and support the assigned joint special operations aviation assets. The joint special operations air component commander may be directly subordinate to the joint force special operations component commander or to any nonspecial operations component or joint force commander as directed. Also called JSOACC. JP 1-02

The joint force special operations component commander may choose to organize functional components in lieu of or in combination with Service components. The most common special operations functional organization is the joint special operations air component commander (JSOACC). The JSOACC is the subordinate commander within a special operations command or joint special operations task force responsible for planning and executing joint special air operations and for coordinating and deconflicting those operations with conventional air operations. The JSOACC normally will be the special operations forces aviation commander providing the preponderance of air assets or most capable of controlling special air operations in a specific situation.

Related Terms

combat search and rescue; joint force special operations component commander

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-05.3 Joint Special Operations Operational Procedures

JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONS AREA

A restricted area of land, sea, and airspace assigned by a joint force commander to the commander of a joint special operations force to conduct special operations activities. The commander of joint special operations forces may further assign a specific area or sector within the joint special operations area to a subordinate commander for mission execution. The scope and duration of the special operations forces' mission, friendly and hostile situation, and politico-military considerations all influence the number, composition, and sequencing of special operations forces deployed into a joint special operations area. It may be limited in size to accommodate a discrete direct action mission or may be extensive enough to allow a continuing broad range of unconventional warfare operations. Also called JSOA. JP 1-02

A joint special operations area (JSOA) is an area of land, sea, and airspace, defined by a joint force commander (JFC) who has geographic responsibilities, for use by a joint special operations component or joint special operations task force for the conduct of special operations. JFCs may use a JSOA to delineate and facilitate simultaneous conventional and special operations in the same general operational area.

Related Terms

operational area; special operations

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations


JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONS TASK FORCE

A joint task force composed of special operations units from more than one Service, formed to carry out a specific special operation or prosecute special operations in support of a theater campaign or other operations. The joint special operations task force may have conventional nonspecial operations units assigned or attached to support the conduct of specific missions. Also called JSOTF. JP 1-02

A Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF) is organized in a manner similar to conventional joint task force (JTF). A JSOTF normally is developed to meet a specific special operations (SO) mission or a campaign of limited duration. It may be formed as a standing organization, depending on National Command Authorities or theater command guidance. For example, a geographic combatant commander could elect to form a JTF to prosecute operations in a specific region of the theater and a JSOTF subordinate to that JTF to plan and execute SO required to support the overall conventional effort. Likewise, a theater special operations command (SOC) could establish a JSOTF to focus on a specific mission or region within the area of responsibility assigned by the geographic combatant commander.

A JSOTF is an organization flexible in both size and composition. Its flexibility provides its primary utility. A JSOTF may be small and temporary or larger and more enduring, depending upon the national objective or theater task at hand. It may be specifically established as a joint organization to meet a specific mission or campaign or it may be formed around an

existing Service force structure. In the latter case, an existing theater SOC component might be directed to form the core of a JSOTF when the preponderant force comes from that component. In such an instance, the existing headquarters would be augmented by appropriate forces from other Services and components. (See figure below.)



For example, a theater SOC commander may designate the Army special operations forces (SOF) component as a JSOTF to pursue a foreign internal defense (FID) operation in a given country. In this instance, the Army SOF is the preponderant force, but it may require augmentation in the form of air, maritime, or headquarters staff support to provide military assistance beyond its own capabilities. The FID and/or Security Assistance role presents some unique operational control considerations. Routinely, military personnel conducting such a program are operationally responsible to a military assistance group that reports to the US Ambassador.

Related Terms

special operations

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-05 Doctrine for Joint Special Operations

JOINT STAFF

The staff of a commander of a unified or specified command, subordinate unified command, joint task force, or subordinate functional component (when a functional component command will employ forces from more than one Military Department), which includes members from the several Services comprising the force. These members should be assigned in such a manner as to ensure that the commander understands the tactics, techniques, capabilities, needs, and limitations of the component parts of the force. Positions on the staff should be divided so that Service representation and influence generally reflect the Service composition of the force. 2. (capitalized as Joint Staff) The staff under the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as provided for in the National Security Act of 1947, as amended by the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. The Joint Staff assists the Chairman and, subject to the authority, direction, and control of the Chairman, the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Vice Chairman in carrying out their responsibilities.

JP 1-02

The Joint Staff. The Joint Staff is under the exclusive direction of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Joint Staff will perform such duties as the Chairman prescribes and will perform such duties under such procedures as the Chairman prescribes to assist the Chairman and, subject to the authority, direction, and control of the Chairman, the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Vice Chairman in carrying out their responsibilities.

The Joint Staff includes officers selected in proportional numbers from the Army, Navy and Marine Corps, and Air Force. Selection of officers to serve on the Joint Staff is made by the Chairman from a list of officers submitted by the Services. Each officer whose name is submitted must be among those officers considered to be the most outstanding officers of that Service. The Chairman may specify the number of officers to be included on such a list. The Chairman may suspend from duty and recommend the reassignment of any officer assigned to the Joint Staff.

The Chairman, after coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and with the approval of the Secretary of Defense, may select a Director, Joint Staff. The Chairman manages the Joint Staff and its Director.

The Joint Staff will not operate or be organized as an overall Armed Forces General Staff and will have no executive authority. The Joint Staff is organized and operates along conventional staff lines to support the Chairman, Vice Chairman, and the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in discharging their assigned responsibilities. In addition, the Joint Staff is the focal point for the Chairman to ensure comments and concerns of the combatant commanders are well represented and advocated during all levels of coordination.

"The military staff must be adequately composed: it must contain the best brains in the fields of land, air and sea warfare, propaganda war, technology, economics, politics and also those who know the peoples' life."

General Erich von Ludendorff, Total War 1935

Joint Force Commander's Staff. A joint staff should be established for commands comprised of more than one Service. The staff of the commander of a combatant command,

subordinate unified command, joint task force, or subordinate functional component (when a functional component command will employ forces from more than one Service) must be composed of Service members that comprise significant elements of the joint force. Positions on the staff should be divided so that Service representation and influence generally reflect the Service composition of the force.

A joint force commander (JFC) is authorized to organize the staff and assign responsibilities to individual Service members assigned to the staff as deemed necessary to ensure unity of effort and accomplishment of assigned missions. A joint staff should be reasonably balanced as to numbers, experience, influence of position, and rank of the members among the Services concerned. In determining the composition of a joint staff, due regard should be given to the composition of the forces and the character of the contemplated operations to ensure the commander's staff understands the capabilities, needs, and limitations of each component part of the force. The number of personnel on a joint staff should be kept to the minimum consistent with the task to be performed. For the staff to function smoothly and properly, the personnel who compose the joint staff should be assigned to it long enough to gain experience and be effective. Each person assigned to serve on a joint staff will be responsible to the JFC and should have thorough knowledge of the JFC's policies.

The commander of a force for which a joint staff is established should ensure that the recommendations of any member of the staff receive consideration. The degree of authority to act in the name of and for the commander is a matter to be specifically prescribed by the commander. Orders and directives from a higher to a subordinate command should be issued in the name of the commander of the higher command to the commander of the immediate subordinate command and not directly to elements of that subordinate command. Exceptions may sometimes be required under certain emergency or crisis situations. Command and control of nuclear forces is an example of one such exception.

To expedite the execution of orders and directives and to promote teamwork between commands, a commander may authorize his staff officers to communicate directly with appropriate staff officers of other commands concerning the details of plans and directives that have been received or are to be issued. Each staff division must coordinate its actions and planning with the other staff divisions concerned and keep them currently informed of actions taken and the progress achieved. Normally, each of the general joint staff divisions is assigned responsibility for a particular type of problem and subject and for coordinating the work of the special staff divisions and other agencies of the staff that relate to that problem or subject.

Joint staff divisions and special staff sections should be limited to those functions for which the JFC is responsible or that require the commander's general supervision in the interest of unity of effort. The authority that establishes a joint force should make the provisions for furnishing necessary personnel for the commander's staff.

Staff Organization. The staff organization should generally conform to the principles established in this section.


Principal Staff Officer. The Chief of Staff functions as the principal staff officer, assistant, and adviser to the commander. The Chief of Staff coordinates and directs the work of the staff divisions. One or more deputies to the Chief of Staff and a secretary of the staff may be provided to assist the Chief of Staff in the performance of assigned duties. A deputy Chief of Staff should normally be from a Service other than that of the Chief of Staff. The secretary of the staff is the executive in the office of the Chief of Staff and is responsible for routing and forwarding correspondence and papers and maintaining office records.

Personal Staff Group of the Commander. The commander's personal staff perform duties prescribed by the commander and are responsible directly to the commander. This group, normally composed of aides to the commander and staff officers handling special matters over which the commander wishes to exercise close personal control, will usually include a political adviser and a public affairs officer.

Special Staff Group. The special staff group consists of representatives of technical or administrative services and can include representatives from government or nongovernment agencies. The general functions of the special staff include furnishing technical, administrative, and tactical advice and recommendations to the commander and other staff officers; preparing the parts of plans, estimates, and orders in which they have primary interest; and coordinating and supervising the activities for which each staff division is responsible. Because the headquarters of a joint force is concerned primarily with broad operational matters rather than with technical problems associated with administration and support of Service forces, this group should be small to avoid unnecessary duplication of corresponding staff sections or divisions within the Service component headquarters. When a commander's headquarters is organized without a special staff group, the officers who might otherwise compose the special staff group may be organized as branches of the divisions of the joint staff or as additional joint staff divisions.

Joint Force Staff Divisions. The general or joint staff group is made up of staff divisions corresponding to the major functions of command, such as personnel, intelligence, operations, logistics, plans, and command, control, communications, and computers (C4) systems. The head of each staff division may be designated as a Director or as an Assistant Chief of Staff. The Directors or Assistant Chiefs of Staff provide staff supervision for the commander of all activities pertaining to their respective functions. (See figure below.)

- **Manpower and Personnel Division (J-1).** The J-1 is charged with manpower management, the formulation of personnel policies, and supervision of the administration of personnel of the command (including civilians under the supervision or control of the command), and enemy prisoners of war. Because many of the problems confronting this division are necessarily of a single-Service nature, the division should consider the established policies of the Military Departments.
- **Intelligence Division (J-2).** The primary function of the J-2 is to support the commander and the staff by ensuring the availability of reliable intelligence and timely indications and warnings on the characteristics of the area. Within the scope of the essential elements of information, the Intelligence Division actively participates in joint staff planning and in planning, coordinating, directing, integrating, and controlling a concentration of intelligence efforts on the proper enemy items of intelligence interest at the appropriate time. The J-2 also ensures adequate intelligence collection and reporting to disclose enemy capabilities and intentions as quickly as possible. The J-2 is responsible for the operation of the Joint Intelligence Center for the joint force commander.
- **Operations Division (J-3).** The J-3 assists the commander in the discharge of assigned responsibility for the direction and control of operations, beginning with planning and follow-through until specific operations are completed. In this capacity the division plans, coordinates, and integrates operations. The flexibility and range of modern forces require close coordination and integration for effective unity of effort. When the joint staff includes a Plans Division, it also performs the long-range or future planning responsibilities. The J-3 is responsible for the operation of the Joint Operations Center for the joint force commander.



- Logistics Division (J-4). The J-4 is charged with the formulation of logistic plans and with the coordination and supervision of supply, maintenance, repair, evacuation, transportation, engineering, salvage, procurement, health services, mortuary affairs, communications system support, security assistance, host-nation support, and related logistic activities. Because many of the problems confronting this division are necessarily of a single-Service nature, the established policies of the Military Departments should be considered. This division is responsible for advising the commander of the logistic support that can be provided for proposed courses of action. In general, this division formulates policies to ensure effective logistic support for all forces in the command and coordinates execution of the commander's policies and guidance.
- Plans and Policy Division (J-5). The J-5 assists the commander in long-range or future planning, preparation of campaign and joint operation plans, and associated estimates of the situation. The Plans and Policy Division may contain an analytic cell that conducts simulations and analyses to assist the commander in plans preparation activities, or such a cell may be established as a special staff division or section. When the commander does not organize a separate Plans and Policy Division, the planning functions are performed by the Operations Division.
- Command, Control, Communications, and Computer Systems Division (J-6). The J-6 assists the commander in all responsibilities for communications, electronics, and automated information systems. This includes development and integration of C4 architectures and plans which support the command's operational and strategic requirements, as well as policy and guidance for implementation and integration of

JOINT STRATEGIC CAPABILITIES PLAN

interoperable C4 systems to exercise command in the execution of the mission. When a commander does not organize a separate C4 systems division, these functions may be performed by the Operations Division or by a special staff division or section.

Related Terms

joint force

Source Joint Publications

JP 0-2

Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)

JOINT STRATEGIC CAPABILITIES PLAN

The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) provides the strategic direction required to coordinate the planning efforts of the combatant commanders in pursuit of national strategic objectives and to integrate their efforts with those of the remainder of the Joint Planning and Execution Community. The JSCP is the link between strategic planning accomplished through the Joint Strategic Planning System and joint operation planning conducted through Joint Operation Planning and Execution System. The major factors used in developing the JSCP are shown in the figure below. It is the primary vehicle through which the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff exercises his responsibility to provide for the preparation of joint operation plans.

The JSCP and its annexes, as well as the administrative procedures governing its preparation, are described in detail in CJCS MOP 7, to be revised as CJCSI 3100.01. The JSCP initiates deliberate joint operation planning by:

- assigning planning tasks to the combatant commanders;
- apportioning major combat forces and resources;



- issuing planning guidance to integrate the joint operation planning activities of the entire JPEC within a coherent, focused framework.

The JSCP base document provides the following:

- A summary of the current national military strategy for deterrence and war and a statement of general strategic taskings to combatant commanders. The JSCP provides the strategic direction required to coordinate the efforts of the combatant commanders in the attainment of national military objectives.
- Planning guidance to the combatant commanders governing the development of plans.
- Planning guidance to the Services and Combat Support Agencies for supporting the combatant commanders in the execution of assigned objectives and tasks.
- A list of major combat forces expected to be available during the planning period under various conditions of mobilization and apportionment of those forces to the combatant commanders for planning.
- Service- and force-unique information and limitations on the use of specific forces as required to meet plan taskings.
- An intelligence estimate for planning. This estimate is an appraisal of available intelligence relating to a specific situation or condition with a view to determining the courses of action open to the enemy or potential enemy and the order of probability of their adoption. It will support activities during the JSCP planning cycle.

Related Terms

joint operation planning; joint strategic planning system

Source Joint Publications

JP 5-0 Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations

JOINT STRATEGIC PLANNING SYSTEM

The primary means by which the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in consultation with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the combatant commanders, carries out his statutory responsibilities to assist the President and Secretary of Defense in providing strategic direction to the armed forces; prepares strategic plans; prepares and reviews contingency plans; advises the President and Secretary of Defense on requirements, programs, and budgets; and provides net assessment on the capabilities of the Armed Forces of the United States and its allies as compared with those of their potential adversaries.

Also called JSPS.

JP 1-02

General. The Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS) is the primary formal means by which the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the combatant commanders, carries out his statutory responsibilities required by title 10, US Code, 6 April 1991, and further delineated in Department of Defense (DOD) 5100.1, 25 September 1987. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) memorandum of policy (MOP) 7 to be revised as CJCSI 3100.01, provides policy and procedures governing the operation of the JSPS. The purpose and outputs of the JSPS are summarized in the figure below.

The central process of the JSPS is the Joint Strategy Review (JSR). The JSR is a continuous process that assesses the strategic environment for issues and factors that affect the National Military Strategy (NMS) in the near-term or the long-range. It continuously gathers information; examines current, emerging and future issues, threats, technologies, organizations,

JOINT STRATEGIC PLANNING SYSTEM

- **Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) discharges strategic planning responsibilities**
- **Series of complementary documents**
- **CJCS military advice to National Command Authorities**
- **CJCS formal input to Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System**

doctrinal concepts, force structures and military missions; and reviews and assesses current strategy, forces, and national policy objectives. The JSR facilitates the integration of strategy, joint operation planning, and program assessment. When significant changes or factors in the strategic environment are identified, JSR issue papers are presented to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Chiefs of the Services, and the combatant commanders. These papers will provide entering arguments for proposed changes to the NMS, Joint Planning Document (JPD), and Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) and solicit the Chairman's guidance for changing the military strategy if required.

JSPS Products. The four products of the JSPS are as follows:

National Military Strategy. The NMS provides the advice of the Chairman, in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the combatant commanders, to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense on the recommended NMS and fiscally constrained force structure required to attain national security objectives. The NMS is designed to assist the Secretary of Defense in the preparation of the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) and to guide the development of the JSCP. Following Secretary of Defense review, the NMS is forwarded to the President. The NMS may be used to determine the CJCS position on matters of strategic importance for use in National Command Authorities (NCA)-directed actions.

The Joint Planning Document. The JPD supports the NMS by providing concise programming priorities, requirements, or advice to the Secretary of Defense for consideration during preparation of the DPG. Published as stand-alone documents addressing specific functional areas, JPD volumes are coordinated and collaborated with the Chiefs of the Services, combatant commanders and Defense agencies, and serve as a conduit for input to the DPG.

Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan. The JSCP provides guidance to the combatant commanders and the Chiefs of the Services to accomplish tasks and missions based on current military capabilities. It apportions resources to combatant commanders, based on military capabilities resulting from completed program and budget actions. The JSCP provides a coherent framework for capabilities-based military advice provided to the NCA. It is reviewed at least biennially for required changes.

Chairman's Program Assessment (CPA). The CPA assists the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in fulfilling his responsibility to provide advice to the Secretary of Defense on how well the Program Objective Memorandums (POMs) conform to established priorities. It also provides assistance to the Secretary in decisions concerning the defense program subsequent to receipt of the POMs. The CPA summarizes the views of the Chairman on the balance and

capabilities of the POM force and the support levels required to attain US national security objectives.

Joint Strategic Planning System Interactions. The JSPS is a flexible and interactive system intended to provide supporting military advice to the DOD Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) and strategic guidance for use in Joint Operation Planning and Execution System. The JSPS provides the means for the Chairman, in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the combatant commanders, to review the national security environment and US national security objectives. Additionally, it provides the means to evaluate the threat; assess current strategy and existing or proposed programs and budgets; and propose military strategy, programs, and forces necessary to achieve those national security objectives in a resource-limited environment consistent with policies and priorities established by the President and the Secretary of Defense.

The JSPS is also a formal means by which the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the combatant commanders carry out some of their statutory responsibilities. Therefore, the JSPS process must establish the opportunity for their timely and substantive participation in the development of every JSPS document. As programs are developed and resources allocated, JSPS products and JSPS-related documents provide a means to evaluate capabilities and to assess the adequacy and risk associated with the programs and budgets of the Military Departments and Defense agencies and, where appropriate, propose changes to those programs and budgets in conformity with strategic priorities.

JSPS Plans and Documents. The JSPS comprises plans and documents that are described in CJCS MOP 7 and will not be superseded by other documents without the express approval of the Chairman, in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

JSPS-Related Assessments and Guidance. In addition to the JSPS plans and documents included in CJCS MOP 7, assessments are performed and planning guidance is issued to support those plans and documents. The following is a list of assessments and guidance that contain critical JSPS-related information and other key documents.

Joint Military Net Assessment (JMNA). The JMNA is prepared by the Chairman in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the combatant commanders. It is submitted annually to the Secretary of Defense for his approval and submission to Congress in conjunction with the submission of the defense budget. The JMNA fulfills the Secretary of Defense's statutory duty to submit to Congress an annual comprehensive net assessment of the defense capabilities and programs of the Armed Forces of the United States and its allies compared with those of potential adversaries.

Logistics Sustainability Analysis (LSA). The LSA of an operation plan will be completed during the development and maintenance of the combatant commanders' operational plan. The LSA provides a broad assessment of key logistic capabilities by: documenting the results of a process that assures an integrated evaluation of key logistic capabilities, identifying logistic support short-falls and assessing the risks, and providing a baseline for the Joint Monthly Readiness Review process. The LSA builds upon assessments, which are formed in collaboration with the Services, supporting commanders, and DOD Agencies. The LSA assesses the combined support capabilities represented by the four pillars of logistics: material, logistic support forces, infrastructure, and lift. The LSA integrates the assessments of the individual pillars of logistics by optimizing and balancing their contributions as both enablers and constrainers of logistic support. Preparation of this analysis is a two step process. It begins with the Services and DOD Agencies assessment of their ability to support the commander of a combatant command's (CINC's) plan, followed by the CINC's assessment

JOINT STRATEGY REVIEW

of the inputs along with supported commander's analysis of theater requirements and capabilities.

Defense Planning Guidance. The DPG furnishes the Secretary of Defense's programming and fiscal guidance to the Military Departments for development of department POMs for the defense planning period. The DPG includes major planning issues and decisions, strategy and policy, strategic elements, the Secretary's program planning objectives, the Defense Planning Estimate, the Illustrative Planning Scenarios, and a series of studies. The DPG is a major link between JSPS and the PPBS.

Contingency Planning Guidance (CPG). The CPG fulfills the Secretary of Defense's statutory duty to provide annually to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff written policy guidance for joint operation planning. The Secretary provides this guidance with the approval of the President after coordination with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The CPG is the primary source document for the JSCP.

Related Terms

joint planning document; Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan; joint strategy review; national military strategy

Source Joint Publications

JP 5-0 Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations

JOINT STRATEGY REVIEW

The central process of the Joint Strategic Planning System is the Joint Strategy Review (JSR). The JSR is a continuous process that assesses the strategic environment for issues and factors that affect the National Military Strategy (NMS) in the near-term or the long-range. It continuously gathers information; examines current, emerging and future issues, threats, technologies, organizations, doctrinal concepts, force structures and military missions; and reviews and assesses current strategy, forces, and national policy objectives. The JSR facilitates the integration of strategy, joint operation planning, and program assessment. When significant changes or factors in the strategic environment are identified, JSR issue papers are presented to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Chiefs of the Services, and the combatant commanders. These papers will provide entering arguments for proposed changes to the NMS, Joint Planning Document, and Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, and solicit the Chairman's guidance for changing the military strategy if required.

Related Terms

Joint Strategic Planning System

Source Joint Publications

JP 5-0 Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations

JOINT SUPPRESSION MEASURES

Joint Suppression Measures. During joint suppression of enemy air defenses (J-SEAD) operations, suppression requirements vary according to mission objectives, system capabilities, and threat complexity. Major employment considerations include overall air defense system architecture, capabilities of system components, geography and terrain, disposition and density of defenses, weather, resupply and repair capabilities, and friendly force organization, training, and equipment. J-SEAD operations can be accomplished through destructive and disruptive means as shown in the figure below. Using sound combinations of the two can maximize their effectiveness.

JOINT SUPPRESSION MEASURES

DESTRUCTIVE MEANS

Destructive means seek the destruction of the target system or operating personnel. The effects are cumulative and increase aircraft survivability, but destructive means may place large demands on the available combat capabilities/forces. Examples of destructive suppression of enemy air defenses assets are bombs, air and surface-to-surface missiles, air scatterable mines, and artillery.

DISRUPTIVE MEANS

Disruptive means temporarily deny, degrade, deceive, delay or neutralize enemy air defense systems to increase aircraft survivability. Disruptive means may be either active or passive.

Destructive Means. Destructive means seek the destruction of the target system or operating personnel. The effects are cumulative and increase aircraft survivability, but destructive means may place large demands on the available combat capabilities/forces. Examples of destructive suppression of enemy air defenses capabilities are bombs, air and surface-to-surface missiles, air scatterable mines, and artillery.

Disruptive Means. Disruptive means temporarily deny, degrade, deceive, delay, or neutralize enemy air defense systems to increase aircraft survivability. Disruptive means may be either active or passive.

- Active Means include electronic attack (antiradiation missiles, directed energy, electromagnetic jamming and electromagnetic deception) expendables (chaff, flares, and decoys), tactics such as deception, avoidance, or evasive flight profiles, and unmanned aerial vehicles.
- Passive Means include emission control, camouflage, infrared shielding, warning receivers, and material design features.

Mutual Support. Joint air operations may require support for suppression of enemy air defenses from resources other than aircraft. The joint force commander may direct components to support joint air operations with assets, capabilities, or forces, in addition to the air capabilities/forces provided. The measures a commander may request include the following:

- reconnaissance and target-acquisition support to gain specific coverage in the area of operations.
- electronic warfare to provide close-in jamming and standoff jamming of radar, data links, and voice communication signals.

Related Terms

joint suppression of enemy air defenses

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-01.4 JTTP for Joint Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (J-SEAD)

JOINT SUPPRESSION OF ENEMY AIR DEFENSES

A broad term that includes all suppression of enemy air defense activities provided by one component of the joint force in support of another. Also called J-SEAD.
JP 1-02

Suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD) is any activity that neutralizes, destroys, or temporarily degrades enemy surface based air defenses by destructive and/or disruptive means. Joint suppression of enemy air defenses (J-SEAD) is a broad term that encompasses all SEAD activities provided by components of a joint force in support of one another. As shown in the figure below, J-SEAD operations can fall into three categories: area of responsibility (AOR)/joint operations area (JOA) air defense system suppression, localized suppression, and opportune suppression. AOR/JOA air defense system suppression creates increasingly favorable conditions for friendly operations by disabling enemy air defense systems (or major capabilities of those systems). Localized suppression operations normally have specified time and space limitations because they support specific operations or missions. Opportune suppression includes self-defense and offensive attacks against enemy air defense targets of opportunity.



SEAD and J-SEAD are not ends in and of themselves but, rather, they are a subset of counterair operations which create favorable conditions for all friendly air operations. Therefore, SEAD and J-SEAD need to be an integral part of planning and executing joint air operations. SEAD objectives are specified by the joint force commander, who will consider the unique capabilities of each component to contribute to counterair operations. Each component of a joint force has unique suppression capabilities and responsibilities to support J-SEAD operations. These responsibilities involve numerous command and staff functions in both the planning and the execution phases.

There are three primary objectives for planning J-SEAD in support of air operations. First, accomplish an accurate appraisal of enemy air defenses and their ability to influence the outcome of overall air operations. Second, decide on the scope, magnitude, and duration of SEAD operations necessary to reduce enemy air defense capabilities to acceptable risk levels. Finally, determine the capabilities of available suppression assets, as well as potential competing requirements for these forces.

The Beginnings of SEAD

It is hardly a surprise that since the time soldiers first left the surface of the earth, militarily, opponents have sought ways to bring them back down. There are reports of balloon and anti-balloon artillery in the American Civil War and the Franco Prussian War, and in 1890 the Russians tested a field-gun battery against a balloon moored three kilometers away. The first aircraft downed in combat fell to ground fire in the Italo-Turkish War of 1912; so when World War I began, there were precedents for ground-based air defense.

It is similarly unremarkable, then, that whoever controlled this third dimension above the battlefield would seek to stay there with equal vigor. During WW I, operations to suppress enemy antiaircraft artillery (AAA) were confined to strafing and bombing enemy artillery and machine gun positions. Since that time, the mission of neutralizing, destroying, or temporarily degrading an enemy air defense system in a specific area by physical and/or electronic means has come to be known as suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD) and has grown tremendously in importance. There are good reasons why. If an air force of 1,000 aircraft flying two sorties per day per aircraft suffered only a 1 percent attrition rate, that air force would fly 45,150 sorties and have only 557 aircraft remaining at the end of 30 days of combat. If the attrition rate jumped to 10 percent, that same air force would fly only 8,320 sorties and have but two aircraft remaining at the end of 30 days!

The advent of radar in the interwar years made ground-based air defenses, as well as fighters, more effective, and its potential was clearly recognized. The Luftwaffe attempted to destroy the British radar chains at the outset of the Battle of Britain to “put Britain’s eyes out” and make the rest of the plan for attaining air superiority over Britain easier. The Allies also understood the importance of the German radars and flew numerous sorties in attempts to destroy them. To this end, the British developed a radar homing device fitted to three Royal Air Force (RAF) Typhoons. The “Abdullah” equipment worked as intended, however, the aircraft were unarmed, flew only with escort fighters, and provided no new information because the locations of German fixed radars were already well known.

During the Second World War, German AAA proved to be a formidable and deadly defense against Allied aircraft, both bombers and fighters. Attrition rates due to flak during the late summer, 1944 became so high that Eighth Air Force was forced to form specific procedures to reduce these losses. The Eighth Air Force measures recommended a number of tactics to counter the AAA threat to blind-bombing aircraft. When possible, bomber pilots were not to overfly flak defenses en route to and from their targets. Bombers were also to fly at the highest possible altitude consistent with offensive and defensive considerations (i.e., clouds, formation, target visibility, etc.). They also recommended planning bomber spacing and axes of attack to make the fullest use of Window and Carpet countermeasures.

Window was the code name for chaff, thin strips of aluminum that “plumed” when deployed, reflecting a much larger image to the radar on the ground and adding to the radar operators’ confusion. Laid in trails, the chaff formed a protective screen for bombers flying within 2,000 feet of the stream. Carpet

was a radar jammer which caused interference in the reception of signals by AAA radar. Bombers enjoyed some protection from radar detection when flying, optimally, within one mile of Carpet equipped aircraft. Besides the nonlethal suppression tactics, more direct methods were also used to counter the deadly flak. The first objective of Operation Market Garden, the September 1944 Allied assault to place three divisions behind German lines, was to provide “anti-aircraft neutralization support,” using bomber and fighter aircraft to strike the anti-aircraft installations along the routes to be followed by the troop carrier aircraft and in the areas surrounding the drop and landing zones.

In the Pacific, operations virtually mirrored those in the European theater. As the Japanese increased the numbers and sophistication of their radars, the US increased the numbers of assets assigned to counter them. The US forces employed B-24 and B-29 “ferret” aircraft to locate and jam the Japanese radars. B-25 gunships equipped with radar homing receivers were used in the lethal-suppression role, flying down a radar beam until they located the site visually and attacking it with their nose-mounted cannons.

In the Second World War, ground-based air defenses proved to be a lethal counter to US air power. However, loss rates varied with the mission flown. Aircraft which operated at lower altitudes were much more vulnerable to enemy flak than those that operated at higher altitudes. Destructive defense suppression efforts were only part of the solution to the flak problem. Good tactics and the use of electronic countermeasures were also important means for reducing aircraft loss rates. These conclusions would also be borne out in later wars.

Source: Hewitt, William A., *Planting the Seeds of SEAD*, Maxwell AFB: Air University Press, 1993

Related Terms

joint suppression measures

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-01.4 JTTP for Joint Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (J-SEAD)

JOINT TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES

The actions and methods which implement joint doctrine and describe how forces will be employed in joint operations. They will be promulgated by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in coordination with the combatant commands, Services, and Joint Staff. Also called JTTP. JP 1-02

The purpose of joint doctrine and joint tactics, techniques, and procedures (JTTP) is to enhance the combat effectiveness of US forces. Joint doctrine and JTTP will not contain policy. Policy will be established in other Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff documents and can only be referenced in joint publications.

Joint doctrine (or JTTP) applies to the commanders of combatant commands, subunified commands, joint task forces, and subordinate components of these commands. These principles and guidance also may apply when significant forces of one Service are attached to forces of another Service or when significant forces of one Service support forces of another Service.

Joint tactics, techniques, and procedures are written for those who implement joint doctrine such as:

- commanders of joint forces;
- commanders of subordinate commands;
- commanders at echelons where joint forces interact.

Related Terms

joint doctrine

Source Joint Publications

JP 1-01 Joint Publication System, Joint Doctrine and JTTP Development Program

JOINT TARGETING COORDINATION BOARD

A group formed by the joint force commander to accomplish broad targeting oversight functions that may include but are not limited to coordinating targeting information, providing targeting guidance and priorities, and preparing and/or refining joint target lists. The board is normally comprised of representatives from the joint force staff, all components, and if required, component subordinate units. Also called JTCB. JP 1-02

Targeting mechanisms should exist at multiple levels. Joint force components identify requirements, nominate targets that are outside their boundaries or exceed the capabilities of organic and supporting assets (based on joint force commander's (JFC's) apportionment and subapportionment decisions), and conduct execution planning. After the JFC makes the targeting and apportionment decisions, components plan and execute assigned missions.

JFCs may establish and task an organization within their staffs to accomplish these broad targeting oversight functions or may delegate the responsibility to a subordinate commander. Typically, JFCs organize Joint Targeting Coordination Boards (JTCBs). If the JFC so designates, a JTCB may be an integrating center for this effort or a JFC-level review mechanism. In either case, it needs to be a joint activity comprised of representatives from the staff, all components, and, if required, their subordinate units. JFCs task commanders or staff officers with the JTCB function based on the JFC's concept of operations and the individual's experience, expertise, and situational awareness appropriate to the situation.

The JFC defines the role of the JTCB. Typically, the JTCB reviews target information, develops targeting guidance and priorities, and may prepare and refine joint target lists. The JTCB should also maintain a complete list of restricted targets and areas where special operations forces are operating to avoid endangering current or future operations. In multinational operations, the JTCB may be subordinate to a multinational Targeting Coordination Board, with JFCs or their agents representing the joint force on the multinational board.

JFCs will normally delegate the authority to conduct execution planning, coordination, and deconfliction associated with targeting and will ensure that this process is also a joint effort involving applicable subordinate commands. Whoever is designated this responsibility must possess or have access to a sufficient command and control infrastructure, adequate facilities, and ready availability of joint planning expertise. Should such an agency be charged with joint functional command responsibilities, a joint targeting mechanism is also needed to facilitate this process at this level. All components are normally involved in targeting and should establish procedures and mechanisms to manage the targeting function.

JOINT TARGET LIST

Related Terms

joint target list; targeting

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations

JOINT TARGET LIST

A consolidated list of selected targets considered to have military significance in the joint operations area. JP 1-02

The joint target list (JTL) is normally constructed by the unified command with support from components and with inputs from the Joint Staff and other national agencies. The JTL contains prioritized target categories (command and control, airfields, lines of communications, and others as appropriate), listing specific targets. It also contains a sufficient level of detail to assist complete target identification, location, and assessment. Upon direction of the joint force commander (JFC), the JTL is updated daily or as required via target information report messages from components. Maintenance of the JTL may be conducted by the JFC's staff or as directed by the JFC (e.g., Joint Targeting Coordination Board). During execution, the JTL continues to serve as an updated reference. Consideration of any requirements imposed by the law of armed conflict and rules of engagement is also essential in targeting development.

Related Terms

joint targeting coordination board; targeting

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-56.1 Command and Control for Joint Air Operations


JOINT TASK FORCE

A joint force that is constituted and so designated by the Secretary of Defense, a combatant commander, a subunified commander, or an existing joint task force commander. Also called JTF. JP 1-02

As shown in the figure below, a joint task force (JTF) is a joint force that is constituted and so designated by the Secretary of Defense, a combatant commander, a subordinate unified command commander, or an existing joint task force commander. (A naval force consisting of Navy and Marine Corps forces does not by itself constitute a joint task force.)

A JTF may be established on a geographical area or functional basis when the mission has a specific limited objective and does not require overall centralized control of logistics. The mission assigned to a JTF should require execution of responsibilities involving a joint force on a significant scale and close integration of effort, or should require coordination within a subordinate area or coordination of local defense of a subordinate area. A JTF is dissolved by the proper authority when the purpose for which it was created has been achieved or when it is no longer required.

The authority establishing a JTF designates the commander and assigns the mission and forces. The commander of a JTF exercises operational control over assigned and normally over attached forces. The commander is responsible for making recommendations to the superior commander on the proper employment of assigned and attached forces and for accomplishing such operational missions as may be assigned by the establishing commander.



JTF commanders are also responsible to the establishing commander for the conduct of joint training of assigned forces.

The JTF commander may also be a Service component commander. When this is the case, the commander also has the responsibilities associated with Service component command for the forces belonging to the parent Service.

The commander of a JTF will have a joint staff with appropriate members in key positions of responsibility from each Service or functional component having significant forces assigned to the command.

Related Terms

joint force

Source Joint Publications

JP 0-2 Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)

JOINT TRANSPORTATION BOARD

The Joint Transportation Board (JTB) will establish priorities and allocate common-user transportation resources within the theater. The JTB will process all requests for reapportionment or adjustment of established allocations from the component commanders.

Related Terms

logistics

Source Joint Publications

JP 4-0 Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations

JOINT WORLDWIDE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM

The sensitive compartmented information portion of the Defense Information System Network. It incorporates advanced networking technologies that permit point-to-point or multipoint information exchange involving voice, text, graphics, data, and video teleconferencing. Also called JWICS. JP 1-02

As shown in the figure below, the Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System (JWICS) satisfies the requirement for secure, high-speed, multimedia transmission services for intelligence information. JWICS incorporates advanced networking technologies that permit greater throughput and capacity, making possible the use of circuit is available. The architecture optimizes flexibility to focus intelligence efforts efficiently and assure that support is maximized for a theater engaged in military operations.

All-source intelligence dissemination in support of joint operations at the national, theater, and subordinate joint force levels will be via JWICS. This system supports the production, dissemination, and display of fused intelligence critical to theater battle management. The architecture provides access to data from national, theater and tactical intelligence organizations and sources primarily from a “push-pull” system. A “pull” concept will result in joint force commanders (JFCs) receiving only high-quality, relevant intelligence based on their mission and phase of the operation. The “pull” capability is designed to prevent communications circuit saturation. In addition, time-sensitive intelligence will be “pushed” to JFCs and components via dedicated broadcasts applications that take advantage of multimedia technologies including video teleconferencing. Each JWICS node can create, receive, transmit, and store video images as well as voice, text, graphics, and data. Information can be either broadcast or shared interactively among JWICS subscribers on a point-to-point or multipoint basis. The JWICS circuit can be managed via allocation of bandwidth, allowing simultaneous use of the link for multiple applications. JWICS is an integral part of the sensitive compartmented information portion of the Defense Information Systems Network.

JOINT WORLDWIDE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM

The Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System is a sensitive compartmented information portion of the Defense Information System Network. It incorporates advanced networking technologies that permit point-to-point or multipoint information exchange involving voice, text, graphics, data, and video teleconferencing.

Related Terms

intelligence

Sources Joint Publications

JP 2-0

Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Operations

Intentionally Blank

KEY ELEMENTS OF THE LOGISTIC SYSTEM

Lines Of Communications. The lines of communications (LOCs) consist of all the routes (land, water, and air) that connect an operating military force with a theater base of operations and along which supplies and military forces move.

Theater Transportation Network. The ports, bases, airports, rail heads, pipeline terminals, and trailer transfer points that serve as the reception and transshipment points for the LOCs.

Units. Specified units are responsible for operating the seaports, bases, and airports.

Host-Nation Support. Desired civil and military assistance from allies that includes: en route support, reception, onward movement, and sustainment of deploying US forces.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 4-0 Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations

KEY PLANNING CONCEPTS

To facilitate coordination of strategic priorities, deliberate and crisis action plans should contain key planning concepts that enhance understanding of the combatant commander's strategic vision and the sequence of operations needed to attain the commander's theater objectives. These concepts are shown in the figure below. Because of the ambiguous nature of the threat in some plans, all of these concepts may not be applicable. Where possible, they should at least be considered and identified in the plan.

KEY PLANNING CONCEPTS

To the extent possible, plans should incorporate the following concepts of joint operation planning doctrine:

- **Combatant commander's strategic intent and operational focus.**
- **Orientation on the strategic and operational centers of gravity of the threat.**
- **Protection of friendly strategic and operational centers of gravity.**
- **Phasing of operations (such as prehostilities, lodgment, decisive combat and stabilization, follow through, and post hostilities), to include the commander's intent for each phase.**

Related Terms

joint operation planning

Source Joint Publications

JP 5-0 Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations

Intentionally Blank

LANDING PLAN

1. In amphibious operations, a collective term referring to all individually prepared naval and landing force documents that, taken together, present in detail all instructions for execution of the ship-to-shore movement. 2. In airlift operations, the sequence, method of delivery, and place of arrival of troops and materiel.

JP 1-02

Amphibious Operations. The landing plan is essentially the plan for the ship-to-shore movement of the landing force (LF). It is predicated on the scheme of maneuver ashore and the means available to move the LF ashore.

Planning for the ship-to-shore movement follows a general sequence of development. Detailed planning for the ship-to-shore movement cannot begin until after the concept of operations ashore (including the scheme of maneuver) is formulated and approved. The landing plan must be substantially completed before embarkation planning can begin. The landing plan must be carefully integrated with the plan of supporting fires and must provide for the requisite combat service support of all forces ashore.

Basic Considerations.

Basic Requirements. The basic requirements for maximum support to initial tactical operations ashore are the maintenance of tactical integrity in the LF and achieving the required degree of concentration or dispersion of assault shipping.

- **Tactical Integrity.** The organization for landing must ensure adequate control upon landing with a rapid achievement of overall tactical control by commanders of each echelon. Maintenance of tactical integrity is accomplished by proper combat loading of assault shipping and by proper assignment of troops to landing ships, landing craft, amphibious vehicles, and helicopters in the landing plan.
- **Concentration or Dispersion of Assault Shipping.** The required degree of concentration or dispersion of assault shipping is reflected in the organization of sea areas in the objective area, including preparation and implementation of the sea echelon plan.

Availability of Amphibious Shipping and Ship-to-Shore Movement Assets. The type and quantity of available assault shipping and ship-to-shore movement assets will influence every aspect of the planning and execution of an amphibious operation.

Defense of the Amphibious Task Force. The protection of the amphibious task force (ATF) is a matter of mutual concern to and cooperation between the commander of the amphibious task force and the commander of the landing force. Two types of threats must be considered in planning and executing an amphibious operation: threats to the LF and threats to ATF shipping. LF planning must consider the use of LF assets (e.g., aircraft, REDEYE missiles) in the defense of the ATF. Protection comprising both active and passive measures must be provided during all phases of the amphibious operation. Of particular importance during the ship-to-shore movement is the protection acquired through speed of execution and aggressiveness in the conduct of the assault.

- **Active Protection.** Active protection includes offensive air operations, air defense, antisubmarine and anti-small-boat screens, covering forces, electronic countermeasures, smoke, and naval gunfire.
- **Passive Protection.** Passive protection places major emphasis on dispersion and mobility. Dispersion is achieved initially through unit separation afforded by the proper embarkation

of units in assault shipping. Mobility permits speed in movement, which denies the enemy accurate target information.

Flexibility. Planning must incorporate sufficient flexibility to respond to changing situations and to exploit weaknesses in enemy defenses when discovered. Alternate plans and plans for employment of reserves contribute to flexibility.

Fire Support. Planning must include the use and coordination of all fire support means.

Speed and Control. The requirement for speed and positive control in executing an amphibious operation must be emphasized in each phase of the operation.

Special Considerations.

Concept of Operations. The LF concept of operations ashore is the principal determinant in development of the landing plan. As the basis for the landing plan, the concept of operations ashore itself is influenced by many factors; e.g., intelligence on enemy dispositions, the combat power available, hydrographic conditions in the landing area, and the beaches and landing zones available. The concept of operations is the basis on which all subsequent, inverse planning for the amphibious operation as a whole is predicated.

Combat Loading. The arrangement of personnel and the stowage of equipment and supplies in a manner designed to conform to the anticipated tactical operation of the organization embarked. Each individual item is stowed so that it can be unloaded at the required time.

Organization for Embarkation. The organization for embarkation must support both the plan for landing and the concept of operations ashore. It must also provide for maximum flexibility to support alternate plans that may be adopted. The landing plan is based on conditions and enemy capabilities known or believed to have existed in the amphibious objective area before embarkation of the assault troops. A change in conditions affecting either friendly or enemy forces during the transit to the objective area may necessitate modifications to the landing plan without the opportunity for reconfiguring the embarkation organization. The extent to which such changes to the landing plan can be accommodated depends on the flexibility within the organization for embarkation.


Air Operations. The force commander's landing plan links air movement to the overall tactical plan and is the basis for joint development of the air movement plan. To develop the landing plan, planners should have the following information:

- overall commander's priorities;
- subordinate unit tactical plan;
- subordinate unit landing plan.

The landing plan contains five elements of information: the sequence of delivery (starting with time over target through offload and departure); the method of delivery; the time of delivery; the place of delivery of troops, equipment, and supplies into the objective area; and the assembly plan. (See figure below.)

The nature and location of the airfield, drop zone (DZ), landing zone (LZ), and extraction zone (EZ) are basic considerations in preparing the landing plan. Landing areas should be large enough to accommodate initial forces. The following are desirable characteristics of an airfield, DZ, LZ, or EZ:

- near to or, if the enemy situation permits, directly on top of the objective;
- free of nuclear, biological, and chemical contamination and natural obstacles;
- avoids enemy air defenses and strong ground forces;
- easily identified from the air;
- straight-line, minimum threat approach to the objective area permitting proper aircraft alignment;



- near dominating terrain, good road networks, and terrain favorable for defense against attack;
- sufficient in size for rapid delivery of the force or, if airdropped, to allow delivery in a single pass;
- adequate cover and concealment for troops to assemble and reorganize near the landing area;
- minimum construction required to maintain or upgrade an airfield, LZ, or EZ;
- outside the range of enemy suppressive fires.



Mass aerial delivery of forces requires large, unobstructed drop zone areas from which the forces can effect a rapid assembly and reorganization.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-02.1	Joint Doctrine for Landing Force Operations
JP 3-17	JTTP for Theater Airlift Operations

LANDING ZONE

Any specified zone used for the landing of aircraft.

JP 1-02

General. A landing zone (LZ) is any specified zone used for the landing of aircraft. In the theater airlift context, LZs are usually less sophisticated than airfields, with facilities meeting only the minimum requirements of anticipated operations by specific aircraft. They may vary from isolated dirt strips with no off-runway aircraft-handling areas to hard surface airfields with limited support infrastructure. The main advantage of LZs is that in most cases it is possible to find or construct one nearer ground combat units than existing airfields. A close-by, but less sophisticated LZ offers fewer delays in providing airland resupply to forward deployed troops.

The parameters for selecting and preparing LZs are many, but they usually include: anticipated capacity requirements; the nearness of the LZ to the user; the operating and defensive requirements of the aircraft expected to transit the field, and; the time and engineering capabilities available and required to open and/or maintain the LZ.

Locations. The component commanders and the joint force engineer determine the most suitable LZ locations. The selected sites must meet Air Force operational requirements, ground component requirements, and construction considerations.

Construction. If an airfield is to be constructed, the supported component engineer, the joint force commander designated representative, and the Air Force staff engineer must agree on its specific site. The supported component engineer controls the selected site until the designated representative of the airlift mission commander accepts use of the LZ.

Aircraft may have to use LZ facilities before construction is completed. In addition to emergency landing situations, delivery of additional construction equipment, emergency supplies, or reinforcing units may be necessary. Such use should be jointly agreed to by the supported component construction engineer and the designated representative of the airlift mission commander.

When established construction requirements have been met and the airlift mission commander or designated representative accepts the LZ, operational control of the LZ passes to the airlift mission commander. The construction engineer assigns a minimal force to repair and maintain the critical landing surfaces, taxiway, and hardstands. The composition and size of the unit will depend on the threat situation, type and location of the LZ, availability of engineer forces, expected LZ use, and weather.

Criteria. Although the senior planning headquarters assigns the general landing area, subordinate units usually designate specific LZs. Desirable characteristics of LZs are ease of identification from the air; a straight, unobstructed, and secure approach for aircraft; and close proximity to ground objectives. LZs to be developed into more sophisticated facilities should have these additional characteristics as shown in the figure below.

LZs should be classified according to the applicable aircraft and airfield criteria furnished by the construction engineer. Essential airland facilities should be identified before the operation begins. Minimum facilities are provided initially to permit early occupancy and

LANDING ZONE CHARACTERISTICS

Area of sufficient size to accommodate the number and type of aircraft to be landed

Parking and dispersal area for optimal use

A road net to handle ground vehicular traffic

Minimum construction and maintenance needs

Areas and facilities for air terminal operations

Facilities for holding patients awaiting evacuation

Sufficient aerial port capacity to handle incoming personnel and supplies

Facilities to support crash and rescue vehicles

for safe and efficient landing operations. Plans and orders should provide for later improvements to increase the efficiency of operations and safety factors of the facility.

LZ dimensions vary according to the types of aircraft involved. Factors considered include aircraft ground roll, temperature, field elevation, and nature and conditions of the landing surface. Expected maximum takeoff and landing gross weights, obstructions, and terrain on approach and departure should also be considered.

Existing facilities, such as roads and open areas, should be used to reduce the time and effort for new construction. Furthermore, airland facilities should be dispersed to avoid becoming lucrative targets. Host-nation support agencies may be used to identify emergency or contingency runways.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-17

JTTP for Theater Airlift Operations

LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT

See law of war.

JP 1-02

The Law of Armed Conflict. Throughout the history of war, treaties and customs have developed which generally represent the collective views of the belligerents. Their principles protect combatants and noncombatants, safeguard fundamental human rights, and facilitate the restoration of peace by limiting the amount of force and the manner in which force is applied. Together, these treaties and customs are known as the law of armed conflict. Neither the law of armed conflict nor national policy sanction devastation as an end in itself. Both

LAW OF WAR

recognize the need for a reasonable connection between the destruction of life and property and the defeat of the enemy's forces. That having been said, neither the law of armed conflict nor any other customary or conventional international law prohibits the use of nuclear weapons in armed conflict. However, to comply with the law, a particular use of any weapon must satisfy the long-standing targeting rules of military necessity, proportionality, and avoidance of collateral damage and unnecessary suffering. Nuclear weapons are unique in this analysis only in their greater destructive potential (although they also differ from conventional weapons in that they produce radiation and electromagnetic effects and, potentially, radioactive fallout). In some circumstances, the use of a nuclear weapon may therefore be inappropriate. Treaties may impose additional restrictions on nuclear weapons.

Related Terms

law of war

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-12.1 Doctrine for Joint Theater Nuclear Operations

LAW OF WAR

That part of international law that regulates the conduct of armed hostilities. Also called the law of armed conflict. JP 1-02

Law of War (see figure below). In the event of armed conflict involving US forces, it is US law that the law of war (also called law of armed conflict) and the obligations of the US Government under that law are observed and enforced by the US forces. US commanders will ensure that the Department of Defense (DOD) Law of War Program is implemented in accordance with DOD and Service directives and that adequate procedures are in place for the prompt reporting and thorough investigation of any allegations of violations of the law of war by or against US or enemy personnel. Three general categories within the law of war relating most closely to security operations are briefly discussed below. Legal representatives should be consulted concerning implementation of these basic laws.

Treatment of Combatants. During armed conflict, treatment of combatants is governed by the law of war and relevant host nation and domestic laws. Enemy personnel acting in accordance with the law of war will be accorded enemy prisoner of war (EPW) status. All enemy combatants will be accorded the protection of the law of war and will be treated in a manner consistent with EPW status until an Article 5 tribunal makes a determination of the merits of the claim to EPW status.

Treatment of Insurgents. US policy requires and directs humane care and treatment for insurgents held in US military custody during counterinsurgency operations from the moment of capture until release or repatriation. Inhumane treatment, even under stress of combat and with deep provocation, is a serious and punishable violation under international law and the US Uniform Code of Military Justice.

Treatment of Prisoners. The treatment of EPWs is outlined in the 1949 Geneva Convention, relative to the treatment of prisoners of war, which prescribes specific protective measures for EPWs captured during armed conflict.

CATEGORIES OF THE LAW OF WAR RELATING TO SECURITY OPERATIONS

Treatment of Combatants

Treatment of Insurgents

Treatment of Prisoners

Related Terms

law of armed conflict; rules of engagement

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-0

Doctrine for Joint Operations

LEAD AGENCY

Designated among US Government agencies to coordinate the interagency oversight of the day-to-day conduct of an ongoing operation. The lead agency is to chair the interagency working group established to coordinate policy related to a particular operation. The lead agency determines the agenda, ensures cohesion among the agencies and is responsible for implementing decisions.

JP 1-02

The National Security Council (NSC) staff normally designates the lead agency for situations in which the Department of Defense will participate, but lead agency responsibility can be situationally dependent, with the NSC staff setting the agenda. Among US government agencies, a charter enables the NSC to discharge responsibilities with the active support of others assigned to the problem. While not inviolate, the principle of lead agency is applied to a variety of functions requiring interagency coordination. Application of the principle is not limited to national-level coordination. It can be applied at the tactical level with counterpart

LEAD NATION COMMAND

agencies such as government field offices and local law enforcement agencies. It is important to determine details about the agencies and organizations that have an active role in the issue at hand to ensure that those requiring information receive it and those that have information provide it.

Related Terms

interagency coordination

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-08 Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations, Vol. I

LEAD NATION COMMAND

In this arrangement, the nation providing the preponderance of forces and resources typically provides the commander of the coalition force. The lead nation can retain its organic command and control structure, employing other national forces as subordinate formations. More commonly, the lead nation command is characterized by some integration of staffs. The composition of staffs is determined by the coalition leadership.

Related Terms

parallel command

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations

LEGITIMACY

Committed forces must sustain the legitimacy of the operation and of the host government, where applicable.

In military operations other than war (MOOTW), legitimacy is a condition based on the perception by a specific audience of the legality, morality, or rightness of a set of actions. This audience may be the US public, foreign nations, the populations in the area of responsibility/joint operations area, or the participating forces. If an operation is perceived as legitimate, there is a strong impulse to support the action. If an operation is not perceived as legitimate, the actions may not be supported and may be actively resisted. In MOOTW, legitimacy is frequently a decisive element. The prudent use of psychological operations and humanitarian and civic assistance programs assists in developing a sense of legitimacy for the supported government.

Legitimacy may depend on adherence to objectives agreed to by the international community, ensuring the action is appropriate to the situation, and fairness in dealing with various factions. It may be reinforced by restraint in the use of force, the type of forces employed, and the disciplined conduct of the forces involved. The perception of legitimacy by the US public is strengthened if there are obvious national or humanitarian interests at stake, and if there is assurance that American lives are not being needlessly or carelessly risked.

Another aspect of this principle is the legitimacy bestowed upon a government through the perception of the populace which it governs. Because the populace perceives that the government has genuine authority to govern and uses proper agencies for valid purposes, they consider that government as legitimate.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-07 Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War

LEVELS OF AUTHORITY

The authority vested in a commander must be commensurate with the responsibility assigned. There are various levels of authority used for US military forces, four are command relationships — combatant command (command authority), operational control, tactical control, and support. The other authorities are coordinating authority, administrative control, and direct liaison authorized.

Related Terms


administrative control; combatant command (command authority); coordinating authority; direct liaison authorized; operational control; support; tactical control

Source Joint Publications

JP 0-2 Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)

LEVELS OF LOGISTIC SUPPORT

Joint doctrine states that there are three levels of war — strategic, operational, and tactical. They apply in war and in operations other than war. Logistic support within these levels is demonstrated in the way the Joint Staff, Services, and warfighting commanders handle logistics. The Joint Staff and Services concentrate on strategic logistic matters. The supported and supporting commanders' logistic staffs manage both the strategic and operational logistic issues affecting missions assigned to the combatant commanders in the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan by the National Command Authorities and other such areas as directed by the combatant commander. The Services and the subordinate commanders down to their battlefield logisticians at the unit and ship level, deal with operational and tactical logistic responsibilities, including developing procedures, doctrine, and training for supplying personnel with all necessary materiel to do their jobs. All levels are interrelated, with constraints at any level limiting options of decision makers. Within their areas of responsibility, geographic combatant commanders may establish a theater of war and, if needed, subordinate theaters of operations. The logistic concept should support theater activity by properly organizing support from the continental US base to the combat zone. The figure below shows a broad framework for this organization and the scope of logistic support needed to support a theater. All levels of logistics involve combat service support and affect the sustainability of forces in the combat zone.



Related Terms

levels of war

Source Joint Publications

JP 4-0 Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations

LEVELS OF WAR

General. The levels of war are doctrinal perspectives that clarify the links between strategic objectives and tactical actions. Although there are no finite limits or boundaries between them, the three levels, in general, are strategic, operational, and tactical. They apply to both war and operations other than war. (See figure below.)

Levels of command, size of units, types of equipment, or types of forces or components are not associated with a particular level. National assets such as intelligence and communications satellites, previously considered principally in a strategic context, are an important adjunct to tactical operations. Actions can be defined as strategic, operational, or tactical based on their effect or contribution to achieving strategic, operational, or tactical objectives, but many times the accuracy of these labels can only be determined during historical studies.

Advances in technology, information age media reporting, and the compression of time-space relationships contribute to the growing inter-relationships between the levels of war. The levels of war help commanders visualize a logical flow of operations, allocate resources, and assign tasks to the appropriate command. However, commanders at every level must be aware that in a world of constant, immediate communications, any single event may cut across the three levels.

The Strategic Level. The strategic level is that level of war at which a nation, often as a member of a group of nations, determines national or multinational (alliance or coalition) strategic security objectives and guidance and develops and uses national resources to accomplish these objectives. Strategy is the art and science of developing and employing



armed forces and other instruments of national power in a synchronized fashion to secure national or multinational objectives. The National Command Authorities (NCA) translate policy into national strategic military objectives. These military objectives facilitate theater strategic planning.

A geographic combatant commander usually participates in discussions with the NCA through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and with allies and coalition members. The theater strategy is thus an element that relates to both US national strategy and operational activities within the theater. Strategy, derived from policy, is the basis for all operations.

The Operational Level. The operational level links the tactical employment of forces to strategic objectives. The focus at this level is on operational art — the use of military forces to achieve strategic goals through the design, organization, integration, and conduct of strategies, campaigns, major operations, and battles. Operational art determines when, where, and for what purpose major forces will be employed and should influence the enemy disposition before combat. It governs the deployment of those forces, their commitment to or withdrawal from battle, and the arrangement of battles and major operations to achieve operational and strategic objectives.

Operational art helps commanders use resources efficiently and effectively to achieve strategic objectives. It provides a framework to assist commanders in ordering their thoughts when designing campaigns and major operations. Operational art helps commanders understand the conditions for victory before seeking battle, thus avoiding unnecessary battles. Without operational art, war would be a set of disconnected engagements, with relative attrition the only measure of success or failure.

Operational art requires broad vision, the ability to anticipate, and effective joint and multinational cooperation. Operational art is practiced not only by joint force commanders

LEVERAGE

but also by their senior staff officers and subordinate commanders. Joint operational art looks not only at the employment of military forces but also at the arrangement of their efforts in time, space, and purpose. Joint operational art, in particular, focuses on the fundamental methods and issues associated with the synchronization of air, land, sea, space, and special operations forces.

Among many considerations, operational art requires commanders to answer the following questions:

- What military (or related political and social) conditions must be produced in the operational area to achieve the strategic goal? (Ends)
- What sequence of actions is most likely to produce that condition? (Ways)
- How should the resources of the joint force be applied to accomplish that sequence of actions? (Means)
- What is the likely cost or risk to the joint force in performing that sequence of actions?

The Tactical Level. Tactics is the employment of units in combat. It includes the ordered arrangement and maneuver of units in relation to each other and/or to the enemy in order to use their full potential. An engagement is normally short in duration and fought between small forces, such as individual aircraft in air-to-air combat. Engagements include a wide variety of actions between opposing forces in the air, on and under the sea, or on land. A battle consists of a set of related engagements. Battles typically last longer; involve larger forces such as fleets, armies, and air forces; and could affect the course of a campaign.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations

LEVERAGE

Leverage among the forces is the centerpiece of joint operational art. Force interactions can be described with respect to friendly forces and to enemy forces. Friendly relationships may be characterized as supported or supporting. Engagements with the enemy may be thought of as symmetric, if our force and the enemy force are similar (land versus land, etc.) or asymmetric, if the forces are dissimilar (air versus sea, sea versus land, etc.). These interactions will be discussed in turn. In combination they illustrate the richness of relationships achievable with joint forces and the foundation for synergy that those relationships create.

Force interaction with respect to friendly force relationships can be generally characterized as supported (the receiver of a given effort) or supporting (the provider of such an effort). The command relationships that provide the framework for arranging for such support are discussed extensively in joint doctrine. A principal joint force commander (JFC) responsibility is to assess continuously whether force relationships enhance to the fullest extent possible the provision of fighting assistance from and to each element of the joint force in all dimensions. Support relationships afford an effective means to weight (and ensure unity of effort for) various operations, each component typically receiving and providing support at the same time. For example, a land component may be supported for a deep maneuver, a joint force air component commander for theater counterair and direct attack of enemy centers of gravity, a maritime component for sea control and an amphibious forcible entry, and a special operations component for direct action and other missions. The potentially large number of such relationships requires the close attention not only of JFCs but also their components to plan and execute.

Force interaction with regard to enemy forces is another way for JFCs to achieve concentration in the various dimensions. JFCs arrange symmetrical and asymmetrical actions to take advantage of friendly strengths and enemy vulnerabilities and to preserve freedom of action for future operations. The history of joint operations highlights the enormous lethality of asymmetrical operations and the great operational sensitivity to such threats. Asymmetrical actions that pit joint force strengths against enemy weaknesses and maneuver in time and space can provide decisive advantage. Asymmetrical operations are particularly effective when applied against enemy forces not postured for immediate tactical battle but instead operating in more vulnerable aspects — operational deployment and/or movement, extended logistic activity (including rest and refitting), or mobilization and training (including industrial production). There are literally dozens of potential modes of attack to be considered as JFCs plan the application of air, land, sea, space, and special operations forces against the various aspects of enemy capabilities.

As a final part of force interaction, JFCs must take action to protect or shield all elements of the joint force from enemy symmetrical and asymmetrical action. This function of protection has particular relevance in joint warfare, as JFCs seek to reduce the vulnerability of their forces and enhance their own freedom of action. JFCs gain decisive advantage over the enemy through leverage. This leverage can be achieved in a variety of ways. Asymmetrical actions that pit joint force strengths against enemy weaknesses and maneuver in time and space can provide decisive advantage. Synergy from the concentration and integration of joint force actions also provides JFCs with decisive advantage. Leverage allows JFCs to impose their will on the enemy, increase the enemy's dilemma, and maintain the initiative.

Related Terms

operational art

Source Joint Publications

JP 1	Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States
JP 3-0	Doctrine for Joint Operations

LIAISON

That contact or intercommunication maintained between elements of military forces to ensure mutual understanding and unity of purpose and action.

JP 1-02

Liaison is an important aspect of joint force command and control. Liaison teams or individuals may be dispatched from higher to lower, lower to higher, laterally, or any combination of these. They generally represent the interests of the sending commander to the receiving commander, but can greatly promote understanding of the commander's intent at both the sending and receiving headquarters.

Experience shows liaison is a particularly important part of command, control, communications, and computers in a joint force. Recalling Clausewitz' analogy of a military force as an intricate machine, ample liaison parties, properly manned and equipped, may be viewed as a lubricant that helps keep that machine working smoothly. The Gulf War vividly demonstrated the role of effective liaison in both the joint and multinational contexts.

In the realm of command, ample and effective liaison parties and teams served to keep communications constant and effective. For example, US Marine Forces Central Command had liaison teams with US Air Forces Central Command (CENTAF), including all seven CENTAF airborne command aircraft, US Army Forces Central Command (ARCENT), US

LINEAR AND NON-LINEAR OPERATIONS

Naval Forces Central Command, and the major coalition commands. The US Central Command special operations command had numerous liaison teams with coalition military forces, which played major roles in coordinating fire support and other aspects of military operations. ARCENT sent out several very large liaison teams, including teams to both major coalition groups of land forces. This partial listing of liaison activities was in addition to the “normal” liaison extended among and between the armed forces (for example, Air Naval Gunfire Liaison Company teams, Air Force tactical air control parties, Army ground liaison teams to the Air Force, and Navy liaison to the Air Force). In short, liaison teams played an important and effective role in reducing the frictions associated with a large and complex collection of forces.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 1	Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States
JP 3-0	Doctrine for Joint Operations

LINEAR AND NON-LINEAR OPERATIONS

“The full dimensional joint campaign is in major respects ‘nonlinear.’ That is, the dominant effects of air, sea, space, and special operations may be felt more or less independently of the front line of ground troops. The impact of these operations on land battles, interacting with the modern dynamics of land combat itself, helps obtain the required fluidity, breadth, and depth of operations. In the same way, land operations can provide or protect critical bases for air, land, sea, and space operations and enable these operations to be supported and extended throughout the theater”

Joint Pub 1, Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States

As technology and doctrines have expanded the lethality, tempo, and depth of operations, the potential for conventional forces to conduct nonlinear operations has increased. Linearity refers primarily to the conduct of operations along lines of operations with identified forward line of own troops. In linear operations, emphasis is placed on maintaining the position of the land force in relation to other friendly forces. From this relative positioning of forces, security is enhanced and massing of forces can be facilitated. Also inherent in linear operations is the security of rear areas, especially lines of communications (LOCs) between sustaining bases and fighting forces. World Wars I and II offer multiple examples of linear operations.

In the land context, nonlinear operations tend to be conducted from selected bases of operations (ashore or afloat), but without clearly defined lines of operations. Because rear areas are likewise not clearly defined, their security as well as that of LOCs are not priority concerns. Operation JUST CAUSE is an excellent example of a nonlinear operation. In such an operation, land forces orient more on their assigned objectives (for example, destroying an enemy force or seizing and controlling critical terrain or population centers) and less on their geographic relationship to other friendly forces. Maritime operations, special operations, and the operations of insurgent forces tend to be nonlinear. To protect themselves, individual forces conducting nonlinear operations rely more on situational awareness, mobility advantages, and freedom of action than on mass. Nonlinear operations place a premium on command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence, mobility, and innovative means for sustainment.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-0

Doctrine for Joint Operations

LINES OF COMMUNICATIONS

All the routes, land, water, and air, which connect an operating military force with a base of operations and along which supplies and military forces move. Also called LOC. JP 1-02

Transportation enables the joint campaign to begin and continue. The projection of power relies upon the mobility inherent in air, naval, and land forces, supported by the defense transportation system. Transportation at the strategic and operational levels of war is a complex operation. It can best be served by a single, sound deployment concept that reflects en route and theater constraints and undergoes minimum rapid changes (which may create unforeseen, cascading effects). Experience has shown that the cooperation of all supporting combatant commands and Services is required to ensure the efficient coordination and execution of a major deployment. Furthermore, transportation requires control of the necessary lines of communication (LOCs). Without secure air, sea, space, and land LOCs we cannot reliably move forces and materiel, reinforce forward-deployed forces, or sustain the campaign. LOCs are included in the list of key elements of the logistic system, as seen in the figure below.

KEY ELEMENTS OF THE LOGISTIC SYSTEM

LINES OF COMMUNICATIONS (LOCs)

The LOCs consists of all the routes (land, water, and air) that connect an operating military force with a theater base of operations and along which supplies and military forces move.

THEATER TRANSPORTATION NETWORK

The ports, bases, airports, rail heads, pipeline terminals, and trailer transfer points that serve as the reception and transshipment points for the LOCs.

UNITS

Specified units are responsible for operating the seaports, bases, and airports.

HOST-NATION SUPPORT

Desired civil and military assistance from allies that includes: en route support, reception, onward movement, and sustainment of deploying US forces.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 1

Joint Warfare of the Armed Services of the United States

JP 4-0

Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations

LINES OF OPERATIONS

Lines which define the directional orientation of the force in time and space in relation to the enemy. They connect the force with its base of operations and its objectives. JP 1-02

Lines of operations define the directional orientation of the force in time and space in relation to the enemy. They connect the force with its base of operations and its objectives. A force operates on interior lines when its operations diverge from a central point and when it is therefore closer to separate enemy forces than the latter are to one another. Interior lines benefit a weaker force by allowing it to shift the main effort laterally more rapidly than the enemy. A force operates on exterior lines when its operations converge on the enemy. Successful operations on exterior lines require a stronger or more mobile force, but offer the opportunity to encircle and annihilate a weaker or less mobile opponent.

In modern war, lines of operation attain a three-dimensional aspect and pertain to more than just maneuver. Joint force commanders (JFCs) use them to focus combat power effects toward a desired end. JFCs apply combat power throughout the three dimensions of space and over time in a logical design that integrates the capabilities of the joint force to converge on and defeat enemy centers of gravity.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations

LITTORAL

Depending on the situation, joint force commanders (JFCs) may conduct operations in the littoral to achieve or support joint force objectives. The littoral area contains two parts. First is the seaward area from the open ocean to the shore, which must be controlled to support operations ashore. Second is the landward area inland from the shore that can be supported and defended directly from the sea. Control of the littoral area is often essential to dimensional superiority. Naval operations in the littoral can provide for the seizure of an adversary's port, naval base, or coastal air base to allow entry of other elements of the joint force.

Controlled littorals often offer the best positions from which to begin, sustain, and support joint operations, especially in operational areas with poor infrastructure for supporting operations ashore. Sea-based airpower and sea-launched land combat power are formidable tools that JFCs can use to gain and maintain initiative. Naval forces operating in littoral areas can dominate coastal areas to mass forces rapidly and generate high intensity offensive power at times and in locations required by JFCs. Naval forces' relative freedom of action enables JFCs to position these capabilities where they can readily strike opponents. Naval forces' very presence, if made known, can pose a threat that the enemy cannot ignore.

Even when joint forces are firmly established ashore, littoral operations provide JFCs with excellent opportunities to achieve leverage over the enemy by operational maneuver from the sea. Such operations can introduce significant size forces over relatively great distances in short periods of time into the rear or flanks of the enemy. The mobility of naval forces at sea, coupled with the ability to rapidly land operationally significant forces, can be key to



Destroyers can provide a dominating presence, which joint force commanders can use in the littoral area to achieve objectives.

achieving JFC objectives. These capabilities are further enhanced by operational flexibility and the ability to identify and take advantage of fleeting opportunities.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations

LODGMENT

A lodgment phase allows the movement and buildup of a decisive combat force in the operational area. In operations during peacetime, deployment will normally include movements to host-nation air or sea ports. In operations conducted before and during combat, initial deployment may require forcible entry, followed by the occupation and expansion of lodgment areas.

Related Terms

phases

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations

LOGISTIC CONCEPT

Combatant Commander's Logistic Concept. Although the commanders of Service component commands provide logistic resources, combatant commanders are responsible for ensuring that the overall plan for using these resources supports the theater concept of operations.

The Logistic System. A critical element of a theater logistic system is timely integration of intertheater and intratheater transportation of personnel and supplies in the theater distribution system. The means to move people and equipment forward and to evacuate them to the rear is fundamental to successful theater operations. The logistic system ranges from the continental US (CONUS) or the deployed support base through a theater port of

entry and on to the forward areas of the theater. Key elements of the logistic system are illustrated in the first figure below.

Considerations in Developing a Logistic System. (See second figure below.)

Geography. The planner must examine the impact of topography, climate, and external factors affecting the logistic system, especially the impact on the various segments of the transportation system, including all waterways, rail, roads, pipelines, and airways.

"Victory is the beautiful, bright-colored flower. Transport is the stem without which it could never have blossomed."

Winston Churchill: The River War, vii 1899

Transportation. Many factors should influence the time-phased selection of transportation modes to meet operational requirements. For example, sealift is by far the most efficient mode for bulk tonnage; airlift is often the most expedient for people or for rapid movement of equipment and supplies when time is critical. On land, rail (for bulk tonnage) and pipeline (for bulk liquids) are more efficient than trucks.

Logistic Capability. The ability of the base infrastructure to receive, warehouse, and issue logistic resources influences the efficiency of the entire logistic system (for example, through the use of specialized container handling equipment). Infrastructure also limits the size of the force that can be supported.

Logistic Enhancements. Plans should include means to reduce the impact of logistic bottlenecks. Some examples are opening or gaining access to high-capacity ports, expanding airfield parking aprons, additional materials handling equipment, and expedient airfield matting. Improved use of commercial International Organization for Standards containers vice breakbulk can aid in port clearance; but planners should realize such a container policy may create problems elsewhere.

Logistic Infrastructure Protection. Provisions must be made for security of the logistic system because it is an integral part of combat power.

Echelon of Support. The logistic system must be responsive to the needs of the most forward combat forces. It must start from CONUS and extend to the forward area of operations, providing supplies and services when and where they are needed.

Assignment of Responsibility. Combatant commanders should assign responsibility for operating the seaports, bases, and airports to the Service components (or host nations, if applicable).

Availability of Wartime Host-Nation Support (HNS). The level of assistance in terms of transportation resources, labor, facilities, and materiel that can be provided by allied nations affects the amount of airlift and sealift that may be devoted to initial movement of combat forces or sustainment.

Theater Concept of Logistic Support. The concept of logistic support should derive from the estimate of logistic supportability of one or more courses of action (COAs). The commander for a combatant command's (CINC's) directorate for logistics prepares these estimates for each alternative COA proposed by either the operations or planning directorate. The estimate of logistic supportability for the selected COA along with the logistic system framework considerations outlined above may be refined into the concept of logistic support for an operation or campaign.

The concept of logistic support is the envisioned manner in which the capabilities and resources of the CINCS' components will be employed to provide supply, maintenance,

KEY ELEMENTS OF THE LOGISTIC SYSTEM

LINES OF COMMUNICATIONS (LOCs)

The LOCs consists of all the routes (land, water, and air) that connect an operating military force with a theater base of operations and along which supplies and military forces move.

THEATER TRANSPORTATION NETWORK

The ports, bases, airports, rail heads, pipeline terminals, and trailer transfer points that serve as the reception and transshipment points for the LOCs.

UNITS

Specified units are responsible for operating the seaports, bases, and airports.

HOST-NATION SUPPORT

Desired civil and military assistance from allies that includes: en route support, reception, onward movement, and sustainment of deploying US forces.

transportation, and engineering services. It is the organization of capabilities and resources into an overall theater warfare support concept.

The concept of logistic support should specify how operations will be supported. It should give special attention to the major lines of communications (LOCs) to be developed, as well

CONSIDERATIONS IN DEVELOPING A LOGISTIC SYSTEM

Geography

Transportation

Logistic Capability

Logistic Enhancements

Logistic Infrastructure Protection

Echelon of Support

Assignment of Responsibility

Availability of Wartime Host-Nation Support

LOGISTIC DISCIPLINE

as wartime HNS to be provided by each allied nation. If there is to be a communications zone to support air or land operations or a network of intermediate and advanced bases to support naval operations within a theater, the general organization and functions should be laid out. Supporting paragraphs should cover any topics the CINC believes are necessary and may include the following:

- **Guidance on Harmonization.** Multiple Military Services (US and allied nations) may operate simultaneously within the theater and the LOCs approaching the theater. Coordination of functions among all affected commands, nations, and agencies is essential to avoid confusion and unnecessary duplication. The combatant commanders should provide general guidance, by function and area, wherever needed to ensure unity of effort.
- **Logistic Command, Control, Communications, and Computer (C4) Systems.** In addition to standard operating procedures for C4 systems, consideration should be given to backup plans or manual procedures in the event of possible C4 system outages or incompatible interfaces during combined operations.
- **Intratheater Support.** Specific guidance should be provided for employment of all available logistic infrastructure, including allied civilian and military support. In addition, the geographic combatant commander can assign logistic responsibility for the theater to the predominant user of a particular category of support (i.e., intratheater transportation is frequently an Army component responsibility).

Related Terms

logistics

Source Joint Publications

JP 4-0 Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations

LOGISTIC DISCIPLINE

Logistic resources are always constrained. At the theater (strategic) level, these limitations are either fiscal constraints or the unavailability of materials, industrial facilities, and skilled labor and long leadtimes for mobilization and deployment, which affect the strategic concentration of forces and supplies within the theater. At the operational and tactical levels, common limitations are attributed to: inadequate transportation means and port capacities; insufficient quantities of certain munitions, equipment, and critical spare parts; the lack of trained logistic personnel; and the failure to plan for adequate, interoperable command, control, communications, and computer systems. Unwise use of logistic resources means combat forces will be deprived of manpower, equipment, supplies, or training, and constitutes a disregard for economy of force.

True economy of supply requires the careful planning and buildup of levels to provide those resources and combat facilities, based on threat distribution and phase duration, that are essential to initiate and sustain combat operations. At the same time, avoid building too large a stockpile. Excess stocks decrease flexibility, drain transportation resources from other priorities, and deny sustainment to other areas. In all cases, the cost of any military operation must be considered; usually the most efficient means consistent with the concept of operations should be chosen.

Related Terms

logistics

Source Joint Publications

JP 4-0 Doctrine for Logistic Support to Joint Operations

LOGISTIC PLANNING

General. As shown in the figure below, operations and logistics are inseparable facets of war. Neither can claim primacy; each is integral to the other. Integration of the operation and logistic planners' efforts is necessary throughout the planning and execution phases. Although obvious, such integration does not occur automatically. Command interest at all levels is essential.


Sound logistic planning forms the foundation for strategic, operational, and tactical flexibility and mobility. To influence the relative combat power of his force, the commander must have adequate control of the command's logistic support capability.

The combatant commanders' campaign and operation plans should have logistic implications coordinated at all levels: international, national, Service and functional component, and supporting command.

Adaptability. Plans should make provisions for changes to the concept of operations. These changes could include the need for creation of logistic support sites, additional security forces, more transportation, expanded port capacity, logistics over-the-shore sites, and numerous other increases in logistic overhead. Plans should be written to anticipate changes.

Benefits of Adequate Logistic Plans. Proper logistic planning will reduce the need for emergency measures and logistic improvisations, which are usually expensive and often have an adverse effect on subordinate and adjacent commands.

Equivalence of Deployment and Employment Planning. Deployment planning is more deliberate and methodical than employment planning and lends itself better to automated data processing support. Logistic planners must avoid focusing solely on the deployment requirements at the expense of sustaining the employment concept of the campaign. Detailed logistic planning for employment is equally important and should neither be neglected nor



LOGISTIC REFINEMENT

delayed until deployment plans are completed. Only by thorough and concurrent consideration of both deployment and employment facets of the campaign or operation will planners be able to construct adequate logistic plans.

Integration. Logistic plans should be integrated with a combatant commander's operation plan annexes and with plans of other commands and organizations within the Department of Defense, as well as external departments and agencies and wartime host-nation support that will be supporting the combatant commanders.

Strategic, Operational, and Tactical Levels. Logistic planning should be done at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels.

Strategic and Operational Logistic Support Concepts. Combatant commanders' strategic logistic concept will focus on the ability to generate and move forces and materiel into the theater base and on to desired operating locations, where operational logistic concepts are employed. With the transportation and distribution systems in mind, planners must determine the basic, but broad, mobilization, deployment, and sustainment requirements of the combatant commanders' concept of operations.

Tactical Logistic Support Concepts. This planning is done primarily by the Service components. It includes line-item planning and involves the detailed application of the best planning factors available from historical usage data, analysis, or exercise experience. Also, planners determine the size and precise location of logistic facilities and units. Combatant commanders and their staffs should examine the Service components' methods, assumptions, and factors to determine their validity and to guard against duplication of effort and any tendency to establish unnecessarily high safety margins or standards of living.

"Mobility is the true test of a supply system."

Captain Sir Basil Liddell Hart: Thoughts on War, 1944

Related Terms

logistics

Source Joint Publications

JP 4-0 Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations

LOGISTIC REFINEMENT

Logistic refinement is conducted primarily by the Services, the Defense Logistics Agency, and Service component commanders under the overall direction of the supported commander. Logistic refinement confirms the sourcing of logistic requirements in accordance with Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan guidance and assesses the adequacy of resources provided through support planning. US Transportation Command coordinates on logistic planning matters and hosts conferences dedicated to logistic planning and refinement.

Related Terms

joint operation planning

Source Joint Publications

JP 5-0 Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations

LOGISTICS

The science of planning and carrying out the movement and maintenance of forces. In its most comprehensive sense, those aspects of military operations which deal with: a. design and development, acquisition, storage, movement, distribution, maintenance, evacuation, and disposition of materiel; b. movement, evacuation, and hospitalization of personnel; c. acquisition or construction, maintenance, operation, and disposition of facilities; and d. acquisition or furnishing of services. JP 1-02

Logistics provides the foundation of our combat power. It can be described as the bridge connecting a nation's economy to a nation's warfighting forces. Logistics is the process of planning and executing the movement and sustainment of operating forces in the execution of a military strategy and operations. Areas of logistic responsibilities are shown in the figure below.

The art of logistics is how to integrate the strategic, operational, and tactical sustainment efforts within the theater, while scheduling the mobilization and deployment of units, personnel, and supplies in support of the employment concept of a geographic combatant commander. The relative combat power military forces can bring to bear against an enemy is constrained by a nation's capability to deliver forces and materiel to the required points of application across the range of military operations. Commanders may have more combat forces than available logistic resources to move and sustain desired operations. A nation's capability to deliver logistic resources has historically been a major limiting factor in military operations. This may be especially true in future joint operations, when demands for military resources become highly competitive.

To avoid shortfalls or increased risk in operation plans, logistics must be balanced between the combatant commander's needs and logistic resource availability. Logistics is also a function of command. To have control over the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war, one must also have control over logistics. For a given area and for a given mission, a single command authority should be responsible for logistics. Combatant commanders exercise combatant command (command authority) (COCOM) over assigned forces. COCOM includes directive authority for logistics, giving the combatant commander the unique ability to shift logistic resources within the theater. COCOM cannot be delegated. Normally, this authority is exercised through subordinate joint force commanders and Service and/or functional component commanders. (Note: A commander of a combatant command's (CINC's) authority is generally confined to the theater, while logistic support beyond the theater is usually a Service's responsibility. This authority underscores the need for accurate, and well coordinated, prior logistic planning between CINCs, Services, supporting agencies, and allies.)

AREAS OF LOGISTIC RESPONSIBILITIES

MATERIEL

Design and Development
Acquisition
Storage
Movement
Distribution
Maintenance
Evacuation
Disposition

PERSONNEL

Movement
Evacuation
Hospitalization

SERVICES

Acquisition or Furnishing

FACILITIES

Acquisition or Construction
Maintenance
Operation
Disposition

Related Terms

concept of logistic support; estimate of logistic feasibility; logistic concept; logistic discipline; logistic planning; logistic refinement; logistic support system; theater concept of logistic support

Source Joint Publications

JP 4-0 Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations

LOGISTICS AS A FACTOR IN DETERMINING OBJECTIVES

Depending on the theater operation and logistic concepts a geographic combatant commander employs in a campaign, logistic factors will almost always affect a theater campaign and exert different constraints. Strategically, logistic capabilities may limit the deployment, concentration, and employment options available to the National Command

Authorities, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, or combatant commanders. Operationally, theater logistic constraints may dictate the rate of strategic buildup or theater onward movement, overall size of the combat force, the depth of any attack, or the speed of advance.

Related Terms

logistics

Source Joint Publications

JP 4-0 Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations

LOGISTICS AS A FORCE MULTIPLIER

Correlations of combat power between opposing forces are often so close that a small advantage gained by one side over the other can prove decisive. Logistics plays a significant role, both offensively and defensively, in attaining the leverage potential from a given force configuration. It does this primarily by increasing the endurance of the force. For example, a small investment in forward infrastructure can pay large dividends by reconstituting forces rapidly and returning them to battle in time to influence the outcome. Specifically, forward battle damage repair and maintenance capability, rapid runway repair capability, and forward medical treatment facilities can help in reconstituting forces efficiently.

Related Terms

logistics

Source Joint Publications

JP 4-0 Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations

LOGISTICS-OVER-THE-SHORE OPERATIONS

The loading and unloading of ships without the benefit of fixed port facilities, in friendly or nondefended territory, and, in time of war, during phases of theater development in which there is no opposition by the enemy. Also called LOTS.

JP 1-02

Logistics-over-the-shore (LOTS) is the loading and unloading of ships without the benefit of fixed port facilities in either friendly or undefended territory and, in time of war, during phases of theater development. LOTS operations are conducted over unimproved shorelines, through fixed ports not accessible to deep draft shipping, and through fixed ports that are inadequate without the use of LOTS capabilities.

Both Navy and Army may conduct LOTS operations. In an amphibious operation, the Navy may conduct LOTS operations in conjunction with the Marine Corps as a naval operation. During an amphibious operation, the Navy is responsible for the discharge of cargo and supplies to the high water mark, where the landing force assumes the responsibility for acceptance, transfer, and transportation to inland marshalling areas.

An Army LOTS operation may be conducted as part of the base, garrison, or theater development that immediately follows an amphibious operation or as a separate evolution when no amphibious operation precedes it. It is supported and/or coordinated with other Services. During Army LOTS operations, supplies and equipment are moved ashore and transferred to a transportation agency for onward movement.

The scope of the LOTS operation will depend on geographic, tactical, and time considerations. A LOTS operation area is the geographic area required to successfully conduct a LOTS operation.

Related Terms

joint logistics-over-the-shore operations

Source Joint Publications

JP 4-01.6 JTTP for Joint Logistics-Over-the-Shore (JLOTS)

LOGISTICS READINESS CENTER

Commanders of combatant commands (CINCs) will usually form command centers and operational planning teams in wartime. The logistic staff members in these groups are usually supported by a Logistics Readiness Center (LRC) or are teamed with representatives from various functional areas: fuels, ammunition, engineering, supply, surface transportation, sealift, airlift, and medical services. The LRC receives reports from Service components and external sources, distills information for presentation to the CINC, and responds to questions. In addition to operating the LRC and providing representation in the command center, the combatant command logistic staff monitors current and evolving theater logistic capabilities. The status information collected from Service components should support the following questions:

- Are any planned operations in jeopardy because of logistic limitations?
- Are there any types of operations that should not be considered because they could not be supported?

The data reported should be in the form of gross comparisons of current stock and expected consumption and should identify the on-hand percentage of requirements of critical items and munitions. The logistic status information should be converted to output indicators; the types of operations current and incoming assets could support, including factors such as intensity of combat, duration of the operation, and the operational reach that can be attained. In summary, this function involves collecting, consolidating, interpreting, and explaining data regarding current and upcoming logistic status in the theater. It then relates those data to the operations the CINCs are considering.

Related Terms

logistics

Source Joint Publications

JP 4-0 Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations

LOGISTICS SUSTAINABILITY ANALYSIS

The logistics sustainability analysis (LSA) of an operation plan will be completed during the development and maintenance of the combatant commanders' operational plan. The LSA provides a broad assessment of key logistic capabilities by: documenting the results of a process that assures an integrated evaluation of key logistic capabilities, identifying logistic support short-falls and assessing the risks, and providing a baseline for the Joint Monthly Readiness Review process.

The LSA builds upon assessments, which are formed in collaboration with the Services, supporting commanders, and Department of Defense (DOD) agencies. The LSA assesses the combined support capabilities represented by the four pillars of logistics: material, logistic support forces, infrastructure, and lift. The LSA integrates the assessments of the individual pillars of logistics by optimizing and balancing their contributions as both enablers and constrainers of logistic support. Preparation of this analysis is a two step process. It begins with the Services and DOD agencies assessment of their ability to support the combatant

commander's (CINC's) plan, followed by the CINC's assessment of the inputs along with supported commander's analysis of theater requirements and capabilities.

Related Terms

joint operation planning

Source Joint Publications

JP 5-0


Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations

LOGISTIC SUPPORT

Logistic support encompasses the logistic services, materiel, and transportation required to support the continental United States-based and worldwide deployed forces. JP 1-02

Joint doctrine states that there are three levels of war — strategic, operational, and tactical. They apply in war and in operations other than war. Logistic support within these levels is demonstrated in the way the Joint Staff, Services, and warfighting commanders handle logistics. The Joint Staff and Services concentrate on strategic logistic matters. The supported and supporting commanders' logistic staffs manage both the strategic and operational logistic issues affecting missions assigned to the combatant commanders in the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan by the National Command Authorities and other such areas as directed by the combatant commander. The Services and the subordinate commanders down to their battlefield logisticians at the unit and ship level, deal with operational and tactical logistic responsibilities, including developing procedures, doctrine, and training for supplying personnel with all necessary materiel to do their jobs. All levels are interrelated, with constraints at any level limiting options of decision makers. Within their areas of responsibility, geographic combatant commanders may establish a theater of war and, if needed, subordinate theaters of operations.

The logistic concept should support theater activity by properly organizing support from the continental US base to the combat zone. The figure below shows a broad framework for this organization and the scope of logistic support needed to support a theater. All levels of logistics involve combat service support and affect the sustainability of forces in the combat zone.



Related Terms

logistic

Source Joint Publications

JP 4-0 Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations

LOGISTIC SUPPORT SYSTEM

The logistic support system must be in harmony with the structure and employment of the combat forces it supports. This unity of effort is best attained under a single command authority. Wherever feasible, peacetime chains of command and staffs should be organized during peacetime to avoid reorganization during war. This includes Reserve component forces (US and host-nation) that may be assigned specific theater missions. Commanders must be able to call forward, in a timely manner, those assets needed to initiate and sustain war.

Related Terms

logistics

Source Joint Publications

JP 4-0 Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations

LOW-ALTITUDE MISSILE ENGAGEMENT ZONE

The low-altitude missile engagement zone (LOMEZ) is a volume of airspace established to control engagements of low- to medium-altitude surface-to-air missiles. Subject to weapon system capabilities, the LOMEZ normally will extend beyond the forward edge of the battle area. From an airspace control perspective, LOMEZ provides airspace users with location of

the engagement zone of low-altitude missile systems for mission planning purposes. The design of the LOMEZ is contingent on specific weapon system capabilities. The point of contact for the LOMEZ is the area air defense commander.

Related Terms

weapon engagement zone

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-52 Doctrine for Joint Airspace Control in the Combat Zone

Intentionally Blank